According to Plantinga, supralapsarianism is just the view that “… the decree to save some of the fallen precedes the decree to permit sin” (‘Supralapsarianism or ‘O Felix Culpa”, in P. van Inwagen (ed.) Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil (Cambridge: Eerdmans Publishing, 2004) p. 1). A supralapsarian believes that God primarily aims to actualize a world in which free beings are saved (or not) and takes as a means to actualizing such a world the creation of free beings that go wrong in various ways and suffer in various ways. Marilyn M. Adams has an interesting criticism of Plantinga’s suprapasarianism. It’s also a criticism I don’t understand entirely. Suppose the strong value assumption (SVA) is true.
SVA. There is a level L of excellence or goodness among possible worlds such that all worlds at level L or above contain Incarnation and atonement.
Plantinga urges that if SVA is true, or even if the weak value assumption WVA is true, then God’s primary aim might have been to actualize a world with Incarnation and atonement.
WVA. Some possible worlds of great value include Incarnation and atonement.
Now this is a form of supralapsarianism. God’s central aim is to actualize a world in which there is Incarnation and atonement. As a mean to doing that, God creates moral agents that go wrong and suffer in various ways. Adams then offers this criticism.
Isn’t Plantinga’s God just using created persons, treating them to their detriment, as means to Divine cosmic ends? However Plantinga may commend Divine excellence at world-making, doesn’t his theodicy undermine any claim that God is loving or merciful, good-to the persons involved? (Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 25, 2008)
I’m not sure I understand that objection. It’s supposed to be a Kantian objection to using persons merely as a means to a greater good. Since these beings never consented to being created in such a world, they are being used merely as a means. But how exactly are these persons being used? All of the beings in question are free, and can choose to act for good or ill. Let’s look at one case to see where this criticism goes wrong. Let S be among the created free beings. And suppose God creates S in T knowing that S would freely go wrong and suffer the consequences of doing so. And let’s suppose that this is a means to God’s Incarnation, atonement and redemption of S. How does S get used? (1)- (5) are true.
- God actualizes T []—> S freely goes wrong and suffers.
- God actualizes T.
- S freely goes wrong and suffers.
- (God actualizes T & S freely goes wrong and suffers) []—> God atones for S.
- God atones for S.
But (6) is true as well and compatible with (1)-(5).
(6). <>(God actualizes T & S freely goes right and does not suffer).
Since (6) is true we know that S could just as well have gone right and not suffered, despite the fact that God actualizes T and (1) is true. So the fact that S went wrong and suffered was his own doing. Wasn’t it? Are we supposed to add the assumption that God manipulated S? There’s no evidence in Plantinga’s argument that God manipulates anyone into going wrong. But then it is hard to see how God uses S merely as a means to actualizing an Incarnation & atonement-world.
Where is M. Adams's critique found?
Hi James,
It's in F&P, Vol 25, No. 2, (2008) 123-140.
Hi Mike,
Is (6) intended to replace (1)? Since you actually have a (1) in front of it, it's not clear.
I'm sorry. I don't know why that happens. It should read (6), not (1). I'll try to fix that.
I haven't read Adams's article, but maybe the thought is this: assume that God creates the world because he wants to create beings that love Him and each other. Ultimately, then, what God is aiming at is the good of these beings, and this good is fully arrived at when these beings act according to the function for which they were created (which is, again, to love God and each other).
However, if a world is better when there is an Incarnation and Atonement--which of course requires a Fall--then it seems as though God is privileging the good of some beings at the expense of others. Admittedly, God does not have a particular being in mind that he uses as a mere means to the end of leading others to atone, but he does have a set of beings (viz., the ones that fall) in mind that will serve as a mere means for bringing about the good of another set of beings (viz., the ones that atone).
Hi Mike,
Am I right that you are making the assumption that if someone acts freely, they are not being manipulated or used? Is this true?
Suppose Joe knows jane loves him. Joe does not really care about Jane, but knows she will sleep with him at the moments notice and also knows that if she does, she will be more attached to Joe. Also Joe knows that he has no interest in Jane and will drop her as soon as the thril is gone.
Sally is a factory owner. She knows the economy is bad, and she can pay her workers a a subsistence wage and they will freely agree to it. She is exploitative, even though the workers freely agree to work for her.
Albert knows that Joe is a drunk. He nevertheless gives Joe a bottle of whiskey before the company party. Joe embarrasses himself loses his position in the company, and Albert gets ahead. Albert is culpable, despite Joe's freely acquiesing.
As I understand Plantinga, God specifically creates individuals whom he knows will sin. He does so in order to achieve this great good of attonement. I don't see how merely adding "freely sinning" takes away from God an intention to use another merely as a means.
However, if a world is better when there is an Incarnation and Atonement--which of course requires a Fall--then it seems as though God is privileging the good of some beings at the expense of others.
