Let's take reformed epistemology, at a first approximation, to be the view that beliefs about God can be properly basic. A belief is basic iff it is not held on the basis of another belief, and a belief is properly basic iff it is basic and has positive epistemic status. I say beliefs about God rather than the specific belief that God exists, because, following Plantinga, it is more likely that the properly basic beliefs humans have will have contents such as God is speaking to me, God is with me now, God is to be praised, and so forth. Each of these propositions would be the obvious basis for belief that God exists, and this belief could be very quickly and easily inferred. This is the sort of stuff Plantinga said in his very early work.
Why do I think that almost all theists are reformed epistemologists? I think this because I can't think of any theist who would deny reformed epistemology.
But some clarification is needed. Depending on how broadly we interpret the modal 'can' in the definition of reformed epistemology, we get different versions of reformed epistemology. Let reformed epistemology* be the view that it is possible for some person's belief in God to be properly basic. But then any theist should be a reformed epistemologist*. Surely God believes in his own existence in a properly basic way.
We can take the modal 'can' to refer to only humans. Let reformed epistemology** be the view that it is possible for some human's belief in God to be properly basic. Again, any theist should think this is true. Many will think that this is actually the case. Plausibly, Adam and Eve believed in God in a properly basic way, as did probably Jesus. It certainly seems possible that God design a human who is able to know that He exists in a properly basic way.
Maybe we should take 'can' to be talking about what is actual today. (I know this is stretching it.) So...
Let reformed epistemology*** be the view that there are some humans today who have properly basic belief in God. Now, I believe there are few theists who deny this. There are few theists who think that there aren't any people who, in recent times, have had a religious experience and noninferentially formed belief in God in a justified way (in a way similar to properly basic perceptual beliefs or properly basic belief in other minds). (As mentioned before, more typically, the beliefs will have contents like God is to be praised or God is speaking to me, from which belief that God exists could be quickly deduced.)
Lastly, let reformed epistemology**** be the view that it is not uncommon for humans today to have properly basic belief in God. But again, most theists will acknowledge that it is not uncommon for people to believe in God on the basis of religious experience and noninferentially form belief in God in a justified way. Most Christians who spend time in Christian community should think this happens quite regularly.
And by 'reformed epistemology', I can't think that reformed epistemologists mean something much stronger than the four versions I've outlined. But then it follows that we're almost all reformed epistemologists. Lovers of natural theology might be tempted to dislike reformed epistemology, but it seems to me that they can embrace reformed epistemology and love natural theology. I don't see why they couldn't.
You're probably right, which means theists are as stubborn and intractable as ever. They don't give a damn whether there's evidence for God or not, because they think their own inner feelings are enough to warrant God-belief - even though everybody else's inner feelings for belief in other gods do not provide warrant for belief in them, because that would result in contradictions, and theists (for the moment) still respect basic logic.
Did you send this to Swinburne?:)
If I hold that a religious experience justifies my belief, is that belief still basic? True its not justified by another belief, but that does not mean that it does not have independent justification
Andrew,
As a historical matter this is kind of weak-sauce reformed epistemology. Part of the initial impetus for RE was the view that natural theology was not only a largely failed endeavor, but a largely destructive (from a spiritual point of view) endeavor. I think this view is no longer very common among theists.
Also, it would be an interesting sociological question how many (philosopher-)theists would accept reformed epistemology*****, the view that people in the contemporary West, who have been exposed to the main intellectual critiques of religious belief and experience, can still have positive epistemic status for their basic beliefs about God. (Such a view would entail that the believer does not need defeaters for the critiques they know of.)
lukeprog
Well, there are the lovers of natural theology. They would give a damn. Furthermore, I don't see why a reformed epistemologist couldn't think that a polytheist could have rational/justified belief in some sort of powerful being. I don't see where the contradiction comes in.
Gordon,
Yeah, that's good to point out, and if you look at least at all of Plantinga's old stuff, he's pretty explicit that he's talking about justifiably believing that God exists without the belief being based on argument. That's what he thinks it is for a belief to be basic. And I take that to be equivalent to saying it's belief not based on other beliefs.
