I mean to beg no questions in claiming that (1) is an easily observed a priori truth.
- <>(Ex)(x is maximally excellent & x is necessarily existing).
I do not take the proposition that x is maximally excellent to (obviously) entail that x is omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent or creator of everything that exists. I take (1) to entail that there is something that necessarily exists and is such that there is nothing that is more excellent (than it).
Still, observing that (1) is true is important. Now we avoid altogether the hackneyed objection that, “well, it is possible that a maximally excellent being does not exist, too”. The only question in dispute is what are the maximally excellent compossible properties.
But that too is an avoidable question. There are only certain sets of properties that we are actually concerned about and we can, without begging any questions, focus on them. Observe that it is equally undeniable that there is some degree K of knowledge that (more or less closely) approximates omniscience, some degree P of (essential) power that approximates omnipotence, some degree G of (essential) goodness that approximates (essential) omnibenevolence such that Px & Kx & Gx are compossible with necessary existence, Nx. So, the only question that is open is what is the greatest degree of each that is compossible with necessary existence. Let’s put it more exactly, quantifiying over degrees of such properties and beings that might possess them.
- <>(EK)(EP)(EG)(Ex)([]Kx & []Px & []Gx & Nx)
[3.13.09 revised and updated; 3.14.09 addendum]
(2) states that there is some maximally excellent set of compossible properties. Since those properties are compossible, they are obviously instantiated in some world. But then the being that instantiates those properties actually exists. Such a being actually exists, but what being is it? We can rule out human beings, each of whom has those properties to some degree, but none of whom necessarily exists. We can rule out any natural being, since every natural being contingently exists. We can rule out abstract beings such as numbers, properties, propositions and the like, each of which has necessary existence but none of which has the remaining properties. It’s beginning to look like any being satisfying all of those properties would have to be non-natural or supernatural, since there is no natural being that has the property of necessary existence and there is no abstract object that has the properties P, K, or G. Call that being God-.
Notice the difficulty in attempting to refute that there is such a maximally excellent being. You would have to show that every interesting degree of K, P and G fails to be compossible with N. I submit that there is no reason to believe that there isn’t some interesting degree of those properties that is compossible with necessary existence. Now imagine believing that this supernatural being God- exists, but refusing to believe that God exists. That would be strange.
Addendum
I think several commentators have misread the initial premise and not quite followed the argument thereafter. The proposition in (1) states (just) that there is some necessarily existing thing, and this thing is, in some deliberately unspecified sense, a maximally excellent thing. I’m happy to say that it is at least as good as any other necessarily existing thing. Maybe none of them has any value at all. So, if there are abstract objects that are at least as good as any other necessarily existing thing (maybe at least as good as any other abstract object), then (1) is true.
That’s the first step in the argument. I explicitly skip all talk of the value or greatness of this being. I say “the only question in dispute is what are the maximally excellent compossible properties” and quickly add “but that too is an avoidable question”.
The argument is now captured in one question: what is the greatest degree of Px, Kx, and Gx that is compossible with necessary existence? That’s all I ask. I note that I’ve never seen an argument that shows (or even attempts to show) that every interesting degree of Px, Kx, and Gx is incompossible with Nx.
My conclusion is effectively that the psychological obstacles that (I think) inhibit nontheists from believing in God are removed once the nontheist believes that there is something God-ish in existence. And I do think that most of the reasons that keep nontheists from believing are psychological reasons (not epistemic ones).
I can't sign in for some reason, but I was wondering if you knew a quick and easy answer to this one. What do you say to someone who doubts that omnibenevolence has an "intrinsic maximum"? (I think that's Plantinga's term.) If omnibenevolence doesn't have an intrinsic maximum, couldn't someone say that there's no greatest degree of goodness?
What do you say to someone who doubts that omnibenevolence has an "intrinsic maximum"? (I think that's Plantinga's term.) If omnibenevolence doesn't have an intrinsic maximum, couldn't someone say that there's no greatest degree of goodness?
Clayton,
Even if there isn't some maximum in omnibenevolence, there might still be a maximum compossible with P and K. But if there is no unique degree of omnibenevolence that is compossible with P and K, then for every set of (such) compossible properties S, there is some being that instantiates every member of S.
Hi Mike,
Interesting post! Suppose it turns out that the kind of being with maximal excellence is clearly limited in, say, knowledge & power. I would think that this is the kind of being that also lacks necessary existence. I don’t have an argument here, but it points to the unity of perfections. I do find it odd to offer an ontological argument for, say, McEar! Granted necessary existence is one property and omniscience is another property, so there’s always the argument that these are possibly exemplified by different things. But, speaking for myself, the property of necessary existence seems special. Do you have an argument against the unity of perfections?
Suppose it turns out that the kind of being with maximal excellence is clearly limited in, say, knowledge & power. I would think that this is the kind of being that also lacks necessary existence.
There are beings like the ones you describe: human beings, for instance. I have no argument against the unity of the perfections, nor do I know of any persuasive argument for it. I'm trying to avoid all talk about perfections. The argument I offer does not mention them. I use the Plantingan term 'maximal excellence', but even that I don't use in the way he does. Actually, the argument I propose needn't appeal to value or excellence at all. I'm after a being that has the highest degree knowledege, power and goodness compossible with necessary existence. It is a compossibility argument. As I say, I'd be stunned if that there weren't some interesting degree of each of those attributes compossible with necessary existence. There is every reason to believe there is such a compossible set of attributes.
Mike: If (1) is an "easily observed" (whatever that means) a priori truth, is
(1*) > ~(Ex)(x is necessarily existing)
likewise an "easily observed" a priori truth?
Hi Matt,
I don't think so. Though I concede my claim is a bit overstated, it is nonetheless pretty uncontroversial that there are necessarly existing things. Certain abstract objects, for instance. I agree that there are always those willing to take extreme positions to avoid inconvenient conclusions. That's either a virtue or a vice of philosophy.
Let’s call the individual that satisfies (1) "Max". It’s compatible with Max’s existence that in every world there’s some being that has more knowledge, power, goodness, etc, than Max. (We might want to dub Max by the sobriquet ‘Mini-Max’.) If you can use an ontological argument to conclude that Max exists then it would seem you can use such an argument to conclude that Max+ exists. Max+ is a bit more powerful than Max in world w and otherwise has the same properties as Max. Continue until you get to ‘a being no greater than which can be conceived.’
I don't see the entailment. Your claim is that:
(1) Possibly there exists a maximally excellent and necessarily existing being.
entails
(2) There exists a maximally excellent and necessarily existing being.
