I'm afraid that the answer to my question might be obvious; if so, then it'll be answered quickly!
I come from a Christian background which told me that God has forgiven all of my sins, past, present, and future. I also come from a background which tells me that I should ask God for forgiveness. I also have the background belief that it's not the case that you should ask for what you already have. These beliefs seem to me to conflict. Let's be more precise.
I've heard from older, experienced professors that doing a dissertation on or specializing in philosophy of religion may hurt your chances of getting a philosophy job or getting tenure at a secular university. It's better to focus on some other subject and then do philosophy of religion after you get tenure.
Is this true? If so, why? It doesn't make sense to me; it seems that schools would want professors who could teach philosophy of religion.
In a story that concerns the interesting question of how we should take into account the beliefs (especially the religious beliefs) of others that we take to be false in deciding how to treat those people, a University of Central Florida student walked out of a Catholic Mass on June 29 with a consecrated communion wafer. Given their beliefs, this is a rather big deal to Catholics, some of whom seem to have reacted very strongly against the student. Bill Donohue and the Catholic League became involved, calling on the University to take strong action against the student. The biologist, P.Z. Myers, of the University of Minnesota, Morris came to the defense of the student in this post of Myers's blog, Pharyngula, and called on readers to steal consecrated wafers from Catholic churches so that he could publicly desecrate them, posting pictures on the web. Donohue and the Catholic have taken note of Myers's blog post, and seem to have begun something of a campaign against him. From what I understand, despite some very negative encounters with some of those who protested his actions, the student himself was nonetheless able to hear the appeals of others who explained to him why the matter was so important to them, and he responded humanely, returning the wafer.
Readers here may have heard of this case already, because it entered the world of philosophy blogs when Brian Leiter wrote about it in this blog post. However, Leiter's position seems to me very one-sided, so I thought I would post a different perspective. (Thanks to Matthew Mullins and Prosblogion for allowing me to use this forum. For those who don't know, I should make clear that I am a Christian, but not a Catholic, so readers can know where this commentary is coming from.)
In particular, Leiter seems to me to go way too easy on Prof. Myers. To put my opposition in context, please note that I do not support any efforts to get Prof. Myers fired or disciplined at his job over this incident, that I agree with Prof. Myers that the reaction against the Florida student by many was too strong, and that I find it admirable that Prof. Myers would come to the student's defense. However, Myers's proposed retaliation, which would hurt many Catholics who are completely innocent in this whole matter, strikes me as extremely nasty. To my thinking, it is morally more problematic than anything Donohue has yet done in this case. I can understand those who might disagree with that comparative judgment of mine, but have a hard time understanding the judgment of those who see the matter as so one-sidedly favoring Myers as Leiter seems to see things.
Myers's retaliation hurts Catholics because of beliefs they hold that he disagrees with, and, admittedly, it's not easy to say, in general terms, just how we should take the beliefs of others into account in deciding how to treat them. However, Myers's retaliation seems so aimed at hurting innocent parties and so incapable of producing any good, and, well, just so nasty, that this seems an easy call. So readers can judge for themselves, here's the relevant paragraph of Myers's post (follow the link above to read the whole thing):
So, what to do. I have an idea. Can anyone out there score me some consecrated communion wafers? There's no way I can personally get them -- my local churches have stakes prepared for me, I'm sure -- but if any of you would be willing to do what it takes to get me some, or even one, and mail it to me, I'll show you sacrilege, gladly, and with much fanfare. I won't be tempted to hold it hostage (no, not even if I have a choice between returning the Eucharist and watching Bill Donohue kick the pope in the balls, which would apparently be a more humane act than desecrating a goddamned cracker), but will instead treat it with profound disrespect and heinous cracker abuse, all photographed and presented here on the web. I shall do so joyfully and with laughter in my heart. If you can smuggle some out from under the armed guards and grim nuns hovering over your local communion ceremony, just write to me and I'll send you my home address.
Is he perhaps just joking? To some extent, this is clearly all a joke to Myers. But it doesn't seem to be just a joke in the sense that it's clear nobody should really steal the items and send them to him. The Washington Times reports:
In an interview Friday, Mr. Myers said he already had received "a double-digit number" of positive responses, from people saying that they would try to get consecrated Catholic hosts for him and that the writer already had one."Enough that I could sculpt a statue of them," he said, declining to say what he'd do to desecrate them. "I've got a few ideas, but I want to keep the surprise."
I hope that this is a joke at least to the extent that Myers won't follow through on his sick plan, but it will be very revealing to see people's reactions if he does. In any case, if a joke, this would seem a rather nasty joke -- perhaps to be compared with those who would publicly ask for others to raid burial grounds sacred to Native Americans and send them remains so that they might publicly desecrate them. ("They're just frackin' bones!") "Wickedly funny"?
