I find something like the following argument for Soteriological Universalism quite compelling, but while the argument is often implied by things that Universalists say, it is nevertheless seldom explicitly stated (in fact if anyone knows of an instance of an argument like this one being explicitly stated, I would be glad to have a look at it).
1. God is that being than whom no being more worthy of worship or adoration is possible.
2. Either Soteriological Universalism (i.e., the hypothesis that all human beings will eventually be reconciled to God and enjoy eternal life) is true or it is false.
3. (Assumption for reductio) SU is false.
4. If SU is false, then it follows either (a) that God is not able to reconcile all to himself, or (b) God is not willing to reconcile all to himself.
5. But it follows from (1) that God must be willing to reconcile all to himself, since if God were not willing to reconcile all to himself, then God would not be as worthy of worship and adoration as some other possible being, God*, who was willing to reconcile all to himself.
6. And furthermore it follows from (1) that God must be able to reconcile all to himself, since if God were not able to reconcile all to himself then God would not be as worthy of worship and adoration as some other possible being God* who was able to reconcile all to himself.
7. So then, if (1) is true, then it follows that neither (4a) nor (4b) is true.
8. If neither (4a) nor (4b) is true then (3) must be false.
9. (1) is true.
10. Thus, (from 7, 8, 2, 1) SU is true.
6. And furthermore it follows from (1) that God must be able to reconcile all to himself, since if God were not able to reconcile all to himself then God would not be as worthy of worship and adoration as some other possible being God* who was able to reconcile all to himself.
Why is that true? God might not be able to reconcile all to himself because it might take the free choice of (perhaps recalcitrant) individuals to make reconciliation possible. But also there might be no such God* to whom all freely chose to reconcile. Finally, even if there were such a God*, universal reconcilation would not reflect in any obvious way on his worthiness, since everyone might have chosen to reconcile for craven reasons. Or he might have a world of very docile individuals, etc.
(4) is unsound, as there is the third possibility; God is able and willing to reconcile all to Himself, but not all willing to reconcile themselves to God.
A Calvinistic idea that God will simply make all be reconciled to Himself could be supposed, but if God must coerce some or all people to be reconciled to Himself, this would defeat the point of reconciliation in the first place, as reconciliation is only truly reconciliation if it stems out of one's free will.
Mike...
God might not be able to reconcile all to himself because it might take the free choice of (perhaps recalcitrant) individuals to make reconciliation possible.
It is not clear to me that the existence of free will necessarily entails that anyone will resist reconciliation forever. it maybe a logical possibility that some recalcitrant individuals could resist reconciliation ad infinitum. But that doesn't mean that anyone will.
But, suppose we grant that humans have free will, and that as a result, God is unable to reconcile all to himself. Surely God, being omniscient, knows prior to his act of creatiing free willing agents, that as a result some will never be reconciled to himself. Then, it seems to me like God has a moral obligation not to create such beings (i.e., beings that he knows will never be reconciled to him). At least it seems to me that a deity, God', who sees that for some possible world, W, W will, of necessity, include some individuals who will never be reconciled to him, has a sufficient reason not to create W, such that if God' does create W, then he is morally culpable for his act of creating W. Thus, God' is less worthy of worship than some other deity, God* who creates only worlds wherein all are reconciled to himself.
Finally, even if there were such a God*, universal reconcilation would not reflect in any obvious way on his worthiness, since everyone might have chosen to reconcile for craven reasons. Or he might have a world of very docile individuals, etc.
Obviously a God who uses nefarious means to ensure SU is true, would be less worthy of worship than one who did not. So, if (1) is true, then it rules out the nefarious scenarios. God has to be that being most worthy of worship, God* is not most worthy of worship if God* employs nefarious means to acheive SU. In that case some other being God** who both ensured SU, and did so via non-nefarious means, would be more worthy of worship.
editorial note: I changed the above comment, removing the word "obligation" and inserting "sufficient reason".
From premise (5): if God were not willing to reconcile all to himself, then God would not be as worthy of worship and adoration as some other possible being, God*, who was willing to reconcile all to himself.
Do you have an argument for the conditional? I could understand why someone would think this conditional is true, such as if someone thought that what made an object worthy of worship was first and foremost how much that object (God) was willing (and/or able) to reconcile all people to himself. But if this is the reason, I wonder what argument someone could put forth for that proposition - the proposition that specifies what makes an object worthy of worship is the willing/ability to reconcile every individual to himself.
James,
You have two beings, God and God*, such that both are deities and both create worlds with human inhabitants. Suppose You know that the only difference between God and God* is that God is not willing that all humans should be reconciled to himself and enjoy eternal life, while God* is willing that all should be reconciled to himself and enjoy eternal life. Other than that they are exactly similar.
On the basis of this description, ask yourself, which world would you rather inhabit, the world created by God, or the world created by God*?
I think many people will share the intuition that it would be better to inhabit the world created by God*.
This intuition pushes us in the direction, or so I suppose, that the existence of God* is preferable to the existence of God. Or in Anselmian language, God* is greater than God. If this is true then it follows that God* in virtue of being greater than God is more worthy of worship than God.
But, suppose we grant that humans have free will, and that as a result, God is unable to reconcile all to himself. Surely God, being omniscient, knows prior to his act of creatiing free willing agents, that as a result some will never be reconciled to himself. Then, it seems to me like God has a moral obligation not to create such beings (i.e., beings that he knows will never be reconciled to him).