(At least I think this is your claim.) But before I attempt to explain why I think that the entailment does not go through, maybe you could explain why you think it does. Are you assuming that the 'possibly' and 'necessarily' in (1) are duals of the same modality? Which modality is that?
Dustin,
I take the a priori (i.e., epistemic, in my use) compossibility of such properties to entail their metaphysical compossibility. I don't see worries arising from other a posteriori necessities; though I've argued about this in another context http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2008/11/epistemic-possi.html.
Ted, you write,
It’s compatible with Max’s existence that in every world there’s some being that has more knowledge, power, goodness, etc, than Max.
I think that's right. But he would have to have such properties contingently.
If you can use an ontological argument to conclude that Max exists then it would seem you can use such an argument to conclude that Max+ exists.
I don't see it. It might be that these properties are not compossible in their extreme degree. But maybe I'm missing your point.
Mike:
I like this argument. I've lately been quite friendly to ontological arguments, as you know. :-)
But what if an atheist thinks this? "It is compatible with everything I know that the only necessary beings there are, or can be, are abstracta. None of the abstracta can be maximally excellent, because maximal excellence entails having mental states or causal powers or some other quality that abstracta cannot have, and so it is impossible that there be a maximally excellent necessary being. Therefore, it is compatible with everything I know that (1) is false."
It’s compatible with Max’s existence that in every world there’s some being that has more knowledge, power, goodness, etc, than Max.
I think that's right. But he would have to have such properties contingently.
Isn't that a bit odd. Doesn't that mean that although there is a necessary being who has an interestingly high level of knowledge, power, benevolence etc, there could be a being with more.
Suppose this is a world where N-Max exists and where C-Max exists.
N-Max has necessary existence and the highest compossible set of great making properties.
C-Max has higher degrees of the great making properties than N-Max, but has them contingently, and exists contingently.
Which one would we call God?
Don't you need to be able to rule things like this out?
But what if an atheist thinks this? "It is compatible with everything I know that the only necessary beings there are, or can be, are abstracta. None of the abstracta can be maximally excellent, because maximal excellence entails having mental states or causal powers or some other quality that abstracta cannot have. . .
Two things. First, I'm not using 'maximal excellence' in a way that entails that any such being would have mental states of any kind. Second, the challenge to anyone who would take such a position is huge. You would have to show that there is no degree of K, P & G compossible with necessary existence. I find that difficult to believe. Human beings have some degree of K,P, & G, so it is clear that some degree of these properties is compossible. The only inconsistency would have to be with necessary existence, and it is hard to see what that might be.
Doesn't that mean that although there is a necessary being who has an interestingly high level of knowledge, power, benevolence etc, there could be a being with more.
Yes, it does mean that.
Suppose this is a world where N-Max exists and where C-Max exists. N-Max has necessary existence and the highest compossible set of great making properties. C-Max has higher degrees of the great making properties than N-Max, but has them contingently, and exists contingently. Which one would we call God?
It does not matter to me which you call God.
Don't you need to be able to rule things like this out?
Not for my purposes. I'm arguing for something close enough to God. Close enough for what? Close enough for it not to be a big ontological leap from the being whose existence you're prepared to countenance, to God. So, I'm actually inviting this sort of objection. I hope lots of non-theists find this sort of objection plausible.
Mike:
All kinds of things are incompossible with necessary existence. For instance, for all n, being nothing but a sphere of diameter n is incompossible with necessary existence. In fact, any way of being nothing but a material object is incompossible with necessary existence. (The reason I say "nothing but" is because a necessary being could be a sphere of diameter n; God could become incarnate as an intelligent being whose body is a sphere of diameter n.) Similarly, being a concrete entity in no way knowing the Pythagorean theorem is incompossible with necessary existence. Etc.
I have found that many skeptics about the OA think the crucial claim is that there is a concrete particular that necessarily exists. You can give examples of numbers, universals etc, but these seem to be ontologically distinct in kind from a conscious being or a physical object. While we have examples of abstracta that necessarily exists, there is no example of a concreta that has this property. Of course this does not show the impossibility of such a NB that is also concrete, but it does indicate where the defender of the OA needs to go to make the arg. more plausible.
All kinds of things are incompossible with necessary existence.
Alex,
I'm sure I did not deny that. Whatever is so inconsistent would have to be itself impossible or entail contingency (the property of not existing in some worlds, for instance, is inconsistent with necessary existence). What I said was that the properties P, K, & G are clearly compossible to some degree, since they are compossible in us. What would be odd, I was urging, is that they should be compossible in us and not compossible in a necessarily existing being. I can't see why that should be true.
I don't think (1) is easily observed. A moral error-theorist, for example, is going to deny there is any property of goodness, making it impossible for there to be a maximally excellent being. And even if in each possible world there is a being more excellent than any other, why think there is a necessary being such that it is more excellent than any other being in any possible world? It seems to me those who reject the OA on the basis that God is impossible will find this premise necessarily false as well.
Mike:
I take it that the atheist who thinks that the only necessary beings are abstracta will say that no degree of power is compatible with necessary existence, and ditto for goodness and knowledge. She can then say that because maximal excellence entails having at least some degree of at least one of power, goodness and knowledge (if x has power, goodness and knowledge, then at least some human beings are more excellent than x), it follows that maximal excellence is not compatible with necessary existence.
She may, however, grant the that if necessary existence were compossible with concreteness, then P, G and K would be compossible with necessary existence.
The statement in parentheses in my comment is missing some words. It should read: "if x has no power, no goodness and no knowledge, then at least some human beings are more excellent than x"
I don't think (1) is easily observed. A moral error-theorist, for example, is going to deny there is any property of goodness, making it impossible for there to be a maximally excellent being.
Premise (1) does not entail that a maximally excellent being must be morally good at all. 'x is maximally excellent', as I am using it there, has no such entailment. But, to be frank, if you have to find error theory credible in order to avoid the conclusion of this argument, I'm not so worried.
I take it that the atheist who thinks that the only necessary beings are abstracta will say that no degree of power is compatible with necessary existence, and ditto for goodness and knowledge. She can then say that because maximal excellence entails having at least some degree of at least one of power, goodness and knowledge
Alex,
What I'm urging is that no atheist can just say these things. What they have to do is show that there is no degree of these properties that is compossible with necessary existence. And it is not easy to show; I know of no argument that credibly shows this. Similarly, it does not matter to me how an atheist chooses to use the word 'maximal excellence'. I'm worried about my use of it.
