There is no shortage of escathological paradoxes. Here’s another. Suppose God distributes punishments and rewards based on how well we live up to moral standards over time and God determines when we die and when will be judged. For simplicity, suppose everyone knows what the standards are, the standards are objective and precise, excusing and mitigating conditions never arise, and so on.
No matter what time God selects for our death and judgment, it is true that we might live a much better life. So, God cannot be justified in choosing a time to make the judgment. I initially thought the following was true.
- God is justified in punishing S at t iff. it is true at t that (i) S has not led a good life and (ii) S would not live a good life after t, were he to continue living.
That is, all we need to know is the truth-value of the propositions in (i) and (ii) to know whether it is permissible to punish S. But now that seems wrong. What could God punish S for at t? He cannot justifiably punish S for the overall value of S’s life L, since S’s life was ended at t. He cannot punish S for the part of S’s life that he lived, since that might have been an insignificant part of a superb life, had S’s life not been ended. So there is nothing God can justifiably punish S for.
Suppose it is true at t that S would lead a morally exemplary life. Is (1.1) true?
1.1. God is justified in rewarding S at t iff. it is true at t that (i) S has led a good life and (ii) S would lead a good life after t, were he to continue living.
(1.1) also seems mistaken. Even if it is true that I would lead an exemplary life, I might not do so. But now consider (1.2)
1.2 For any time t in S’s life L, (i) it is possible that L is overall good and (ii) it is possible that S’s life is overall bad.
Whatever else is true about S at t, it is true at t that, possibly, S lives a life whose overall value is exemplary and it is true that possibly, S lives a life whose overall value is bad. This creates a serious problem for those who believe that (i) God will punish/reward S at some time t and (ii) God determines when S’s judgment will occur. As far as I can see, (1.3) is true.
1.3. There is no time t in S’s life at which it is permissible for God to reward or punish S, since there is nothing for which S is properly punished at any time t.
Mike:
Could you explain more why you think the molinist answer is unsatisfactory?
If God really knows these counterfactuals of freedom, then God knows what my life would be, were I left to live on indefinitely.
So giving me extra time for repentence may, in some cases, simply be an empty gesture--it will do me no good.
So giving me extra time for repentence may, in some cases, simply be an empty gesture--it will do me no good.
Hi Gordon,
I've just finished updating the entry, so maybe it's clearer. I think the Molinist response won't help. God decides on the time t at which my life ends and I am judged. The Molinist says something like (1).
1. God is justified in punishing S at t iff. it is true at t that (i) S has not led a good life and (ii) S would not live a good life after t, were he to continue living.
But (i) and (ii) do not ensure that S could not live a morally superb life overall. That's entirely up to S. That is, it is perfectly consistent to say that S would lead a bad life but, possibly, S leads a morally superb life. Let Lt be the part of S's life that he lived until t, the time at which God ends it. Let Ln be much longer life that includes Lt and which is overall very good. It is true that Lt was lived poorly. But it is also true that S might have gone on to live Ln, an overall superb life. It seems to me that S has a legitimate grievance if he is judged on Lt alone or if he is judged on Lt and what S would do, were he to live on after t. He can say truly: "I could have lived an overall superb life, but was not given the opportunity". The 'could have' is no empty gesture. It genuinely true that S could do that, despite (i) and (ii), and despite what God knows at t.
(First off, it seems to me to be quite acceptable for God to send one to judgment when one led a bad life even if it were true that the life would, or would likely, turn into a good one. It's quite just. I am inclined to think that as a contingent matter of fact God doesn't act in this way, but he could.)
In any case, in regard to your first question, I think we need to distinguish what S is being punished for from why S is being punished. A bank robber is caught. She is being punished for bank robber. But a part of the answer for why she (and not her fleeter-footed confederate) is being punished is that she was caught. But she is not being punished for being caught.
In the case a just judge, what S is being punished for is always a part of the reason for the punishment. However, it is often only a part of the reason. Thus, perhaps, the judge would have given S get a lesser sentence had she informed on her more wicked confederates. She is not being punished for failure to inform--the judge may well know that her failure to inform is not her fault, but is simply a result of her not having any valuable information--but her failure to inform is a part of why she is being punished.
