Recently in Problem of Evil Category

In his debate on evil with Plantinga in their book, Tooley uses Carnap's logical probability measure to get an upper bound on the probability that N evils are in fact unjustified. The result is technically interesting, but Carnap's probability measure is standardly seen as merely a part of the history of philosophy of science, and I don't know of anybody other than Tooley in recent decades to have actually used it for anything. I've always seen Carnap's measure as a failed attempt to produce a logical probability measure that makes induction possible, and I assumed that everyone shared the view that it was a failed attempt--I am pretty sure it was taught to us as a failed attempt at Pittsburgh. Anyway, in case anybody is curious what is wrong with the Carnap measure, here are some remarks (cross-posted from my own blog). I have no idea if the criticisms are original or not.

Let G be the benefits of climbing Mt Everest, and let E be the (rather horrific, I think) burdens. Let us grant that it's not contrary to virtue (prudence in this case) to achieve G for oneself at the expense of suffering E. One way to say this is like this: E-for-me is proportionate (or not disproportionate) to G-for-me relative to me as an agent. I will abbreviate "E-for-x is proportionate to G-for-y relative to z as an agent" as "P(E,G,x,y,z)." So the above claim is: P(E,G,I,I,I).

On the other hand, it would be disproportionate for me to achieve G for myself at the expense of your suffering E (in the Mt Everest case, after all, E is weeks of hard labor, frostbite, danger, etc.). Thus, ~P(E,G,you,you,I). (The utilitarian, on the other hand, thinks that P(E,G,x,y,z) iff P(E,G,x',y',z') for any x,y,z,x',y',z'. But she's wrong about that.) Interestingly, it would also be disproportionate for me to achieve G for you at the expense of your suffering E (without your permission, that is--I shall take it for granted in all the discussion that there is no consent).

Let "p(x,y,z)" be the "proportionality standard" for permitting burdens to x that are the cost of benefits to y as produced by agent z. We can think of p(x,y,z) as the set of all pairs (E,G) such that P(E,G,x,y,z). Any such pair (E,G) is said to be "allowed" for (x,y,z). We can then compare proportionality standards by stringency. A simple and precise way is to say that p(x,y,z) is at least as stringent as p(x',y',z') iff anything that is allowed for (x,y,z) is allowed for (x',y',z'). However, it may be necessary to modify this, as there may be some pairs (E,G) that need to be special-cased. So, let's say that p(x,y,z) is at least as stringent as p(x',y',z') iff typically a pair (E,G) allowed for (x,y,z) is allowed for (x',y',z').

I think that thinking about the Mt Everest case suggests that if x, y and z are mutual strangers, then p(x,y,z) and p(x,x,z) are much more stringent than p(x,x,x) or p(x,y,x)--it is much easier to justify my imposing a burden on me than for another to justify imposing that burden on me.

Now, here is where the philosophy of religion comes in. Question: Where do p(x,y,God) and p(x,x,God) rank in stringency?

I have the intuition that p(x,y,God) and p(x,x,God) are no more stringent than the fairly lax p(x,y,x) and p(x,x,x). In other words, it's no harder for God to be justified in achieving a good (for myself or another) at an expense to me than it would be for me to be justified in achieving a good at that expense to me. While I think what I said is plausible, I am a little more comfortable with this in the case of p(x,x,God). (p(x,x,z) are the standards for z's paternalism with respect to z, and I think God has the right to be the ultimate paternalist.)

Intuitively, p(x,x,x) is a fairly low standard. After all, the costs of climbing Mt Everest are very, very high, and yet p(x,x,x) justifies these costs for the sake of goods that are not, perhaps, incredibly great. If p(x,x,x) is also the standard for deciding in theodicy whether God was permitted to achieve a good at the expense of a certain cost, then that should make theodicy easier than if the relevant standard were like the more stringent p(x,x,z) or p(x,y,z) (where z is a stranger to x).

But what I don't at present have is much in the way of an argument that p(x,y or x,God) is like p(x,y or x,x), apart from hearing at the back of my mind a maxim that God is closer to us than we are to ourselves. If you can supply an argument or refutation, I will be grateful.

I was talking to Norman Daniels the other day about healthcare reform and he had some interesting observations about the history of healthcare reform in the US. He remarked that Roosevelt could have easily provided healthcare in a workers protection bill because healthcare at that time was cheap. Evidently, other nations provided universal healthcare earlier on in the development of the healthcare system (with the exception of Canada which began universal healthcare in the 70's). Norman also mentioned that Ted Kennedy says in his memoirs that he wished he had made a deal with Nixon on healthcare. Evidently, Nixon had a healthcare bill that was much more just than current healthcare bills and Kennedy viewed his failure to work with Nixon as a major mistake. Now, what does this have to do with philosophy of religion? Let's assume Kennedy's lapse is a social evil. It is an omission that results in a much worse state of affairs that led to more suffering than would have otherwise resulted. I think there are some interesting features of social evils that aren't shared by moral evils or natural evils. First, social evils are different from moral evils because the evil that results isn't a direct result of personal agency. It's not as if Kennedy's omission directly caused Joe to be denied healthcare because of a preexisting condition. Second, hindsight can be an important factor in social evils. Kennedy's lapse provides an interesting case in which he seems to have knowledge of the relevant counterfactuals. If he had worked with Nixon then a much more just healthcare system would have resulted. The presence of knowledge of counterfactuals here seems relevantly different from the case of natural evil. There's not to my knowledge a discussion of social evil in the POE literature, though I'd be happy to learn otherwise. If the two differences I mentioned survive reflection then it's possible that reflection on social evil will shed new light on the POE. What do you guys think? I'm particularly interested in whether you think social evil is different in kind from moral evil and natural evil and also whether social evil poses a special problem not already posed by moral and natural evils.