I have found that many skeptics about the OA think the crucial claim is that there is a concrete particular that necessarily exists
Gordon,
I'm unmoved by reports of mental states such as 'x is skeptical'. Give me a reason to care. My argument claims that there is nothing a priori impossible in a concrete being (I assume you have in mind by 'concrete' a being that can be causally affective/effective, a conscious being for instance) necessarily existing. Is there an a priori argument that no conscious being could necessarily exist that appeals to the concreteness of that being? I confess to not knowing of one.
I guess I'm still unmoved. First, the claim doesn't seem possible to me; it only fails to seem impossible to me. Second, the properties of being a physical universe and being uncreated by a god, plus a "that's all" clause, fail to seem impossible to me. But that's incompatible with your claim. What's a poor old agnostic to do?
First, the claim doesn't seem possible to me; it only fails to seem impossible to me. Second, the properties of being a physical universe and being uncreated by a god, plus a "that's all" clause, fail to seem impossible to me. But that's incompatible with your claim. What's a poor old agnostic to do?
Felipe,
Not really. I actually think several commentators have misread the initial premise and not quite followed the argument thereafter. I'm certain this is because of bad exposition; maybe I can do better.
The proposition in (1) states (just) that there is some necessarily existing thing, and this thing is, in some deliberately unspecified sense, a maximally excellent thing. I'm happy to say that it is at least as good as any other necessarily existing thing. So, if there are abstract objects that are at least as good as any other necessarily existing thing (maybe at least as good as any other abstract object), then (1) is true. I expected wild affirmative applause for making such an agreeable and sane assertion.
That's the first step in the argument. To keep the applause going, I explicitly skip all talk of the value or greatness of this being. I say "the only question in dispute is what are the maximally excellent compossible properties" and quickly add "but that too is an avoidable question". Great, I expected to hear, he's not going to ladle on any opaque perfection stuff.
The argument is now captured in one question: what is the greatest degree of Px, Kx, and Gx that is compossible with necessary existence? That's all I ask. I note that I've never seen an argument that shows (or even attempts to show) that every interesting degree of Px, Kx, and Gx is incompossible with Nx.
I close with a (maybe) unexpected conclusion. My conclusion is effectively that the psychological obstacles that (I think) inhibit nontheists from believing in God are removed once the nontheist believes that there is something God-ish in existence. And I do think that most of the reasons that keep nontheists from believing are psychological reasons (not epistemic ones).
This is the reason to care. We have a huge set of particulars, all of which seem on the face of it to be contingent. We have another set of things, abstracta etc. which seem to be necessary. So, in our evidence base, there seems to be this rule:particulars are contingent, necess beings are abstract. Now, the OA claims that it is possible for there to be a necessarily existent particular. But this claim goes against everything we know about how necessary and contingent "divide up."
I don't think this consideration is decisive (I am inclined to think the CA shows there IS a necc. being), but anyone who wants to push OA needs to consider it.
"I'm unmoved by reports of mental states such as 'x is skeptical'."
Really? Because I'm unmoved by reports of mental states such as "(1) is an easily observed a priori truth."
Mike:
"What they have to do is show that there is no degree of these properties that is compossible with necessary existence."
Are you here thinking, with Leibniz (so you're in good company), that something is to be assumed possible unless proved impossible?
We have a huge set of particulars, all of which seem on the face of it to be contingent. We have another set of things, abstracta etc. which seem to be necessary. So, in our evidence base, there seems to be this rule:particulars are contingent, necess beings are abstract
This would be good if what there is were evidence for what there might be. But it doesn't seem to be much of a guide. I mean, there aren't any 12 ft. tall humans in our evidence base, but there might have been. There aren't any five eyed giraffes, but there might have been, and so on and on. There is by any assessment an (uncountably) infinite number of things that might have been actual. So the actual evidence base is a little slim to generalize on.
Are you here thinking, with Leibniz (so you're in good company), that something is to be assumed possible unless proved impossible?
Alex,
There is reason to believe that the relevant properties, Px, Kx & Gx, are compossible: they are all instantiated in human beings, for instance. Every argument that these properties are not compossible with necessary existence has appealed to the extreme degree of these properties. All of those arguments can be accommodated by lessening the degree of one or more of these properties. On the positive side, these properties, each in some degree, seems compossible; on the negative side, there is no argument that these properties, in any degree, are not compossible. So, it's rational to believe that they are compossible.
. . . on the negative side, there is no argument that these properties, in any degree, are not compossible.
That should be "there is no argument that these properties, in every degree, are incompossible".
I'm unmoved by reports of mental states such as "(1) is an easily observed a priori truth."
See the comment at April 14, 2009 2:00 PM above.
But the possible evidence base does not help you either! the 35 foot giraffe is also contingent, so are any of the particulars I can think of now with the arguable exception of God.
Gordon,
it seems that once one might admit that abstracta aren't contigent, one might admit the epistemic possibility of necessary concreta.
Honestly, I don't think that God is so much different from abstracta. Being immaterial, non-temporal, non-spatial, eternal etc. why shouldn't it be the case that God can be necessary?
But the possible evidence base does not help you either!
Gordon,
I wasn't arguing from the evidence base. The argument is not a posterori, it's a priori.
"[T]here is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable." - David Hume
And thus, we cannot prove anything exists a priori - except perhaps, our selves.
And thus, we cannot prove anything exists a priori - except perhaps, our selves.
All due respect for Hume but denying the existence of a necessarily existing thing is a contradictory. To simply assert that there are no necessarily existing things begs the question at issue here.
Hi Mike,
So far, I can follow you through the assent to necessarily existent abstracta (no problem there; I already accepted them before I approached the argument). If your happy with that result, the applause is still coming from my end.
However, how do I get from there to a maximally great (or whatever) concrete individual -- if indeed you think I can't stop with abstracta? You're using this method of seeming compossibility of properties as, what, prima facie evidence of possibility, right? If so, suppose we go with that. But then don't the properties involved in being a natural world (throw in abstracta too -- what the heck) with no maximally excellent individual seem compossible? And if so, then how is your claim not undercut?
You're using this method of seeming compossibility of properties as, what, prima facie evidence of possibility, right?
Yes, the idea is to consider what degree of Kx, Gx, and Px are such that there is no greater degree of these properties (really, attributes) that is compossible with Nx. I'm confident we can move upward in degree without objection, since, of course, there is and has been no convincing objection. Compossibility entails instantiation in some world, and that entails actual instantiation (attributes are essential properties).
