December 2009 Archives

Leiter's put up a "top ten philosophy books or articles in last decade" post on his blog, and other blogs are doing their own specialized versions. I thought it'd be fun to follow the trend. Basically, write what you think might qualify to be among the top ten books or articles in philosophy of religion in the last decade (starting at 2000) and some reasons why it is important and worth reading.

Warranted Christian Belief's left a big impact; it is probably the most thorough defense of the justification, rationality and warrant of both theistic and Christian belief. (W/r/t warrant, it argues that there is no good de jure argument apart from a good de facto argument against theistic or Christian belief; w/r/t justification and rationality, it argues that there is no good de jure argument simpliciter.) This defense, as far as I've seen, has had little by way of strong objection in the literature. The book also outlines a detailed model for how Christian belief can have warrant. In addition, the chapter on defeaters is a good contribution to epistemology, and the chapter on pluralism has some of the earliest and (in my opinion) some of the best work on the currently hot topic of epistemic disagreement (it includes the now standard charge of self-defeat that equal weight viewers have to deal with). There is also the valuable material on the problem of evil.

There have been several posts on the kinds of worlds God could create. I want to argue that, odd as it might sound initially, there are infinitely bad worlds that God could have created. But how is that possible? Here’s how. Let the world w contain a countably infinite number of sentient beings (say, all human beings). And let each human being Hn in w be assigned a natural number, n. Let each natural number n be mapped onto an equivalent number of seconds t: number 1 to 1 second, 2 to 2 seconds, and so on upward. So we have for each human being Hn in w and number of seconds t, a pair, (Hn, t). Finally, let t be the number of seconds that Hn suffers in w. H1 suffers for 1 second in w, H2 suffers for 2 seconds in w, H3 suffers for 3 seconds in w and so on upward for all of the natural numbers. We know that each Hn in w will suffer a finite amount of time, since each Hn = t is a finite number of seconds. Suppose it is true, for each Hn in w that he enjoys at least n^100000 seconds of joy after his suffering. The only evils in w are the instances of suffering, and the only good are the instances of joy. Here are some strange facts about w.

1. For each human Hn in w, Hn suffers for a finite amount of time X.
2. For each human Hn in w, Hn enjoys for a finite amount of time (X + Y) > X
3. For each human Hn in w, Hn’s life is on balance very good.
4. Every evil in w is outweighed by a much greater good.
5. There will always be an infinite amount of suffering in w.
6. There will always be a finite amount of joy in w.

Since each human’s life is on balance very good in w (we could make it superb, if you like), and each evil is outweighed by a much greater good in w, I claim that God could have actualized w. But it is also true that there is no time in w at which there is not an infinite amount of suffering. At each moment t in the world w, there is an infinite amount of evil. So God could have actualize an infinitely bad world.

[Revised and Updated 12.21.09]

Related posts

I find something like the following argument for Soteriological Universalism quite compelling, but while the argument is often implied by things that Universalists say, it is nevertheless seldom explicitly stated (in fact if anyone knows of an instance of an argument like this one being explicitly stated, I would be glad to have a look at it).

1. God is that being than whom no being more worthy of worship or adoration is possible.
2. Either Soteriological Universalism (i.e., the hypothesis that all human beings will eventually be reconciled to God and enjoy eternal life) is true or it is false.
3. (Assumption for reductio) SU is false.
4. If SU is false, then it follows either (a) that God is not able to reconcile all to himself, or (b) God is not willing to reconcile all to himself.
5. But it follows from (1) that God must be willing to reconcile all to himself, since if God were not willing to reconcile all to himself, then God would not be as worthy of worship and adoration as some other possible being, God*, who was willing to reconcile all to himself.
6. And furthermore it follows from (1) that God must be able to reconcile all to himself, since if God were not able to reconcile all to himself then God would not be as worthy of worship and adoration as some other possible being God* who was able to reconcile all to himself.
7. So then, if (1) is true, then it follows that neither (4a) nor (4b) is true.
8. If neither (4a) nor (4b) is true then (3) must be false.
9. (1) is true.
10. Thus, (from 7, 8, 2, 1) SU is true.

