December 2010 Archives

Continuing the recent theme of skeptical theism. It only recently occurred to me to puzzle over the fact that skeptical theism--at least for leading proponent Mike Bergmann--has nothing to do with theism. Of course, there's the axiom ST ---> T, but that's not what I'm talking about.

What I mean is that skeptical theism's skeptical thesis are just about the nature of the good. That seems a *bit* odd to me: there's nothing theological motivating skeptical theism as Bergmann expresses it. It has nothing obvious to do with "God's ways being greater than ours." It's just that we don't understand goodness well enough.

And here's another thing I noticed recently that bothered me--then I'll put the criticism below the fold: It's almost all deontolgical stuff. But I'm a virtue and value guy. As such, I think I have some insight into the *nature* of the good, which tells me something about *all* goods. This gives one more purchase than may be compatible with Bergmann's versions of the "S" in "ST."

The goal of this post is to layout various skeptical theistic theses. Skeptical theism is the position that we should be leery of our ability to limn the limits of God's reasons for permitting some cases of horrendous evils. Bergmann casts skeptical theism as responding to Rowe's noseeum inference: (P) No good we know of justifies God in permitting E1 and E2 (the bambi and sue cases) to (Q) No good at all justifies God in permitting E1 and E2. From (Q) one deduces that there's no God (~G).

Here's a list of various skeptical theistic theses in the order of strongest to weakest.

First group: evidential irrelevance

1. Necessarily, for any evil, P(G|e)=P(G).

(1) claims that necessarily evil is evidentially irrelevant to the existence of God. (1) is clearly subject to counterexample: let e be a trillion sentient creatures suffer endless torment. Skeptical theism need not be committed to denying that this would be evidence against theism.

2. For any evil, necessarily, P(G|e)=P(G).

(2) restricts the evils to evils that occur in the actual world and claims that they are such that necessarily they are evidentially irrelevant to the existence of God.

3. For any evil, P(G|e)=P(G).

(3) drops the embedded necessity operator. Depending on how one understands the nature of the P function and the nature of evil, 2 and 3 could be equivalent.

4. For E1 and E2 (and similar evils), P(G|E1&E2)=P(G).

This further restricts the evils in our world to those like the Bambi and Sue cases. One advantage of this restriction is that it allows skeptical theism to be viewed as a special case defense and not a general strategy defense. (Also, we can add back in the necessity operator to get further distinctions here).

Second group: Relevance but not significance (my gloss: "evil isn't a game changer")

An evil is a game-changer if it can tip the balance of evidence in favor of atheism or agnosticism. A no-game changer version of skeptical theism says that while evil can detract from the probability of God it can't be the proverbial straw that brought the camel's back. I shall represent the 'no-game changer thesis' by using '≈'. This represents that the probabilities are closely similar.

5. Necessary, for any evil, P(G|e)≈P(G).

6. For any evil, necessarily, P(G|e)≈P(G).

7. For any evil, P(G|e)≈P(G).

8. For E1 and E2 (and similar evils), P(G|e)≈P(G).

To undermine Rowe's inference all Bergmann and company need is 8. Thus, the skeptical theist can easily recognize that there are many evils that could occur that would significantly distract from the probability of theism. Also, 8 is interesting because it allows skeptical theism to be viewed as a special case defense that can be run along with other defenses--the free will defense, the soul-making defense, the value of natural laws, etc.

The view that a contingently existing thing cannot explain everything is mistaken. For all that I, or anyone else, knows the proper logic of metaphysical possibility is S4. The characteristic thesis of S4 is Lp —> LLp. S4 does not include the thesis that MLp —> Lp. Consider whether there is a metaphysical model in which a contingent God explains everything. Suppose every possible world is accessible from every other possible world, except for the worlds W0 and W1. W0 and W1, let’s suppose, are accessible from every other world, but they only have access to themselves and each other. Call these Hell Worlds. The hell worlds W0 and W1 are metaphysically nihilistic worlds: these are worlds that include no concrete objects and so no God (abstract objects only).

It is true in the hell worlds W0 and W1 that concrete objects necessarily do not exist and so, it is true there that necessarily God does not exist. Since God exists in every world except W0 and W1, God is contingent. Nonetheless God explains everything there is to explain including himself. We have all of the following true.