But then don't the properties involved in being a natural world . . . with no maximally excellent individual seem compossible? And if so, then how is your claim not undercut?
It is much more difficult than this. You need to show there is no (not that there is not some) interesting degree of Gx, Px, & Kx that is compossible with Nx. I agree that, likely, there is not some degree. I doubt that there is no degree at all compossible with Nx. The atheistic claim is obviously much too strong to be evinced with modal intuition. The mildly theistic claim is comparatively much weaker: it is that at least one of the infinitely many possible interesting degrees of these is compossible with Nx.
To be clear, I'm not saying that the "physical world+abstracta and that's all" intuition is stronger than the relevant intuition or seeming you have that's incompatible with it. Rather, I'm making the weaker claim that the former seeming is at least as strong as the latter seeming, in which case the PFJ each enjoyed before the clash of intuitions is mutually deflated after the clash
Rather, I'm making the weaker claim that the former seeming is at least as strong as the latter seeming, in which case the PFJ each enjoyed before the clash of intuitions is mutually deflated after the clash
I'm not following. This is not merely a clash of 'seemings', thankfully. The quasi-theist is obviously defending the weaker (and hence, more probable, claim). He is defending the claim that at least one of the infinitely many interesting degrees of Px, Gx, and Kx is compossible with Nx. The atheists is defending the claim that none of them are. It's just false that they are in the same epistemic situation. So, (as far as I can tell) you owe me an argument for this vast generalization. Give me an argument that none of the infintiely many possible combinations in degrees of Px, Gx, and Kx is compossible with Nx. To show that is not easy; it's going to take a lot of work.
Hmm. Given that I'm not an atheist, I don't see why I have to defend the atheist's position. I'm an agnostic: I can't tell which of the two incompatible propositions are in play here. It seems to me, then, that I don't shoulder the sort of burden you're pushing my way. My claim weaker than both the theist's and the non-theist's.
Hmm. Given that I'm not an atheist, I don't see why I have to defend the atheist's position. As an agnostic, my claim is weaker than both the theist's and the non-theist's: I can't tell which of the two incompatible propositions in play here is true. It seems to me, then, that I don't shoulder the sort of burden you're pushing my way.
Hi Mike,
Since nobody brought it up, it's worth flagging the following assumption:
I take (1) to entail that there is something that necessarily exists and is such that there is nothing that is more excellent (than it).
Perhaps you accept that []p entails []p. This is a controversial inference. Are you able to get your conclusion without it?
To my ear, the following seems to be a natural way of using 'possibly' (or 'could') and 'must' or 'necessarily' in English:
There could be necessarily existing thing. I mean, it's possible. There might be. But it's possible there isn't. There might not be.
You might think there is an epistemic and metaphysical conflation going on. But I am not using 'might' in this sense. And we can deflate the alleged difference by making the above speech within a supposition.
Supposing there is something, there could also be a necessarily existing thing. But, then again, supposing there is something, there could not be a necessarily existing thing. Surely, it's possible that, supposing there is something, there might not be a necessarily existing thing.
In any case, there's reason to suspect the inference that seems to be required to get your conclusion.
One worry about this argument is that it could be recast for a maximally vicious being, namely
>(EK)(EP)(ED)(Ex)([]Kx & []Px & []Dx & Nx)
Where D stands for essential depravity. But this could get one into some logical trouble. An omnipotent, omnidepraved being is logically incompatible with an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being. Call the former the anti-God and the latter God. Anti-God will will state of affairs X, God state of affairs Y, where X and Y are logically possible but mutually exclusive; but if Anti-God is omnipotent, X will obtain, and if God is omnipotent, Y will obtain. So both X and Y obtain, which is contradictory. Similar problems will arise for Gods and anti-Gods of lesser degrees of power and benevolence/depravity: at the very least, we might get the counter-intuitive notion that a God and anti-God bargain for an intermediate condition after assessing each others' relative strength. This strikes me as a good reductio for the proposition that either God or anti-God is possible.
Such considerations may lead one to think that every interesting degree of K, P and G fails to be compossible with N. The same could be said for various nihilist and anti-realist views of value: G would not express anything objective, leaving only K and P to make the necessary being. But if there are no objective values, nothing would be intrinsically interesting anyway.
Perhaps the best way to respond to this kind of worry is to hold the line with a strong motivational internalism about moral judgments. A high degree of knowledge would then not be compossible with much depravity, undermining the initial worry. But the point is only that the implication of the argument is not immediately obvious.
Hi Mike,
I really like your argument.
You seem to assume that the maximum consistent set of knowledge, power and goodness is consistent with necessary existence. One might question such an assumption. For example, one might say that there are tasks that only contingent beings can perform.
In order to set aside this kind of worry perhaps you need to define the being in question as a being that exists necessarily and possesses the maximum consistent set of knowledge, power and goodness that is consistent with necessary existence (not the maximum consistent set of knowledge, power and goodness simpliciter).
However, this would make your argument compatible with (but not committed to) the idea that there is a contingent being that is more excellent than the being that your argument is concerned with. One might claim that this would undermine your claim that the being in question is God-ish, especially in possible worlds in which the more excellent contingent being exists.
P.S. My paper, 'A New Defence of Anselmian Theism' might complement your argument. In that paper I use a similar idea to defend the existence of a maximally excellent being from (nearly) all existing atheistic arguments.
In order to set aside this kind of worry perhaps you need to define the being in question as a being that exists necessarily and possesses the maximum consistent set of knowledge, power and goodness that is consistent with necessary existence
Hi Yujin,
Yes, I'm pretty sure this is what I do in the argument. Maybe the exposition is not as clear as it could be. I agree that it might make the being having the maximal set of Kx, Gx and Px consistent with Nx, less powerful (or less good, etc.) than some contingent being. But, as I note above, this is a nice problem to have. If the best atheistic response is to point out that there are possibly beings that are (contingently) better, then I'm satisfied.
I'm an agnostic: I can't tell which of the two incompatible propositions are in play here. It seems to me, then, that I don't shoulder the sort of burden you're pushing my way. My claim weaker than both the theist's and the non-theist's.
You seem to be saying that, prima facie, the evidence for the claim in (C1),
C1. There is no degree of the properties Gx, Kx & Px that is compossible with Nx,
is as strong as the evidence for the claim in (C2),
C2 Some degree of the properties Gx, Kx, & Px is compossible with Nx.
