April 2010 Archives

Descartes’ frequently criticized argument for dualism, on one version, goes like this.

1. I can conceive myself as existing without my body.
2. If I can conceive x as existing without y, then x can exist without y.
3. :. It is possible for me to exist without my body.
4. :. I am not identical to my body.

Criticism of this argument comes in various forms. One criticism is that even if it showed that you can exist without your current body, it does not show that you could exist without any body at all. A more familiar criticism concerns premise (2), and the argument from conceivablity to possibility. It states that Descartes might have shown that it’s epistemically possible for you to exist without your body, but not that it is metaphysically so.

Let me try to defend Descartes. (1) is almost certainly true. Not only can I conceive of myself as existing without my (current) body, I have existed without my current body. Fifteen years ago I did not have this body, but I existed. Given the rate of protein turnover in the brain, I certainly do not have the same brain cells now that I had then. But surely I existed then. So I’m not metaphysically dependent on my current body. But then (3) is true. It is possible for me to exist without my current body. But the interesting question is whether I can exist without any body at all. I have an argument that I can exist without any body at all.

Suppose I have body B. Let B-1 be my body minus one cell of my current body. I can exist without B-1. Inductive step: for any body Bn that I might have, there is a world in which I exist with Bn-1. Therefore there is a world in which I exist with no body at all.

If we reject this conclusion, then there is some world in which I exist with body Bn and no world in which I exist with body Bn-1. But for any world in which I exist with any body Bn, it is possible that I lose a single cell (or single particle) and continue to exist. Of course, it might be argued that ‘exist’ is vague, and so there are worlds in which I have cells Bn-1 and indeterminately exist. But there are well-known, powerful arguments that ‘exist’ is not vague; there is no world in which I indeterminately exist. So we cannot reject our conclusion. Therefore it is possible that I exist with no body at all.

Three cheers for dualism!

Multiverses promise neat solutions to the problem(s) of evil and the problem of no best world. The solution is fairly simple. Let S be an infinite set of improving universes (assuming it’s a set). Let S’ be the set of all universes in S that are on-balance good. What God must actualize is the multiverse M = the set S’ of all on-balance good universes. We can make all sorts of other assumptions about whether every U in M is an island universe, or is in some remote way physically/causally accessible to the other universes in M. But some main problems from philosophical theology are resolved.

1. God has actualized the best possible world, though there are infinitely many improving worlds.

2. God cannot prevent an instance of evil E in M without failing to actualize a universe U that is on balance good, and so without diminishing the overall value of the world = M.

There are other major problems for this view, but I want to focus on the problem of evil. We have stipulated that each U in M is on balance good, and so it is true that the prevention of any E in U would cost the mulitiverse more good than evil. But our assumptions also make it (close to) undeniable that the multiverse is infinitely valuable. So I put down the following (perhaps controversial) principle. Call P the Principle of Minimizing Aggregative Evil.

P. Necessarily, for any instance of evil E and multiverse M, if the prevention of E in M would cost M more increments in good then decrements in evil but the prevention of E would not diminish the overall value of M, then God ought to prevent E.

I think this announcement definitely deserves its own post. Flew was one of the most influential atheists of the past century. Of note is his late-life rejection of his atheism on the basis of biological design arguments. More information can be found here (thanks to Mike Almeida for the link). If anybody has any personal notes in remembrance of Flew, they would be appreciated.

This was pretty disappointing. The argument for agnosticism is effectively the obscure claim that ‘you can’t prove a negative’. So you can’t prove that God does not exist. But there are any number of apriori proofs that God does not exist, any one of which might be sound. I don’t know what it means that you can’t prove a negative. You can’t prove that 2+3 is not 9? And the explanation for why we should be suspicious of theistic belief is equally unsophisticated. Everyone wants desperately to believe, according to Searle, so we ought to be suspicious of (presumably our grounds for) theistic belief. But I don’t think I know anyone who wants desperately to believe. It’s rather easier not to believe, I think. Anyway, here it is.

The John Templeton Foundation, the Society of Christian Philosophers, Oxford University and the University of Oklahoma are pleased to announce the Templeton Research Fellows Program for 2011-2012. This is the final year of a program designed to promote extended international exchange at Oxford University with philosophers of religion and scientists. We are seeking highly-qualified Fellows with an established record of successful publication, and whose proposed research will open up new avenues for interdisciplinary growth in the philosophy of religion. Applicants must have a Ph.D. prior to application and be affiliated with an accredited institution.

Two of the fellowships will be given to applicants proposing research at the interface of philosophy of religion and philosophy of physics, cosmology, mathematics, logic, or the natural sciences. One of the fellowships will be given to an applicant proposing research in any area of the philosophy of religion.

We invite recent Ph.D.’s and more advanced scholars to apply for a year-long fellowship in residence at Oxford University for the opportunity to engage in sustained interaction with some of the world’s foremost philosophers, scientists, theologians, and other specialists in religion. Three scholars will be chosen as research Fellows for the 2011-2012 year of the program (two junior and one senior). A Junior Fellow will receive a stipend of $50,000. A Senior Fellow will receive a stipend of $70,000. In addition, there will be funds for relocation, travel, research, etc.

