I just finished (most of) Plantinga's really nice article "Materialism and Christian Belief" in Persons: Human and Divine, and he proposes that broadly logical necessity is that relation. He writes,
According to classical theism, it's a necessary truth that whatever God wills, takes place. It's a necessary truth that if God says, "Let there be light," then there is light. Necessarily, if God says, "Let Adam come into existence," Adam comes into existence. So what is it that makes it the case that God's intentions cause what they cause? To ask that question is like asking, "What is it that makes an equiangular triangle equilateral?" The answer is (broadly) logical necessity; it's necessary that whatever God wills comes to be just as it's necessary that every equiangular triangle be equilateral. Accordingly there isn't a problem about that factor X in the divine case... (p. 133)
So Kim's Pairing Problem that it is impossible that souls be causally related to the world fails. Plantinga goes on to show that once you have theism, there is no problem for human souls having causal interaction in the world as well.
This seems compelling to me. Anybody see any problems with it?
]]>All meetings: 4:15pm-6:00pm, Room 104 Arts Building, University of Birmingham
All Welcome
8 March
Kelly James Clark (Calvin College)
God, Chance and Religion
15 March
Tim Chappell (Open University)
Glory as an Ethical Idea
22 March
David Efird (University of York)
The Body of Christ and the the Metaphysics of the Church
For Prospective Doctoral Students
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]]>A. A being x = God only if (i) for most essential properties P of x, it is primarily necessary (i.e., apriori) that x has P, and (ii) the essential properties of x include omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and necessary existence
There is a concise and valid apriori demonstration based on (A) and some well-known logical relations holding between primary necessity (aprioricity) and secondary necessity (metaphysical necessity). Let M be restricted to essential properties understood as properties objects have in every world in which they exist. Here’s a concise ontological argument.
]]> 1.0. □1∀x(□1Mx ⊃ □2Mx)(1.0) states that, it is apriori that x instantiates essential property M, only if it is metaphysically necessary that x instantiates essential property M. For instance, if it is apriori true that the empty set instantiates the essential property of being non-membered, then it is metaphysically necessary that the empty set instantiates the essential property of being non-membered. Now instantiate (1.0).
1.1. □1(□1MG ⊃ □2MG)
(1.1) says that If it is apriori that God has essential property M, then it is metaphysically necessary that God essential property M. But we know from (A) that (1.2) is true.
1.2. □1MG
It is an apriori known conceptual truth, based on (A), that God has the essential properties of omniscience, omnipotence, perfect goodness and necessary existence. But then, obviously, (1.3).
1.3. □2MG
It is metaphysically necessary that God has the essential properties of omniscience, omnipotence, perfect goodness and necessary existence.
The argument is valid. And it makes no mistakes in moving from conceivability to necessity. The principle in (1.0) properly licenses that inference. And it would be sound if (A) were true. But I’m not sure (A) is true. Is it an apriori knowable conceptual truth that God instantiates the divine essential properties? Norman Malcolm thought so, and so did Anselm of Proslogion 3. Suppose it isn’t apriori knowable. Then it can be no more than aposteriori knowable that God instantiates the divine essential properties. That’s a pretty startling conclusion that is contrary to what most theists and certainly most Anselmians believe. It entails that we might have discovered that God had quite a different set of properties.
]]>In order to get Adams to accept some counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs, denoted with →), Plantinga offered this example. Actually Curley takes a bribe of a certain amount. Surely, then, it is true that were Curley to have been offered a larger bribe, he would have taken that, too. Adams agrees.
One might not unreasonably take Plantinga's example to support the following thesis:
(*) Necessarily: If x actually freely chooses A in circumstances C, then had x instead been in circumstances C* instead of C such that D(C*,C,x,A), then x would still have freely chosen A.
Here, D(C*,C,A) says that circumstances C* are a variation on C (this minimally implies that they occur in the same spatiotemporal location, but more may need to be added), and they dominate circumstances C for x in respect of A in the following sense: (a) the agent is non-perverse and hence without the least inclination to act unreasonably for the sake of acting unreasonably, (b) any consideration operative for x in C in favor of A is also operative for x in C* in favor of A in at least as strong a form, and (c) any consideration operative for x in C* against A is operative in C against A in at least as strong a form.
One might then generalize (*) to:
(**) If C and C* are sufficiently determinate circumstances for a free choice, then (C → x freely does A) & D(C*,C,x,A) entails C* → x freely does A.