The following two claims seem plausible enough to me:

1. God is not morally obligated to create the best possible world.
2. There are no supererogatory acts.

Supererogatory acts are those acts that go above and beyond what duty or obligation requires. But if God isn't obligated to create the best possible world, and is merely obligated to produce a good enough world, then isn't it better if God creates a world that's better than the minimally good enough world? It seems like a supererogatory act for God to create at all, since it will never be the best act of creation. So there does seem to be a problem if you accept both these claims. But, though I would not submit to martydrom for either claim, there do seem to me to be good arguments for both, and yet they seem inconsistent.

1. I think it's plausible that adding one more intrinsically good thing to a world will make the world better, and its always possible to add one more intrinsically good thing. This means there is no best possible world, and thus it is impossible even for an omnipotent being to create the best possible world. Unless God is obligated to do the impossible, it seems that claim 1 is true.

2. Consequence-based ethical theories have usually required maximizing the best consequences, but a lot of people have rejected such an approach, because it implies that it's wrong to go see a movie because that money could better be spent helping starving people get some food (for one example). So we now have satisficing theories approaches that say that all we're obligated to do is seek good enough consequences. A similar approach occurs in non-consequentialist ethics, where perfect duties are duties everyone has but imperfect duties are acts that someone or other ought to do but no one particular person is required to do them.

Premises:

1. If there are any Molinist counterfactuals, there are ungrounded true contingent propositions.
2. Propositions reporting divine beliefs are grounded.
3. If p is a contingent truth (i.e., true proposition), then either God's belief is explained constitutively or causally by p, or p is explained constitutively or causally, or there is some third truth that explains both p and God's belief constitutively or causally.
4. An ungrounded truth cannot be explained causally.
5. An ungrounded truth cannot explain causally.
6. When a truth p explains q constitutively, something that grounds p grounds q.
7. God believes every truth.

Premise (3) is a way of working out the idea that God's beliefs are knowledge and cannot be merely contingently related to what makes them true.

St. Anselm believes that the least of our sins puts us in an infinite debt to God and is infinitely bad. Anselm's own argument for this thesis is uses some implicit premises. Here is my best reconstruction:

1. (Premise) To sin is to oppose the will of God.
2. (Premise) If it is not permissible to do A in order to preserve a good G, then A is at least as bad as the loss of G.
3. (Premise) It is not permissible to oppose the will of God "even to preserve the whole of creation", even "if there were more worlds as full of beings as this", and even if "they increased to an infinite extent".
4. (Premise) The badness of the loss of the whole of creation if the whole of creation consisted of planets as full of beings as Earth and increased to an infinite extent would be infinite.
5. (Premise) If something is at least as bad as an infinite bad, then it's infinitely bad.
6. To oppose the will of God is at least as bad as something infinitely bad. (2, 3 and 4)
7. To oppose the will of God is infinitely bad. (5 and 6)
8. Every sin is infinitely bad. (1 and 7)
9. (Premise) To do something infinitely bad puts us in infinite debt.
10. Every sin sin is infinitely bad and puts us in infinite debt. (8 and 9)

Suppose we take it as settled that God is not required to actualize a world that exceeds positive value N. There are, in short, some good enough worlds. What then happens to the problem of evil? I claim the problem disappears. Two possibilities.

A. If God need not actualize a world whose overall value exceeds N, and God actualizes W whose value is N and whose total evil is E, then (1) it constitutes no objection to the existence of God that he might have actualized W’ whose overall value is N - E. It is true that God might have actualized a world W’ with less evil, or even no evil, but only if he actualizes a world that (by hypothesis) is better than he is required to actualize.

B. If God need not actualize a world whose overall value exceeds N, and God actualizes W whose value is N and whose total evil is E, then (2) it constitutes no objection to the existence of God that he might have actualized W’ that contains less evil than W but whose overall value is also N . It is true that God might have actualized a world with less evil, but only if he actualizes a world W’ that is (by hypothesis) no better than the world he did actualize.

Conclusion (1): If there is a world W that meets the criterion of being good enough for God to actualize, then the existence of actual gratuitous evil constitutes no objection at all to the existence of God.

That’s a remarkable conclusion, I think. We’d all agree—or most of us would—that some world or other is good enough for God to create. The argument above shows that it follows from that widely agreed-upon fact that the existence of gratuitous evil—standardly defined gratuitous evil—constutites no objection to theism at all!

