March 2010 Archives

The Thomistic Seminar is the Witherspoon Institute's fifth-annual, week-long, intensive program for graduate students in philosophy. The seminar is devoted to exploring the intersection between analytic philosophy and the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.

This year's seminar, entitled "Aesthetics and Morality: Thomistic and Contemporary Philosophical Approaches," will examine the relationship between aesthetics and morality, particularly with respect to the social aspects of human life. It will take place August 15 - 21, 2010 in Princeton, New Jersey.

I'd like to share some recent thoughts I've had about testimony in relation to prior probability. In particular, I'd like to motivate the claim that in many important cases of testimony (including religious testimony, depending upon one's background beliefs), one's estimate of the the prior probability of a claim has no bearing at all on the credibility of the testimony expressing that claim. Disclaimer: The discussion to follow is tentative and expressed by one who hasn't studied the literature on the epistemology of testimony.

I used to suspect that one important reason why certain testimonies are not credible is that the prior probability of the claim reported is very low--perhaps lower than the prior probability that the testifier hasn't lied or made a mistake. But here's some evidence against thinking that testimonies are defeated merely by virtue of their having a low prior probability. My wife says to me, "I just bought a book. The book says ...." She reads me the first page of the book. Suppose she reads 30 sentences and suppose for simplicity that for each sentence, the prior probability that the book really records that sentence or something similar is ½. (Naturally, it would be much lower). Then the prior probability that the book contains all those sentences (or similar sentences) is 1/2^30 = about 1/(1 billion). That's pretty low. If she reads another page of 30 sentences, the prior probability drops to 1/(1 trillion * 1 trillion * 1 trillion * 1 trillion * 1 trillion). That's ridiculously low. It's so low that if low prior probabilities can defeat testimony, my wife's testimony should be defeated well before she completes the second page. But surely her testimony isn't defeated. Sure, she may have gotten a word or two wrong, but most likely the book really does contain sentences approximately like the ones she reports. Her testimony isn't defeated by the remarkably low prior probability of her claim.

On a recent NPR program, a guest (I don't remember the name) discussed his hypothesis as to why people believe in an afterlife. He said that studies suggest that the prevalent belief in an afterlife among kids isn't adequately explained merely in terms of their being taught it by society. His theory, instead, is that we have a hard time imagining ourselves not existing, for when we try to do so, we always have our own conscious mind there in the background. That's an interesting proposal.

I'd like to offer a different hypothesis for consideration. Perhaps we are directly aware of our selves, and in being aware of our selves, we do not thereby detect any of the properties that our bodies have. (Some anecdotal evidence: I recently asked a 1 year-old (almost 2) "who are you?" He looked intently at me, paused, and then said, "I'm me". How did he come up with that answer if not by awareness of himself?) If so, then perhaps when a child considers what happens after her body is destroyed, she finds no reason to think that she her self would thereby be destroyed. It's thus natural for her to suppose that she'd keep existing. Why wouldn't she?

In order to foster philosophical discussion and encourage fellowship in smaller departments and institutions, the Society of Christian Philosophers has established a new small grant program. The program provides up to $1500 for departments to host a well-known Christian philosopher for a lecture and discussion. (These funds can be supplemented or matched by the host institution.) Two such grants will be made available each academic year (ideally, one in the fall semester and one in the spring semester).

REQUIREMENTS AND CONDITIONS

• "Smaller" departments are defined as departments with 3 or fewer full-time philosophers on the faculty.
• Both the applicant (i.e., inviter) and lecturer (invitee) must be members of the Society of Christian Philosophers. For information on membership in SCP, visit http://www.societyofchristianphilosophers.com/about/membership/.
• The host department/institution is responsible for all logistics related to inviting and hosting the lecturer. Applicants are encouraged to query the potential lecturer before applying for the grant.
• Grant recipients need not provide receipts; grant funds will be disbursed upon approval of a proposed budget. The grant can be supplemented or leveraged with other institutional funds, but this is neither a requirement nor a factor in evaluating applications.
• After the event, grant recipients are required to submit a brief report (and photos, if possible) to the Executive Director of SCP in a format that can be shared with the membership in the SCP newsletter and via the SCP website.
• Unsuccessful applicants are encouraged to re-apply.