Suppose (**) is true. Imagine circumstances C where there is only one free agent, Eve, who makes only one free choice: whether to eat a yummy apple or to dance a merry jig (no other options are available, and it is not possible to do both), and this choice is significantly free because God forbade Eve to eat the apple. Eve has no inclination to disobey God or act unreasonably as such. Eve, however, has a desire to eat the apple on account of its yumminess or to dance the jig on account of its merriness. Call these circumstances C. Now, let C* be circumstances just like these, except that God instead forbade Eve to dance the jig.
Now, suppose TWD holds. Then, C→(Eve freely eats apple) and C*→(Eve freely dances jig). But this contradicts (**), since C* dominates C in respect of apple-eating for Eve. Why does domination hold? Well, any operative consideration in favor of apple-eating in C (namely the yumminess of the apple) is present in C*, and any operative consideration against apple-eating (namely the merriness of the jig) in C* is present in C. The only difference is that the fact that God forbids the apple-eating in C but it is the jig-dancing that is forbidden in C*; but given that Eve has no inclination to act unreasonably or disobediently as such, this does nothing to contradict C's being dominated by C* in respect of apple-eating (that God forbids apple-eating in C either counts for nothing or counts against apple-eating in C, etc.)
]]> The argument for (**) from (*) is, roughly, as follows. Suppose C→A and ~(C*→A). Then, were C to be actualized by God, it would still be the case that: C→A and ~(C*→A), since God is unable to affect the truth values of CCFs. But by (*) it is impossible to have C and C→A and ~(C*→A), since it is not possible to have C and A and ~(C*→A).So, the defender of the possibility of TWD needs to deny (*). But I think (*) is pretty plausible. In fact, it seems just to be a consequence of what "is operative for/against A in at least as strong a form" means.
Suppose, for simplicity, that C and C* differ only in respect of the fact that C* contains one or more additional considerations in favor of A. (In fact, that is the only case my counterexample to the possibility of TWD needs: in C* there is an additional consideration in favor of apple-eating, namely that jig-dancing is forbidden by God.) It is surely very plausible to say that, necessarily, given the above, if x had an additional reason in favor of A, she would (still) have chosen A, at least assuming the non-perversity condition that she has no inclination to act unreasonably for the sake of acting unreasonably. (Some people think the non-perversity condition is always satisfied. But that's controversial.)
So, the Molinist defender of the possibility of TWD needs to deny (*). But the intuition in Plantinga's Curley example is pretty strong, as are, I think, the above arguments. (I am thinking that the Molinist's best move here is to say that her counterfactuals are different in kind from the counterfactuals used to test what considerations are operative.)
What this points out is that the possibility of TWD is, basically, a sort of logical independence thesis for CCFs: Even if C and C* are related by domination, there are no entailments between C→(x does A) and C*→(x does A).
Here is another interesting result. Even if (*) is false, the intuition about Curley is pretty plausible. I think this means that if C→(x does A) and D(C*,C,x,A), then it is very probable that C*→(x does A). But, if so, then my argument establishes that it is very probably that TWD is false, assuming Molinism.
]]>I might try to organize some information on him but in the mean time here are some links.
Bio from the Center for Ethics and Culture at Notre Dame
Maritain Center Bio, Notre Dame
Good summary from Gifford Lecture Website
I have learned more than I can say from him on a variety of issues and life in general over the years. He was involved in one of the first book projects I ever worked on, and was a gracious interlocutor and teacher.
He really was a living legend, a man from another time and world it seemed, but he still battled for the redemption of the culture he was a part of. Irreplaceable, he'll be missed.
]]>Here's the argument:
1. God is a perfect (i.e. the greatest possible) being.
2. A perfect being will have all property-kinds that are intrinsically good.
3. Being extended (or being physical/material) is an intrinsically good property-kind.
--------
C. God is extended (or physical/material).
If the argument works, it is neutral, considered in itself, about whether pantheism or panentheism is true. Perhaps material reality (or some part of it) is only part of God (this is panentheism), or perhaps God is somehow identical to all (or part of) material reality (this would be pantheism). God might even have the freedom to create his own material attributes, on this view, depending on whether God is the greatest possible being contingently or by necessity. If God is necessarily the greatest possible being, then arguably he couldn't freely choose to not be material, and so being material would somehow flow necessarily out of his essence. (I'm conceiving of freedom in the libertarian way; if we instead suppose that God is free only in the sense that he has no outside constraints, then of course matters would be different).
Although (1)-(3) sound pretty plausible, I don't believe the conclusion. But, I can't identify a clear problem with the argument. What do you all think? Also, are any of you aware of an argument like this in the literature?