Anyway, with this distinction in place, the Molinist seems to have a complete answer to your first question:
1. God punishes S solely for S's misdeeds prior to death.
2. God punishes S both because of S's misdeeds prior to death and because S would not have improved.
Even if the misdeeds had been a part of a superb life, they would have been deserving of punishment in the "punish for" sense. Granted, if they were a part of a superb life, there would have been reason not to punish them, but that is beside the point, I think.
Even if the misdeeds had been a part of a superb life, they would have been deserving of punishment in the "punish for" sense. Granted, if they were a part of a superb life, there would have been reason not to punish them, but that is beside the point, I think.
I'm not sure that's coherent. The misdeed are not punished, I am punished! The question is whether God justifiably punished ME, not my deeds, when he chooses the end of my life and time of judgment. I say he doesn't, since he inevitably precludes my doing better. He inevitably precludes a possible future in which I am not justifiably punishable.
Anyway, with this distinction in place, the Molinist seems to have a complete answer to your first question:
1. God punishes S solely for S's misdeeds prior to death.
2. God punishes S both because of S's misdeeds prior to death and because S would not have improved.
How is that relevant? Granting (1) and (2) it is nonetheless true that God acts in a way that precludes a possible future in which S is not punishable. I concede,
a. S has gone wrong.
b. Were S's life not ended, S would go wrong.
But these are irrelevant to the fact that (c) is true,
c. If S's life is not ended, then possibly S actualizes a world in which he leads an overall superb life.
(c) is the problem. Given what God does, S cannot actualize such a world. That is the basis for the complaint.
Take this Molinist reply to the extreme case and you have God justified in ending the lives of newborns and damning them to hell on the basis of the fact that they would have led a terrible life, had they lived on. I hope I don't have to argue that this way lies moral madness.
Does not the word 'would' imply determinacy? If this is so, then if S would lead an exemplary life had he lived then it would not be possible for him to not live an exemplary life had he lived. Furthermore, why should we be concerned with what might happen if S lives when S in fact dies? If God rewards (or punished) S for the type of life S lived then it does not matter what might have been the case had he lived. I guess I do not see the paradox.
"Whatever else is true about S at t, it is true at t that, possibly, S lives a life whose overall value is exemplary and it is true that possibly, S lives a life whose overall value is bad. This creates a serious problem for those who believe that (i) God will punish/reward S at some time t and (ii) God determines when S’s judgment will occur. As far as I can see, (1.3) is true."
I do not see the relevancy of the word 'possibly' in this context. If S lives a life and dies at t then the content of that life is fixed; it cannot be changed or it would not be S. Besides, God, and presumably S also (given your criteria above), would know whether S's life was exemplary or not. This being the case then God can properly reward or punish S for the life that S lived. It seems that 1.3 is false.
Furthermore, why should we be concerned with what might happen if S lives when S in fact dies? If God rewards (or punished) S for the type of life S lived then it does not matter what might have been the case had he lived. I guess I do not see the paradox.
You have to keep in mind that God decides when S dies. A metaphor might help. Case 1: Suppose I decide when your baseball skill is to be evaluated. You play one inning and I pull you out of the game and form a judgment about your skill from one inning of play. You might be right in insisting that you did not get a fair chance to show what you could do. Case 2: You live until 5 years of age, God "pulls you from the game" and punishes you based on what you would have done at age 35yrs. You might rightly complain that God's actions precluded you from living a life that did not deserve punishent. And that's in fact true.
In general, (i) it is hard to see how someone G can properly evaluate someone's life, if G gets to choose the time of evaluation and (ii) it is hard to see how an evaluation can be based on what one would have done, if one did not actually do it.
Thanks Mike for your response.
"You have to keep in mind that God decides when S dies."
I presume that you are not claiming that God is complicit in the murder of S if S is being murdered by S' at t. Is God allowing S to die at t or is He deciding that t is the time for S to die well in advance of t? If the former then God can certainly judge how well a life has been lived relative to the moral standards that are known by all, including S. If the latter, then based on a non-compatabalist view of human freedom S is not free and therefore should not be punished.