HOW TO APPLY

Applications to the lecture grant program must:

1. briefly describe your department and confirm that it is a "small" department as defined above;
2. identify the philosopher to be invited, with a brief description of the topic(s) to be addressed and when the event would be held (i.e., semester; specific date not required);
3. indicate the format of the visit (e.g., lecture + lunch with undergraduate philosophy majors); and
4. provide a proposed budget of expenses, indicating how the grant will be used (and, where applicable, how other institutional funds will be used to supplement the grant).

The application should be submitted to James K.A. Smith, Executive Director of the Society of Christian Philosophers at jkasmith@calvin.edu. Any questions should be directed to the same.

DEADLINES

Applications will be considered semiannually on June 1 and December 1. Grant announcements will be made on June 30 and December 30.

Sad news indeed from Thomas Oord's blog:

I received sad news in an email recently: Clark Pinnock is suffering from Alzheimer's disease.

Clark sent John Sanders and me the following note:

Dear Tom and John:

I want to inform you that I am now middle stage Alzheimer's. I will not be able to do my writing etc. I am 73 years now, and I've enjoyed my biblical three score and ten. I am not bitter. I have had a good life. I'll meet you over Jordan if not before.

You are free to make this news known.

With love,

Clark

There are some nice comments on Oord's post; follow the above link.

Bas van Fraassen on possible worlds here. I’ve posted this link before, but see the extraordinarily enriched set of programs (many more than previously noted) on God, Consciousness and Cosmos Closer to Truth. Really a terrific resource (I’ve shown several of these in courses).

The 2010 UT- San Antonio workshop in metaphysics and philosophy of religion is scheduled for April 9-10. All are welcome. There is no registration fee. The papers and list of participants are posted here. The program is posted here.

Conversations from the Pale Blue Dot by Luke Muehlhauser.

Episodes so far:

030. Divine Command Morality (Mar 2010)
Guest David McNaughton: philosopher at Florida State University

029. Non-Natural Moral Realism (Mar 2010)
Guest Erik Wielenberg: philosopher at DePauw University

028. Christianity Beyond Fundamentalism (Mar 2010)
Guest Eric Reitan: philosopher and theologian at Oklahoma State University

027. Encouragement to Doubting Christians (Mar 2010)
Guest Ken Pulliam: former Christian professor and apologist

026. Naturalism, Humanism, and Democracy (Mar 2010)
Guest John Shook: philosopher with Center For Inquiry Transnational

025. Can Theism Ground Morality? (Mar 2010)
Guest Stephen Maitzen: philosopher of religion at Acadia University

Suppose you think that metaphysical nihilism is possible. Take metaphysical nihilism to be the position that there exist no concete objects. And take concrete objects to be spatially and temporally (or at least temporally) located objects. There is a well-known argument for the possiblity of metaphysical nihilism: the subtraction argument.

1. There might be a world with a finite domain of concrete objects.
2. These concrete objects are each things which might not exist.
3. The non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate the existence of any other such thing.

The argument goes this way (see T. Baldwin, Analysis, ‘96). If W is the actual world, then either W contains finitely many objects or there is a world W1 accessible from W that has finitely many objects. From W1, there is a world W2 that is exactly like W1 except that W1 contains object x0 and W2 does not. From W2 there is an accessible world W3 just like W2 except that W2 contains object x1 and W2 does not. By repeated substractions we arrive at Wn that contains one concrete object and finally the world Wnil that contains no concrete objects at all. If we allow that S5 is describes accessibility among worlds, then Wnil is accessible from the actual world W. We should conclude that it is possible that there are no concrete objects at all.

