July 2010 Archives

Revised and Updated 7.31.10

~~The Argument in a Nutshell~~

1. I sincerely affirm principle M: I am required to be kind.

2. I know that, without excuse or mitigating reason or justification, I will be unkind.

3. I am prepared to sincerely affirm that, without excuse or mitigating reason or justification, I will be unkind. From 2

4. The only explanation for my being unkind, given that I have no excuse or justification or mitigating reason (I’m not akratic, for instance), is that I really don’t believe the principle M.

5. /:. I don’t genuinely believe M. From (3) and (4).

6. /:. I do not sincerely affirm M. From (5), contradiction 6, 1

Posting on behalf of Janusz Salamon. I will be at this conference. Hope to see many of you in Krakow!

CALL FOR PAPERS
International Conference in Philosophy of Religion: "Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century"
27-29 June 2011 - Krakow, Poland

Organizers: The conference is organized under the auspices of the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion in cooperation with the Jagiellonian University of Krakow, the Society of Christian Philosophers (USA), the Polish Society for Philosophy of Religion, and the Central European Society for Philosophy of Religion.

The focus of the conference will be any issues that from today's perspective seem likely to dominate the debate of philosophers of religion in the decades to come. While the majority of the participants in the conference will be practitioners of analytic philosophy of religion, speakers are invited to consider the meta-philosophical question whether "an exchange between representatives of various traditions within contemporary philosophy of religion" (a phrase taken from the mission statement of the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion) might positively shape the future of the philosophy of religion in the course of the 21st C, and therefore should be encouraged.

Keynote Speakers: Eleonore Stump, Linda Zagzebski, Richard Swinburne, William Wainwright, et al.

Call for papers:
There will be opportunity for 40 concurrent papers.

Authors are invited to submit a 500 word abstract for a paper of about 30 minutes reading time. The abstracts are to be submitted by e-mail, as an attachment (pdf or doc). Please send abstracts and requests for further information to Dr. Janusz Salamon: journal@philosophy-of-religion.eu

The submission deadline is 31 December 2010. Prospective presenters will be notified by the end of March 2011.

Selected papers will be considered for publication in the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.

Further details regarding the event will be posted in due course on the conference website:

http://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/conference2011.html

Nice link to Hugh LaFollette intervewing John Haldane on ‘Why I am a Theist’. For the record, LaFollette is not at East Tennessee State. He’s currently at University of South Florida.

Having recently noted the passing of James Ross--one of the early luminaries of what came to be known as "Analytic Thomism"--I got to thinking about the growth of this movement (which was greatly accelerated by the formation of the Society of Christian Philosophers).

In my lifetime, I've noticed a real swelling of interest in the titular subject of this post. I got it in high school from reading Geisler, and then later from Haldane and the Analytic Thomist movement (by the way, see Haldane's new book here which is a follow up to this one).

A lot of my Peeps at the at the Society for Catholicism and Analytic Philosophy would consider themselves analytic Thomists. I would say that my colleague Alex Pruss is one, though he'd be uncomfortable with the "Thomist" part, though I read that pretty broadly. SLU's Jonathan Jacobs would count in my book too, though I'd want to add the same caveat.

Setting aside any debate about the extension of "Thomist," Pruss and Jacobs seem clearly to be in the Neo-Aristotelian camp in several ways. I'm wondering what other writers you think fit this bill or how many people want to say Amen! to it or something rather less complimentary. It might be good to think about what some tenets are. I've been thinking of an anti-Platonism and a focus on powers as pointing in the right direction, but it's more complicated than that.

Taxonomy's may not have much intrinsic philosophical relevance, but they can help us think better about the discipline and even issues when we do them right. So I'm wondering what people think about this.

I'd also like to network folks interested in this, so I've added "analytical thomism" to my interests in Academia.edu and I encourage others to do so as well.

Book of Essays
Wikipedia Entry
Monist Issue Table of Contents
List of Some Analytic Thomists
Society for Catholicism and Analytical Philosophy (Yahoo! Group)