For further details, please visit our website.

Readers of Prosblogion will want to know that J. Howard Sobel died on March 26, 2010. Klaas Kraay forwarded his obiturary to me today, which I post below. He was a good friend and colleague, and a welcome and frequent visitor to the Brackenridge Philosophy Symposium. He loved talking about philosophy (during the Brackenridge Symposia, he’d talk philosophy at my home, with more energy than any of us, late into the evening), and had (as anyone who has met him will attest) one of the sharpest minds in the business.

David Johnson told me recently that he thought Howard’s Logic and Theism was the best book of it’s kind. I certainly agree. But he also made major contributions to decision theory, the logic of counterfactuals, ethical theory and metaethics. Much of his work is posted on his site. Howard was unfailingly kind, patient, and generous to me, no matter how often I sought his advice or asked his opinion (and that was very often). I’ll never forget that. I’ll miss him a lot.

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion now has a Younger Scholars Prize in Philosophical Theology, to be awarded annually. The deadline for submission for this year is August 31, 2010. Details of the award and current competition details below the fold.

Help spread the word on this fantastic opportunity!

Augustine says that our hearts are restless until they rest in God. This is a desire for God, but it is not at all explicit, which is why humans restlessly seek after other things, hoping to satisfy the desire, unaware that it is a desire for God. In this way, it is like hunger in a young child: hunger is a desire for food, but the child may only know that she is miserable, and not that what she desires is food. I shall call this kind of desire "deep theological desire". The argument form now is this:

1. (Premise) Every desire has an intentional object.
2. (Premise) If there is no God, deep theological desire has no intentional object.
3. (Premise) Deep theological desire exists.
4. Therefore, God exists.

Premise (1) is a consequence of the standard view of desire which entails that a desire is a state that inclines one in the direction of the intentional object. Observe, that the object is only intentional, so one can have desires for non-existent things. (If presentism were true, such desires would be very common.) I am sceptical of aspects of the standard view of desire, but I say that (1) is still correct. Premise (3) is justified by the lived experience of attentive persons like Augustine.

The really controversial assumption is premise (2), and I haven't said anything in favor of it yet. It would be mistaken to try to derive (2) from some premise like: "The intentional object of a desire has to exist", since one can desire a golden mountain. In general, it is possible to have desires with non-existent objects. What is special in the theological case?

In Leiter's recent post on Jason Stanley's nice article on the relationship between philosophy and the humanities, somebody asked, "What eternal truths have philosophers discovered in the last 2,000 years that have any bearing on life such that anyone in any discipline outside of philosophy ought to care?"

There was a lot of discussion on what philosophers (and analytic philosophers) have discovered, and so I cited Plantinga's argument in the Nature of Necessity for the conclusion that the existence of God and evil are compatible. Most theists and atheists who work on the problem of evil (at least in analytic philosophy) think that his argument was successful. I thought that this was a conclusion that people in the humanities (outside of philosophy) should care about.

I'm bringing attention to this discussion at this blog partly because, if you have the time, I want to ask that you make sure that I'm not saying false things. (One guy thought that I was kidding!) (Also, here, I am really asking only those people who work on PoE and are familiar with the literature.) Second, I would like to give good PR to philosophy of religion; it's largely ignored in these sorts of discussions, but I think it's an area where real progress - progress that nonphilosophers should care about - has been made. And most philosophers who frequent this blog will care that phil. religion gets good PR.

I've been reading here and there through one of Michael Rea's philosophical theology books, and I discovered this amazing article by David Lewis called "Do We Believe in Penal Substitution". This is probably old news for some readers, but it was new for me, and I was deeply impressed; I had lost a lot of confidence in penal substitution.

I don't have the book currently available to me, but I want to post on it. The gist (in my own words and from memory):

Many Christians seem to be double-minded. They would not be happy with penal substitution in certain cases (some innocent, even a willing innocent, serving a murderer's six-year sentence), but they are okay with Christ taking our punishment. This is inconsistent. Problem? Perhaps.

BUT, Lewis points out, we ALL believe in penal substitution to some extent, in the area of paying fines. My punishment for parking illegally or damaging somebody else's property can be paid for by a fine. And it doesn't matter if a loved one pays that fine for me; justice is met even if I myself do not pay it. So, Lewis says, we are all double-minded about penal substitution.

Insofar as we agree with Lewis' case, we must also agree that penal substitution is at least possible; the idea itself is not incoherent, as some claim. This point alone goes a long way in response to some criticisms.

The work that needs to be done, however, is why penal substitution seems okay in the fine case but not in the jail-serving case. What's the difference? Lewis doesn't answer, and I don't know either. If we could find it, this might serve to count either for or against penal substitution as it applies to the atonement. Any ideas?

