The Cluster Group on Analytic Theology at University of Navarra (http://www.unav.edu/en/web/facultad-de-filosofia-y-letras/analytic-theology) is pleased to announce four new lectures videos by Eleonore Stump:
1) ‘Eternity, Simplicity, and Divine Presence’ by Eleonore Stump. Second Public Lecture on Analytic Theology. Cluster Group at University of Navarra. April 20, 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YtHOqnQBAMo
2) Q&A ‘Eternity, Simplicity, and Divine Presence’ by Eleonore Stump. Analytic Theology Cluster Group at University of Navarra. April 20, 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MlW8ueEYbhw
3) ‘The Openness of God: Eternity and Free Will’ by Eleonore Stump Second Special Session for the Cluster Group on Analytic Theology at the University of Navarra. April 21, 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JVzy-eXqKU
4) Q&A ‘The Openness of God: Eternity and Free Will’ by Eleonore Stump. Analytic Theology Cluster Group at University of Navarra. April 21, 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=js9K9R9_F-4
The Cluster Group in Analytic Theology at the University of Navarra “Philosophical and Theological Perspectives on Divine Providence” gathered together philosophers and theologians to study and discuss the main approaches made to this issue with an analytic methodology. As a result of the group activities Analytic Theology was introduced for the first time in Spanish academia. The Cluster Group was supported by the Project “Analytic Theology” of the Center for Philosophy of Religion of the University of Notre Dame, funded by the John Templeton Foundation.
Comments are very much welcome.
Thesis: If Open Theism is true, then either possibly there are some things some humans know that God doesn't know or possibly God has some false beliefs. The conclusion is absurd, hence we should reject Open Theism.
For simplicity I will abbreviate "x does not fulfill the promise P and nothing prevents x from keeping P, nor does x conclude a defeater arises, nor does x forget" as "x violates P".
- Let x and y be humans. Often when x knows y's character to be solid and knows y to have promised to do something for x, x is not only justified in believing y will not violate the promise, but x knows it.
- If Open Theism holds, there is no possible divine doxastic policy such that, necessarily: (In every case like the one described in (1), God believes y will not violate the promise, and God has no false beliefs).
- Therefore, whatever possible divine doxastic policy is adopted, either in some worlds there will be a situation like that described in (1) where x knows y will not violate the promise, but God doesn't believe it and hence doesn't know it, or in some worlds God will have a false belief.
- This is absurd, and so Open Theism should be rejected.
Moreover, it is very likely that in the actual world either there are going to be cases of (1) where God doesn't know y will not violate the promise, or cases where God has some false belief. For there are so many cases of (1) in the actual world, that it is highly likely that any divine doxastic policy that doesn't involve foreknowledge of free actions will either miss some cases of (1) or will lead to belief in some cases where y in fact violates the promise.
Suppose God is omnipotent. Then, it seems, he can bring it about that
(*) a new crater now appears on the far side of the moon if and only if Jones tomorrow freely mows the lawn.
But if God did that, then his knowledge of the present state of the moon, plus his knowledge of his omnipotence, would yield him knowledge of whether Jones tomorrow mows the lawn. Hence, if one restricts omniscience with respect to future free actions, one must similarly restrict omnipotence.
This may not be such a big deal. After all, although (*) is logically possible, the open theist may claim that it is logically impossible that God bring about (*). Still, it does show that there is a connection between omniscience and omnipotence.
One might think that an open theist who holds that propositions about future free actions cannot have truth value, or who holds that reports of future free actions are all automatically false, can escape the worry about the above restriction on omnipotence. After all, if such propositions are all false, then God can bring (*) about simply by doing nothing, since the right hand side of (*) is automatically false. And it seems too much to ask out of omnipotence to require that God bring about a proposition that cannot have a truth value. But one can still modify the task to get around this response. Let the task be to bring it about that:
(**) At t it be true that a day before t Jones mowed the lawn iff two days before t a new crater appeared on the far side of the moon,
where t is two days from now. In other words, the restriction on omniscience still implies a new restriction on what histories God can bring about. Again, it may not be such a big deal to the open theist.
Suppose Open Theism (OT) holds. There is a possible world where a demon is better off doxastically than God in respect of future free actions of creatures. On some views of inductive knowledge, there is a possible world where a demon is better off epistemically than God in respect of future free actions of creatures. Hence OT is false. This may be all old hat. But, hey, it's fun to reinvent the wheel–the thrill of discovery, of seeing it roll, etc. Now I need to argue for my above claims.