For the record, I'll paste below the fold the e-mail I sent to Prof. Myers on July 11. It now appears to me too smug and sanctimonious in tone, but I stand behind the position there expressed:
Welcome to the Knowledge of God Prosblogion reading group! Each week, we will read a section of the book, and the section breakdown and ordering is as follows:
C. 1 (1-30), C. 1 (30-69), C. 4, C. 5, C. 2 (70-108), C. 2 (108-150), C. 3, C. 6.
Each Monday, a different Prosblogion contributor will write an opening post. Other contributors can post on that section two or three days later in the week. Everybody is welcome to read along in the book and comment.
It's a pleasure to kick-off all the fun. Let me summarize the main claims that I take Plantinga to argue for in my section.
I) If God exists, then it is likely that many people know that God exists.
II) If Christian belief is true, then it is likely that many people know that it is true.
III) If naturalism is true, then no biological organs function properly or improperly.
Plantinga's defends (I) and (II) as follows:
It's often considered arrogant and false to say that one way of living is superior to another. As a Korean American, there are certain ways that I live life (in relating to family, work, food, etc.) that are different from the ways most other Americans live life; but I wouldn't say they are superior - that would be false and arrogant.
But there are certain ways of living that many would agree are superior to other ways: living in community with other people that we love and are loved by is a better way of living than living in denial of the existence and worth of other people. This seems quite plausible to me.
Let's take this another step. It seems to me that in the same way, Christians are committed to believing that their way of life is superior to that of atheists. As Christians, we (I speak as a Christian) believe that we have a committed relationship with God, the most valuable and worthy being possible. We believe that God loves us, and he loves us so much that he would send his Son to endure a horrible death so that we could be reconciled to him. We believe that God the Holy Spirit lives inside of us and is with us. We believe that we can converse with God, through praying to him and through hearing from him (minimally, from the Bible). There is a 'way of living' that incorporates these specifically Christian beliefs into one's life, and I will call that 'the Christian way of living'. (I admit that this is a little vague; maybe I'll have the chance to clear it up in the discussion; I think that there is something to the notion.) Atheists deny that God exists and that God does any of these things with or for humans. So atheists do not live the Christian way of living.
It seems to me that in the same way that it is plausible to think that a person who denies the existence and value of other people is living a way of life that is inferior, so should the Christian think that the atheist is living an inferior way of life by not living the Christian way of life. And I think that this is an interesting and surprising conclusion, though some may find it completely obvious. I'm still trying to get clear on my thoughts on the matter, so comments are welcome.
The by-line to this article in the New York Magazine: "The fastest-growing faith in America is no faith at all. And now some atheists think they need a church."
Given the topic, I found the headline to be a bit ironic simply because one of the groups Nietzsche is critiquing in his parable of the madman is those atheists who believe that the Enlightenment project and the sciences can continue just as they were without the theistic metaphysics that underlay them.
Otherwise, it's an interesting article that covers some of the history of atheistic "religious" organisations and thoughts by luminaries in the contemporary movement on how to make it mainstream and compensate for the lack of community among atheists that one often finds within the life of an organized faith.
In Revelation, we learn that the angels are singing "Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord God almighty!" We speak of "holy men" and there might be a "holy moment". We strive for "personal holiness".
I've always had difficulty getting a grasp of this concept. Sometimes, it seems that "holiness" is used synonymously with "moral purity" or "sinlessness". I've also heard "being holy" equated with "being wholly other or set apart or different", but what's that supposed to mean?
As a first approximation, x is holy iff x is really, really morally good. But this feels like its lacking. Any ideas?
The set of issues usually entitled "God and morality" is at the metaethical level. This includes a difficulty (the Euthyphro problem), an argument for the existence of God (the argument from morality) and just a really interesting set of questions about the relationship between God and morality.
There is, however, also a set of issues at the normative and applied levels largely independent of the metaethical level. Whatever the metaethical story of the relationship between God and the truth of moral propositions, one can ask about any particular rule at the normative level or any particular ethical judgments at the applied level whether the particular ethical truth in a special way depends on the existence of God.
To see that this question is in large part independent of the metaethical one, take a trivial case at the applied level: the duty to thank God for our lives. This is indeed a moral duty, and it depends on the existence of God in a special way: namely, we need to thank God for our lives because God exists and has created us. This is true if the right meta-ethics makes no reference to God, as in the Kantian case--there still is a general duty to be grateful to our benefactors, and we can apply this to the case of God creating us. And this may well be true even if the right meta-ethics makes reference to God, as in the divine command theory case--God commands the general principle to be grateful to our benefactors; in this case, our benefactor is God, so the duty to thank him depends in a special or additional way on the existence of God.
The interesting question, of course, is about moral duties that do not make explicit reference to God. Do some of these moral duties presuppose the existence of God? If so, then they give rise to arguments for the existence of God, though the atheist might just deny the existence of the duty.
So let me open this up for discussion--what moral duties are there that, although they do not say so on their face, in fact depend on the existence of God?
Note: It might seem that such special claims of dependence are incompatible with the idea of ethics not being dependent on revelation. But that problem is only there if both (a) the belief in the existence of God requires revelation and (b) our knowledge of these ethical claims requires a belief in the existence of God (the truth of the claim may depend on the existence of God, but it does not follow that the claim epistemically depends on the claim that God exists, just as the truth of there being a rainbow depends on facts about refraction of light, but the claim that there is a rainbow does not epistemically depend on claims about refraction of light, being independently knowable).
