Let G be the benefits of climbing Mt Everest, and let E be the (rather horrific, I think) burdens. Let us grant that it's not contrary to virtue (prudence in this case) to achieve G for oneself at the expense of suffering E. One way to say this is like this: E-for-me is proportionate (or not disproportionate) to G-for-me relative to me as an agent. I will abbreviate "E-for-x is proportionate to G-for-y relative to z as an agent" as "P(E,G,x,y,z)." So the above claim is: P(E,G,I,I,I).
On the other hand, it would be disproportionate for me to achieve G for myself at the expense of your suffering E (in the Mt Everest case, after all, E is weeks of hard labor, frostbite, danger, etc.). Thus, ~P(E,G,you,you,I). (The utilitarian, on the other hand, thinks that P(E,G,x,y,z) iff P(E,G,x',y',z') for any x,y,z,x',y',z'. But she's wrong about that.) Interestingly, it would also be disproportionate for me to achieve G for you at the expense of your suffering E (without your permission, that is--I shall take it for granted in all the discussion that there is no consent).
Let "p(x,y,z)" be the "proportionality standard" for permitting burdens to x that are the cost of benefits to y as produced by agent z. We can think of p(x,y,z) as the set of all pairs (E,G) such that P(E,G,x,y,z). Any such pair (E,G) is said to be "allowed" for (x,y,z). We can then compare proportionality standards by stringency. A simple and precise way is to say that p(x,y,z) is at least as stringent as p(x',y',z') iff anything that is allowed for (x,y,z) is allowed for (x',y',z'). However, it may be necessary to modify this, as there may be some pairs (E,G) that need to be special-cased. So, let's say that p(x,y,z) is at least as stringent as p(x',y',z') iff typically a pair (E,G) allowed for (x,y,z) is allowed for (x',y',z').
I think that thinking about the Mt Everest case suggests that if x, y and z are mutual strangers, then p(x,y,z) and p(x,x,z) are much more stringent than p(x,x,x) or p(x,y,x)--it is much easier to justify my imposing a burden on me than for another to justify imposing that burden on me.
Now, here is where the philosophy of religion comes in. Question: Where do p(x,y,God) and p(x,x,God) rank in stringency?
I have the intuition that p(x,y,God) and p(x,x,God) are no more stringent than the fairly lax p(x,y,x) and p(x,x,x). In other words, it's no harder for God to be justified in achieving a good (for myself or another) at an expense to me than it would be for me to be justified in achieving a good at that expense to me. While I think what I said is plausible, I am a little more comfortable with this in the case of p(x,x,God). (p(x,x,z) are the standards for z's paternalism with respect to z, and I think God has the right to be the ultimate paternalist.)
Intuitively, p(x,x,x) is a fairly low standard. After all, the costs of climbing Mt Everest are very, very high, and yet p(x,x,x) justifies these costs for the sake of goods that are not, perhaps, incredibly great. If p(x,x,x) is also the standard for deciding in theodicy whether God was permitted to achieve a good at the expense of a certain cost, then that should make theodicy easier than if the relevant standard were like the more stringent p(x,x,z) or p(x,y,z) (where z is a stranger to x).
But what I don't at present have is much in the way of an argument that p(x,y or x,God) is like p(x,y or x,x), apart from hearing at the back of my mind a maxim that God is closer to us than we are to ourselves. If you can supply an argument or refutation, I will be grateful.
I think that thinking about the Mt Everest case suggests that if x, y and z are mutual strangers, then p(x,y,z) and p(x,x,z) are much more stringent than p(x,x,x) or p(x,y,x)--it is much easier to justify my imposing a burden on me than for another to justify imposing that burden on me.
I find this a bit difficult to understand, probably because I'm misreading you. If you are speaking about prudential reasons P, then this seems right. But if you are speaking about moral reasons R, then I can't see how it is. If I have moral reasons R to impose burden B in order to achieve C, then how does it matter who I impose the burden on? It is a central feature of moral reasons that they apply indifferently over moral equivalents and other persons and I are moral equivalents. So if there is a moral reason to climb Everest and doing so demands that a burden is borne by either you or I, and we are moral equivalents, then choose either one. But if I'm climbing for the thrill, then things are obviously different.
I dislike the distinction between moral and prudential reasons, and I do not fully understand its grounds. What we have is a variety of goods and a variety of bads, to a variety of people. We often do achieve goods to self or others at the cost of bads to self or others (respectively or not). Sometimes, the bads are proportionate to the goods, and sometimes they are disproportionate (I stipulate "proportionate" to just mean "not disproportionate"). Whenever an action A of x's is such as to achieve a good G for a person y, whether or not y=x, that fact is a reason in favor A. Is it a moral or prudential reason? Well, we could, if we wished, stipulate that in the case y=x it is "prudential" and that otherwise it is "moral". But it does not seem to be a different kind of reason in the two cases: in both cases, the reason is grounded in a good G for y. Whether x=y may affect the force of the reason for x, but it does not change the kind of normativity involved. I do not know how much of this I need to assume for my question, though.
For instance, if someone offers me a million dollars while I am on my way to an ordinary meeting with you, at the cost of a five minute conversation, it is not wrong for me to accept the offer even if it imposes on you the inconvenience of waiting around for five minutes for me. That small inconvenience to you is not disproportionate to the good for me.