Our perceptual beliefs are nowadays seen to be paradigmatic cases of properly basic beliefs, even though most people think they are believed on the basis of an experience (a redness sense datum or something like that). So you could say that these beliefs are based on evidence (sensory or sensuous evidence), but still hold that the beliefs are basic.
What about the coherentists?
Insofar as coherentists don't think that belief in God is justified by being believed on the basis of other beliefs, but merely by the instantiation of coherence relations holding between belief in God and other beliefs the believer has, I think that they should think that belief in God is properly basic (given how I defined proper basicality above). (Plantinga says something like this in his chapter on coherentism in Warrant the Current Debate.) Now if coherentists require that a belief be held on the basis of other beliefs for it to be justified, then it looks like they will be caught up by the regress argument and have to accept something like infinitism or an implausible "linear loop coherentism" which endorses circular reasoning. They probably don't want to do that.
Hi Heath,
I know Plantinga's mentioned in the past that he doesn't think natural theological arguments are convincing (such as in God and Other Minds), but I wonder which reformed epistemologist nowadays (Plantinga, Alston, Wolterstorff) has thought that natural theology is destructive? I know you only said it was an impetus, but I wonder if you're implying that that's part of the view.
Anyway, adding the thesis that natural theology arguments are unsuccessful to RE would make it more robust, but much more controversial. I think what makes an argument count as successful is interesting and considered in Plantinga's article in the recent book called "Alvin Plantinga", edited by Deanne Peter-Baker. Historically, that might be something that should be part of RE that I did not include in this post. So maybe it is weak sauce. Still, I think it is interesting to point out that most theists would hold to this weak sauce RE.
Heath,
Regarding RE*****, I doubt that even people who are recognized as paradigm reformed epistemologists (plantinga, alston, wolterstorff) wold endorse it. but there might be people who would still hold it, such as very strong externalists who hold only that sufficiently strong external requirements need to be met for knowledge, regardless of any defeaters that the believer has. (I believe that Armstrong, Nozick, and Goldman at one time might hold views of knowledge like this.)
May I suggest another possible properly basic belief:
I am a sinner.
Reflecting on my own conversion, I think that this conviction is what led me to theism. Sin implies a moral bent-ness or disconnectedness with some transcendent lawgiver to whom/which we are accountable. I also think that this is why, in 12-Step recovery programs, Step 1 (belief in one's powerlessness) naturally leads to step 2 (belief in a higher power).
Hi Kyle,
I'm inclined to think that, for most individuals, belief that I am a sinner is inferred from beliefs about intentions, thoughts, and actions of oneself. So I don't think it is basic, though it may be inferentially justified.
Andrew,
There is a difference between a belief being triggered by an experience and its being justified by one. I think Plantinga holds some religious beliefs are triggered by experiences (though doesn't he also says that people just "find themselves" having these beliefs?)
Are there any reformed epistemologists who are not externalists?
I also think it might be that evidentialists and RE are asking different questions. Plantinga seems very concerned with whether a person is being rational, where rationality is understood in a deontological way. But an evidentialist may think the goal of epistemology is the discovery of truth.
Gordon,
On your first paragraph, I think most theists think that many people who do believe on the basis of religious experience are justified in their belief. (say, there is a sense or an impression or a seeming that God is there with them or forgives them or something like that.)
On your question, I think that a lot of internalists are confused. However, I think that most theists who identify themselves as internalists would accept RE, as I've defined it.
On the third paragraph, I'm not sure what you mean by 'evidentialist', since the way Plantinga defined it in his early work and the way it is defined by Conee and Feldman are different. (Conee and Feldman note this in the Intro to their book.)
I think what you're getting at, however, is that there are different types of positive epistemic status. And I think that the points I made about RE would hold for rationality, justification, warrant, and so on. For example, most theists will probably agree that a person can know that God is comforting them on the basis of experience. I don't think it matters what sort of positive epistemic status we're talking about; RE comes out plausible.
Hi Andrew,
I'm not sure I personally agree with RE****. Near as I can tell, my own theism is based on the twin beliefs that without God life would be meaningless and that morality would be irrational. My own Christian theism is based a bit on the strength of the argument for the historicity of the resurrection but more strongly on the attractiveness of what I take a paradigmatically Christian life to be. I shouldn't be shocked if a lot of other Christians, or at least theists, believe in theism for the kind of defensive reasons I myself endorse theism.