Conclusion (2): If there is a world W that meets the criterion of being good enough for God to actualize, and the value of @ is at least the value of W, then the problem of evil is resolved.

[Revised and Updated, 12.15.09]

Let's say I climb Mt. Everest, and then enjoy a delightful view from the top. But as I climb the mountain, I undergo various horrendous sufferings. And after I get back down, I have to undergo extremely painful surgery. Suppose that, so far, the overall value assessment is negative. If that's all that is involved, then climb wasn't worth it. The view was nice, and the good of achievement was nice, but, by far, it just wasn't worth it.

But let me add a little more to the story. I did this when I was 20. I am not permanently traumatized by the suffering, and indeed by the time I am 30, my memories of the hideous pains are no longer unpleasant. But I continue to have memories of the beauty of the climb and of the camaraderie, memories of the grandeur of the epic struggle, and these memories continue to be fairly pleasant. Moreover, the feeling of accomplishment, of having overcome the pains, is nice to have. I then live on for fifty more years, continuing to have pleasant memories of that climb.

While the goods achieved at the time of the climb were not worth the suffering, when combined with the value of half a century's worth of memories, even when these memories are not particularly intensely pleasant, they may be worth it. Suppose you say the contrary. Well, then, replace the fifty years with five hundred or five million. Eventually, the cumulative value of enjoying these memories will overshadow the bads which were confined to one decade of one's life (the climb, plus about ten years during which the memories of pain were painful). (This of course reminds one of Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion. But I think there is nothing repugnant here.)

In case people missed it, Thomas Nagel gave a positive review of Stephen Meyer's book defending intelligent design. Brian Leiter gives his response here, along with a number of helpful links to further criticisms. Bradley Monton is more sympathetic with Nagel.

Also, William Lane Craig recently debated Fransisco Ayala on the subject of intelligent design. Ayala is supposed to be a prominent anti-ID proponent. From a quick skim of the blogosphere, it looks like Craig thoroughly won the debate. Monton was the moderator and gives his thoughts here. He also provides some further links.

From what I can tell, the main reason is the outcome of the following social trends in the early 20th century. 1. Reacting to British Idealism, Russell and Moore found what comes to be known as "Analytic Philosophy" with Wittgenstein playing a major role. Moore and Russell are "infidels" with Russell being very outspoken about it (and given Russell's childhood, who *wouldn't* be an atheist?! It's very sad: a tortured genius.). Wittgenstein, though perhaps a theist of some sort, doesn't want to talk about it. Both men are revered in the new school. 2. Catholics, already having their own systematic tradition, said "Pff" to analytic philosophy. 3. Protestantism splits in the 20's between the "Mainline'ers" and the "Fundamentalists." The latter are suspicious of reason generally, and the former aren't sure they believe anything in the first place (though there are some fantastic exceptions). So as I see it, widespread atheism in academic philosophy is mostly the result of social trends among Christian groups.

What's surprising, and exceptional (and thus evidential) are those cases which buck the trends, the adult converts like PvI, and the fact, indicated in the surveys, that those theists who go into PR manage to keep their belief in an intellectually respectable way. The more I think about it, the more this survey boosts my confidence in theism (though we're still only talking a few percent at most. I'd say between 1-3% boost, but the numbers fluctuate day to day.

OK, so as usual I've got an R&R, a book review, and a proposal all due this month, but I can't resist a few comments on the Phil Papers survey. http://philpapers.org/surveys/

There are only three views with extremely widespread acceptance. 1. Non-skepticism about the external world, 2. Scientific realism, 3. Atheism.

Not surprised about 1, especially since not surprised about 2. A bit surprised about 3 (in some of the areas. The widest net catches 18.8% theists, the narrowest relevant one is 14.6%).

So here's the thought. In all the other areas--I checked all the epistemology one's first, but the same goes for all the others--I was more interested in what the top specialists thought. For example, I was...[word weaker than "disgusted" but stronger than "shocked in a bad way"] that contextualism had such a strong plurality among all respondents. But I was heartened that among epistemologists, invariantism held that honor, and even more heartened that it was even more solid among "Target Faculty" in Epistemology. This sort of thinking was repeated repeatedly. The working assumption seems to be:

AOS1 Ceteris paribus, what specialists think is more important (holds more epistemic weight, is better evidence) than what non-specialists think.