1. God is necessarily co-contingent: God must exist in any world in which there are any contingent objects at all.

2. Why do contingent objects exist? In every world in which there are contingent objects, God creates every contingent object.

3. Why doesn’t God exist in every world? Any world in which God does not exist is a hell world. It is true in hell worlds that God necessarily does not exist.

4. It is possible that, necessarily, God does not exist, since hell worlds are possible worlds.

5. We can construct a model in which there are some concrete objects in hell worlds: these are concrete beings for whom God is inaccessible. For such beings, it is necessary that God does not exist.

6. The S4 models including hell worlds preserve the distinction between necessarily existing objects and contingent objects while having an explanation for every contingent object.

In a single paragraph near the beginning of the Theodicy, Leibniz gives a very compressed version of an argument a contingentia mundi (from the contingency of the world) from which he purports to derive not just the existence of God, but several of the most important traditional divine attributes (from which, Leibniz seems to think, the other divine attributes follow). In this post, I'll try to unpack Leibniz's reasoning. I'm not going to do too much evaluation of the arguments, since this post will be long enough without that; I'll just lay out the arguments as I see them and we can discuss their soundness in the comments.

First, here's the paragraph:

God is the first reason of things: for such things as are bounded, as all that which we see and experience, are contingent and have nothing in them to render their existence necessary, it being plain that time, space and matter, united and uniform in themselves and indifferent to everything, might have received entirely other motions and shapes, and in another order. Therefore one must seek the reason for the existence of the world, which is the whole assemblage of contingent things, and seek it in the substance which carries with it the reason for its existence, and which in consequence is necessary and eternal. Moreover, this cause must be intelligent: for this existence being contingent and an infinity of other worlds being equally possible, and holding, so to say, equal claim to existence with it, the cause of the world must needs have had regard or reference to all these possible worlds in order to fix upon one of them. This regard or relation of an existent substance to simple possibilities can be nothing other than the understanding which has ideas of them, while to fix upon one of them can be nothing other than the act of the will which chooses. It is the power of this substance that renders its will efficacious. Power relates to being, wisdom or understanding to truth, and will to good. And this intelligent cause ought to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom and in goodness, since it relates to all that which is possible. Furthermore, since all is connected together, there is no ground for admitting more than one. Its understanding is the source of essences, its will is the origin of existences. There in a few words is the proof of one only God with his perfections, and through him of the origin of things (Theodicy, tr. Huggard, sect. 7)

Alright, let's see what we can make out of this. It will help to divide the argument into several stages. In the first stage, we show that a necessary being exists. In the second stage, we show that some necessary being has understanding, will, and power. In the third stage we prove that some necessary being is "absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom and in goodness." In the fourth stage, we show that the necessary being is unique. In the fifth and final stage we show that the unique necessary being (God) is the ground of both possibility (essences) and actuality (existences). The last two stages are so elliptical and opaque that I am not going to try to reconstruct them, for now. Besides, the first three stages are enough to count as a proof of the traditional God: if sound, they would show that, necessarily, there exists a being who is perfectly powerful, perfectly wise, and perfectly good.

Women comprise a significantly smaller percentage of the Society of Christian Philosophers than of the American Philosophical Association. Is this a problem? Do Christian Philosophers have particular reasons to be troubled by under-representation of women in the profession? Are there positive steps Christian philosophers or institutions can take to increase the numbers of women in philosophy?

We invite "younger" women philosophers (Ph.D since 2000) to participate in a panel discussion of these issues at the Pacific/Mountain Region Conference of the SCP. Please send your name, institutional connection, and a brief synopsis of your ideas to Phil Smith: psmith@georgefox.edu. Conference fees will be waived for panel participants.

There are several people who hang around here who resist skeptical theism, that is the view that we should consider our conceptual resources and factual knowledge insufficient to render a judgment about whether God could be justified in allowing the evils apparent in the world.

I suspect most of these people accept the book of Job as divine revelation. Yet it seems to me that the point of the book of Job (or at least one of its main points) is something very close to what skeptical theists want to assert, namely that we aren't in the sort of position to make judgments about why God must have done or allowed various things that happen.

