January 2010 Archives

Transworld Depravity (TWD) is the thesis that possibly every feasible world with significantly free agents contains moral evil. I will offer an argument, assuming Molinism, that TWD is necessarily false. I don't think the argument is all that strong, but I hope it will push Molinists to think about a certain interesting (to me) issue.

In order to get Adams to accept some counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs, denoted with →), Plantinga offered this example. Actually Curley takes a bribe of a certain amount. Surely, then, it is true that were Curley to have been offered a larger bribe, he would have taken that, too. Adams agrees.

One might not unreasonably take Plantinga's example to support the following thesis:
(*) Necessarily: If x actually freely chooses A in circumstances C, then had x instead been in circumstances C* instead of C such that D(C*,C,x,A), then x would still have freely chosen A.
Here, D(C*,C,A) says that circumstances C* are a variation on C (this minimally implies that they occur in the same spatiotemporal location, but more may need to be added), and they dominate circumstances C for x in respect of A in the following sense: (a) the agent is non-perverse and hence without the least inclination to act unreasonably for the sake of acting unreasonably, (b) any consideration operative for x in C in favor of A is also operative for x in C* in favor of A in at least as strong a form, and (c) any consideration operative for x in C* against A is operative in C against A in at least as strong a form.

One might then generalize (*) to:
(**) If C and C* are sufficiently determinate circumstances for a free choice, then (C → x freely does A) & D(C*,C,x,A) entails C* → x freely does A.

Suppose (**) is true. Imagine circumstances C where there is only one free agent, Eve, who makes only one free choice: whether to eat a yummy apple or to dance a merry jig (no other options are available, and it is not possible to do both), and this choice is significantly free because God forbade Eve to eat the apple. Eve has no inclination to disobey God or act unreasonably as such. Eve, however, has a desire to eat the apple on account of its yumminess or to dance the jig on account of its merriness. Call these circumstances C. Now, let C* be circumstances just like these, except that God instead forbade Eve to dance the jig.

Now, suppose TWD holds. Then, C→(Eve freely eats apple) and C*→(Eve freely dances jig). But this contradicts (**), since C* dominates C in respect of apple-eating for Eve. Why does domination hold? Well, any operative consideration in favor of apple-eating in C (namely the yumminess of the apple) is present in C*, and any operative consideration against apple-eating (namely the merriness of the jig) in C* is present in C. The only difference is that the fact that God forbids the apple-eating in C but it is the jig-dancing that is forbidden in C*; but given that Eve has no inclination to act unreasonably or disobediently as such, this does nothing to contradict C's being dominated by C* in respect of apple-eating (that God forbids apple-eating in C either counts for nothing or counts against apple-eating in C, etc.)

On one reading of the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is identical with divinity. If divinity is a property, this entails that at least one property is a person. A lot of people think this is absurd. I am holding an argument contest--with modest prizes ($50 amazon gift certificate for the best argument; $30 amazon gift certificate for a random entrant subject to some conditions)--for arguments against the thesis that at least one property is a person. See here for rules and how to enter. Comments should be placed there.

Noted Catholic philosopher Ralph McInerny died this morning. One present said "It was, from what I can discern, a happy death, serene and full of he acceptance that comes from a sure and strong faith."

I might try to organize some information on him but in the mean time here are some links.

Bio from the Center for Ethics and Culture at Notre Dame

Maritain Center Bio, Notre Dame

Good summary from Gifford Lecture Website

I have learned more than I can say from him on a variety of issues and life in general over the years. He was involved in one of the first book projects I ever worked on, and was a gracious interlocutor and teacher.

He really was a living legend, a man from another time and world it seemed, but he still battled for the redemption of the culture he was a part of. Irreplaceable, he'll be missed.

UPDATE: Great obit by Sir John Haldane here.