Here is a different scenario. Based on your argument a teacher would not be able to evaluate a student's work because she determines when it is going to be evaluated. Now student might very well think this a good thing, but I think teachers would think that it is not.
Also, why would a reasonable person S not lead a good life if she knows the moral standards that are going to be used by God to evaluate her life when she dies. If seems that God knowing when S will die is besides the point if the conditions are as you outline them above. It would also seem irrelevant that S could have lived a better life then she actually lived if she is living a good enough life. It should count for something that she could have lived a worse life then she did as long as she is trying to live a 'good' life, not the best life.
If the latter, then based on a non-compatabalist view of human freedom S is not free and therefore should not be punished.
Not so. God might have actualized him in circumstances in which S is free and dies at a certain time t. God might know this via middle knowledge.
Based on your argument a teacher would not be able to evaluate a student's work because she determines when it is going to be evaluated
I don't see how that follows. What the teacher cannot fairly do is stop some students at 10mins., let others go for 20mins. and still others 2hrs.
I just can't follow the rest of your post. I'm not sure what you're saying there.
"I don't see how that follows. What the teacher cannot fairly do is stop some students at 10mins., let others go for 20mins. and still others 2hrs."
But you said regarding the truth of 1.3 that there is no time at which it would be permissible for God (teachers) to punish or reward S because there is nothing that S can be properly punished or rewarded for. The point I am trying to make is that there is something she can be properly rewarded or punished for; the life she actually lived if certain conditions are met. If S knows that she is going to be evaluated based on some moral standards that she is fully aware of, then she can knowingly and freely act according to them or not. (I would argue that if S is rational and that there are objective moral standards that she knows, etc., then she will try to follow them to the best of her ability. To do otherwise would be irrational and she should not be punished for acting irrationally. I was thinking about your recent paper in Faith and Philosophy.) It would seem that the idea of unfairness would enter in at the point of S being fully aware of the moral standards in that it would be unfair to judge her by utilizing them if she were not fully aware of them. This would rule out judging S until she is capable of acting rationally based on what she knows and can freely choose. It seems to me that doing what is permissible is a matter of degree; one can always do better or worse. But, you have ruled this out if we accept all your constraints. Because you have ruled out excusing or mitigating conditions, it would seem that matters of degree are not relevant to your concerns. But, this seems to beg the question in favor of 1.3. But if we do not accept your constraints on excusing or mitigating conditions then ‘matters of degree’ seem to be morally relevant factors in determining how successful one is in living one's life. We can disregard the idea that S could have done better had S lived longer because S did not live longer. But as long as 1) S knew the moral standards that were going to be used to evaluate her life and 2) that S tried to live up to these standards under conditions of fairness (which includes there being excusing or mitigating conditions) then God can reward S for living a good (enough) life.
The point I am trying to make is that there is something she can be properly rewarded or punished for; the life she actually lived if certain conditions are met.
Right, that's exactly what I am denying. Any time t at which God terminates the "game" is arbitrary. Compare this to a baseball game that I get to terminate at any point I please. You say that the teams should do their best, and that's of course true. But granting both teams are doing their best, one might do better initially than the other. If I quickly terminate the game, my team did not win fairly and squarely.
My life history might start out rather poorly, too. If God terminates it at t and condemns me to hell, that's pretty clearly unjust. The termination point is again arbitrary. Had I lived on, I might have done much better overall, and he could have seen to it that I live on.
Thanks for an interesting exchange.
"My life history might start out rather poorly, too. If God terminates it at t and condemns me to hell, that's pretty clearly unjust. The termination point is again arbitrary. Had I lived on, I might have done much better overall, and he could have seen to it that I live on."
But why is your life history rather poor? Are you aware that it is poor or do you believe it to be rich? If your poor history is the result of a lack of knowing what moral standards to live by then you should not be punished for failing to act on knowledge you do not possess. If you do not follow moral standards you know to be true then you are not rational and again you should not be punished. The arbitrainess of when one dies is not relevant to deciding if reward or punishment is permissible. If you die before you can know you should not be punished. If you die in a state of being irrational you should not be punished. Of course, an important question is who (or what) dies? I presume that a dead person is one who no longer exists. If a dead person cannot be rewarded or punished the argument seems to be moot in so far as if no one dies there is always an opportunity to change. Maybe Hell is empty after all.