Ari: Consider this horrific theology: God forces Sally to sin, in a way that takes away her responsibility, and then he intentionally causes eternal torment to her.
Cal: I thought you were smarter than that. That isn't Calvinist theology! Calvinism holds that God intentionally causes people to sin in a way that retains their responsibility, and then punishes some of them.
Ari: I didn't say it was a Calvinist theology. You agree that this is a horrific theology, I take it?
Cal: Yes, of course.
Ari: Why?
Cal: Because God is punishing an innocent.
Ari: I said nothing about punishment. I said God intentionally caused eternal torment. I didn't say that the torment was a punishment.
Cal: How does that make it not be horrific?

I've been slowly working through Peter van Inwagen's The Problem of Evil, and I gave pause at the following remark:

I believe that science has made only two contributions to the data of natural theology. The discovery of this fact [that animals have been suffering long before the arrival of humans] is one of them; the other is the discovery that the physical world does not have an infinite past. (112)

One could question PvI's claims both about what have been contributions to natural theology and what have not. Regarding the former, I didn't think the finitude of the physical world was an established scientific discovery.

Regarding the latter, I wonder whether there are counterexamples to PvI's claim. Maybe we can make a list and consider why he doesn't think they are contributions to natural theology. Given my respect for PvI, the fact that he doesn't think X is a contribution to natural theology gives me strong reason to think it isn't.

To start off the list, there has been the discovery that the conditions of the universe shortly after the big bang are finely-tuned so that life can exist; the probability that those conditions would be life-permitting rather than life-prohibiting is very small. Surely, this is a contribution to natural theology? I can't see why he would think they weren't.

Any other examples?

J.L. Austin famously distinguished excused actions from justified actions in (roughly) the following way. When we defend ourselves against the charge that what we did was wrong by claiming that the action we performed was justified, we accept responsibility for the action but deny that it was bad. But when we defend ourselves by offering an excuse, we accept that the action was bad or wrong, but we deny that we were responsible (or fully responsible) for the action (cf. ‘A Plea for Excuses’). The distinction is a common one, and important in moral theory and philosophy of religion, but I don’t think it can be sustained. Suppose you are charged with letting a certain evil event E occur, and you want to defend yourself. You can say that you did let E occur and E was necessary to some greater good. In this way you accept responsibility for permitting E, but you deny that permitting E was on balance bad.

P1. If S permits evil E, and N(G ⊃ E), and V(E & G) ≻ 0, then E is a justified (non-gratuitous) evil.

P1 is more or less standard in discussions of gratuitous evil, but surely it’s wrong. Take any very minor good G such that N(G ⊃ E). Add S to G, where S is the great good of salvation of the human race. It follows that N(S & G ⊃ E),and no doubt V(E & G & S) ≻ 0. Now, it is easy to prove that every evil E is non-gratuitous. For every evil E, it is true that N(E ⊃ E). And it follows that N((S & E) ⊃ E), and certainly V(E & S) ≻ 0. So, P1 is wrong.

Suppose you defend yourself by claiming that you let E occur but permitting E is better than it would have been had you not permitted E. Consider P2.

P2. If S permits evil E, and (E N→ O1) and (~E N→ O2), and V(E & O1) ≻ V(~E & O2), then E is a justified (non-gratuitous) evil.

One problem with P2 is that there any number of ways of preventing evil E, many of which have importantly different properties.

Let S0 = {A1, …,An} be a set of actions that satisfy the description (i) preventing evil E and also satisfy the description (ii) (A N→ O1) and (~A N→ O2), and V(~A & O2) ≻ V(A & O1).

Let S1 = {An+1, …,Aj} be a set of actions that satisfy the description (i) preventing evil E and also satisfy the description (ii) (A N→ O1) and (~A N→ O2), and V(A & O1) ≻ V(~A & O2).

Suppose I can prevent evil E, but I cannot perform any action in S1. And suppose S1 is not empty, so E is a gratuitous evil. That is, there is some A such that A is a prevention of E and V(A & O1) ≻ V(~A & O2). Do we say that my action of not preventing evil E is justified, though E is not necessary to any greater good? Or, do we say that the prevention of E is not justified—after all E is gratuitous—but I have an excuse for not preventing E? But how could it be true that I’m excused, since I don’t have any excuse to offer other than I cannot perform an action in S1?

Let’s make it somewhat more concrete. You can perform an action in S1, I cannot. I can perform and action in S0. Since you can perform an action in S1 it is clear that the occurrence of evil E is not necessary to some greater good. E itself is unjustified or gratuitous. So we seem to have the following options:

1. S might be justified in not preventing a gratuitous evil E.
2. S is never justified in not preventing a gratuitous evil E, even if the best that S can do includes not preventing E.
3. S might be excused (but unjustified) in not preventing a gratuitous evil E, even if not preventing E is the best S can do.

Begin with this plausible principle:

1. If x is necessitated by his internal state and the circumstances to do something wrong, then either (a) x's character was in some way vicious prior to the action or (b) x is not culpable for the wrong (or both).

But now add these premises:

2. The first sin was culpable.
3. The internal state of the first sinner was in no way vicious prior to the first sin. (The goodness of creation)

4. The first sinner's first sin was not necessitated by his internal state and the circumstances.