I've been re-reading Book I of Spinoza's Ethics in preparation for teaching History of Modern Philosophy. He defines 'God' as follows: (Book I, Def. 6) "By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence." The two attributes he discusses are, of course, thought and extension. I started wondering why he would simply define 'God' in such a way that God is extended. I came up with what seems to me to be an interesting argument. If the argument is correct, it's an argument for either pantheism or panentheism (the latter is the view that nature is a part of God). It's inspired by some brief comments Spinoza makes in the scholium to Proposition 10 of book 1 and, as far as I've been able to tell in a brief scan of the literature, it hasn't shown up in the literature at all. I'm interested to see what you all think about it.

Here's the argument:
1. God is a perfect (i.e. the greatest possible) being.
2. A perfect being will have all property-kinds that are intrinsically good.
3. Being extended (or being physical/material) is an intrinsically good property-kind.
--------
C. God is extended (or physical/material).

For reasons of theodicy, I'd like to have a nice taxonomy of intrinsic evils that an individual might (in the epistemic sense) suffer that would raise a problem of evil. Here is an unsystematic list. What am I missing? Is there a nice systematic way to generate such a list?

1. Moral depravity
2. Mere deprivation
3. Suffering
4. Mere permanent death

The University of St. Thomas Philosophy Department was just approved to run a tenure-track search this Spring, for a job starting next fall (2010). The text for the ad is below. The ad will appear on the JFP within 48 hours. Our application site hasn't yet added this position, but within 48 hours we should be up and receiving applications. The job ad is now up on the UST website, so we can now receive applications
____

Philosophy position at the University of St. Thomas, St. Paul

The University of St. Thomas Philosophy Department invites applications for at least one tenure-track position to begin Sept. 2010, at the rank of assistant professor or instructor. AOS and AOC are open, but we seek individuals with strengths and interests that complement those of the current department members (we have 23 tenured/tenure-track lines). Applicants should have outstanding reasoning, teaching, and writing skills, and the virtues of collegiality. Ph.D. prior to appointment is preferred but not required. The department is committed to sustaining and developing the Catholic intellectual tradition; in this we are guided by the principles of Ex Corde Ecclesiae and Fides et Ratio. We seek candidates who share these commitments. The teaching load is six courses per year (semester system); there are standard non-teaching duties.

Established in 1885, the University of St. Thomas is located in the major metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul, and is Minnesota's largest private university. Its 11,000 students pursue degrees in a wide range of liberal arts, professional, and graduate programs.

Inspired by Catholic intellectual tradition, the University of St. Thomas educates students to be morally responsible leaders who think critically, act wisely, and work skillfully to advance the common good, and seeks to develop individuals who combine career competency with cultural awareness and intellectual curiosity. The successful candidate will possess a commitment to the ideals of this mission.

The University of St. Thomas has a strong commitment to the principles of diversity and inclusion, to equal opportunity policies and practices, and to the principles and goals of affirmative action. In that spirit, the University welcomes nominations and applications from a broad and diverse applicant pool.

Applications should be submitted online at www.stthomas.edu/jobsatust, and include 1) a cover letter that includes discussion of the candidate's commitment to sustaining and developing the Catholic intellectual tradition, 2) a curriculum vitae, 3) a sample of philosophical writing, 4) evidence of teaching effectiveness, including data from student evaluations of recent courses if available, and 5) transcripts (unofficial versions are acceptable). In addition, candidates should arrange to have at least three letters of recommendation sent, either by email to philosophy@stthomas.edu (pdf format preferred) or by mail to: Philosophy Dept. Chair - JRC 241; University of St. Thomas, 2115 Summit Ave.; St. Paul, MN 55105-1096. To be guaranteed full consideration all application materials should be received by February 11. We expect to bring finalists to campus in early March. Review of applications will continue until the position is filled. Please direct any questions to philosophy@stthomas.edu.

I'm going a bit out on a limb and talking about stuff I haven't read too much about. But if blogs are for learning and fun discussion, I guess I don't need to be an expert! Also, this post is directed more toward people who are theists, substance dualists, and deniers of open theism.

I shall use the phrase "non-derivatively libertarian-free" (NDLF) to describe a libertarian-free choice that does not inherit its freedom from earlier free actions. This corresponds to Kane's Self-Forming Actions. Now consider this plausible principle:
Thesis 1: If x NDLF-ly chooses A in circumstances C, and p is a proposition explanatorily prior to x's choosing A, then were x not to have NDLF-ly chosen A in C, p would still have been true.