In Memoriam: James F. Ross

A decade before the founding of the Society of Christian Philosophers, before Christian philosophy became an accepted mode of doing analytic philosophy, there were only a handful of such philosophers providing the compass and forging the tools which would establish the direction, rigor, integrity, and fecundity of the craft of Christian philosophy in the analytic tradition. The brave, bold, and brilliant originality of his scholarship coupled with his respect for the Thomistic natural theological orientation secures Jim Ross's position as an incomparable pioneer in contemporary theistic philosophy.
Of his many works, consider the two bookends of his impressive career: Philosophical Theology and Thought and World: Hidden Necessities. His Philosophical Theology (published in 1968) wherein he employed the tools of modal logic for feasible arguments for God's existence and the divine attribute of omnipotence, and his persuasive argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason, still stand as models of philosophical analysis.
Thought and World: Hidden Necessities (published in 2008), is actually a condensed précis of his work since 1980. Given the range and depth of his scholarship, it is a dense and difficult piece of metaphysics from a broadly Aristotelian-based perspective. It is philosophical argumentation with nothing soft to cut it: it is like drinking pure hard philosophy and serious contemporary metaphysicians ignore it at their own expense.
Both of those works, along with Portraying Analogy (published in 1981), exhibited Jim's combination of boldness and insight. In some respects, his works were not focused on the 'hottest' or most philosophically fashionable topics but they always penetrated to the heart of vitally important issues and they did so in ways that will have enduring importance. Jim had the kind of independence of mind that obliged him to pursue what mattered most, rather than surfing whatever wave was cresting at the time.
There was humor in Jim's intellectual personality; he could make philosophy fun, while never losing sight of the deep significance of the philosophical project as a human undertaking. Even though his writing was sometimes dense (he once remarked, "I think like William James and write like Immanuel Kant") there was a rare combination of rigor and elegance in his thought. And there was a rare combination of challenge and encouragement in his teaching. He could expose a student's intellectual immaturity in ways that might sting but he never meant merely to wound; the tough-love was a much-needed reminder that there isn't a very good reason to be leisurely or complacent about pushing oneself beyond what had thus far seemed good enough. It could be a bit of a wild ride but it always led somewhere well worth going.
Ross's work deserves wider attention than it has attained so far. Our feeling is that this is because Jim did philosophy and taught philosophy in a way that involved a kind of delight and excitement, taking pleasure in intellectual surprises and discoveries, even when dealing with the most serious and difficult issues. There was a special kind of spark in his approach, and perhaps not enough of his contemporaries noticed and appreciated the illumination it brought with it. But his students did. One of the things he often reminded us of in his classes was that God's creation is His play---and there is surely nothing contrary to this play's being serious or sublime.
The world has lost a great philosopher, we have lost a great teacher and friend, and Jim, in his impish way, may be even having fun with this. However, in my sadness, I find that hard to appreciate.

Jonathan Jacobs (Colgate University) and John Zeis (Canisius College)

Suppose there is a perfect being (God)--a being maximal in power, knowledge, and goodness. Then this being will likely "save" (restore relationship with) everyone (all humans) eventually because:

1. God desires that everyone enjoy union with Himself.
2. If (1) is true, then God will do everything he can, without sacrificing a higher good, to maximize the chances of everyone enjoying union with Himself.
3. Granting each person an indefinite number of times the capacity to enter such a union (through repentance, trusting in Jesus, whatever) doesn't sacrifice a higher good.
4. Granting each person an indefinite number of times the capacity to enter such a union is something God can do.
5. Granting each person an indefinite number of times the capacity to enter such a union maximizes the chances of all his creatures eventually entering such a union.
6. Therefore, God will grant each person an indefinite number of times the capacity to enjoy union with Himself.
7. If (6), then everyone will eventually enjoy union with God (argument for this to come).
8. Therefore, everyone will eventually enjoy union with God (be "saved").

Here's why to believe each of the premises.

SO, I've been reading Stephen Meyer's Signature in the Cell, I'm about three quarters through, and I have to say that it's been an enjoyable read so far. Just as fun has been my reading group for this book with two biology majors, a biochemistry major, and a biological engineering major; they help explain the biology concepts to me.

The book's undergone a lot of controversy; I was motivated to read it primarily by Thomas Nagel's (in)famous recommendation. There's a lot to criticize about the book, and people have pointed to possible errors in biology that I'm currently not in the position to assess. There are also some little errors. For example, Meyer writes, "It follows that mind--conscious, rational intelligent agency--what philosophers call "agent causation," now stands as the only cause known to be capable of generating large amounts of specified information starting from a nonliving state" (341). Of course, this is not what philosophers call "agent causation", so it's an error, but it's a "little error" because nothing of significance falls on it. (In my opinion, most of the critical blog posts on the net that I've read so far focus on little errors and not at all on Meyer's overall argument for ID.) Also, the book is longer than it needs to be, although I often enjoy his excursions and illustrations.