I'm curious, therefore, how those who resist skeptical theism see the book of Job if it does not in fact make that point.

The latest issue of Synthese is devoted to Intelligent Design. The Introductory article by Glenn Branch starts with a story about J.P. Moreland and then traces some history of the movement. It mentions how there are many philosophers (as "eminent" as Alvin Plantinga) supporting the movement. I thought some Prosblogion readers might be interested, so I'm drawing attention to it.

CFA: 2011 Australasian Philosophy of Religion Conference

When: Saturday July 16th- Sunday July 17th, 2011
Where: University of Auckland
Submission Deadline: May 1st, 2011

The Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association (APRA) invites abstracts of 200-300 words on any topic in philosophy of religion. You will have 25-30 minutes for presentation and 25 minutes for questions. Submissions should be sent by email to Dr Chris Tucker (c.tucker@auckland.ac.nz). Please use the subject line "APRA Submission." Expect a decision within two weeks of your submission. For further details about the conference, please visit http://www.apra.org.au/the-apra-conference/.

Committed speakers include:
--Trent Dougherty (Baylor University)
--John Hare (Yale Divinity; Seelye Charitable Trust Distinguished Fellow)
--Mark Murphy (Georgetown University; Auckland University Distinguished Visitor)
--Erik Wielenberg (DePauw University)

There will be a Naturalisms in Ethics conference (NEC) immediately preceding the APRA conference. You are welcome to submit an abstract for the NEC as well. Confirmed speakers include Rosalind Hursthouse (University of Auckland), John Hare, Mark Murphy, and Erik Wielenberg. Further details here: http://sandbox.arts.auckland.ac.nz/~christucker/NEC.html.

Seems that describing it as "shameless self-promotion" absolves one, though I doubt it. But that's the line so I hereby use it, whatever purgatory consequences... My new collection, in draft form, LaTeX'ed to beautiful purposes by Oxford's document class, is here.

Any thoughts welcome, of course--would love to minimize the errors!

Wittgensteinians lay stress on the idea that

1. One cannot understand central worldview concepts without living as part of a community that operates with these concepts.

The non-Christian cannot understand the Christian concept of the Trinity; the Christian and the atheist cannot understand the Jewish concept of God's absolute unity as understood by Maimonedes; the theist cannot understand the concept of a completely natural world; and the non-Fascist cannot understand the concept of the Volk. It is only by being a part of a community in which these concepts are alive that one gains an understanding of them.

Often, a corollary is drawn from this, that while internal critique or justification of a worldview tradition such as Christianity, naturalism or Nazism is possible, no external critique or justification is possible. In fact, there is an argument for this corollary.

2. (Premise) One's evidence set cannot involve any propositions that involve concepts one does not understand.
3. (Premise) Necessarily, if a proposition p uses a concept C, and a body of propositions P is evidence for or against p for an agent x, then some member of P involves C.
4. If x is not a member of the community operating with a central worldview concept C, then x does not have any evidence for or against any proposition involving C. (1-3)
5. (Premise) External critique or justification of a worldview of a community is possible only if someone who is not a member of the community can have evidence for or against a proposition involving a central worldview concept of that community.
6. Therefore, external critique or justification of a worldview of a community is not possible. (4 and 5)

This is a particularly unfortunate result in the case of something like Nazism, and may suggest an unacceptable relativism.

The argument is valid but unsound, and I think unsalvageable. I think that (5) is false, and on some plausible interpretations of (1), (2) and (3) are false as well.

1. P(the universe has low entropy | naturalism) is extremely tiny.
2. P(the universe has low entropy | theism) is not very small.
3. The universe has low entropy.
4. Therefore, the low entropy of the universe strongly confirms theism over naturalism.

Low-entropy states have low probability. So, (1) is true. The universe, at the Big Bang, had a very surprisingly low entropy. It still has a low entropy, though the entropy has gone up. So, (3) is true. What about (2)? This follows from the fact that there is significant value in a world that has low entropy and given theism God is not unlikely to produce what is significantly valuable. At least locally low entropy is needed for the existence of life, and we need uniformity between our local area and the rest of the universe if we are to have scientific knowledge of the universe, and such knowledge is valuable. So (2) is true. The rest is Bayes.