As far as I can see, this is mistaken. Prior to further investigation into these two claims, the likelihood definitely goes with C2. For C2 to be right, there has to be one, of infinitely many possible combinations of Gx, Kx & Px, that is consistent with Nx. The chances of that being true are not about the same as the chances of C1 being true. Apart from that, we know that Gx, Kx, and Px are in fact compossible with each other! But then we know that Gx, Kx & Px are incompossible with Nx only if C3 is true, ('M' for possibility), and C4 is false,
C3. M(EG)(EK)(EP)(Ex)((Gx & Kx & Px)) & ~M(Ex)(EG)(EK)(EP)((Gx & Kx & Px & Nx).
C4. M(EG)(EK)(EP)(Ex)((Gx & Kx & Px)) & M(Ex)(EG)(EK)(EP)((Gx & Kx & Px & Nx).
(C3) makes an impossibility claim: some degree of these properties is compossible and it is not the case that at least one of the possible degrees of these properties is compossible with necessary existence. That is, to say the least, an extremely strong metaphysical claim. (C4) makes the possibility claim: some degree of these properties is compossible and at least one of the possible degrees of these properties is compossible with necessary existence.
Prima facie, prior to further investigation, the rational bet is on (C4).
Addendum
Just by the way, if Tim Wliiamson is right, I necessarily exist, and so those properties are compossible with a necessarily existing being.
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/1326/rip.pdf
"There is reason to believe that the relevant properties, Px, Kx & Gx, are compossible: they are all instantiated in human beings, for instance. Every argument that these properties are not compossible with necessary existence has appealed to the extreme degree of these properties."
1. Findlay's argument for the impossibility of a concrete necessary being did not appeal to the extreme degree of these properties, and if his argument is sound (and it's not), then no property that entails concreteness is compossible with necessary existence.
2. Are you thinking that whenever we have no argument that a self-consistent property P is incompossible with necessary existence, then we should believe that P is compossible with necessary existence? If so, then it's probably not that hard to find parodies.
Are you thinking that whenever we have no argument that a self-consistent property P is incompossible with necessary existence, then we should believe that P is compossible with necessary existence?
No, what I'm thinking is that it is prima facie more reasonable to believe (C4) than to believe (C3).
C3. M(EG)(EK)(EP)(Ex)((Gx & Kx & Px)) & ~M(Ex)(EG)(EK)(EP)((Gx & Kx & Px & Nx).
Some degree of the properties Gx,Kx, and Px are compossible AND no degree of those properties is compossible with necessary existence.
C4. M(EG)(EK)(EP)(Ex)((Gx & Kx & Px)) & M(Ex)(EG)(EK)(EP)((Gx & Kx & Px & Nx).
Some degree of the properties Gx,Kx, and Px are compossible AND at least some degree of those properties is compossible with necessary existence.
Perhaps you accept that []p entails []p. This is a controversial inference. Are you able to get your conclusion without it?
I'm guessing you're asking whether I take MNp -> Np to be valid ('M' for possibility, 'N' for necessity). Yes, and I'm working in S5. So, you should read my English modal sentences in a way consistent with S5; that's how I intend them.
Mike,
OK, I now am clearer on what you're getting at, sorry. So let's try a parody. Let S be stupidity, V be venality, and U be ugliness. Plainly, some degrees of S, V and U are compossible, because there are people who instantiate it. By the same argument, it is plausible that some degree of S, V and U is compossible with necessary existence. So, plausibly, there is a necessary being that is at least somewhat stupid, at least somewhat venal and at least somewhat ugly.
Mike,
Your last reply was very intriguing! However (sticking with your C1 and C2 for the moment), I'm not sure why C2 is less plausible than C1. C2 gets its plausibility, not directly, but via the seeming compossibility of the properties involved in the "physical world+abstracta and that's all" scenario.
So this is how it seems to me. There is an inconsistent set of sentences:
1. Px, Kx, Gx, and Nx are compossible.
2. The properties involved in a "physical world+abstracta and that's all" scenario are compossible.
3. the properties in (1) are compossible iff the properties involved in (2) are incompossible.
Which one do I throw out? Well, (3) seems non-negotiable. So it's either (1) or (2) that has to go. But neither one has an epistemic advantage over the other, by my lights. In fact, the idea of a necessarily existent contrete individual seems pretty fishy to me. So perhaps I should suspend judgement.
So, plausibly, there is a necessary being that is at least somewhat stupid, at least somewhat venal and at least somewhat ugly.
I'm not sure these properties are compossible with necessary existence, since I'm not sure a necessarily existing being can literally possess the aesthetic property you describe. But if you're using 'ugliness' in some non-literal sense, then it is not obvious to me that there is no such being, and so not obvious to me that this is parodic.
2. The properties involved in a "physical world+abstracta and that's all" scenario are compossible.
(2) entails an extremely strong impossiblity claim. Impossiblity claims of this sort constitute important metaphysical theorems (e.g., that something (or some kind of thing) x exists in no world whatsoever): the work it takes to discover and establish these is really no less difficult than the work it takes to establish an important mathematical theorem. It's seeming so, when it comes to such important claims, is not a good reason to believe it's so.
Mike:
Why couldn't a necessary being be literally ugly? Is it because literal ugliness requires matter, and matter cannot exist necessarily?
Anyway, do you really think there actually is a venal and ignorant necessary being?
Is it because literal ugliness requires matter, and matter cannot exist necessarily?
Yes, but I don't have a knock-down argument. I just can't think of an instance of a material thing that necessarily exists (setting aside complications wrt the Incarnation).
Alex,
abstracta are probably ignorant entities, but I'm not sure if they are venal.
Mike:
I think Alex's parody objection is interesting.
Proponents of the classic ontological argument tend to say that what is unique about the concept of God as a maximally excellent being is that it subsumes the notion of necessary existence and other forms of perfection in a non-question-begging manner. Other concepts, such as NE-Lion (defined as 'a necessarily existing lion'), for example, don't have such a feature.
However, in order to derive the existence of the God-ish being, your ontological argument treats necessary existence and the set of other great-making properties separately and doesn't provide a mechanism to bridge these two things under one description (such as the maximally excellent being).
It appears that this makes it easier to construct a parody. We can just name a set of several appropriate properties that are consistent with necessary existence, add necessary existence to it, and derive its actual existence.
Not specifying the degree of greatness is a virtue of your ontological argument but perhaps it also makes the argument vulnerable to a parody objection.