The Templeton Foundation has awarded a $3.67m grant to fund The Character Project, under the direction of Christian Miller at Wake Forest University. Professor Miller writes to say that:

$2m will be devoted to three separate funding competitions, one of which will be for philosophers working on topics related to character broadly conceived, and another for theologians working on character. Projects on human and divine character, divine motivation theory, and religion and morality more generally might be good fits for these competitions when the RFPs are announced.

Yesterday, a funeral Mass was held for the inimitable James Ross. He was a truly remarkable philosopher and a remarkable man. He was one of my earliest inspirations for combining analytic philosophy with Medieval philosophy (a very natural fit as it turns out). And that was back in the 80's (I was Medieval when Medieval wasn't cool!)

A few years ago, I was privileged to be a commentator on the MS of his, as it turns out, last book, Thought and World: Hiddenn Necessities. It was an amazingly erudite monograph covering a vast range of topics for which he seemed to have the knowledge at his fingertips. He seemed to have read everything. It was a pleasure to know him.

Philly.com has a really nice obit.

It notes "For 54 years, he was married to Kathleen Fallon Ross, a nurse. They grew up in the same neighborhood and renewed their friendship when he had a summer job in Providence while in college. She died May 23." He made it less than two months without her. Having been with Sarah for 20 years now, I can totally understand that. I hope God grants me the grace of dying before her or not long after.

It's a testament to his optimism and remarkable productivity that he left a considerable list of unfinished projects in his CV.

His Phil Papers section also testifies to his productivity.

Sometimes I wish I lived in the UK. I can't imagine such a rational and fair discussion airing in the states, not even on NPR maybe.

Interview on Australian ABC affiliate.

Article in the Guardian on the old "New Atheists."

Morris's cool book _Inevitable Humans_.

A summary of some of his ideas from Wikipedia.

Simon Conway Morris's homepage in the Department of Earth Sciences, Cambridge U.

He's well known for his work on evolutionary convergence, the fact that certain features seem to evolve independently and almost inevitably. This has lead him to make the controversial claim--for which he however makes a good case based on the convergence data he's famous for in his field--that if there were life on other planets, it wold likely resemble life on Earth to a remarkable degree.

There are two potential applications of his work (at least) concerning the design argument. One is that it would settle a dilemma posed in this paper by Dougherty and Poston: "A User's Guide to Design Arguments." I.e. it would show that there is possibly a good fine-tuning argument for God's existence, but not a good biological design argument.

Second, it would go some way toward defeating the "strange alternative forms of life" objection to the fine-tuning argument.

I welcome both these results.

in May of this year, the Center for Philosophy of Religion, in partnership with the John Templeton Foundation, Calvin College, the Notre Dame Philosophy Department, and other sponsors put on a conference in honor of Alvin Plantinga's retirement. The video for that conference is now available here.

The standard age-of-accountability view includes the following claims:

1. At some age (which may not be the same for everyone), each person becomes morally responsible.
2. Before that point, (a) it would be unjust for God to hold the person responsible for their sins, or (b) they aren't really sins until that point, or (c) God would always be merciful in such cases when justice might still be deserved.
3. After that point, the gospel message applies, and those who repent and follow Christ are saved, while those who don't are not.

Now there's an unspecified fourth issue that an age-of-accountability view might go either way on. What criteria determine what the age of accountability is, and do the criteria admit of vagueness such that there isn't a clear line between being morally responsible and not being morally responsible? So we get the following two views:

Non-philosophy-based writing on religious epistemology mostly confuses me and frequently frustrates me. This article on Slate.com definitely confused me. But it's an opportunity to make a point. Consider this excerpt.

"Agnosticism doesn't fear uncertainty. It doesn't cling like a child in the dark to the dogmas of orthodox religion or atheism. Agnosticism respects and celebrates uncertainty and has been doing so since before quantum physics revealed the uncertainty that lies at the very groundwork of being."

Apart from the ad hominem and the fact that though quantum mechanics is pretty fundamental it's still pretty far from the "very groundwork of being," the thing that bugs me is this idea that religious believers have any particular interest in certainty. "Lord I believe, help thou my unbelief."

I've been pretty forthcoming about my own undulating credences here (enough so that some folks have asked me to send them my Spreadsheet (yes, I keep one)). Religious publishers catalogs abound with books embracing the consistency of faith and some limited but real doubt. There might be some fundamentalist sombitches out there who espouse certainty, but their getting all the press gets old. I've blogged a good bit on my Catholic blog about a *species* of certainty faith includes, but it's not the kind of certainty these kind of people are talking about.

