Readers here may have heard of this case already, because it entered the world of philosophy blogs when Brian Leiter wrote about it in this blog post. However, Leiter's position seems to me very one-sided, so I thought I would post a different perspective. (Thanks to Matthew Mullins and Prosblogion for allowing me to use this forum. For those who don't know, I should make clear that I am a Christian, but not a Catholic, so readers can know where this commentary is coming from.)

In particular, Leiter seems to me to go way too easy on Prof. Myers. To put my opposition in context, please note that I do not support any efforts to get Prof. Myers fired or disciplined at his job over this incident, that I agree with Prof. Myers that the reaction against the Florida student by many was too strong, and that I find it admirable that Prof. Myers would come to the student's defense. However, Myers's proposed retaliation, which would hurt many Catholics who are completely innocent in this whole matter, strikes me as extremely nasty. To my thinking, it is morally more problematic than anything Donohue has yet done in this case. I can understand those who might disagree with that comparative judgment of mine, but have a hard time understanding the judgment of those who see the matter as so one-sidedly favoring Myers as Leiter seems to see things.

Myers's retaliation hurts Catholics because of beliefs they hold that he disagrees with, and, admittedly, it's not easy to say, in general terms, just how we should take the beliefs of others into account in deciding how to treat them. However, Myers's retaliation seems so aimed at hurting innocent parties and so incapable of producing any good, and, well, just so nasty, that this seems an easy call. So readers can judge for themselves, here's the relevant paragraph of Myers's post (follow the link above to read the whole thing):

So, what to do. I have an idea. Can anyone out there score me some consecrated communion wafers? There's no way I can personally get them -- my local churches have stakes prepared for me, I'm sure -- but if any of you would be willing to do what it takes to get me some, or even one, and mail it to me, I'll show you sacrilege, gladly, and with much fanfare. I won't be tempted to hold it hostage (no, not even if I have a choice between returning the Eucharist and watching Bill Donohue kick the pope in the balls, which would apparently be a more humane act than desecrating a goddamned cracker), but will instead treat it with profound disrespect and heinous cracker abuse, all photographed and presented here on the web. I shall do so joyfully and with laughter in my heart. If you can smuggle some out from under the armed guards and grim nuns hovering over your local communion ceremony, just write to me and I'll send you my home address.

Is he perhaps just joking? To some extent, this is clearly all a joke to Myers. But it doesn't seem to be just a joke in the sense that it's clear nobody should really steal the items and send them to him. The Washington Times reports:

In an interview Friday, Mr. Myers said he already had received "a double-digit number" of positive responses, from people saying that they would try to get consecrated Catholic hosts for him and that the writer already had one.

"Enough that I could sculpt a statue of them," he said, declining to say what he'd do to desecrate them. "I've got a few ideas, but I want to keep the surprise."

I hope that this is a joke at least to the extent that Myers won't follow through on his sick plan, but it will be very revealing to see people's reactions if he does. In any case, if a joke, this would seem a rather nasty joke -- perhaps to be compared with those who would publicly ask for others to raid burial grounds sacred to Native Americans and send them remains so that they might publicly desecrate them. ("They're just frackin' bones!") "Wickedly funny"?

For the record, I'll paste below the fold the e-mail I sent to Prof. Myers on July 11. It now appears to me too smug and sanctimonious in tone, but I stand behind the position there expressed:

The crux of Plantinga's argument against materialism, I think, is in this passage (where, in talking about contents, he's talking about belief-contents):

Call for Papers

The Society of Christian Philosophers
Pacific Division

presents

Mind, Body, and Free Will
October 30^th, 2008 – November 1^st, 2008
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, CA

Plenary Speaker: Richard Swinburne (Oxford University)

1. naturalism cannot accommodate the idea of proper function (and since warrant essentially involves proper function, if naturalism were true then no one would have knowledge),


2. naturalism leads directly to Humean skepticism, the condition in which you have a defeater for whatever you believe and cannot sensibly trust your cognitive faculties, and


3. naturalism cannot accommodate belief; if naturalism were true, no one would believe anything (19).
   

Consider one such creature, m. Plantinga asks, "But wouldn't it be wrong (not to mention crazy) to say that m's visual system is functioning properly? Or that its function is to produce both pain and a visual field that is uniformly green? Or that the resistance medical technicians who desperately try to repair the damage are interfering with the proper function of the visual system?" (p. 26) This example seems to work against any evolutionary theory of proper function.

Here's one worry for this example.