The idea is supposed to be that God has some goal in mind--a world with atonement and Incarnation--and he creates free beings whom he knows will fall, sin, and suffer, in order to actualize that atonement world. Adams' sees that as a violation of individual autonomy in the Kantian sense. I don't see it, since God's knowing that you will fall, sin and suffer does not prevent you from not falling, sinning or suffering. You might freely choose to do none of these. In any case, the atonement and redemption comes from Christ, not from fellow sinful beings. So they are not being used in the relevant way by you, but we are all being used by God.
As I understand Plantinga, God specifically creates individuals whom he knows will sin. He does so in order to achieve this great good of attonement. I don't see how merely adding "freely sinning" takes away from God an intention to use another merely as a means
The cases you provide are tendentious. I don't deny that people can be used merely as a means, even when they could freely do otherwise (who would deny that?). The question is whether it is in general true that putting S in a situation in which you know he will go wrong entails using S merely as a means. I think the answer to that is no. Suppose I know that if I asked you directly whether you stole Smiths' car, you'd lie about it. If I asked you and you lied, I clearly did not use you as a means. I did not use you as a means even if I wanted to confirm my suspicion that you'd say "Smith did it". So the fact that God places you in circumstances in which you freely go wrong, and does so for some reason, does not entail that he uses you as a means. There is nothing more to Adam's argument than this assumption. Adam's does not claim that God otherwise manipulates agents or leads them into wrongdoing.
Hi Mike,
You say: "And let’s suppose that this is a means to God’s Incarnation, atonement and redemption of S."
I'm not sure the 'end' in 'God uses S as a means to an end' will always be the end of S's redemption via I&A. When I read the piece, I think I thought MMA was saying that the means to which creatures are being put is the end of a really good world; but a really good world, on Plantinga's view, might not include all S's being redeemed (so far as I know he's noncommittal on this).
The way you've set it up, S seems to be being 'used' as a means to his own redemption, which presumably ultimately involves loads of increase to his well-being. Moreover, God might be intending S's well-being all along; I guess I don't see that S is being used as a means at all here, in any objectionable way.
Suppose God's intent is to create a really good I&A world; but that all the really good I&A worlds contain some free creatures who suffer gratuitous evil at those worlds, and whose lives aren't valuable for them on the whole. Maybe in order to bring about lots of value, God has to put these creatures in harm way. It seems to me that this possibility is what motivates Adams's worries.
I don't think appealing to freedom helps much. We can also suppose that the 'harm' these creatures suffer isn't a product of free choices; maybe it stems from blind natural processes (disease, etc.). I think Adams's point is just that the well-being of individuals shouldn't be trumped by overall value, whatever the source of value/disvalue (even if your suffering is a result of your own free choices). This might wind up resting on her more general views about limited human responsibility for horrors, though. Sam Newlands has a helpful piece on her views here:
http://www.baylor.edu/philofreligion/index.php?id=43672
I don't think appealing to freedom helps much. We can also suppose that the 'harm' these creatures suffer isn't a product of free choices; maybe it stems from blind natural processes (disease, etc.).
I don't see how the suffering due to natural processes could demand the sort of atonement Plantinga is aiming at. The atonement is for, presumably, significant moral wrongs. It is not a necessary condition of atonement that there is natural disease. It is a necesary condition of atonement that there is moral wrongdoing. So what Plantinga has to do is create beings that will freely choose to go wrong.
Right, my point is just that, on Plantinga's view, to get a really good world, God might need to permit creatures to suffer gratuitous natural evils (of course, if it's an I&A world, moral evils are needed too). The problem I think is with Plantinga's insistence on what's guiding God's creative act--bringing about a really good world--and his lack of detail as to how achieving this global good is supposed to cohere with achieving meaningful lives for creatures. There's nothing in Plantinga's view to constrain God from maximizing global goods at the expense of some creatures. I think that's the more general worry.
Plantinga could, like Adams, move toward universalism; this would help. And in some way I read Adams's critique as an admonition for him to do just that ...
As I recall from Plantinga's article, he seems ambiguous between:
(1) God knows S will sin and God will use this Sin for attonement and redemption of all, including S.
OR
(2) God knows S will sin and God will use this sin as a reason for attonement and redemption of some but not all.
If (2), then I think the claim that God is merely using his creatures is fairly clear. For in this case God knows that the end result will be bad for S, and yet creates S. In this case God cannot be valuing S for S's own sake, He must be valuing S as a means to further the redemption of others.
I don't think the moral problem arrises from the creatures freedom being violated (assuming for fun that foreknowledge and freedom can be reconciled), but in God's attitude towards the creature as a mere instrument for some other end.
Does anyone know whether Plantinga has an expressed view re: universalism?
(2) God knows S will sin and God will use this sin as a reason for attonement and redemption of some but not all.
Is God really using those whose sins he does not atone for?
If S sins then God cannot use that sin as a reason for the atonement unless he actually atones for that sin. Can he?