But if metaphysical nihilism is possible, and S5 describes the logic of possibility, then we should conclude that God exists. If S5 describes the logic of possibility, then not only is Wnil accessible from W but that W is accessible from Wnil. That is, S5 + metaphysical nihilism, entails that P is true.

P. It is possible that the actual world—the set of contingent objects that comprise the actual world—came from nothing at all—came from a world in which there are no concrete objects at all.

But I can’t think of anyone who thinks that the actual world W is accessible from the nihilisitc world, Wnil, without some explanatory assumptions about Wnil. Whatever assumptions you make about Wnil, they cannot involve any concrete objects. So they cannot involve any object in the natural world in Wnil. I suppose one might hold that we can arrive at W from Wnil as a matter of brute fact. But that’s pretty desperate. The only reasonable and available option is an explanation that appeals to something non-natural and non-concrete.

Virtually no one denies that S5 is the logic of metaphysical possibility. So we seem to have two possible conclusions.

a. Metaphysical nihilism is impossible.

b. God exists.

To the extent that you have evidence that (a) is false, you have evidence that (b) is true. I think that evidence is pretty strong.

I’ve been talking with AP recently about whether God’s causing strong dispositions to always do what is right is consistent with the agent (in whom God causes such dispositions) being significantly free. He’s not inclined to deny significant freedom in these cases, if I’m understanding him right. But then I mentioned this probabilistic argument against transworld depravity.

Suppose I tell you that my die is fair. But I quickly add that, in every world in which it is tossed, it it fails to come up 5. You’d rightly urge that my die does not have a 1/6 chance of coming up 5, and so is not fair, despite what I say. You’d certainly be right.

Suppose I tell you that, given the strong dispositions D to always go right that God caused Smith to have, he has a 1/10,000 chance of always going right. But I quickly add that, in every world in which God creates Smith with D, Smith fails to always go right. You’d rightly deny that he really has a 1/10,000 chance of always going right. Obviously, his chances of always going right are 0.

The fact is that if God can cause Smith to have those dispositions, and having them is consistent with Smith being significantly free, then the probabilities alone (1/10,000) guarantee that in some world in which God creates him with D he always goes right. Again, if there is no world in which Smith is created with D and always goes right, then the chances of him always going right given D are 0. So, here are the possible conclusions:

1. TWD is still true since, possibly, a set of strong dispositions to always go right does not make the chances of always going right any greater than it would be given a set of strong dispositions never to go right. And possibly the chances are zero on either set of dispositions.

2. TWD is still true since, possibly, God cannot cause a significantly free agent to have a set of strong dispositions always to go right. Creating him with D makes him unfree with respect to right actions.

3. TWD is false since, God can cause an agent to have a set of strong dispositions always to go right and in any world where he does so, the chances of always going right are greater than 0. But if the chances of Smith always going right given D are greater than 0, then there is some feasible world in which God creates Smith with D and Smith always goes right.

(1) seems clearly false. Certainly, strong dispositions to always go right affect the chances of always going right. (2) was what I asked AP about, and he seems to deny it. So, it looks like (3) is the right option. But then we have an argument from chance against TWD.

(I got this from John Haldane.)

School of Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies
Professorial Fellowship in Moral Philosophy

Applications are invited for the position of Professorial Fellow in moral philosophy, within the School of Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies.

The position is open to scholars of the highest international distinction in research, working in moral philosophy, social philosophy, philosophy of religion, or aesthetics - including the histories of these.

The position will be a one-quarter fixed-term position (with duration of 5 years). You will visit St. Andrews for a period of at least six teaching weeks in either of the University's two semesters. You will contribute to undergraduate and graduate teaching in the School of Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies, and also contribute to the research activities of the School. A commitment to engagement with a wider public audience is also considered essential.

The Professorial Fellowship will provide a stipend of £12,000 per annum, a sum intended to cover the cost of travel to St. Andrews, and accommodation and living expenses during residence.