On the other hand, if the meeting with you is to provide you with medical treatment, and a five minute delay is likely to result in your having to have a finger amputated, then it is wrong for me to accept the offer. The loss of a finger to you is disproportionate to the good for me.
However, it might not be disproportionate for me to delay medical treatment of myself, even if it were to cost me a finger, in order to gain a million dollars.
On the other hand, it would be disproportionate for me to suffer the loss of all my limbs in order to gain a million dollars.
Now, vary these cases by supposing that the million dollars is not to be paid to me, but to a mutual stranger. Suppose it's a non-zero-sum case, so that nobody actually loses a million dollars in the process (the million dollars' wealth is directly generated in some way). In that case, it would still not be disproportionate for me to suffer the loss of my finger in order that the stranger should get the million dollars. But it probably would be disproportionate for me to impose on you the loss of your finger in order that the stranger get the million dollars.
What I said seems quite comprehensible without any mention of which reasons are moral and which are prudential. If you like, you can fill in in my examples which reasons you think are moral and which you think are prudential, e.g., by using the stipulation that the reasons count as moral iff the benefits are to someone other than the agent.
I dislike the distinction between moral and prudential reasons, and I do not fully understand its grounds. What we have is a variety of goods and a variety of bads, to a variety of people
I guess I don't know what it means to "dislike a distinction". I'm assuming that you believe that there is no genuine distinction here. But, idiosyncractic views aside, of course there is; and it's fundamental to the discussion of what constitutes a moral reason. The most obvious cases are those in distributive justice. You can have a prudential reason not to attend your friend's funeral. They're too long, filled with false emotion and imagined histories. There is nothing in your self-interest (even your enlightened self-interest) about enduring that. On the other hand, you can have overriding moral reasons to endure attend. My guess is that you do not believe that there are prudential reasons that are non-moral or immoral; or you believe something like every reason to do anything is a moral reason (or at least not immoral). If so, then right, we disagree.
Well, we could, if we wished, stipulate that in the case y=x it is "prudential" and that otherwise it is "moral". But it does not seem to be a different kind of reason in the two cases: in both cases, the reason is grounded in a good G for y. Whether x=y may affect the force of the reason for x, but it does not change the kind of normativity involved
Suppose you had a vial of medicine whose flavor you really liked. Drinking the medicine would benefit you, but only because of the flavor. Drinking the medicine would benefit Smith, because he badly needs the medicine. Here's the difference in reasons. You have all-in overriding prudential reason to drink the medicine, since prudence considers the value of outcomes to you, not the value of outcomes from the point of view of every morally relevant agent. From the prudential point of view, the interests of others matter at most indirectly. You have an all-in moral reason to provide Smith with the vial, since that is the best outcome under the assumption that every relevant agent's interests matter directly. So, standardly, the difference between reasons is based on whose interests matter directly.
Actually, you don't have an all-in prudential reason to drink the medicine, if only because it is vicious to do so, and vice is very bad for you.
Now, take the taste case. That drinking the medicine would benefit me gustatorily surely gives everyone a reason to provide me with the medicine. Now, maybe it gives a different strength of reason to different people--maybe it gives me more reason than it gives my friend, and it gives my friend more reason than it gives a stranger. But it gives a reason to all of them, and does so in virtue of the same fact--the fact that it benefits me. We can call the reason that it gives me "prudential", and the reason that it gives others "moral", if we like. But one reason to dislike a distinction is that it does not cut reality at its joints. In this case, I think there is a continuum between the reason that the benefit gives me, through the reason that the benefit gives my friends, to the reason that the benefit gives strangers (or enemies).
"From the prudential point of view, the interests of others matter at most indirectly. ... You have an all-in moral reason to provide Smith with the vial, since that is the best outcome under the assumption that every relevant agent's interests matter directly."
I am puzzled by the talk of points of view. As an agent, I am not interested in what matters from a point of view: I am interesting in what matters. As an agent, I am likewise not interested in what matters under an assumption, unless that assumption is in fact true or can be made true.
I realize that the approach you have is common outside of virtue-ethics and natural-law circles. But I think it is mistaken. For instance, by making prudence be a non-moral matter, it makes it impossible to say that every vicious action is immoral, since surely imprudence is among the vices. For another, I deny that "the best outcome" is what you have all-in moral reason to do. Surely, ceteris paribus, I have a moral duty to give a somewhat smaller benefit to one of my parents instead of a somewhat greater benefit to a stranger. I suppose one might count as part of the "outcome" such things as "paying your debt of gratitude to your parents", but one can manufacture cases where this is balanced for (e.g., you have a choice between making it possible for you to pay your debt of gratitude to your parents or a stranger to pay her debt of gratitude to her parents). Besides, incommensurability makes the notion of a "best outcome" rarely applicable.
Anyway, all that said, probably my best bet would be to talk of moral reasons throughout. But then it is a presupposition of the question I am trying to pose that if G is good for x, then I have moral reason to provide x with G, whether or not x is distinct from me. (Why should I think that I am so different that potential benefits to me don't provide me with moral reasons, while potential benefits to everybody else do? :-) ) Given this, it makes sense to ask questions like: Under what circumstances is it morally permissible for C to bestow a good G on A at the cost of a bad E for B. And it seems plausible that the answer to this question will depend on what identity relations hold among the triple (A,B,C). If C=B, it is probably easiest to get a positive answer to the permissibility question. And my conjecture was that the answer is affirmative for (A,B,God) if it is affirmative for (A,B,B).