"The arbitrariness of when one dies is not relevant to deciding if reward or punishment is permissible."
As stated, this is incorrect. I should have qualified it by adding that there must be an element of fairness involved. Setting a time limit can be arbitrary, but fair if reasonable criteria are established. Having a 2-hour time limit on an exam is arbitrary but fair if everyone has the full amount of time available to them to complete the exam. If I oversleep and am one hour late for the exam, that is my problem (all things being equal) and does not mean that I am being treated unfairly by only having one hour to finish the exam. I knew the rules and the consequences of not following them.
Mike,
Here's why the baseball analogy does not work. Baseball skills are developed over time. Even in the context of one game, it becomes easier to hit the pitcher as the game goes on. But the Final Judgment is to be based on something any rational creature can always do simply: obey God’s commands. The senior citizen is no abler here than the adolescent. (That is why Jesus warns His followers: "You know neither the time nor the place.") Thus, there is no “moral luck;” everyone gets the same chance to prove himself worthy of the Kingdom.
Mike:
My intuition is that we would have no right to complain if God immediately sent us straight to hell as soon as we committed our first mortal sin. (This might actually be analytic.) There would be nothing arbitrary. Now, suppose God had me die 12 days after I committed my 17th mortal sin, without my having repented. That does not seem any less fair than having me die right after I committed that 17th mortal sin--it seems I owed him gratitude for the offer of twelve days to repent in. And having die right after I committed my 17th mortal sin seems no less fair than having me die after committing my first. So I don't see a justice problem.
As soon as I commit a mortal sin, God has a reason of justice to terminate my life and send me to hell. Of course, he also has a reason of mercy to give me some time to repent. God, then, is placed in the position of having two incommensurables to choose between, with both choices morally permissible. Whichever he chooses to act on, he will act well.
As soon as I commit a mortal sin, God has a reason of justice to terminate my life and send me to hell.
I guess I don't see it. It's my moral life that is being evaluated, isn't it? I don't think a moral life can be evaluated in a short time. I don't think one mortal sin reveals much about you as a moral agent, nor do ten mortal sins.
But let me set that much aside. My worry is based on the assumption that God's assessment of my moral life would, in many cases, (and could, in every case) be different at different times. So, his choosing this particular time to end my life is, in effect, choosing the final judgment he wants to make about me. If he wanted to make a different final judgment, he could simply wait longer. It is a little like someone giving you an exam and choosing when he wants you to stop doing the problems. He might stop after one problem that you were careless about and fail you. Or, he might let you keep going until you've acheived a passing grade and then assess your work. There seems no non-arbitrary reason to stop you at one point, rather than another.
"It is a little like someone giving you an exam and choosing when he wants you to stop doing the problems. He might stop after one problem that you were careless about and fail you. Or, he might let you keep going until you've acheived (sic) a passing grade and then assess your work. There seems no non-arbitrary reason to stop you at one point, rather than another."
Again, that is why you don't want to be like the foolish virgins and miss YOUR opportunity to enter the 'wedding feast' Or, to put it in your terms, we have been told that the 'exam' might stop at any time, so we should do our level best on each problem. Moreover, what seems arbitrary from our limited perspective must (yet) fit in the economy of salvation. Bottom line: one's relationship with God is the most serious matter possible and, thus, should not be neglected, as Jesus warns us, even for an instant. There is no room for carelessness here, as should be.
Again, that is why you don't want to be like the foolish virgins and miss YOUR opportunity to enter the 'wedding feast' Or, to put it in your terms, we have been told that the 'exam' might stop at any time, so we should do our level best on each problem
The point is that, since God chooses the time of death, he also chooses the judgment. That's the problem. God can choose not to have S die at a time when the judgment would not be as bad, but in many cases he does not. That, too, is the problem. I'm pointing up a problem of justice, not a problem of rational self-interest. You keep offering advice about how to maximize rational self-interest when you find yourself in such an odd context. All good, but entirely beside the point.
Robert:
One's ability to do the right thing is not easy, it depends crucially on character, which of course changes over time.