The Proper Function Argument Against Naturalism

1. If naturalism is true, then there is no proper function (with respect to human beings).
2. There is proper function (with respect to human beings).
3. Therefore, naturalism is not true.
   (Note: I'm oversimplifying this. I'm translating all of Plantinga's talk about naturalism can't accomodate proper function" to "there is no proper function" - this oversimplification has no bearing on the puzzle I want to raise.)
   

Proper Function Requires Design Thesis
(P) If S functions properly, then S has an intelligent designer.

Each Monday, a different Prosblogion contributor will write an opening post. Other contributors can post on that section two or three days later in the week. Everybody is welcome to read along in the book and comment.

It's a pleasure to kick-off all the fun. Let me summarize the main claims that I take Plantinga to argue for in my section.

I) If God exists, then it is likely that many people know that God exists.
II) If Christian belief is true, then it is likely that many people know that it is true.
III) If naturalism is true, then no biological organs function properly or improperly.

Plantinga's defends (I) and (II) as follows:

C. If Nixon had pressed the nuclear button, God would have brought it about that the future was no different from the actual future.

The asymmetry of counterfactual dependence in indeterministic worlds mirrors, as a matter of contingent fact, the asymmetry of quasi-miracles. In the most similar worlds where Nixon pressed the nuclear button he performed some free action. No divergence miracle was necessary. But what was the future of that world like? Do the closest worlds in which Nixon pressed the nuclear button reconverge to the actual future? Re-convergence to the actual future requires a quasi-miracle that, as a matter of contingent fact, constitutes a significant dissimilarity between worlds. A quasi-miracle could bring about re-convergence should an extremely improbable pattern of chance events cover every trace of Nixon's having pressed the nuclear button. But it would be remarkable that just the chance pattern needed to cover every effect of that counterfactual hypothesis is the pattern that occurs.

But, now, are quasi-miracles remarkable under the assumption that we inhabit not some ordinary indeterministic world, but a Molinist indeterministic world? There seems no reason to think so. For all we know about God's purposes and goals for individuals, nations, and humankind, and for all we know about his ways of achieving these goals, God is using quasi-miracles constantly to ensure the realization of his providential aims. After all, quasi-miracles require no violation of law, not even probablistic law. So, it seems to be a contingent fact about Molinist indeterministic worlds that quasi-miracles do not constitute a significant dissimilarity between worlds. If the world we inhabit is a Molinist indeterministic world then, at the very least, we are not sure whether (C) is true.

But now to the problem. If we are not sure if (C) is true, then we are also not sure whether (C') is true.

C'. If Nixon had pressed the button, then there would have been a nuclear holocaust.

But, on the contrary, we do know that (C') is true. So we know too that (C) is false. That is, either we are in radical skepticism about which counterfactuals are true or this is not a Molinist world. Therefore this is not a Molinist world.

So, by my count in the last four years of the blog there has been a baby to Pierce, Rhoda, Timpe, Dougherty, Pawl, and now a Cullison. Who goes next in the rotation? Is it back to me?

Plantinga gives the following (he calls 'inconclusive') argument:

But if there is such a person as God, it is unlikely that it is possible that a being capable of belief and moral agency should just pop into existence, unintended and undesigned by God. According to the Christian tradition, only God can create beings capable of belief and moral agency; I am inclined to think this is right. But even if it isn't, even if it is possible that God should delegate the task of creating such beings to some of his creatures, it still wouldn't be possible that such a creature pop into existence unintended by God. (1995, PPR 55:2, p. 460)

I have a few questions. First, where in the Christian tradition does it say this?

Secondly, is it possible that a creature that is capable of belief and agency come into existence, and it is not intended by God?

Thirdly, is it possible that a creature that is capable of belief and agency come into existence, and it is not designed by God?

I take it that to design something takes a little more than intending its existence. The owners of Honda could intend for there to be the creation of more cars, but the engineers of Honda might have to design those cars. I also take it that some facts are unintended by God. I am a certain distance from an atom on your left cheek - it's not obvious (and probably not the case) that God intended this fact to be the case. This is probably an unintended byproduct of other things God intended. Both of these points can be disputed.

I want to examine his response to the tu quo que objection. Now it's dangerous to reach into the middle of a complicated dialectic and pull out relevant little bits for discussion, but that's what I'll try to do! (There is a possibility that I will make hermeneutical errors; I take full responsibility and am open to correction!)

One new development is the advent of the Prosblogion reading group. A number of contributors have gotten together to read Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley's new book Knowledge of God, part of Blackwell's Great Debates in Philosophy series. You can expect the first post, on the first half of chapter one, beginning June 30th. Our plan is to put up fresh posts on the book every Monday thereafter. For those of you that would like to read along, you can help out funding this place by purchasing the book from Amazon.

Here's to another year of thoughtful and engaging posts and discussions!