2. The properties involved in a "physical world+abstracta and that's all" scenario are compossible.
(2) entails an extremely strong impossiblity claim. Impossiblity claims of this sort constitute important metaphysical theorems (e.g., that something (or some kind of thing) x exists in no world whatsoever): the work it takes to discover and establish these is really no less difficult than the work it takes to establish an important mathematical theorem. It's seeming so, when it comes to such important claims, is not a good reason to believe it's so.
Well, I suppose it's an extremely strong impossibility claim. But by the same token, so is yours. (1) entails that worlds of the sort captured in (2) are metaphysically impossible. So again, how is it not a wash here?
It appears that this makes it easier to construct a parody. We can just name a set of several appropriate properties that are consistent with necessary existence, add necessary existence to it, and derive its actual existence.
Yujin,
This all depends on the goal of one's argument. I'm not interested in establising the existence of some uniquely great being. I'm not interesting--not in the slightest--in disproving the existence of these less than perfectly great beings. I'm interested in establishing the existence of a being that is much greater than we are. Parodic arguments are successful iff. there is some great being such that my argument shows that being exists, and that being clearly does not exist. Is there such a being? Show me clearly that my argument shows that, and I'd be happy to agree.
But by the same token, so is yours. (1) entails that worlds of the sort captured in (2) are metaphysically impossible. So again, how is it not a wash here?
I haven't much left that I want to say on this particular score. The claim in (1), that at least one of the infinitely many possible degrees of Px, Kx, Gx, is compossible with Nx, is plainly weaker than the claim in (2) that not one of the infinitely many possible degrees of them are. You deny it. That's pretty much it.
Abstracta are not ignorant. They just don't know anything. (To be ignorant requires that one be the sort of thing that could know, but yet one does not know.) Similarly, a rock cannot be deaf.
Mike,
Sorry I've been out of action for the past few days but just a quick follow up. My initial worry was that omnibenevolence doesn't have an intrinsic maximum. Your response was that you could say (i) that there's a maximal level that is compossible with P and K or (ii) that for each set of compossible properties, S, there is a being that instantiates that set of properties.
It seems to me that (i) isn't all that promising since whatever problems we have with the idea of there being an upper limit on benevolence it seems odd to think such a limit would be imposed by K, P, or the combination. (I don't know if using K +/or P to impose a limit on omnibenevolence if it doesn't have an intrinsic maximum is better than saying 'Well, instead of the largest prime, let's think of the largest prime compossible with being nicknamed 'Biggie'.) (ii) is the more promising route but it seems to face the problem of multiple omnipotent beings. I've always thought that this problem was soluble. I remember (vaguely) writing a paper on this in graduate school arguing that Scotus' arguments for unicity failed, but I also had the distinct impression that most were far more impressed by arguments against the possibility of multiple omnipotent beings than I. I thought that there was no problem with multiple omnipotent beings with wills that were in unison, but my guess is that if I suggested that this is how things were someone would jump all over me for suggesting it. Is your inclination to go with (ii) and dismiss arguments against multiple omnipotent beings as well?
Clayton,
With respect to (i), it is exactly what has been argued against traditional ontological arguments that there is a limit on the degrees one could have of each. It has been well-recieved as an objection to the argument; I'm not sure why I can't use it as a defense of my version.
But really all I'm asking about are the chances that some degree or other of those properties are compossible with necessary existence. If there cannot be more than one omnipotent being, fine, it is not central to what I'm doing.
Alex and Yujin,
Concerning the parodic arguments, the response I've given is that I don't see the parody, since the unwanted being has not been shown obviously not to exist. That's true, I think, but even that is more than I want to say. The properties that Alex lists--stupidity, venality, ugliness--are simply the lowest degrees of goodness, knowledge, etc. Maybe there is good reason to think that such properties are not compossible with necessary existence (I wish you'd tell me what it is!), but it does not matter to my argument. I'm not committed to saying that such a being exists or probably exists. All my argument claims is that there is some degree of goodness, knowledge and power compossible with necessary existence. It does not claim that there is some degree of any set of compossible properties that is compossible with necessary existence.
Here is my attempt to construct a parody objection to your ontological argument, which is slightly different from Alex's. Instead of deriving the existence of an absurd entity it says as follows:
If there is a maximum consistent set of knowledge, power and goodness that is consistent with necessary existence, probably there are many similar sets with smaller degrees of knowledge, smaller degrees of power, etc. From these sets we can construct ontological arguments and derive the necessary existence of so many (possibly millions or billions of) different kinds of beings. Their existence is not incompatible with the existence of your God-ish being but one might think that there is something wrong with your ontological argument if the same reasoning proves the existence of so many kinds of necessary beings.
If there is a maximum consistent set of knowledge, power and goodness that is consistent with necessary existence, probably there are many similar sets with smaller degrees of knowledge, smaller degrees of power, etc.
Why doesn't the following count as a response. There is likely some set (maximal or not) of properties compossible with necessary existence. According to your argument, there cannot be lots of sets of properties compossible with necessary existence. So, the existence of some such set is not evidence that there are lots of such sets. I don't see how the fact that some set of compossible properties is likely makes it likely that there are lots of others.
I honestly can't see anything untoward about the argument I've offered. It's pretty straightforward. If there are properties compossible with necessary existence, then there is a world in which those properties are instantiated. There cannot be a quarrel with that. Given the infinite degrees in which goodness, knowledge and power come, and given no argument that comes close to establishing the opposite conclusion, it does seem reasonable (to me anyway) to believe that some degree of these properties is compossible with necessary existence. This is perfectly compstible with believing that lots of these properties are incompossible with necessary existence.
Yujin's parody is similar to Mini-Max I described in one of the initial comments. Mike, could you say why a being that satisfies (1) has any religious significance?
Hi Mike,
I didn’t really get your response. Let me try again. Suppose that the maximum consistent combination of knowledge, power, goodness that is consistent with necessary existence is the following: (90% omniscient, 95% omnipotent, 90% omnibenevolent).
Unless you have an argument for the claim that that is the only consistent combination of knowledge, power and goodness that is consistent with necessary existence, it seems reasonable to think that there are a lot more combinations of knowledge, power and goodness that are consistent with necessary existence (e.g., (89% omniscient, 95% omnipotent, 90% omnibenevolent), etc.).
If so, your argument proves not only the necessary and actual existence of the God-ish being that achieves the first combination above but also the necessary and actual existence of many (possibly millions of) other beings that achieve different combinations of knowledge, power and goodness. One might find this counterintuitive.