A consequence of this is the following PAP:
Thesis 2: If x NDLF-ly chooses A in C, then x's failing to NDLF-ly choose A in C is logically compatible with any proposition that is explanatorily prior to x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C.

(The argument from Thesis 1 to Thesis 2 is this. Suppose Thesis 2 is false. Then we have a proposition p explanatorily prior to x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C such that p entails x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C. But then x's failing to NDLF-ly choose A in C entails ~p. It is obvious that if x NDLF-ly chooses A in C, then x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C is not logically necessary. But if u entails v, then at least if u is contingent, were u to hold, v would hold. So, were x to fail to NDLF-ly choose A in C, then ~p would hold. But by Thesis 1, it follows that were x to fail to NDLF-ly choose A in C, then p would. But these two conditionals cannot both be true if the antecedent is possible, as it is. So Thesis 2 cannot be false.)

Now on to the argument. If Molinism holds, then the following scenario is possible:
Scenario 1: God believes that were he to place agent x in circumstances C, the agent would NDLF-ly choose A in C, and for that reason God in fact places agent x in circumstances C.

Now, assume that if p and q are explanatorily prior to r, so is the conjunction p&q. Suppose Scenario 1 holds. Let p be the proposition that x is in C, and let q be the proposition that God believes that were God to place x in C, x would NDLF-ly choose A in C. Then p and q are explanatorily prior to x NDLF-ly choosing A in C. Hence so is their conjunction. Hence, their conjunction does not entail x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C (by Thesis 2). But, necessarily, God believes only truths. So, q entails that were God to place x in C, x would NDLF-ly choose A in C. By modus ponens, p&q entails that x NDLF-ly chooses A in C. Hence, p&q both does and does not entail that x NDLF-ly chooses A in C, which is a contradiction.

This is, of course, a version of Adams' circularity-in-the-order-of-explanation argument. Strictly speaking, it doesn't show that God can't know conditionals of free will, but only that it is incoherent to suppose him to act on that knowledge in the way indicated in Scenario 1. Thus, the argument is compatible with a weak Molinism on which God knows the conditionals but must bracket that knowledge when choosing to act.

I actually don't quite buy the argument because my current view of counterfactuals does not support Thesis 1 (but neither does it support Molinism).

Lots of people have the modal intuition that there are infinitely many better and better worlds. I have it, for what it’s worth. I also have the intuition that there is a best possible world. Both seem possible, so both seem true. The good news is that we can have our cake and eat it, too. We can satisfy both intuitions.

Claim: If there are infinitely many better and better worlds, then there is (also) some best (unexceeded or unsurpassed) world.

Some assumptions. Let the overall intrinsic value of a world W be the sum of the intrinsic values of each temporal stage S of W. Let the intrinsic value of any stage S depend exclusively on the intrinsic facts in S. Finally, assume that for any non-overlapping stages S, S’ in any world W, the intrinsic facts in S do not logically entail the intrinsic facts in S’. Effectively, we are assuming—as seems reasonable—that God can terminate any world W at any temporal stage S of W.

How would the argument go that, even if there are infinitely many improving worlds, there must be a best world? For any arbitrarily chosen world Wn in the infinite sequence, there is a most valuable temporal stage Sn+ of Wn. A best stage S+ in W is a stage whose intrinsic value is positive and unexceeded by any other (overlapping or non-overlapping) stage in W. There is then a set B+ of the best stages of each world in the infinite sequence. We know that no temporal stage S of any world W entails any (non-overlapping) stage (recall that God can terminate W at any S). So we know that there is a world W+ composed of the stages in B+. The intrinsic value of W+ is itself unexceeded by the value of any world W in the infinite sequence (recall that the intrinsic value of any world W is the sum of the intrinsic value of its temporal stages). That concludes the proof.

So, if there are infinitely many improving worlds, there must be some world that is unexceeded in intrinsic value. There is then some best possible world.