I'm a theist and not a Reformed Epistemologist. I don't think beliefs in or about God can be properly basic; my theism is based on some variant of the cosmological argument and some prudential considerations (e.g., re: ethics).
Jonathan,
Okay, we can take this a step at a time. Do you disagree with reformed epistemology*?
Robert,
Hmm, well, what you say isn't compatible with RE****; there may certainly be many theists and Christians who hold their belief inferentially (you included), and RE**** could still be true.
I guess the "not uncommon" in my definition of RE**** is a little vague. But are you okay with RE***? That there are some humans today who justifiably believe in God in a properly basic way?
Andrew,
Yes, but the only person here would be God as per your example.
Jon
I have two comments regarding whether one can affirm RE and natural theology. First, it seems to me one can affirm both RE and natural theology in such a way that Christian belief is doubly warranted. There's nothing incompatible in affirming that we don't need arguments, and that some arguments work. That leads to the second comment. Some have mentioned the early Plantinga's view that natural theology was a failure as somehow a necessary feature of RE. But, as no doubt many of you know, in the most recent edition of God and Other Minds, Plantinga retracted his view that natural theology was a failure. His mistake, according to him, was that he had too high standards for a natural theological argument to be deemed a "success." Plantinga's change of heart is evident in his lecture "Two Dozen (Or So) Theistic Arguments." Thus, one can't cite Plantinga as evidence that RE cannot be conjoined with natural theology.
This didn't seem to get through, so I'll try again:
Andrew,
I'm uncomfortable with RE****, which claims that it's "not uncommon for humans today to have properly basic belief in God" because most people I know, when asked why they believe in God, give some reason for it, which is usually either a variant of the cosmological argument ("well, this all had to come from somewhere") or some variant of what I said ("if there's no God, then why is anything wrong?"). Whether this is in fact the reason that motivates them to believe in God is something about which I'm not sure. Moreover, for all I know people who are theists outside the USA and Europe believe in God on the basis of religious experience or just because it primitively seemed sensible.
That said, I'd certainly believe in RE*** because I know someone who went from being an atheist to being a Christian on the basis of religious experience.
Jonathan,
Okay, let's move to RE**. Do you deny that it's possible for some human to justifiably believe in God, but not on the basis of other beliefs? Another way to phrase it: do you think it's possible for God to create a human being who is able to know that He exists in a noninferential way?
Ryan,
Just to make sure the record's straight, Heath only said (9/5, 2:23pm) that, "Part of the initial impetus for RE was the view that natural theology was not only a largely failed endeavor, but a largely destructive (from a spiritual point of view) endeavor." So nobody here has (yet) advanced the view that commitment to the failure of natural theology is an essential part of RE. Heath was only talking about an impetus.
Your point about Plantinga's change in God and Other Minds is well taken. You might also be interested in the article I cited in response to Heath (9/5, 3:01pm). Also, what's clearly the case is that RE as I've defined it in this post is clearly in concord with the projects of natural theology. Anyway, I'm largely in agreement with the spirit of your post.
Robert,
Hmm, you might be right about that, it might come back to my ambiguity with "not uncommon". And you're right that there might be some implicit, simple reasoning on the basis of which most theists actually believe in God, in something like the ways you mention. People will certainly talk this way.
You say, "Whether this is in fact the reason that motivates them to believe in God is something about which I'm not sure."
Yeah, I'm not sure either. Here's a thought. People might consider and put forth reasons for their belief post belief-formation, when they are challenged to give a reason, and in that context, saying, "It seemed true to me" or "I had a powerful experience" will not seem convincing to the interlocutor. But I doubt this happens all the time.
Here're three other ways of defending RE****. First, it's not too uncommon to hear of people who are out in nature, they're viewing its beauty, and then, in those circumstances, they come to believe that God created it all. A friend of mine (smart, theist philosopher) actually claims that it seems to him that he's seeing God in these times, in a manner akin to perception. Now, I'd never go that far.