Why do we suppose that God judges right after death? Though the problem seems to continue as long as God picks any time as "last judgement"
Maybe God waits for all to be saved, and never cuts anyone off.
"God can choose not to have S die at a time when the judgment would not be as bad, but in many cases he does not. That, too, is the problem."
If I warn my students that I might end the exam at any time after the first problem is assigned, then there is no valid excuse for failure based on a subjunctive of the sort you are relying upon, not to mention that it would be purely speculative. What they would have done beyond my cut-off point, to the extent that that that can be known at all, is irrelevant for the purpose of my evaluation. What I am telling them in effect is 'You had better give your all on every single problem; treat every answer as if your grade depended on it'. Now suppose someone doesn't take me seriously and fails to solve the first problem, not because he lacks the ability (this relates to my other point about simplicity), but because of carelessness. Should I suspend the exam before he has another chance to prove himself, he has no business complaining.
I would think the appropriate analogy would not be an exam, but an entire course, indeed an entire course. Suppose you were teaching Logic, and you told the students that you would end the class arbitrarily at any time the class and grade them appropriately according to how they did.
But you also know that if the course lasts 16 weeks more people would pass then if you cut it off at 6 weeks.
What would be the pedagogic justification for cutting the course short? Likewise, God wants everyone to be be saved, so what is the reason God has for cutting the chance for salvation short?
If I warn my students that I might end the exam at any time after the first problem is assigned, then there is no valid excuse for failure based on a subjunctive of the sort you are relying upon, not to mention that it would be purely speculative
Robert, you seem to think that you can avoid doing an injustice simply by promulgating the news that you act unjustly. If I promulgate the news that I mug people who take 'Unleasant Avenue' home, and you nonetheless take Unpleasant Ave., is it now your fault if I mug you? No, it isn't. You might be unwise or imprudent, but (as I said above) that's a different question. It's my fault. I still act unjustly despite informing you.
Similarly, if you inform me of your unjust testing methods, that does not suddenly make those methods just. I might be imprudent not to act in certain ways, given this information, but you are no less unjust for your testing methods.
Similarly, if God informs me of his unjust approach to judgment, that does not make it just. Again, it might be imprudent for me not to act differently, given the information, but it is still unjust for God to exercise judgment in this way.
Mike,
With all due respect, I think you are begging the question- what makes my test unjust? Mugging is intrinsically unjust, unlike testing. So what is it about my test that makes it unjust? Because it can be suspended at any minute? If the students were not apprised of that possibility, then that would make it unjust. But they were, so that can't be it. (Students are always complaining 'If I only had more time, then I would have done better'. I tell them, 'If you had done your homework, you wouldn't have needed more time'. Assuming that is correct, that they were guilty of negligence, I am not being unfair.) I am calling them to perfection, asking them to give their all on each problem. Similarly, it would not be unjust for God to call someone to account sooner than later. Assuming that he was able to pass every moral test assigned him, not necessarily with ease, but by making an honest effort, there would be no unfairness in God basing His judgment on the work done so far.
With similarly due respect, I've explained the injustice of this sort of procedure several times now. I've pointed out that the procedure allows you (or God, in the case I care about) to stop the test arbitrarily. Informing students that you halt testing arbitrarily does not suddenly make it just to do so.
Mike,
I guess I am not seeing the arbitrary part. I am assuming that God has a good but perhaps hard to fathom reason for suspending each test when He does, having to do with the economy of salvation. It's not like He says to Himself 'Allen just messed up again, that puts him over the limit for transgressions, I think I'll call him to account now'. Armed with the knowledge that the test can be suspended at any time, I can't see how anyone can complain about arbitrariness. I'll go out on a limb and say a test is unfair iff its takers are unprepared for it. Holy Scripture amply prepares me for the test in question, giving me the rules I am to follow and warning me to live each day as if was going to be my last.
Would telling the students, to go back to the analogy, precisely when the test will end eradicate it unfairness? But I don't want them to know that precisely because it may encourage neglect. I had to take over another Professor's class last term, who was allowing the students to drop their lowest grade. Much to my chagrin, one student simply disregarded the final because he had already earned his A.