I find the idea that an actual infinity is impossible very counterintuitive, but sometimes arguments can establish something very counterintuitive. Actually, even if the following argument does not show that actual infinities are impossible, it will, I think, show that one cannot make any probabilistic inferences in an infinite multiverse. And that's an interesting conclusion in its own right. (That said, I have some technical qualms about the argument that I can't articulate.)

Begin with the Parity Principle: If it is almost certain (i.e., if it has probability one) that (a) the basic properties Q and R have exactly the same distribution at t1, and that (b) x is a substance existing at t1 and a member of basic kind K, and no other information is available about x, then the probability that x has Q is equal to the probability that x has R. (Here, I allow such probability values as "undefined", "inscrutable" as well as intervals, vague values.)

For my argument I will need the assumption that it is possible to have indiscernibles--objects that have all the same basic properties. I actually think this assumption is false, but I am hoping that this assumption can be relaxed.

The possibility of indiscernibles and the Parity Principle are going to be the only potentially controversial assumptions in the argument. If you trust me on this point, you can stop reading the argument, and just argue against these two assumptions. Though you might want to read on to see how exactly I understand the "same distribution" condition in the Parity Principle.

Grants offered through Florida State University supporting philosophical and theological inquiry into the importance and implications of free will in the theological domain.

Fellowship Announcement

The Big Questions in Free Will Program offers funds for inquiry into theological presuppositions and implications of belief in free will. Grants will support work along two general lines. The first includes projects that aim to elucidate the nature of divine freedom itself. The second includes projects addressing the interplay between human free will and divine attributes.

For information about the project and the application process, go to http://www.freewillandscience.com.

This is inspired by Mike Almeida's post. For simplicity, suppose all utilities are commensurable.

No finite amount of utility justifies killing a being with moral standing. Take this to be stipulative of moral standing, and further take it as a substantive thesis that adult humans have moral standing. For any being x at a time t, let u(x,t) be the greatest (finite or infinite) number u with the property that if u' is any number smaller than u, then it is wrong to destroy x at t to produce u' units of utility. For instance, if the units of utility are average human lives, maybe u(adult dog, now) is 0.0001--it would be wrong to kill a dog to produce less than 0.0001 times the value of an average human life, but it would not be wrong to kill a dog to produce 0.00011 times that value. The exact calibration will be obviously controversial, and some people will say that the right number for a dog is 0.1 or 0.5 or even 1. We could call u(x,t) the "moral significance of x at t". Note that x has moral standing at t if and only if u(x,t) is infinite.

Now consider the following plausible assumptions:

1. No earthly critter changes at all significantly in its natural properties over a period of time in its life that does not exceed the Planck time (5.4x10⁻⁴⁴ seconds).
2. If x is an earthly critter, and u(x,t) changes very significantly over a period of time, then x changes at least somewhat significantly in its natural properties over that period.
3. If u(x,t₂)>100u(x,t₁)+100, where the units are average human life utilities, then u(x,t) has changed very significantly between t₁ and t₂.

4. If x is an earthly critter that has moral standing at some time in its life, then x has moral standing at all times in its life.

5. I was once a fetus.
6. I now have moral standing.

7. The fetus I have grown out of had moral standing.

Case 1:

Consider a possible world which is similar to ours except for the rate at which our counterparts develop into persons. Otherwise, the rate of biological development is not much different, the human counterparts are born on average 9 months after conception too. But they are conscious, thinking, and reasoning at a much higher level, much sooner. They are, in short, persons much sooner in something like the textbook sense of ‘person’. Suppose they are textbook persons within a week of conception. Here’s what’s not credible: it is permissible to terminate a textbook person so long as you do so before a week has elapsed. It is just not credible that, on day 5.99999 the being has no particular value, but on day 6 it has great value.

Case 2:

But suppose you don’t find that incredible. Consider a world in which it takes 30 seconds to develop into a textbook person. It’s not credible that I had no moral value .00002 seconds ago, and now I have great moral value. The moral difference in you is negligible over .002 seconds.