Second, depending on your background, this may sound more or less convincing. But having attended many church retreats (high school and college level), worship services, and so on, it is during times of singing and worship when many people will report having a powerful sense of God's presence with them. Others, while hearing a preaching about God's compassionate love for them (perhaps, expressed through Jesus' death on the cross) will report suddenly having a strong sense that this is true, that God does indeed love them; they feel it and it strikes them as true, and they come to believe on the basis of its seeming true to them. (Plantinga talks a bit about these sorts of cases.) As a theist (and definitely as a Christian), I am inclined to think that the requirements for justification (or rationality or warrant) are met in these cases. This second sort of case is what convinces me most.
Third defense. Suppose you take the view that beliefs formed on the basis of testimony are formed in a noninferential way. Your parents tell you your name is 'Robert', and you believe them, not on the basis of reasoning, but simply because they tell you. The belief, furthermore, seems to be justified. Many theists believe in God in precisely this way, via testimony from parents. Insofar as it is plausible that these beliefs are justified, it is plausible that they are properly basic.
Of course, my reasoning in the previous paragraph presupposes a controversial view of testimony.
Andrew,
I see your point about belief in one's sinful state being an inference from reflection on one's own intentions/actions, but my misgiving with that is it seems to detract from the immediacy of the sense of sin. Could one not say that, rather than certain sinful choices being the justification for our sense of sin, they are rather the occasion for that sense? Wouldn't this be a better reflection of Plantinga's own externalist view of RE?
Kyle,
Hmm, I could see it going both ways. I might believe via memory, "I did x wrong and y wrong and z wrong and I had bad motive A and bad motive B and bad intention C", and form on the basis of these beliefs the further belief that I am a sinner.
On the other hand, like you say, there are times when I don't reason this way. Maybe the way I'd put it is that, in certain times, the Holy Spirit just causes my mind to open up and I see directly the truth that I am a sinner. On that occasion (as you put it, and as Plantinga and Reid would probably put it), I noninferentially form believe that I am a sinner.
So, I could see it going both ways.
Andrew,
I think traditional (pre-Plantinga) Reformed epistemology, at least Calvin's Reformed epistemology, includes quite a few more theses than what you've advanced. (This isn't an objection to your point, just an observation.)
First, Calvin's view of the sense of deity is quite a bit more than the mere claim that it is not uncommon for people to have justified basic beliefs in God. It is the universal claim that everybody has this sense of deity, and suppresses it by sin. So it accounts not only for the positive epistemic status of theists, but (more importantly) for the blameworthiness of those who refuse to acknowledge God -- this is actually pretty clear in the key passage for the sense of deity, Romans 1. So Calvin's claim is that everybody has a kind of quasi-perceptual awareness of God, such that those who acknowledge it have basic justification for their belief and in, and that those who refuse to acknowledge it are blameworthy for their withholding of belief. Call this claim the Non-inferentialist Thesis -- it is stronger than any of the theses you listed as Reformed epistemology.
Second, Calvin then adds to this the further claim that Christians are justified in believing the Bible and specifically Christian doctrine on the basis of an internal testimony from the Holy Spirit. This also can go under the umbrella of the "Non-inferentialist thesis," but it is far more specific than any of the claims you list with respect to the content of the foundationally justified beliefs.
Third, the Dutch Reformed tradition (Kuyper and followers) added to the (2-part) Non-inferentialist Thesis some version of a Perspectivist Thesis: the basic knowledge of God had in the sense of deity and the testimony of the Spirit controls (in some disagreed-about way) our reasoning about other areas of life. This is what led Kuyper to dismiss positive apologetics altogether in favor of simple preaching; Wolterstorff's Reason within the Bounds of Religion is a watered-down version of this thesis, and Plantinga's stuff on Augustinian science is recognizably related to this thesis.
So Calvin's Reformed epistemology is stronger than what you termed Reformed epistemology (his view is that all people have this awareness of God that renders them foundationally justified if they believe or blameworthy if they don't; and that all Christians have foundationally justified belief in at least some part of Christian doctrine derived from Scripture). And the Dutch Reformed (Kuyperian) contribution here is even stronger than that. So there are positions which have better historical claim to the title of "Reformed epistemology" which are less widely accepted than the theses you mention.