God can make the test the most serious matter possible, which is what it should be, only by conducting it on His terms, which entails being the one to decide when it is over. What if I could decide when it was over: then I would simply wait until I had achieved the required ‘score’ and call it quits, like my “student” did, disregarding those problems I didn’t want to solve because of the second chances I planned on giving myself. (Or is God supposed to wait, as suggested in A. P. Taylor’s post on Universalism, for each one of us to ‘earn enough points’ to enter the Kingdom.) By your reasoning, every test is going to be unfair, given that the assignor gets to decide its length. Even if I allow my students to complete the assigned problems on a test, some may still complain that it was too short. In fact, I have heard this complaint on more than one occasion and suspect you have as well. But, again, if they were prepared for the problems I did assign I can’t see why the length should matter.
Mike
"I've pointed out that the procedure allows you (or God, in the case I care about) to stop the test arbitrarily. Informing students that you halt testing arbitrarily does not suddenly make it just to do so."
Given the fact that God is just, God will not stop the test unfairly. If he does, then He is not just and I do not think that is what you are arguing for.
I think that the problem many of us have (I know that it is my issue) is that you have not adequately demonstrated that being arbitrary equates to always being unjust. Certainly in some cases being arbitrary is unjust, but in those cases the concept of fairness comes into play (as you have indicated). A time frame is always arbitrary be it an exam or a lifetime, but that does not make it unjust or unfair. You need to demonstrate that it is unfair to establish an arbitrary time frame and that I do not think you have successfully done. Simply stipulating that one could have done better had one more time is not a defense that not having more time is somehow inherently unfair. Assuming that one knows that their is time frame and the rules of the game, then the outcome of following (or not following as the case may be) the rules must be fair. Given your thought experiment I know that God has determined that I will die at some future time t. I do not know this time, but I do know that it is in the future. It must be far enough in the future that I have a fair chance of living a life that will result in God giving me a fair evaluation. Assuming that I am reasonable and know the standards by which I will be judged (and you stipulated that we do possess this knowledge)then I will follow those standards to the best of my ability. As I argued earlier, if I die before I have a fair chance to live a life according to these standards then God, being just, will not punish me. Also, if I am not rational and die then God, being just,will not punish me. He can only evaluate me justly if 1) I am rational, 2) know the rules of the game, and 3) have sufficient time to act accordingly. If I waste the time I have knowing 1-3, then God is not at fault when he evaluates my life accordingly when I die when he determined that I would.
Mike, et. al.
I have a question regarding God judging us and the idea of fairness. It is outside the scope of Mike's post and I apologize for taking advantage of this, but...
Let us assume that Mike is correct that 1) God determines when we are going to die and 2) God will evaluate us when we die according to standards known to us all and reward or punishes us accordingly. Is it fair that God can judge us,etc., if we have no choice in playing the game? A student can drop a course up to a certain time without penalty if she decides that she does not want to continue. If a student drops after that time she gets a 'do-over.' Only if she takes the course till the time she cannot drop, even with a penalty, will she be finally evaluated. It seems that God does not allow us this opportunity. Is this fair? Does this constitute another escathological paradox?
I think that the problem many of us have (I know that it is my issue) is that you have not adequately demonstrated that being arbitrary equates to always being unjust.
It's obvious to me that I'm not committed to defending any such claim in order to defend my position on the injustice here. Obviously, if I arbitrarily choose ice cream rather than candy, I do nothing wrong.
A time frame is always arbitrary be it an exam or a lifetime, but that does not make it unjust or unfair.
No, it isn't. I've been giving exams for years that are designed to be completed in the allotted time. Nothing arbitrary about it.
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I've nearly exhausted my interest in clarifying this, but I'll make one last attempt. Here's the problem.
1. God chooses that I die at t, knowing how I will be judged at t.
2. No matter what time t God chooses to judge me, the interval (0, t) is a part of a life (0, t+n) I could have lived instead.
3. So, no matter what time t God judges me, he does so on the basis of a part (0, t) of a longer life (0, t+n) that I could have lived.
4. As a basis to judge my whole life on, there is no reason to choose one part of my life rather than another.
5. The part of my life that God chooses as a basis for the judgment of my whole life is arbitrary.
6. Anyone x who bases his judgment of another y on an arbitrarily chosen part (0, t) of y's life acts unjustly.
7. /:. God acts unjustly in judging me on an arbitrarily chosen part of my life.