For reasons of theodicy, I'd like to have a nice taxonomy of intrinsic evils that an individual might (in the epistemic sense) suffer that would raise a problem of evil. Here is an unsystematic list. What am I missing? Is there a nice systematic way to generate such a list?

1. Moral depravity
2. Mere deprivation
3. Suffering
4. Mere permanent death

Plantinga defines strong actualization thus: "God strongly actualizes a state of affairs S if and only if he causes S to be actual and causes to be actual every contingent state of affairs S* such that S includes S*" (Profiles, p. 49).

It is crucial for Plantinga's arguments that "includes" have an interpretation such that if S entails S* and S* is contingent, then S includes S*. Otherwise, Plantinga's FWD includes an invalid argument. For Plantinga is going to argue that if W is a world where Eve freely doesn't take the apple, then T(W)--the maximal strongly actualized state of affairs that includes all the states of affairs strongly actualized in W--does not include Eve's freely refraining from taking the apple, and hence the conditional T(W)→(Eve freely refrains from taking the apple) cannot be necessarily true. But the latter only follows if entailment implies inclusion.

Moreover, it is crucial to the FWD that God cannot strongly actualize a state of affairs of someone doing something freely.

But now we have a problem. For suppose that in some world W where Eve freely doesn't take the apple, God earlier confidentially remarks to the Archangel Gabriel that if Eve doesn't freely refrain, God will create life on Pluto. Let S1 be the state of affairs of God making that remark to Gabriel, and let S2 be the state of affairs of there being no life on Pluto. Suppose S2, as well as S1, obtains at W. It seems that God strongly actualizes S1 and that God strongly actualizes S2.

But now we have a problem, for God strongly actualizes each of two states of affairs whose conjunction entails Eve's freely refaining. Now it either is or is not true that if God strongly actualizes each of two states of affairs, he strongly actualizes their conjunction. If it is true, then it follows, contrary to what is needed for the FWD, that God strongly actualizes Eve's freely refraining. If it is not true, then T(W) need not in general exist--there will, perhaps, always be a state of affairs that includes all the states of affairs strongly actualized at W, but that state of affairs will not itself be strongly actualized by God (why? becuase that state of affairs will include S1 and will include S2, but the conjunction of S1 and S2 is not strongly actualized). And Plantinga's argument seems to require the existence of T(W).

Central to Plantinga's formulation of the FWD is the notion of "weak actualization". In the Profiles volume, Plantinga defines this as follows:

1. God weakly actualizes S iff there is an S* such that God strongly actualizes S* and S* → S, where → is "counterfactual implication".

Theorem 1. If (1), and → is centered, then if God strongly actualizes any actual state of affairs, God weakly actualizes every actual state of affairs.

(Proof: Let S* be any actual state of affairs that God strongly actualizes. Let S be any actual state of affairs. Then, by centering S*→S, and so by (1), God weakly actualizes S.)

Theorem 1 is clearly problematic, as we can see by substituting "Al" for "God". Since Al strongly actualizes some state of affairs (say, the writing of The Nature of Necessity), it follows that he weakly actualizes the Battle of Waterloo.

In light of Theorem 1, we could simplify the concept of "weakly actualizes": God weakly actualizes S iff S is actual and there is an S* such that God strongly actualizes. But if that is what "weakly actualizes" comes down to, it is not a very interesting concept. It is a pretty trivial concept, and I think it does not seem to support the proof that Plantinga gives of Lewis's Lemma.

There have been several posts on the kinds of worlds God could create. I want to argue that, odd as it might sound initially, there are infinitely bad worlds that God could have created. But how is that possible? Here’s how. Let the world w contain a countably infinite number of sentient beings (say, all human beings). And let each human being Hn in w be assigned a natural number, n. Let each natural number n be mapped onto an equivalent number of seconds t: number 1 to 1 second, 2 to 2 seconds, and so on upward. So we have for each human being Hn in w and number of seconds t, a pair, (Hn, t). Finally, let t be the number of seconds that Hn suffers in w. H1 suffers for 1 second in w, H2 suffers for 2 seconds in w, H3 suffers for 3 seconds in w and so on upward for all of the natural numbers. We know that each Hn in w will suffer a finite amount of time, since each Hn = t is a finite number of seconds. Suppose it is true, for each Hn in w that he enjoys at least n^100000 seconds of joy after his suffering. The only evils in w are the instances of suffering, and the only good are the instances of joy. Here are some strange facts about w.