But this just trivializes the argument for universalism. If it is true in every world that God instantiates all and only those beings who will consent to being saved, then of course universalism is true. This assumption gets you universalism no matter how worthy of worship God is or isn't.
But this just trivializes the argument for universalism. If it is true in every world that God instantiates all and only those beings who will consent to being saved, then of course universalism is true. This assumption gets you universalism no matter how worthy of worship God is or isn't.
Not sure I see the triviality Mike. The (free will) opponents of SU, hold that God does in fact instantiate beings whom he has reason to believe will not be reconciled with himself. I think this diminishes the worship/adoration worthiness of God. Since it involves God committing an act that he had sufficient moral grounds to refuse to perform. As I see it, God is only worthy of worship, which is to say, God is only God, if every world which God creates is a Universalist world.
As I see it, God is only worthy of worship, which is to say, God is only God, if every world which God creates is a Universalist world.
I htink to make worthiness relevant here you've got to defend the claim that, for any world w, and for any creaturely essences E, if God instantiates E in w, then E will freely respond favorably to God's sheer worthiness, and find himself saved. We can make reasonable restrictions on E such as any E that dies at birth, etc.,before he has the opportunity to freely accept salvation is saved. In this way, it is God's worthiness that explains why we get universalism. Isn't that the way the argument goes? But take any such E, and suppose E is instantiated in world w (and state of affairs T). Suppose further that E freely accepts salvation in w. If he does so freely, then there is another world w' that shares a past with w, and in which E does not accept salvation. Otherwise, his acceptance isn't free. So the claim above--viz., for any world w, and for any creaturely essences E, if God instantiates E in w, then E will freely respond favorably to God's sheer worthiness-- is not esp. defensible.
Taylor, following your first reply to Mike;
"Thus, God' is less worthy of worship than some other deity, God* who creates only worlds wherein all are reconciled to himself."
I believe there is at least one good reason to disagree with this sort of conclusion. We might term this problem of "Why would God create a person He knows would be damned?" the "Problem of the Damned."
Suppose God is selecting between an infinite amount of future possible worlds to create, and through His omniscience He knows exactly how many beings there will be that reject Him, but He also knows that there are beings who will accept Him. Further consider the possibility that, if God chooses not to create any possible world, He is also choosing to not create any of those beings; the assumption being that no person exists except in that possible world he finds himself in. You or I do not exist in any world except this one; any other possible world might have practically identical people like you and I, but they would not be essentially identical; they would be yet be entirely different people.
Now, should God withhold creating a possible world simply due to the fact that there would be people who would reject Him? Provided there would be people who would accept Him, then I think God is justified in creating that possible world. For God to let some damned people's damnation be a plight in which He refuses to create that world where there would be saved people would be to grant the damned a veto to the joy those saved would get in the beatific vision.
My assumption about the "absolute contingency" of essential identities may be a conclusion based on the idea of a God who is love rather than just an assumption, but for me this is just a speculation I'm putting out there.
AP,
Thanks for your response above. I take it that you meant the only difference between God and God* was that the latter is willing (or wills) that all humans be reconciled to himself and the former does not. In your last comment to me, you described the difference as one concerning the willing of whether humans *should* be reconciled to him (God or God*). I take it that your original argument does not rely upon the willing of a normative claim – whatever that would mean in this case – but the willing that all humans be reconciled to God. So I will consider the options this way:
God* creates w1 in which he wills that all human be reconciled to him.
God creates w2 in which he does not will that all humans be reconciled to him.
Which world would I rather live in? Answer: w1. You think this preference is evidence for the claim that God* is more worthy of worship than God. I deny the evidence warrants this inference. For consider these two cases:
C1: God reconciles some persons to himself but the plan requires the shedding of the blood of some individual to accomplish that end.
C2: God* reconciles some persons to himself without using a plan that requires the death of any individual as a means to accomplish that end.
Suppose in both cases, the same number of persons are saved. Which world would you rather inhabit: the world of case 1 or case 2? Speaking for myself, I would rather inhabit the world of case 2. Does this warrant the inference that God* of case 2 is more worthy of worship than God of case 1? I reject that the inference is warranted since I think case 1 describes the actual world and I am granting premise 1.
What this points to is that determining whether an agent is worthy of worship, or more worthy of worship than another agent, and hence whether one satisfies the title God as per your definition in premise 1, cannot so easily be settled by appeal to our preference sets on the consideration of cases like the ones you raised to justify premise 5. Thus I don’t agree that the intuition pushes us in the direction you suppose it does.
My first reaction was to notice the similarity between the not willing/not able dilemma given here for SU and the same as it has been used in the argument against God's existence based on the presence of evil. How could I accept it in one argument and reject it in the other? On further reflection, however, they are sufficiently different. The one deals with a temporary state of affairs while the other is eternal and final. We are probably in agreement that the present existence of evil is compatible with God's existence precisely because God will ultimately right everything. We differ on how this will take place. While I believe that God is perfectly able to effect SU, I cannot adhere (as I do) to passages such as Romans 9 and believe that God is willing to effect SU. Rather, the picture is that of a God who rights everything through a combination of mercy and reprobation, both of which are sufficient reasons to render to him the maximum amount possible of worship and adoration. As to your argument for the conditional in premise 5, that the existence of God* is preferable to the existence of God- even if this is granted, the leap from preferablity to 'God* is greater than God', i.e., from subjective to objective, is unwarranted. I couldn't begin to number the various situations in which I've thought that God could have improved his providence. Nevertheless, far from suggesting the possibility of a God* in these cases, they simply serve to demonstrate that I am both finite and uninformed.