As a warmup, let me suggest this one: Is it the case that the duty to love everybody depends on the existence of God, e.g., because only if everybody is in the image of God, or only if everybody is loved by God, is it the case that everybody is lovable.
Define Our Task Pelagianism (OTP) as the doctrine that without grace it is possible that a person does all the actions and has the mental states that are directly sufficient, given God's promises, for entering into heavenly joy. The "directly" here is meant to rule out the interposition of further actions or mental states, but is meant to be compatible with the idea that God's gracious causality is still needed to move us into heaven after we have done the required actions or mental states--God is at least needed to reward our merit.
The "directly" is kind of messy, but is needed in an account of Pelagianism. For it is compatible with the denial of Pelagianism that God has specifically promised that Jones will be saved (e.g., God might have made this promise to Jones or to Jones' mother). Then Jones' blowing his nose is sufficient, given God's promises, for entering into heavenly joy, since the content of God's promises entails that Jones will be saved whether or not he blows his nose. But Jones' blowing his nose is not directly sufficient, since other actions and/or mental states are needed, e.g., faith. On the other hand, a doctrine that says that God's judgment is based on whether we have blown our noses--all those who had go to heaven and all others go to hell--would imply OTP given that we do not need God's grace to blow our noses. (We need divine creation, sustenance and cooperation to blow our noses, but grace goes beyond creation, sustenance and cooperation.)
I assume OTP is false.
Call a bunch of actions and mental states that are jointly directly sufficient for entering into heavenly joy given God's promises "salvific". Pelagians and non-Pelagians agree that there are salvific actions and mental states. Thus, all agree that faith, hope and love in mind and action would be sufficient for salvation given God's promises. Our Task Pelagians, however, hold that there is a salvific bunch of actions and mental states that could occur absent God's grace.
The less that a doctrine requires of salvific actions and mental states, the more likely it is that it implies OTP. First, note that a doctrine which made some set of purely external physical movements compatible with the laws of nature directly sufficient for salvation would very likely imply OTP, since any set of purely external physical movements compatible with the laws of nature might well be done without grace, simply on a whim, or might even occur purely randomly due to quantum processes, and hence absent God's grace.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy added another philosophy of religion entry this week: John Hare's contribution on Religion and Morality. It's a lot more historical than I expected, and it has a lot less detail on the contemporary issues, with only one paragraph of eleven sentences on the issues in contemporary analytic philosophy. But it seems like a good historical guide to a number of issues too often ignored in many historical introductions to ethics.
Prospect magazine has published an exchange between Daniel Dennett and Richard Swinburne on how we should study religion. One nitpicky point about the opening. While it is true that Swinburne read for a diploma in theology in 1960, it seems a rather egregious mistake to label Swinburne a theologian. Given his faculty title, Emeritus Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, and the bulk of his publications, it should appear rather obvious that he is a philosopher and not a theologian. It is the kind of thing you'd expect a fact-checker to catch. I find Dennett's claim that we must "set aside the traditional exemption from scrutiny that religions have enjoyed" rather curious in that I have no idea what he is talking about. I don't know how science is demarcated, but religion has been a subject of study within psychology for at least a hundred years. More recently there have been approaches to the subject in evolutionary psychology, and neuroscientists have looked for areas of the brain sensitive to religion. Let me highlight a curious remark by Swinburne too.
The supposition that there is such a God is a very simple one. For it is the supposition that there exists one "person" (not many persons), who is the simplest kind of person there could be.Well now I'm confused because first I thought it was supposed to be three persons and one substance, but then it was three Gods, but now it's just one person and one God.
I just ran across John Cottingham's review of Adriaan Peperzak's Philosophy between Faith and Theology.
In this stimulating series of essays, Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak defends the need for "a kind of learning that goes beyond academic professionalism", and reflects on how one might re-establish the links between philosophy and the "central concern" philosophers once shared with "sages, theologians and masters of spirituality", for whom the driving force was a "profound passion for succeeding in the art of living humanly".I read this and immediately thought of Susan Wolf, who for some time has been urging philosophers to return to trying to address these big picture type questions. As Cottingham points out in his closing "In the last few years there has been a significant revival of some of the "grand" traditional questions of philosophy such as the problem of the meaning of life".But can philosophy recover a spiritual dimension? Indeed, should it? The predominant criteria and goals of academic work (even among those Catholic scholars whom Peperzak has in mind in his subtitle) are largely those of the secular enlightened university, and philosophy's self-conception is strongly conditioned by this ethos.
The small revival in addressing "meaning of life" type questions raises some interesting questions for discussion. Could one go further and say that there is a hunger for philosophers to address these grand traditional questions? Do we bear any kind of public responsibility to try to answer these questions? Are philosophers in a good position to answer these kinds of questions? Are philosophers of religion in a unique position to answer these kinds of questions? I have my own answers, but I'd like to see what others have to say.