Dan,
Thanks for taking the time to give the historical background! It's good to know. And you may be right about those positions having better historical claim to the title.
I wonder if 'RE' might be like the term 'foundationalism', which arose out of a Cartesian view which held that only infallible or certain or indubitable beliefs can be properly basic. I believe that that's how 'foundationalism' was used in the pre-1970's era. But then moderate versions of foundationalism sprung up, and the term 'foundationalism' came to be used to cover a broader range of much more plausible views. Perhaps the same holds for RE.
Jonathan,
Okay, let's move to RE**. Do you deny that it's possible for some human to justifiably believe in God, but not on the basis of other beliefs? Another way to phrase it: do you think it's possible for God to create a human being who is able to know that He exists in a noninferential way?
It depends on how strongly you take "not on the basis of other beliefs." Is "all bachelors are unmarried" this kind of proposition? Is a person who knows that God exists on the basis of something like an ontological argument the kind of person you're referring to? If so, then yes, I concede that it's possible.
I suspect RE*** (as well as the two versions before it) is correct, but I think RE**** is wrong. I deny it. Though I don't explicitly address RE**** as you formulate it, my reasons for denying RE**** can probably be discerned from my paper "Are Christian Beliefs Properly Basic?" (well, perhaps what's in there PLUS my skepticism about many people having the kind of high-octane religious experience than would be needed for properly basic Christian beliefs) at:
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/basic.htm
Toward the beginning, I explain how I think "properly basic" is best construed in this discussion.
Hi Jonathan,
Let's clarify some things.
It depends on how strongly you take "not on the basis of other beliefs." Is "all bachelors are unmarried" this kind of proposition?
I think there may be a confusion. Your first sentence talked about beliefs, and your second sentence talked about a specific proposition. Any proposition can be properly basic (since God believes all true propositions in a properly basic way), but the proposition that all bachelors are unmarried could possibly be formed on the basis of other beliefs. An oddly designed alien who is unable to grasp such truths easily might conclude it on the basis of other beliefs.
Is a person who knows that God exists on the basis of something like an ontological argument the kind of person you're referring to? If so, then yes, I concede that it's possible.
Well, to say that a belief is based on an argument is shorthand for saying that the belief is based on belief in the premises of that argument. So such a belief would not be basic, but inferred.
Is there a part you want me to clarify more? If not, what do you think about RE**?
(Also, you might be interested in http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/ to take a quick look at the regress argument. This might give you a clearer idea of what I'm getting at.)
Hello Keith,
Thanks for the comment and the reference. I hope to take a look at it shortly.
Ah yes, thanks for the clarification. In that case, no, I don't think it's possible for some human to justifiably believe in God, but not on the basis of other beliefs? The problem is with the "justifiably" condition, I think.
well, if you don't it's possible (in the broadly logical sense) that God could successfully make a human who knows He exists in a noninferential way, then I'm not sure if further argument can be made. Good thing I put the "almost" in the title of this post!
Oh, wait: God could make necessarily omniscient humans. All their beliefs would know that God exists in a noninferential way. Perhaps we can proceed after all.
"All their beliefs would know that God exists in a noninferential way." I think I know what you mean, but this sentence really doesn't make sense.
Well, I guess I wonder why you disagree with RE***. Do you have any reason to dispute it?
Also, check out my Sept. 6 response to Robert for reasons to accept RE*** (in virtue of their being reasons to accept RE****).
I know someone who says this about himself: "After a stage of agnosticism, my belief in God arose, as far as I can tell, solely on the basis of my analysis of certain empirical/conceptual data related to causation, design, certain NDEs, and historical testimonies. If God's Spirit has played a doxastic role, it's been undetectable to me."
Goodness me, that was a meaningless sentence indeed! I meant that all their beliefs, including the one in GOd would be nononferential, just like all of God's beliefs are.
I don't think religious experiences produce properly basic beliefs in the existence of God, in the same way that I don't think that perceptual experiences produce properly basic beliefs in the objects perceived.
Jonathan,
haha, glad we got that sentence clarified.