1. For each human Hn in w, Hn suffers for a finite amount of time X.
2. For each human Hn in w, Hn enjoys for a finite amount of time (X + Y) > X
3. For each human Hn in w, Hn’s life is on balance very good.
4. Every evil in w is outweighed by a much greater good.
5. There will always be an infinite amount of suffering in w.
6. There will always be a finite amount of joy in w.

Since each human’s life is on balance very good in w (we could make it superb, if you like), and each evil is outweighed by a much greater good in w, I claim that God could have actualized w. But it is also true that there is no time in w at which there is not an infinite amount of suffering. At each moment t in the world w, there is an infinite amount of evil. So God could have actualize an infinitely bad world.

[Revised and Updated 12.21.09]

Related posts

Suppose we take it as settled that God is not required to actualize a world that exceeds positive value N. There are, in short, some good enough worlds. What then happens to the problem of evil? I claim the problem disappears. Two possibilities.

A. If God need not actualize a world whose overall value exceeds N, and God actualizes W whose value is N and whose total evil is E, then (1) it constitutes no objection to the existence of God that he might have actualized W’ whose overall value is N - E. It is true that God might have actualized a world W’ with less evil, or even no evil, but only if he actualizes a world that (by hypothesis) is better than he is required to actualize.

B. If God need not actualize a world whose overall value exceeds N, and God actualizes W whose value is N and whose total evil is E, then (2) it constitutes no objection to the existence of God that he might have actualized W’ that contains less evil than W but whose overall value is also N . It is true that God might have actualized a world with less evil, but only if he actualizes a world W’ that is (by hypothesis) no better than the world he did actualize.

Conclusion (1): If there is a world W that meets the criterion of being good enough for God to actualize, then the existence of actual gratuitous evil constitutes no objection at all to the existence of God.

That’s a remarkable conclusion, I think. We’d all agree—or most of us would—that some world or other is good enough for God to create. The argument above shows that it follows from that widely agreed-upon fact that the existence of gratuitous evil—standardly defined gratuitous evil—constutites no objection to theism at all!

Conclusion (2): If there is a world W that meets the criterion of being good enough for God to actualize, and the value of @ is at least the value of W, then the problem of evil is resolved.

[Revised and Updated, 12.15.09]

Let's say I climb Mt. Everest, and then enjoy a delightful view from the top. But as I climb the mountain, I undergo various horrendous sufferings. And after I get back down, I have to undergo extremely painful surgery. Suppose that, so far, the overall value assessment is negative. If that's all that is involved, then climb wasn't worth it. The view was nice, and the good of achievement was nice, but, by far, it just wasn't worth it.

But let me add a little more to the story. I did this when I was 20. I am not permanently traumatized by the suffering, and indeed by the time I am 30, my memories of the hideous pains are no longer unpleasant. But I continue to have memories of the beauty of the climb and of the camaraderie, memories of the grandeur of the epic struggle, and these memories continue to be fairly pleasant. Moreover, the feeling of accomplishment, of having overcome the pains, is nice to have. I then live on for fifty more years, continuing to have pleasant memories of that climb.

While the goods achieved at the time of the climb were not worth the suffering, when combined with the value of half a century's worth of memories, even when these memories are not particularly intensely pleasant, they may be worth it. Suppose you say the contrary. Well, then, replace the fifty years with five hundred or five million. Eventually, the cumulative value of enjoying these memories will overshadow the bads which were confined to one decade of one's life (the climb, plus about ten years during which the memories of pain were painful). (This of course reminds one of Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion. But I think there is nothing repugnant here.)

Suppose I am a person who is either not embodied or who doesn't know that he is embodied. I spend all my time communing directly mentally with other minds, playing games like chess, speculating philosophically, praying to God--I am a theist--etc. I never have any perceptions of anything physical. One day, I learn that the world contains matter--maybe God suddenly equips me with some senses, or maybe I learn this from some authority that I have the right to trust. Among the material things in the world, I learn that on one planet there are complex information processing systems, some of which are made of soft but somewhat resilient stuff, with lots of carbon atoms, though with a calcium endoskeleton, and some of which are made of harder but more brittle stuff, with lots of silicon atoms and metals, largely arranged on flat plates, and with a polymer or metal shell. All these information processing systems have sensors and actuators, and engage in complex processing that mediates between sensor input and actuator output. (Some of these systems may even be indeterministic.)

So far, I have little reason to suppose that these information processing systems are conscious. And as for pain, I would not have that concept at all. But to explain various behaviors among some of these systems, both the carbon and the silicon based ones, I could easily posit the concept of a shpain as something that mediates causally in certain ways between sensors sensitive to damage and various behavioral patterns, and I would understand the general utility of a shpain subsystem.

[Cross-posted to my blog.]

Supposedly intense pains that non-human animals undergo provide significant evidence against theism. Why? Well, the thought is that, if he existed, God could have done things better. But how?

As most readers of this blog know, the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame recently hosted a conference about the moral character of God as portrayed in the texts of the Old Testament & Hebrew Bible. Videos of all of the conference sessions (including Q&A) are now posted online here.