There are a lot of factors which would make ceteris non paribus, but AOS1 seems to represent something pretty ingrained in our thinking. It would be good to think about what features of areas make AOS1 more plausible and what features less so.

The thing, though, is that though theism is 4:1 minority in most relevant populations and less so in general, among those who specialize in Philosophy of Religion it's much, much more popular. 68.3% for all respondents and 72.3% among Target Faculty. Now obviously first thing to say is that many theists go into PR because they're theists. And that, of course, is true. However, note the following: we don't know what percentage of theists in academic philosophy work primarily in PR. That would make a difference as to the impact of this this fact. Also, note that what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander: many atheists go into Phil Mind, say, in order to defend some kind of naturalism about the mind, which would need to proportionately discount the majority results for Physicalism (though, I must say, the results aren't that high for physicalism in Phil Mind in this survey).

And do moral theorists really care that only one third of those working in Philosophy of the Americas accept cognitivism about moral judgment? (Real category and real figure.) Of course some disciplines are much more related than others, so Metaphysics is much more relevant to PR than the Americas thing. (And being a metaphysician increases the probability that one is a theist.)

There are LOTS of complications, and I'd LOVE to have the data to do some regression on, especially to investigate the relationship between various positions one holds and their coherence. For example, I doubt there are many non-physicalist, libertarian atheists who affirm free will.

All just a jumble of thoughts on this Tuesday afternoon, but here's a thesis:

TD1 We should be about as impressed with the fact that most PR specialists are theists as that most Mind specialists are physicalists.

But note this fact:

F1 Theism enjoys a MUCH stronger majority in PR than does physicalism in Mind.

Now I think there's fodder here for non-trivial support for theism from this majority because even after we factor in the fact that theists are--presumably, though we have no data--more likely to go into PR, the majority is still very impressive and--per AOS1--should count for more than the fact that the majority of non-PR people are atheists.

Here's another thesis, since TD1 is compatible with being totally unimpressed by any majoritiy:

TD2 If the theist majority in PR is of no evidential merit, then the physicalist majority in Mind is of no evidential merit.

And since the majority support for physicalism is about the only evidence I have for physicalism, my credence in theism is going to be quite high, since the conditional probability of non-physicalism on common sense is quite high, and my conditional probability of theism on non-physicalism is also quite high.

So, despite the clear overall majority of atheists, I come away from this survey with a modicum of credence-boost for theism.

---------------
*Not proof-read

The preliminary results of the PhilPapers survey are now online. Here are some coarse results that may interest Prosblogion readers, though I doubt that they will surprise anyone.

Graduate Student
God: theism or atheism?
Accept or lean toward: atheism 527 / 829 (63.5%)
Accept or lean toward: theism 173 / 829 (20.8%)
Other 129 / 829 (15.5%)

Faculty
God: theism or atheism?
Accept or lean toward: atheism 678 / 931 (72.8%)
Accept or lean toward: theism 136 / 931 (14.6%)
Other 117 / 931 (12.5%)

We have a new APA anti-discrimination policy that attempts to settle it that schools that prohibit same-sex sexual activity are in violation of the policy. Here is a really serious problem with the policy. Suppose George is a member of Westboro Baptist Church (for those who don't know about it, it's a virulently anti-gay congregation--and that's by far an understatement, as is indicated by their URL which I shall not reprint but which you can see if you google for them). George applies for the position of chair of a philosophy department at a state school, and expressly states during the interview that if appointed he would, under all possible circumstances, do his utmost to block the hiring of any gay faculty. It is clear that he ought to be dismissed as a candidate there and then, since he is committed to conduct that is unprofessional in the institutional context he is a candidate for. However the APA policy appears to prohibit dismissing George from one's list of candidates.