You don't think our perceptual experiences produce properly basic beliefs about the objects perceived? Then do you think our beliefs about external world objects are justified? If so, how? By what reasoning?
I think the situation is in fact the opposite of what you suggest. As other comments have noted, Reformed Epistemology is not just a descriptive claim about how belief in God arises or how it could arise for so-and-so; reformed epistemology finds basicality sufficient for religious believers. Evidentialists like Swinburne, and I suspect many Christian philosophers, think you need a bit more to have a rational belief in God, and certainly a rational belief in a religious system. Furthermore most Christians you talk to will not stop at some properly basic justification when giving an account for their belief in God. They will probably say things about Scriptural truths being confirmed in their lives, seeing God's work in other people and in themselves, they may throw something in about the historical nature of the Bible, they probably have a miracle story, and so on.
Joshua,
Just to get clear, are you saying that RE*, RE**, etc., are false?
On your second sentence, sufficient for what? Also on your second sentence, you say, "Reformed Epistemology is not just a descriptive claim about how belief in God arises or how it could arise for so-and-so." Right, but it sounds like you're implying I said otherwise?
Just a thought.. but does anyone approach a moderate version of RE from an internalist perspective, AND furthermore claim that part of the justfication of one's belief in God is, subsonsciously, the apprehension of the intrinsic probability of theism?
Andrew,
I am not saying that the various REs are "false." I think they are just weaker statements than what most Reformed Epistemologists are likely to make.
Your claims are put in oddly descriptive ways. Sure, perhaps many people in fact hold belief in God non-inferentially, not on the basis of other propositions, and in response to some sort of immediate experience. Stipulate it however you want, but Plantinga's claim is that people believing in God in this fashion are not violating any intellectual standards. He's not talking about quantitative data or whether certain specific people are justified in their beliefs, he's saying that the basic way of holding a belief is an okay way of holding belief about God.
At least, this is how I interpret Plantinga and others like Wolterstorff. And if this is what they mean, then it's very likely that many Christians are not Reformed Epistemolgists. Many Christians think you need a lot more than an experience or two, and no inferential justifications, to properly be a Christian believer.
I realize you agree that Reformed Epistemologists hold "stronger" statements than the ones you make, but then it confuses me why you think everyone is a reformed epistemologist.
Joshua,
You said of Plantinga, "he's saying that the basic way of holding a belief is an okay way of holding belief about God."
You also gave the impression that you think that my statement of RE wasn't nearly as strong. But I think you might be misunderstanding me. All of my versions of RE are evaluative in that they say that basic beliefs about God are (or can be) proper (or, as you said in the quote, "okay"). So the basicality part of "properly basic" points to its noninferential formation (which you might call merely descriptive), but the properness part of "properly basic" points to the evaluation of the basic belief (which you might call evaluative). If the word 'proper' is not evaluative, I don't know what is.
So, I think that what you attributed to Plantinga and Wolterstorff in your most recent comment is just what I've been saying, although I split it up into four versions. And my versions of RE are evaluative. Let me know if we're not connecting.
Andrew,
I'm thinking either inference to the best explanation or some pragmatic considerations or some considerations about the evolutionary history of our perceptiual faculties. The "or" is a little misleading here. I'd want to construct arguments with all these elements. Something like:
1. My visual perceptual faculties evolved such as to provide beliefs that improve chances of survival, and (despite Plantinga) the best explanation for how this works is that they provide (sufficiently) accurate beliefs about the world.
2. I visually perceive and object O, and therefore believe it exists.
3. From 1. and 2., my belief that O exists (coming as it does from my visual perceptual faculties) is probably accurate.
Roughly.
Jonathan,
Now that I think about it, at this point, since most theistic philosophers take perceptual beliefs to be properly basic, I doubt there are many theistic philosophers who would take the route you're taking. So I take all this as a friendly tangent.
How do you know premise 1? How do you know that your faculties evolved? Do you know this on the basis of perceptual beliefs?
Hi Andrew,
Of course, I see the circle, and I really worried about this during my undergrad days (which is as much philosophy as I have, really). I'm not sure there's a satisfactory solution here; I'm not sure there's a non-circular justification for perceptual beliefs. But perhaps I'm outdated here.