Case 3:

If you find it incredible that it is permissible to terminate the would-be textbook person in case (1) or case (2), then you should find it incredible that it is permissible to terminate an actual would-be textbook person. Even if you suppose that the predicate ‘being a person’ is vague, it is true that, at some level of vagueness, a being moves from not definitely all the way up a textbook person to definitely all the way up texbook person in an instant. In an instant, the being moves from being the sort of thing that has hardly any value to the kind of thing that you cannot terminate with doing an extreme moral wrong. But it cannot be true that the natural properties you acquire in a single instant are sufficient to make that great of a moral difference.

(Original version was posted on my own blog.)

Occasionally, I've offered theistic arguments that border on begging the question. Here, for instance, is one that's basically due to Kant, but transposed into an argument in a way that Kant would not approve of:

1. (Premise) We should be grateful for the wondrous universe.
2. (Premise) If something is not the product of agency, we should not be grateful for it.
3. Therefore, the wondrous universe is the product of agency.

Nonetheless, I think there could be something to (1)-(3). Dan Johnson, in the January 2009 issue of Faith and Philosophy has a fascinating little article on the ontological and cosmological arguments. He argues that a certain kind of circularity is not vicious. Suppose that I know p₁. I then infer p₂ from p₁ in such a way that I also know p₂. I then non-rationally (or irrationally) stop believing p₁, but as it happens, I continue to believe p₂. It will then often be the case that there will be a good argument from p₂ back to p₁ (perhaps given some auxiliary premises), and if I use that argument, I will be able to regain my knowledge of p₁. This is true even though there is a circularity: from p₁, to p₂, and back to p₁. Here is an uncontroversial example: I am told my hotel room is 314. I infer that my hotel room is the first three digits of pi. I then forget that my hotel room is 314, but continue to believe it is the first three digits of pi. I then infer that my hotel room is 314.

From Remigiusz Sowa, a remarkable story of Father Lazarus El Anthony, university lecturer and Marxist who abandoned his life in Australia and went in search of God. His pilgrimage eventually brought him to the life of a Christian Coptic monk. He lives in solitude on the Al-Qalzam Mountain (Egypt) in the pursuit of what the Desert Fathers called apatheia, holy stillness. (Apologies for the inevitable ad in the video)

Something is wrong in the logic of expiation. It’s a common belief among Christians that God chose to atone for all sin. I wonder whether it is true that God has atoned for all evil, too, but I’ll focus on the narrower claim. Here is one way to understand expiation.

E. The sin S is expiated if God has responded with R to S and the value of R&S is positive or zero.

I say that R&S is positive or zero, but I mean only that it’s morally preferable (or morally indifferent) that R&S than ~R&S. But of course if R&S is positive, then R&S is also better than ~R&~S, and if R&S is zero, then it is no worse than ~R&~S. So, it is better (or at least not worse) that you sin and God atones for it than that you not sin and God does not atone for it. But is it better that R&S than R&~S? Is it better that you commit sin S and God atones for S than that God atones for S and S never occur? Seems likely. It is worse that someone accepts punishment in expiation of a sin that is never committed. Now, suppose God atoned for all actual sin.

According to Mark 3:28-29, Jesus said, "I tell you the truth, all the sins and blasphemies of men will be forgiven them. But whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit will never be forgiven; he is guilty of an eternal sin."

I never was sure exactly what this blaspheming referred to. Anyway, whatever it is, it's something that, according to Jesus, a person will not be forgiven for. If a person will not be forgiven for it, then it follows that God will not forgive the person for it. Then I thought of this argument:

1) Necessarily, the Greatest Conceivable Being (GCB) will forgive all sins.
2) Possibly, God, as conceived of by Jesus, will not forgive all sins.
3) So, God, as conceived of by Jesus, is not the GCB.

Regarding (1), it seems to me that any being that will forgive all sins is greater than one that will not. I take it that A can forgive B even if B has not repented in any way. My only concern is that maybe the GCB's being perfectly just prohibits him from forgiving all sins. But I can't see why this is so. It seems that a parent can both justly punish a child and forgive her child. Any thoughts?