]]>Mere permanent death is permanent death considered intrinsically. It is a controversial question whether permanent death deserves a category of its own. If, for instance, what is bad about death is that it leaves one's plans unfulfilled, then a bad death is just a species of the unfulfillment of one's plans, and hence a mere deprivation, and a death that fails to leave one's plans unfulfilled isn't an evil at all. Moreover, it is a controversial question whether humans actually suffer permanent death--I think they don't..
Augustine will say that all evils are a species of deprivation, and if he is right, then I can simply stipulate that "mere deprivation" is "mere deprivation other than suffering".
A good question to ask is whether "moral depravity" includes vices and actions that one is not culpable for having. I am inclined to count only vices and actions that one is culpable for, and to assimilate the others to mere deprivation.
I can make the taxonomy be exhaustive if I stipulate that mere deprivation is any evil that isn't a suffering or a depravity or permanent death in and of itself. That, I think, is a cheat.
[If you ask me which of these is the most difficult to give a theodicy for, I'd say that permanent death would be--if it happened, but it doesn't happen. The next most difficult is a special case of suffering, namely non-veridical suffering. I think Bob Roberts is right about emotions being something like concern-based construals, and the same is true of suffering. But a construal is intrinsically good if it is veridical, so veridical sufferings aren't an evil at all (this is counterintuitive to an extreme). An example of non-veridical suffering is phantom pain in amputees, or envy in sinners like myself. (As the envy example shows, some cases of non-veridical suffering are tied to moral depravity and can be handled by the same free will tools that will handle moral depravity. But not all are tied to moral depravity, and the remainder is what is harder to handle.) Depravity is handled by means of free will, and mere deprivation by something like this.]
]]>Philosophy position at the University of St. Thomas, St. Paul
The University of St. Thomas Philosophy Department invites applications for at least one tenure-track position to begin Sept. 2010, at the rank of assistant professor or instructor. AOS and AOC are open, but we seek individuals with strengths and interests that complement those of the current department members (we have 23 tenured/tenure-track lines). Applicants should have outstanding reasoning, teaching, and writing skills, and the virtues of collegiality. Ph.D. prior to appointment is preferred but not required. The department is committed to sustaining and developing the Catholic intellectual tradition; in this we are guided by the principles of Ex Corde Ecclesiae and Fides et Ratio. We seek candidates who share these commitments. The teaching load is six courses per year (semester system); there are standard non-teaching duties.
Established in 1885, the University of St. Thomas is located in the major metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul, and is Minnesota's largest private university. Its 11,000 students pursue degrees in a wide range of liberal arts, professional, and graduate programs.
Inspired by Catholic intellectual tradition, the University of St. Thomas educates students to be morally responsible leaders who think critically, act wisely, and work skillfully to advance the common good, and seeks to develop individuals who combine career competency with cultural awareness and intellectual curiosity. The successful candidate will possess a commitment to the ideals of this mission.
The University of St. Thomas has a strong commitment to the principles of diversity and inclusion, to equal opportunity policies and practices, and to the principles and goals of affirmative action. In that spirit, the University welcomes nominations and applications from a broad and diverse applicant pool.
Applications should be submitted online at www.stthomas.edu/jobsatust, and include 1) a cover letter that includes discussion of the candidate's commitment to sustaining and developing the Catholic intellectual tradition, 2) a curriculum vitae, 3) a sample of philosophical writing, 4) evidence of teaching effectiveness, including data from student evaluations of recent courses if available, and 5) transcripts (unofficial versions are acceptable). In addition, candidates should arrange to have at least three letters of recommendation sent, either by email to philosophy@stthomas.edu (pdf format preferred) or by mail to: Philosophy Dept. Chair - JRC 241; University of St. Thomas, 2115 Summit Ave.; St. Paul, MN 55105-1096. To be guaranteed full consideration all application materials should be received by February 11. We expect to bring finalists to campus in early March. Review of applications will continue until the position is filled. Please direct any questions to philosophy@stthomas.edu.
]]>Take another view according to which God sets up some fundamental laws at the beginning of time which determine some mental states to follow from certain physical states and vice versa. Whenever certain brain states enter events of type A, then the soul feels pain. Whenever they are in type B, then the soul feels pleasure. Whenever a soul enters into a state of willing X, then certain brain states enter a certain state. There is genuine causal interaction on this view. Since I can't think of a better word, I'll call this view 'nomologism'.
I suspect that most theistic dualists would accept something like nomologism. (If not, then I'm curious what most theistic dualists would hold?)