Here's why. The relevant part of the policy is:

The American Philosophical Association rejects as unethical all forms of discrimination based on race, color, religion, political convictions, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identification or age, whether in graduate admissions, appointments, retention, promotion and tenure, manuscript evaluation, salary determination, or other professional activities in which APA members characteristically participate. This includes both discrimination on the basis of status and discrimination on the basis of conduct integrally connected to that status, where "integrally connected" means (a) the conduct is a normal and predictable expression of the status (e.g., sexual conduct expressive of a sexual orientation) or (b) the conduct is something that only a person with that status could engage in (e.g., pregnancy), or (c) the proscription of that conduct is historically and routinely connected with invidious discrimination against the status (e.g., interracial marriage). (Emphases added. -ARP)

The irony is that the very conduct which the policy was intended to eliminate becomes protected by the policy.

March 12-13, 2010
Wake Forest University
Winston Salem, NC

Plenary Speakers:

Kathrin Koslicki (University of Colorado)
Commentator: E. J. Lowe (Durham University)

Jeffrey Brower (Purdue University)
Commentator: Hud Hudson (Western Washington University)

Samuel Newlands (University of Notre Dame)
Commentator: Robert M. Adams (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

After a difficult 20th century, metaphysics has made its way back into the mainstream, and current work in metaphysics is often admirably well-argued, scientifically-informed, and engagingly-written. But much of the most important work in contemporary metaphysics is done without serious attention to the history of the discipline. (Needless to say, there are notable exceptions!) The theme of this conference is the relation of metaphysics to its history. Relevant topics abound. For example, should metaphysicians look to historical figures for guidance or inspiration? Perhaps advances in science make earlier thinkers obsolete. Are Christian metaphysicians likely to profit from more attention to history? Do Christians have more motivation (or less?) than non-Christians for turning to historical figures? Can the thought of a great dead philosopher guide contemporary thinking on a specific metaphysical problem? Can our understanding of great dead philosophers be improved by reading them in the light of contemporary metaphysics?

However, papers on any philosophical topic are welcome, as is participation by both Christians and non-Christians.

Submission Deadline: January 1, 2010
Papers (of 25-30 minutes reading time) should be prepared for blind review, and submitted electronically in an easily accessible form. Decisions will be made by February 1. For more information or to submit a paper, contact Patrick Toner: tonerpj {at} wfu {dot} edu

Here is something I was thinking about on the bus ride home the other night (i.e., I haven't fully worked it out yet). It seems possible to have a view about act evaluation that is both significantly consequentialist and committed to the claim that rightness/wrongness is a function of God's commands. This could happen if you think that consequentialism is a view about what makes actions good or bad, better or worse--but that, strictly speaking, consequentialism has nothing to say about rightness/wrongness.

Cambridge University Press is inviting applications for the position of Editor of Religious Studies: An international journal for the philosophy of religion.

Religious Studies, published by Cambridge University Press, was launched in 1966. Since then, it has established itself as a leading international journal devoted to the problems of philosophy of religion as they arise out of classical and contemporary discussions and from varied religious traditions.

Professor Peter Byrne, who has been editing the journal for almost 20 years, will be retiring at the end of 2010. In order to ensure a smooth transition, we are now inviting applications from those interested in taking on the editorship of the journal from 1st January 2011, for an initial term of five years. The new Editor(s) will 'shadow' Peter from September 2010.

We are open to applications from individuals or editorial partnerships (based in the UK, North America or elsewhere).

Interested applicants are invited to send a brief CV and covering letter to the Chair of the Search Committee and to Cambridge University Press at the email addresses below. Covering letters should outline how the applicant(s) would approach the editorship, including:

• thoughts on the future content and strategic direction of Religious Studies, development of the journal's international profile and aims and scope


• the day to day running of the journal editorial office


• any institutional support available, including financial support and time allowed for journal work


• details of any prior journals experience

Applications (by email) are welcome at any time up until 31st March 2010.

Any potential applicants who wish to discuss the role informally with the present editor should contact Professor Peter Byrne (religiousstudies@cambridge.org).

Financial support in the form of an annual editorial stipend will be available from Cambridge University Press. Enquiries about this, or any other contractual issues, should be made to Sally Hoffmann (shoffmann@cambridge.org).

Contact details

Chair of the Search Committee: Professor Richard Swinburne

Email: Richard.Swinburne@oriel.ox.ac.uk

Cambridge University Press: Sally Hoffmann

Email: shoffmann@cambridge.org

http://journals.cambridge.org/res