The St. Thomas Philosophy of Religion Project announces two prizes for work in the philosophy of religion and/or philosophical theology. Both prizes have been made possible by a generous grant from the John Templeton Foundation.

I. The 2009 Excellence in Philosophy of Religion Prize attempts to identify the three best papers published in 2009 in the areas of philosophy of religion or philosophical theology. A panel of three expert reviewers will select three winners. Each winner will receive an award of $2000.

The deadline for submissions is March 31, 2010. For details, please go to: http://www.stthomas.edu/philosophy/templeton/awards.html

II. The C. S. Lewis Prize recognizes the best recent book in the philosophy of religion or philosophical theology written for a general audience. A panel of three expert reviewers will select one first place winner, who will receive a $15,000 prize, and one second place winner, who will receive a $7,500 prize.

For details, please go to: http://www.stthomas.edu/philosophy/templeton/awards.html

I'm thinking of putting together a volume of new and recent work in religious epistemology. I'm not super-happy with much of what I've found. What do you think is the best recent stuff? It will come as no surprise to readers to find that I'm most interested in critiques of Reformed Epistemology. Well, that's not quite true, I always also love critiques of evidentialism--properly understood--because they make good examples of how evidentialism is "misunderestimated." :-) I also had a friend ask for suggestions on this topic, and I don't want to miss anything in my suggestions.

UPDATE: I've pasted below the fold a preliminary list I've made for my friend. The formatting is jacked up because I had links to all the books and I had him-specific comments on the items. It's left it a bit rough looking and all the links were removed by Movabletype.

Plantinga defines strong actualization thus: "God strongly actualizes a state of affairs S if and only if he causes S to be actual and causes to be actual every contingent state of affairs S* such that S includes S*" (Profiles, p. 49).

It is crucial for Plantinga's arguments that "includes" have an interpretation such that if S entails S* and S* is contingent, then S includes S*. Otherwise, Plantinga's FWD includes an invalid argument. For Plantinga is going to argue that if W is a world where Eve freely doesn't take the apple, then T(W)--the maximal strongly actualized state of affairs that includes all the states of affairs strongly actualized in W--does not include Eve's freely refraining from taking the apple, and hence the conditional T(W)→(Eve freely refrains from taking the apple) cannot be necessarily true. But the latter only follows if entailment implies inclusion.

Moreover, it is crucial to the FWD that God cannot strongly actualize a state of affairs of someone doing something freely.

But now we have a problem. For suppose that in some world W where Eve freely doesn't take the apple, God earlier confidentially remarks to the Archangel Gabriel that if Eve doesn't freely refrain, God will create life on Pluto. Let S1 be the state of affairs of God making that remark to Gabriel, and let S2 be the state of affairs of there being no life on Pluto. Suppose S2, as well as S1, obtains at W. It seems that God strongly actualizes S1 and that God strongly actualizes S2.

But now we have a problem, for God strongly actualizes each of two states of affairs whose conjunction entails Eve's freely refaining. Now it either is or is not true that if God strongly actualizes each of two states of affairs, he strongly actualizes their conjunction. If it is true, then it follows, contrary to what is needed for the FWD, that God strongly actualizes Eve's freely refraining. If it is not true, then T(W) need not in general exist--there will, perhaps, always be a state of affairs that includes all the states of affairs strongly actualized at W, but that state of affairs will not itself be strongly actualized by God (why? becuase that state of affairs will include S1 and will include S2, but the conjunction of S1 and S2 is not strongly actualized). And Plantinga's argument seems to require the existence of T(W).

The Glasgow Philosophy of Religion Seminar provides a platform for discussion of work-in-progress in analytic philosophy of religion. Presentations are invited on any topic within analytic philosophy of religion, broadly construed to include Western, Chinese and Indian traditions. Papers on comparative philosophy of religion are also welcome. The seminar is organized by the Centre for Philosophy and Religion and will be held in the Philosophy Department, University of Glasgow. The precise schedule will be announced nearer the time, but it is anticipated that the event will run from 2.00 p.m. on the 22nd April until 5.00 p.m. on the 23rd April. Details will appear on the Centre's website as they become available: http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/philosophy/cpr/events/

If you would like your work to be considered for presentation at this event please email an abstract of between 300 and 500 words to Victoria Harrison (V.Harrison@philosophy.arts.gla.ac.uk) by 1st February 2010. Please state on your submission if you are a graduate student.