Hi Ted,
I don't think a being that satisfies (1) need have any religious significance. My ontological argument asks what being has the greatest degree of goodness, knowledge and possible compossible with necessary existence. Maybe the greatest is pretty a pretty poor specimen. But I think (as I've said) that there is some degree compossible with Nx and I see no reason why it would not be extremely high degree. But that aside, I think once we have some necessarily existing being with these properties, we are well on our way to establishing that there exists a religiously important being.
Mike: All due respect for Hume but denying the existence of a necessarily existing thing is a contradictory. To simply assert that there are no necessarily existing things begs the question at issue here.
Me: Um... that's a strawman, and not what the argument states. It states that you cannot prove something exists "a priori." (other than yourself) And... YOU CAN'T. Unless you can punch a hole in one of Hume's premises, then your argument has been refuted by an old dead philosopher.
To clarify the argument for you: an a priori, ontological argument deals with "concieved" existence. But you cannot demonstrate necessary existence unless the contrary implies a contradiction. "Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction." Your so called "necessarily" existing thing (god), can also be concieved as non-existing. Thus, you have not demonstrated that existence as necessary. And it's unsurprising because you are using an a priori argument to prove the existence of something objective.
Your so called "necessarily" existing thing (god), can also be concieved as non-existing.
Thanks for the clarification. You seem to think that if a being can be conceived as not existing, then that the being does not exist necessarily. That's a bad inference. Conceivablity is in general a poor guide to what is necessary: conceivable not-p does not entail not necessary p. For an old Kripkean counterexample, it is conceivable that water is not H2O, nonetheless it is necessarily H2O. So, it is probably not a good idea to rely to heavily on old Humean assumptions like necessity being coextensive with analyticity.
Hi Mike,
You say, "But that aside, I think once we have some necessarily existing being with these properties, we are well on our way to establishing that there exists a religiously important being."
Could you expand on this? As I understand it, it's just a fact about whether or not there's a Max and Max's nature is entirely up for grabs; could be Mini-Max; could be Mighty-Max. Are you thinking that if one comes to see that Max exists, then there's no principled reason to resist the conclusion that Max is actually Mighty-Max? Sorry if you've already talked about this...
Hi Ted,
Right, once it is reasonable to believe that there is such a being, then it will be reasonable to believe that there is an interesting one. Here's another way to defend the argument.
1. If Px, Gx and Kx are compossible, then some individual essence has the properties Px, Gx and Kx.
2. But if Px, Gx and Kx are compossible, they are necessarily compossible. From S5, Mp->NMp
Since these properties are compossible, we arrive at (3), with e as a variable ranging over essences.
3. (Ee)(Pe & Ge & Ke), from (1)
And since Px, Gx and Kx are necessarily compossible, we arrive at (4); necessarily, there is essence that has these properties.
4. N(Ee)(Pe & Ge & Ke)
So we are left with two questions: Is there a single essence that has those properties in every world? Second, is that essence instantiated in every world? In answering the first, we can define an essential property for the actual essence that has the properties Px, Gx and Kx: let that property be 'Hx' = being identical to the the actual essence that has Gx, Kx, and Px in the highest degree'. Obviously, Gx, Px, Kx and Hx are compossible, and so they are necessarily compossible. And so that essence exists in every world. Now, to the second question: is it instantiated in every world?
There is something very interesting to notice here. In other contexts, what necessarily exists and what doesn't is largely up to God. My inidividual essence exists in every world. It is entirely up to God whether that essence is instantiated in every world. There is a sense in which it is true that I could have necessarily existed (I think we can make sense of that). God delimited the possibilities against it, but needn't have done so. But then the same goes for the individual essence Gx, Px, Kx and Hx! So, there is nothing incoherent in the idea that ('Ne' for the essence e exists in every world),
5. (Ee)(Pe & Ge & Ke & He & Ne),
or in the instantiation that,
6. Pa & Ga & Ka & Ha & Na
. . .it seems reasonable to think that there are a lot more combinations of knowledge, power and goodness that are consistent with necessary existence
Yujin, I'm not sure I clearly replied to this worry. Your argument is strange, though. I have no idea why you say that ". . . it seems reasonable to think that there are a lot more combinations of knowledge, power and goodness that are consistent with necessary existence". Why is that reasonable to think? It is difficult enough to get anyone to believe there's probably one such being! From there probably being one, it certainly does not follow that there are probably lots of them.
This is a fascinating argument and discussion.
Perhaps your argument could be strengthened by the following argument for thinking that necessity is compatible with concreteness:
1. For every intrinsic property, P, if it can begin to be exemplified, there could be a causal explanation of that beginning.
a. There are no known exceptions and many known instances of this principle.
2. The property, being contingent, can begin to be exemplified.
a. E.g., A Big Bang of contingent things is possible.
3. Therefore, being contingent can be caused to begin to be exemplified.
4. No contingent thing could do that.
5. Therefore...
David Lewis has a paper on Anselm's ontological argument which you should probably look at; it seems quite relevant. I will briefly note that the feature of s5 which makes your argument possible, the fact that iterated modalities collapse leaving only the last modal operator to do anything, also seems to make the premise much more questionable than you seem to think. It may be true in most cases that it's all right to assume something is "possibly F" unless you know some reason to think its being F is impossible (though one should never be hasty with modal judgments). However, Since "possibly necessary" just means "necessary" in S5, it doesn't make sense to make that assumption about something being "possibly necessary."
However, Since "possibly necessary" just means "necessary" in S5, it doesn't make sense to make that assumption about something being "possibly necessary."
I guess I don't understand that, if S5 is the logic of broad, logical necessity. If it isn't the logic for broad, logical necessity, then you'd have a concern. So far I don't see that you've made a case against S5. It might be beside the point, but S5 is also the typical assumption made in both ontological and anti-ontological arguments. So, I'm making no unusual or atypical assumptions.
I'm pretty familiar with Lewis's paper, but I don't off hand see how it would contribute much to this discussion. For instance, I don't see that the modal principles of counterpart theory (CPT) are any more plausible than those in QML. There is also some reason to suspect that CPT is too far afield of Anselmian views to be enlightening. CPT serves Lewis's anti-essentialism, and Anselmian arguments obviously assume some form of essentialism is true.
You seem to have misunderstood my point. I wasn't expressing skepticism of S5; I'm quite a fan of it myself (otherwise why would I cite Lewis approvingly? My favorite modal theorist isn't Lewis, but it is Carnap, who also proposed an S5 theory, though of course "in logic there are no morals"). I was pointing out that if one is using S5, one should not take it as the default assumption that "possibly something is F" is probably true in the absence of evidence of the impossibility of F, when F contains modal operators.