"No, it isn't. I've been giving exams for years that are designed to be completed in the allotted time. Nothing arbitrary about it."
But as I noted, you get to decide, as the fair-minded instructor, how long that time is- that is in the very nature of an examination. YOU allot the time, but if you have prepared your students to complete it in that time, it is fair- even though they might complain that they would have done better on a longer exam. You are simply ducking my charge that ANY exam would be considered unfair given your premise 4. Whether it contains 25 questions, 50 or 100 is up to you. That alone does NOT make it unfair. To be fair, all you have to do is make sure that your students are prepared to answer the questions you ask. You are conflating ending the exam without warning when the students had every reason to expect it to be longer with not letting them know in advance the precise length, which I have given a good reason for doing.
I'm not sure what you're talking about. I'm not even addressing your "charge". I'm addressing points in Alexander's post above (which is where the italicised quote in my post is from). Followed by yet another (and certianly last) proof of the injustice arising from God's arbitrary basis for judging my life.
think that an extension of the Molinist response can be rejected only if you appeal to a controversial logical principle. Suppose God says, "It's true that I decided when to end S's life. But I know that, if S had gone on living, he wouldn't have lived his life in a way that alters the judgment made when his life in fact ended."
Your response to this is that if God knows how S's life would have gone on, he is still delimiting a certain time to judge S's life. (I.e., you say, "c. If S's life is not ended, then possibly S actualizes a world in which he leads an overall superb life." )
But suppose God knows that no matter how long S's life extends, the verdict on the overall goodness of S's life never changes? That is, it's possible that S leads a good life, (assuming that his life so far is bad), but this possible world never is the actual world.
If you rule this out, you appear to assume a principle like, "If p is possible, then there exists some time t in which p is actual". If the verdict on S's life life is unfavorable, then if we waited long enough, a time would arise where the verdict would be different.
I don't claim that this principle is false, but it isn't obvious that it's true. (Rescher has a paper somewhere on the use of this principle in ancient and medieval philosophy.)
. . . suppose God knows that no matter how long S's life extends, the verdict on the overall goodness of S's life never changes?
I'm assuming that what you say here is compatible with the possibility that S leads a good life. All of the following can be true together.
1. God knows that S will lead a bad life and will never change.
2. Possibly S leads a good life.
3. Were S to lead a good life, God would never have known that S would lead a bad life. He would have known all along that S would lead a good life.
I don't take God's foreknowledge to be an interesting obstacle to S doing other than leading a bad life, and that might be where we disagree. It is a different story altogether, but all of the alleged problems for freedom from foreknowledge look (to me, anyway) like more or less artful obfuscation.
My comment and your reply are not showing up on the comments page, although they are referred to in "Recent Comments." I'd be grateful if you would fix this.
Sure they are. I'm having no trouble seeing the comments. So, I'm not sure what the problem is.
There must be a problem on my computer, although your response to RTS on the other post comes up. Would you please send me a copy of your response to dgordon50@google.com or dgordon@mises.com? Thanks.
But how are you responding to my recent comments on this thread if you can't read this thread?
Here, I'll re-post what I said above, assuming these are now readable.
. . . suppose God knows that no matter how long S's life extends, the verdict on the overall goodness of S's life never changes?
I'm assuming that what you say here is compatible with the possibility that S leads a good life. All of the following can be true together.
1. God knows that S will lead a bad life and will never change.
2. Possibly S leads a good life.
3. Were S to lead a good life, God would never have known that S would lead a bad life. He would have known all along that S would lead a good life.
I don't take God's foreknowledge to be an interesting obstacle to S doing other than leading a bad life, and that might be where we disagree. It is a different story altogether, but all of the alleged problems for freedom from foreknowledge look (to me, anyway) like more or less artful obfuscation.
So Mike,
Do you think this sort of paradox provides (added) evidence for universalism?
Hi Gordon,
I think it supports the view that universalism is possibly true. More exactly, I think it supports the view that there is a universalism-world that is, for each finite person, identical to ours right up to individual judgment.