Here at the Naturalism and Ethics conference at Auckland and thinking about this again.
Christians seem to like stuff from Aristotle, so it puzzles me that I rarely see anything like the following discussed in contexts where it is asserted that there can’t be ethics without God.
1. A thing that exists has the intrinsic nature it has whether or not God exists.
2. The conditions for an existing thing’s flourishing are fully determined by its intrinsic nature.
3. How a thing ought to be treated is fully determined by the conditions of its flourishing.
4. Lemma: How a thing ought to be treated is fully determined by its intrinsic nature. 2,3
5. How a thing ought to be treated does not depend on whether God exists. 1,4
Wolterstorff discusses a Kantian “capacities approach” in his Justice book (HT Matt Flannigan) which is somewhat similar, but I think he gives it short shrift.
The following simple and valid argument came out of discussions with Mark Murphy (who has a forthcoming book that contains related arguments, though perhaps not this one).
According to the identity version of Divine Command Metaethics (IDCM), to be obligated to A is to be commanded to A by God (or to be willed to A by God or to be commanded to A by a loving God–details of this sort won’t matter). But:
- If p explains x’s being F, and to be F is the same as to be G, then p explains x’s being G.
- My being commanded by God to follow Christ explains my being obligated to follow Christ.
- It is not the case that my being commanded by God to follow Christ explains my being commanded by God to follow Christ.
- Therefore, it is false that to be obligated to A is the same as to be commanded by God to A. (By 1-3)
And so IDCM is false.
The argument more generally shows that no normative-level answer to a “Why am I obligated to A?” question can provide a property identical with being obligated. Thus, sometimes at least the answer to “Why am I obligated to A?” is that Aing maximizes utility. Hence, by an exactly parallel argument, being obligated to A is not the same as having A as one’s utility maximizing option.
The argument is compatible with constitution versions of DCM on which the property of being obligated to A is constituted by the property of being commanded to A. But such theorists then have the added complication of explaining what the constitution relation means here, over and beyond bidirectional entailment (after all, many non-divine-command theorists will agree that necessarily x is obligated to A iff God wills x to A).
Society of Christian Philosophers
2011 Eastern Regional Conference
March 18-19, 2011
New York, NY
Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame
N.T. Wright, University of St. Andrews
Dean Zimmerman, Rutgers University
Call for Papers
Discussions of mind, body, soul, and spirit have played a central role in the history of philosophy, and in the theologies of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and other religious traditions. Possible paper topics include the following: What is the relationship between psychological capacities and states of the human nervous system? Are we animals or something else? What does it take for us to survive over time? What implications do our answers to these questions have for ethics, epistemology, free will and action theory? What implications do they have for theological topics such as resurrection of the dead, immortality of the soul, reincarnation, and our knowledge of divinity? Papers on any philosophical topic are nevertheless welcome.
Submission Deadline: January 1, 2011
Papers should be prepared for blind review, and submitted electronically in an easily accessible form. Reading time should be 25-30 minutes. Decisions will be made by February 1.
For more information or to submit a paper, contact William Jaworski email@example.com
Wittgensteinians lay stress on the idea that
- One cannot understand central worldview concepts without living as part of a community that operates with these concepts.
The non-Christian cannot understand the Christian concept of the Trinity; the Christian and the atheist cannot understand the Jewish concept of God’s absolute unity as understood by Maimonedes; the theist cannot understand the concept of a completely natural world; and the non-Fascist cannot understand the concept of the Volk. It is only by being a part of a community in which these concepts are alive that one gains an understanding of them.
Often, a corollary is drawn from this, that while internal critique or justification of a worldview tradition such as Christianity, naturalism or Nazism is possible, no external critique or justification is possible. In fact, there is an argument for this corollary.
- (Premise) One’s evidence set cannot involve any propositions that involve concepts one does not understand.
- (Premise) Necessarily, if a proposition p uses a concept C, and a body of propositions P is evidence for or against p for an agent x, then some member of P involves C.
- If x is not a member of the community operating with a central worldview concept C, then x does not have any evidence for or against any proposition involving C. (1-3)
- (Premise) External critique or justification of a worldview of a community is possible only if someone who is not a member of the community can have evidence for or against a proposition involving a central worldview concept of that community.
- Therefore, external critique or justification of a worldview of a community is not possible. (4 and 5)
This is a particularly unfortunate result in the case of something like Nazism, and may suggest an unacceptable relativism.
The argument is valid but unsound, and I think unsalvageable. I think that (5) is false, and on some plausible interpretations of (1), (2) and (3) are false as well.