I have no idea how citing D. K. Lewis approvingly would suggest that you are a fan of S5. Lewis does no work in S5 and does not endorse it. He substitutes CPT. But you add,
I was pointing out that if one is using S5, one should not take it as the default assumption that "possibly something is F" is probably true in the absence of evidence of the impossibility of F, when F contains modal operators.
I don't follow that. There is no place in the argument where I make it a "default assumption" that a necessary being is possible except in (1). And in that case it is trivial. Only those that hold that there are no necessary beings at all--not numbers or propositions or properties or sets or classes or worlds or ...--have the slightest reason to deny (1). This is a fringe position. Otherwise, there is no such assumption in the argument.
Unless some contextual restriction is imposed, modal realism makes no distinction between accessible and inaccessible worlds. Thus, it behaves like an S5 system. However, I see your point; Lewis uses counterparts to replace talk about essences because he thinks any effort to talk about essences using just the ordinary boxes and diamonds of S5 will end up with nonsense (as you have perhaps shown by example).
Anyway, on the main point, of course I was talking about (1) and pointing out why it wasn't trivial. Repeating the claim that it is trivial hardly addresses my point, and neither is it relevant to claim that something other than (1) is uncontroversial, so (1) must be, when the other claim is clearly not equivalent to (1). "There is some F such that something which necessarily exists is F" is not the same as "take this specific property F; possibly, something which necessarily exists is F." However uncontroversial the former claim may be, it has nothing to do with the latter claim. The latter claim seems false (or at least not obviously true) for a number of candidates for F; I do not think it is remotely obvious that it is possible that there is something which both necessarily exists and is red. I think that is in fact false. The fact that I might grant that "possibly something which necessarily exists is greater than 2" is true does not strike me as relevant to "possibly something which necessarily exists is red." Why do you think anyone would find it relevant to "possibly something which necessarily exists is maximally perfect?"
Unless some contextual restriction is imposed, modal realism makes no distinction between accessible and inaccessible worlds. Thus, it behaves like an S5 system
The counterpart relation (which for Lewis determines the valid modal theses) is neither symmetric nor transitive, so you don't have in CPT the S5 principles p-->MNp or Np -->NNp. Neither is valid in CPT.
On your main point, you're misreading (1). In order for (1) to be true (as I've said) all we need is one necessarily existing object, x. x has the property of maximal excellence iff. there is no y distinct from x such that y necessarily exists and y is more excellent than x. So, obviously, the proposition that x is maximally excellent does not entail that x is so much as good. It does not entail that x is excellent to a degree greater than 0. If x is excellent to degree 0, and there is nothing else that exceeds x in excellence, then x is maximally excellent. That's why the claim is nearly trivial. It is true on the mere assumption that something necessarily exists. Hope that's clearer.
errata: p-->MNp, should be p-->NMp
I should have read more carefully above. Perhaps my objection is that what you claim is "equally undeniable" isn't. Again, to return to my previous example, I expect that the maximum saturation of redness which is compossible with necessary existence is none, and I have a similar option of the likely maximum degree of moral goodness which is compossible with necessary existence.
I am curious as to what you could possibly expect to establish via your ontological argument. I am somewhat less dismissive of some ontological arguments than I used to be; I have come to think that for Descartes, God just is the logical structure of reality, as perhaps it was for Plato. If so, then his claim that God necessarily exists amounted to the claim that necessary truths are necessary, which is indeed not especially controversial. I'm enough of an anti-realist that I don't believe in this God of the philosophers either, though many people who claim to be atheists seem to be committed to it (including, for example, David K. Lewis), and I certainly don't think it's crazy to believe in this God. It does seem crazy to worship it, though, and I can't help but suspect that Plato and Descartes called it God partly to hide how heretical their views were.
Is that the God you're aiming for? Because I don't see how an ontological argument can get you anywhere close to any traditional religion; it's a purely logical argument, so it yields only logic, as all logical arguments do.
I expect that the maximum saturation of redness which is compossible with necessary existence is none, and I have a similar option of the likely maximum degree of moral goodness which is compossible with necessary existence.
I have no interesting basis for forming such expectations. I do think modal intuition is reliable, but I have no strong intuition either way here. In any case, it isn't much to my point, as you'll note if you work through the thread (I understand entirely not wanting to know that badly). What is distinctive about my version of the ontological argument is that it is probabilistic. My question is not directly whether the relevant set of properties S = {essential omniscience, essential omnipotence, essential moral perfection} is compossible with necessary existence. My direct question is what is the greatest degree of the properties in S compossible with necessary existence. My argument aims to show that it is rational to believe that some interesting degree of those properties is compossible with necessary existence. Given that there are infinitely many possible interesting degrees of those properties, chances are that some one of them is compossible with necessary existence. In the absence of some atheological argument showing that no interesting degree of those properties is compossible with necessary existence (and such an argument would be extraordinarily difficult to produce) the rational bet is for compossibility. So I treat the ontological argument probabilistically and argue for rational belief.
I think that you may have missed Aaron's point (I am a different Aaron of course). His point is that possibility claims are usually comparatively weaker than either actuality or necessity claims. For example, "it is possible that unicorns exist' is weaker than "unicorns exist." However, when we are dealing with the claim that some X is possibly necessary then we are dealing with a very strong claim indeed. We are dealing with a claim that X is necessary. Hence, the word "possibly" has the psychological effect of causing us to think we are making a weak claim while in fact we are making a very strong claim indeed.
More specifically, the claim that a specific creature that has intelligence, power, etc. is possibly necessary reduces to the claim that such a creature has necessary existence and there is not a shred of intuitive pull that this is actually the case. I hope I have captured the dialectic that is in effect here.
. . . the claim that a specific creature that has intelligence, power, etc. is possibly necessary reduces to the claim that such a creature has necessary existence and there is not a shred of intuitive pull that this is actually the case.
There can be no 'reduction' here of the sort you describe. Apart from that, mine is a probabilistic modal argument. So we are considering the chances that something necessarily exists that also satisfies (perhaps to a much lesser degree, that's fine with me) some of the traditional attributes of God. We know already that there are all sorts of necessarily existing beings, so that's not the worry. The only worry concerns compossibility. And there's not a single atheological argument that even suggests that no such set of properties is compossible, despite there being interminably many responses to the ontological argument. Not one is relevant in this case.