It just struck me that while it is very puzzling why there is law-like regularity at the bottom level--in fundamental physics--the puzzle about why there are law-like regularities at higher levels--in astronomy, psychology, biology, chemistry and non-basic physics--is a separate puzzle. In other words, even if we had an explanation of regularity at the bottom level, we would not thereby have an explanation of why there are higher explanatory levels where there are also regularities, albeit somewhat more approximate ones. Thus, when we are puzzled by the laws of nature, there are two things to be explained:
- Why there is regularity at the level of fundamental physics.
- Why this regularity, together with the initial conditions, gives rise to regularities at multiple higher levels of organization.
This gives rise to what one might call a generalized fine-tuning argument. The standard fine-tuning argument asks why the laws of nature (and especially the constants in them) are such that life arises. The generalized fine-tuning argument asks why it is that the laws of nature and initial conditions are such that multiple explanatory levels (either left unspecified like that, or enumerated: astronomy, psychology, biology, chemistry, etc.) arise from these laws and conditions.
Whether the generalized fine-tuning argument is good argument for the existence of God depends on two things: (a) how likely it is that apart from the theistic hypothesis that such multiple levels should arise, and (b) how likely it is on the theistic hypothesis that they should arise.
As for (b), I think in Aquinas and Leibniz we find compelling accounts of how an infinite but simple deity would have good reason to create a world that images his infinity via a diversity of elements and his simplicity via a unity running through these diverse elements. Unity at multiple explanatory levels allows even more of that diversity and unity.
What about (a)? I don't know. I think the question is easier when the levels are enumerated, as then the considerations from the standard fine-tuning arguments can be used. But the general question is quite interesting, too.
(Cross-posted to my own blog.)
hello Alex,
This is tangential, perhaps. But I wonder if we should distinguish two parts of the fine tuning argument. I worry that an implicit assumption regardign laws of nature is that these laws are contingent, which is not at all obvious to me. On the other hand, it does seem that the initial conditions of the universe are plausibly (given what we know), contingent.
Carl Sagan once said, apparently, that if God existed God would rig pi to be in some kind of code, which is silly because pi is a necessary truth. The same might be said of natural laws if it turns out that these depend on essential characteristics of ultimate particles (but again, this does not really weaken the argument if it is true that the fact that there are such particles is really contingent.
"In other words, even if we had an explanation of regularity at the bottom level, we would not thereby have an explanation of why there are higher explanatory levels where there are also regularities, albeit somewhat more approximate ones."
Here are three questions:
(1) Why are there higher level laws?
(2) Why are there lower level laws?
(3) Why are there the kind of lower level laws that can sustain higher level laws?
If the higher level goings on supervene on the lower level goings on, then we have a explanation of the higher level goings on in terms of the lower level goings on. In this case the first question would have an answer in the explanation of the lower level goings on. But the second and third questions would not yet have an answer, and the best explanation here might be theistic.
But does the phenomenon of there being the kind of lower level laws that can sustain higher level laws provide additional confirmation to theism over the confirmation provided by the phenomenon of there being lower level laws, or vice versa?
Gordon:
Actually, even if the laws are necessary, there might be an argument to be made. Suppose that the best mathematics reveals that pi contains encoded within it an intricate account of divine attributes in some amazingly powerful language. Even though the value of pi is a necessary truth, pace Sagan and perhaps Descartes, nonetheless there would be an explanatory question with regard to why this is so, and a theistic explanation that all necessary truths are grounded in the nature of God might actually be the best explanation.
TC:
Let's suppose that the higher level laws supervene on the lower level ones. The supervenient higher level laws will then be hypothetical: "If there are galaxies, here is how they behave; if there are frogs, here's how they speak." But there will still be the question of why the initial conditions were such that the antecedents of these higher level laws are satisfied. Granted, the laws of stellar evolution would still be true if there were no stars, but if there were no stars, most of the regularities that astronomy studies would not exist. (Regularities are not the same as laws. One difference is that on many views of laws, laws can hold vacuously in the absence of the situations governed by them, but regularities must actually be filled out. It is a law that mountains of gold reflect visible light. But it is not a regularity, for there are no mountains of gold.)
Fodor has a very nice discussion of the puzzle about special sciences laws towards the end of 'Special Sciences II'.