Now Brian Leiter lauds a comment on that story which includes this:

"Atheism is NOT the certainty that there are no gods. It is NOT a conviction that science will one day answer all questions. Atheism is the refusal to believe in gods in the absence of evidence for their existence.

Some of my Christian Evidentialist colleagues at Rochester--there's a small colony of us emanating from there now--were discussing this and it was noticed that we counted as atheists according to this! After all, we refuse to believe *anything* in the absence of evidence!

Another problem with this definition is that it makes metaphysically impossible irrational atheists who disbelieve in God in the *presence* of evidence. And I have evidence that such persons are possible (it involves the lemma that the actual is possible). :-)

In The Problem of Evil, PvI presents a very interesting argument in the following dialogue between an atheist and a theist:

Atheist.If the stars in the sky were suddenly rearranged so as to spell out 'I am who am', I'd believe in the existence of God then, all right...

Theist.... even the 'I am who am' story wouldn't make the existence of God evident to a sufficiently determined skeptic--for even the (apparent) rearrangement of the stars could be the work of a lesser being than God. We can imagine no sign that would have to be the work of a necessary, omnipresent, omnipotent being. Any sign one might imagine could be ascribed to a contingent, locally present being whose powers, though vastly greater than ours, were finite. I should expect that someone like you would say that if two hypotheses explain the data equally well, and if they are alike but for the fact that one of them postulates an unobservable infinite being and the other an unobservable finite being, one should always prefer the latter hypothesis, since it does the same explanatory work as the former, but is, literally, infinitely weaker.

Atheist... You argument has convinced me of something you didn't forsee: that you theists have invented a being whose existence no one could possibly rationally believe in, since the hypothesis that he exists is necessarily infinitely stronger than other hypotheses that would explain any possible observations equally well... (pp. 141-142)

There's a lot of interest in here (e.g., the non sequitur that Atheist makes in that last sentence), but I'm interested in this claim:

"if two hypotheses explain the data equally well, and if they are alike but for the fact that one of them postulates an unobservable infinite being and the other an unobservable finite being, one should always prefer the latter hypothesis, since it does the same explanatory work as the former, but is, literally, infinitely weaker."

Unless I missed it, PvI never addresses this claim in the book. Do you guys think it's true? I wonder what arguments there are for or against it. (If people are interested in commenting on other parts of the quote, please go on right ahead.)

It looks as if Prosblogion is not the only way the technorati can get their fix of philosophy of religion. Of course, as Mike Beaty's comments at the end suggest, iPhoners aren't getting the same quality.

Read "You say God is Dead? There's an App for that!" in the NYT.

When we worry about the problem of evil, we tend to worry most about particularly horrendous evils. But consider the atheological inference from the occurrence of an evil to the claim that there would be no good enough reason for God to permit this evil. Is this inference any stronger in the case of a horrendous evil (e.g., genocide) than in the case of a trivial evil (e.g., uncomfortable pebble in shoe)?

Here is one possibility (which I got from Trent): Say that an evil is in principle unjustifiable iff it is not permissible to allow the evil no matter how great a good would be lost or how great an evil caused by preventing it. Obviously trivial evils are poor candidates for being in principle unjustifiable. So if the inference is: "E is in principle unjustified, and hence God has no good enough reason to permitted", then the argument is indeed better off in the case of horrendous evils. Maybe there could be in principle unjustifiable evils. For instance: "everyone always suffering horrendously despite everyone being innocent". But none of the evils we observe are in principle unjustifiable. For instance, let S be the mereological sum of all the human sufferings. Then, S is not in principle unjustifiable, because it would be permissible to allow S if the only way of preventing S would result in a hundred planets full of aliens each suffering in ways comparable to S.

Apart from in principle unjustifiable evils, then, is the atheological inference from horrendous evils better than that from trivial evils? I don't know. On the one hand, allowing a horrendous evil requires a much more potent justificatory reason. On the other hand, many horrendous evils do very obviously bring along with them the opportunities for very great goods--exercises of courage, compassion, patience, forgiveness, etc. Granted, many will query if the value of the opportunities would be sufficient to justify God's allowing the horrendous evil, and intuitions will differ, but at least we can, typically, point to a number of uncontroversial goods of quite high magnitude. On the other hand, with the trivial evils it can often be harder to point to any goods (e.g., consider the uncomfortable pebble in one's shoe).

So maybe it's not harder to say in the case of the horrendous evil "There is a justification, but we don't know what it is" than in the case of a trivial evil. But if so, then why is it that when we worry about the problem of evil, we are more apt to worry about greater evils than smaller ones?