Registration is free and refreshments will be provided on both days. Lunch will be provided on the 23rd. Dinner and accommodation are by own arrangement. Places are limited so advance registration is essential. To register please email Victoria Harrison.

This event is funded by the Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow and the Royal Institute of Philosophy.

Central to Plantinga's formulation of the FWD is the notion of "weak actualization". In the Profiles volume, Plantinga defines this as follows:

1. God weakly actualizes S iff there is an S* such that God strongly actualizes S* and S* → S, where → is "counterfactual implication".

Theorem 1. If (1), and → is centered, then if God strongly actualizes any actual state of affairs, God weakly actualizes every actual state of affairs.

(Proof: Let S* be any actual state of affairs that God strongly actualizes. Let S be any actual state of affairs. Then, by centering S*→S, and so by (1), God weakly actualizes S.)

Theorem 1 is clearly problematic, as we can see by substituting "Al" for "God". Since Al strongly actualizes some state of affairs (say, the writing of The Nature of Necessity), it follows that he weakly actualizes the Battle of Waterloo.

In light of Theorem 1, we could simplify the concept of "weakly actualizes": God weakly actualizes S iff S is actual and there is an S* such that God strongly actualizes. But if that is what "weakly actualizes" comes down to, it is not a very interesting concept. It is a pretty trivial concept, and I think it does not seem to support the proof that Plantinga gives of Lewis's Lemma.

Apart from what Alvin Plantinga calls creative anti-realism, the two main philosophical options for many of us in the West are some version of naturalism and some version of Judeo-Christian theism. As its title indicates, J. P. Moreland's The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (SCM Press, 2009) supports the theistic position by way of a penetrating critique of naturalism and such associated doctrines as scientism. Moreland briefly discusses creative anti-realism in the guise of postmodernism on pp. 13-14, but I won't report on that except to say that his arguments against it, albeit brief, are to my mind decisive. Section One of this review will present in some detail Moreland's conception of naturalism and what it entails. Sections Two and Three will discuss his argument from consciousness for the existence of God. Section Four will ever so briefly report on the contents of the rest of the book. In Part Two of this review I hope to discuss Moreland's critique of Thomas Nagel's Dismissive Naturalism. Numbers in parentheses are page references. Words and phrases enclosed in double quotation marks are quotations from Moreland. Inverted commas are employed for mentioning and 'scaring.'

You are cordially invited to attend the 2010 Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion Workshop at the University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas, April 9-10. If you’re interested in participating (chairing-moderating a session) please send me an email michael.almeida@utsa.edu. The webpage for the workshop is now up, though not all of the papers have been posted. Be sure to “click” on the Participants and Moderators link. The workshop is free and open to the public. Attendees are encouraged to read all of the posted papers. Please don’t hesitate to write, if you have any questions.

Philosophy Department, Azusa Pacific University, Azusa, California

This forum aims at promoting the project of Christian philosophy and recognizing those who have substantially contributed to that project

This year recognizes the work of Dr. Merold Westphal. He will be presenting two lectures:

February 24th, 2010 - 'Kierkegaard on Faith and Reason - Fear and Trembling'

By taking a closer look at what faith and reason actually are, Kierkegaard shows why there is no reason to accept modernity's assumption that reason should have hegemony over faith. There will be a conflict between biblical faith and some versions of reason, but the latter rest on a faith of their own and are anything but self-evidently authoritative.

February 25th, 2010 - 'Kierkegaard on Faith and Selfhood - Sickness unto Death'

Working on the assumption that the self is a complex relation to both self and other, Kierkegaard shows how becoming a self is a task and how the religious form(s) of selfhood help to illuminate what is involved in being a self of any sort.

Sponsored by the Azusa Pacific University Philosophy Department

For more information contact Laura Smith Webb - lwebb@apu.edu, 626-815-5496