But I wonder why nomologism is any better than parallelism, which is widely disregarded and even mocked? One downside of parallelism is the rejection of real causal relationships, but I'm not sure if that's so bad. The theories are still empirically identical. For the theistic dualist who rejects open theism, I can't see a compelling reason to hold to nomologism over parallelism.
For those who find intuitions about causal relationships to obviously set nomologism over parallelism, I wonder if there's any reason to accept nomologism over parallelism in addition to intuitions about causal relationships.
In fact, nomologism [edit: I should have said 'parallelism' here; thanks Clayton] seems to be the simpler theory in that God need not set up laws at the beginning of the universe, which would require determining what happens in nearby possible worlds, but simply what will happen in the future, which would only require determining what will happen in the actual world.
Anyway, for those who are more well-versed in this subject than me, I look forward to learning from you!
]]>A consequence of this is the following PAP:
Thesis 2: If x NDLF-ly chooses A in C, then x's failing to NDLF-ly choose A in C is logically compatible with any proposition that is explanatorily prior to x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C.
(The argument from Thesis 1 to Thesis 2 is this. Suppose Thesis 2 is false. Then we have a proposition p explanatorily prior to x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C such that p entails x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C. But then x's failing to NDLF-ly choose A in C entails ~p. It is obvious that if x NDLF-ly chooses A in C, then x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C is not logically necessary. But if u entails v, then at least if u is contingent, were u to hold, v would hold. So, were x to fail to NDLF-ly choose A in C, then ~p would hold. But by Thesis 1, it follows that were x to fail to NDLF-ly choose A in C, then p would. But these two conditionals cannot both be true if the antecedent is possible, as it is. So Thesis 2 cannot be false.)
Now on to the argument. If Molinism holds, then the following scenario is possible:
Scenario 1: God believes that were he to place agent x in circumstances C, the agent would NDLF-ly choose A in C, and for that reason God in fact places agent x in circumstances C.
Now, assume that if p and q are explanatorily prior to r, so is the conjunction p&q. Suppose Scenario 1 holds. Let p be the proposition that x is in C, and let q be the proposition that God believes that were God to place x in C, x would NDLF-ly choose A in C. Then p and q are explanatorily prior to x NDLF-ly choosing A in C. Hence so is their conjunction. Hence, their conjunction does not entail x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C (by Thesis 2). But, necessarily, God believes only truths. So, q entails that were God to place x in C, x would NDLF-ly choose A in C. By modus ponens, p&q entails that x NDLF-ly chooses A in C. Hence, p&q both does and does not entail that x NDLF-ly chooses A in C, which is a contradiction.
This is, of course, a version of Adams' circularity-in-the-order-of-explanation argument. Strictly speaking, it doesn't show that God can't know conditionals of free will, but only that it is incoherent to suppose him to act on that knowledge in the way indicated in Scenario 1. Thus, the argument is compatible with a weak Molinism on which God knows the conditionals but must bracket that knowledge when choosing to act.
I actually don't quite buy the argument because my current view of counterfactuals does not support Thesis 1 (but neither does it support Molinism).
]]>Claim: If there are infinitely many better and better worlds, then there is (also) some best (unexceeded or unsurpassed) world.
Some assumptions. Let the overall intrinsic value of a world W be the sum of the intrinsic values of each temporal stage S of W. Let the intrinsic value of any stage S depend exclusively on the intrinsic facts in S. Finally, assume that for any non-overlapping stages S, S’ in any world W, the intrinsic facts in S do not logically entail the intrinsic facts in S’. Effectively, we are assuming—as seems reasonable—that God can terminate any world W at any temporal stage S of W.
How would the argument go that, even if there are infinitely many improving worlds, there must be a best world? For any arbitrarily chosen world Wn in the infinite sequence, there is a most valuable temporal stage Sn+ of Wn. A best stage S+ in W is a stage whose intrinsic value is positive and unexceeded by any other (overlapping or non-overlapping) stage in W. There is then a set B+ of the best stages of each world in the infinite sequence. We know that no temporal stage S of any world W entails any (non-overlapping) stage (recall that God can terminate W at any S). So we know that there is a world W+ composed of the stages in B+. The intrinsic value of W+ is itself unexceeded by the value of any world W in the infinite sequence (recall that the intrinsic value of any world W is the sum of the intrinsic value of its temporal stages). That concludes the proof.
So, if there are infinitely many improving worlds, there must be some world that is unexceeded in intrinsic value. There is then some best possible world.
]]>