In order to bring about the incarnation and atonement there must be sins to atone for, but that means that those who's sins are not being atoned for are not helping to bring about the atonement.
One might wonder why God has created them. Does he have some other purpose for them? But it does not seem to be to bring about the atonement.
There's nothing in Plantinga's view to constrain God from maximizing global goods at the expense of some creatures. I think that's the more general worry.
But the worry for the critic of Plantinga is the other way round, isn't it? What has to be shown is that there is no way on his account to avoid this consequence. This is what hasn't been shown, I think.
(2) God knows S will sin and God will use this sin as a reason for attonement and redemption of some but not all.
If (2), then I think the claim that God is merely using his creatures is fairly clear. For in this case God knows that the end result will be bad for S, and yet creates S. In this case God cannot be valuing S for S's own sake, He must be valuing S as a means to further the redemption of others.
I don't think (2) has any such implication. It is consistent with (2) that S and S', who have led the same sorts of moral lives, and otherwise similar psychologically, dispositionally and so on, are placed in circumstances C, where a moral decision has to be made. Suppose the moral decision is to accept or reject God as savior. S freely rejects and S' freely accepts. God's knowing that S would freely reject Him does not in any way (that I can see) remove S's moral responsibility for his decision. His failure to be saved is the result of his own free choice in this case. (2) is true and no one used as a means. S, too, could have been saved.
It does not remove S's moral responsibility, but it does not remove God's moral responsibility either.
to flesh that out: if you know someone will make a choice with disasterious consequences, and intentionally put that person in a situation in which she makes that choice, then you are partially responsible.
Having entirely skipped these comments, I think there's probably an easier way out of this. Unless I badly misread Plantinga, he thought the goodness of I&A came at least in part because those things exemplified or encapsulated God's love for humanity. In other words, I&A is not an end in itself - the value assumptions are (supposedly) plausible not because I&A stands by itself as a kind of good but rather because I&A allows for a quantity (and perhaps purity) of another good (i.e., love) that no other kind of action does. Adams, though, seems to think that Plantinga treats I&A as a good-in-itself (at least, judging from that one snippet), so I'd guess that she's just misreading Plantinga altogether.
Not that I think the felix culpa thing works out, but this ain't why...
But the worry for the critic of Plantinga is the other way round, isn't it? What has to be shown is that there is no way on his account to avoid this consequence. This is what hasn't been shown, I think.
Since Plantinga wants a theodicy, though, the critic just needs to point to cases where, plausibly, appeal to the global good of God's creating a world that contains I&A doesn't seem a compelling way to make sense of some actual persons suffering, or defeat the horrors she's suffered here in this world.
Take some horror-sufferer whose (earthly) life was plausibly thought to be on the whole bad, and who doesn't recognize herself as a recipient of the agent-centered goods that accrue from I&A (relationship with God, etc.). It is, I think, plausible that people who meet these descriptions actually exist. What can Plantinga say to them? It doesn't seem very satisfying to say: 'Look, your existence and suffering is justified b/c God wanted to create an I&A world of great value. And he did create an I&A world of great value; it's just that your life was the unfortunate black splotch on that world. Still, you don't have any good complaint against God; after all, God created a tremendously valuable world.'
I think MMA has big doubts about whether the sort of global goods Plantinga restricts himself to can defeat many of the horrors we find in the actual world. I tend to agree. Not to say that Plantinga can't add to his account, or cash it out in ways that might help. But as it stands it's not clear what sort of compelling reply he can give to these sort of agent-centered worries.
. . .if you know someone will make a choice with disasterious consequences, and intentionally put that person in a situation in which she makes that choice, then you are partially responsible.
That's exactly what's in dispute. I gave an example which, to my mind, falsifies that claim. The example was the following,
Suppose God puts you in a position to make the moral decision to accept or reject him as savior. S freely rejects and S' freely accepts. God's knowing that S would freely reject Him does not in any way (that I can see) remove S's moral responsibility for his decision. His failure to be saved is the result of his own free choice in this case. (2) is true and no one used as a means. S, too, could have been saved.
I see no sense in which God is responsible for you freely rejecting him. He put you in a postion where you could as easily have accepted. It is not different from the case in which I ask you a question that I know you'll lie about. I'm not in any way responsible for your choice to lie.
I think MMA has big doubts about whether the sort of global goods Plantinga restricts himself to can defeat many of the horrors we find in the actual world. I tend to agree.
No, definitely this is Adams's worry. Note that Plantinga says not only that (on the strong value claims) any I&A-world is better than any ~I&~A-world, but that the existence fo God alone--apart from I&A--gives a world unlimited value. So, even if we set aside worlds in which there is I&A, and consider other worlds in which God exists, the positive value conferred by God on those worlds will swamp the disvalue of those worlds. It does strike me as raising standards inordinately high to claim that God must actualize the morally best world globally and then add that he must also actualize the best world for each inhabitant in terms of his well-being or in prudential terms. It might not be possible. The best world in moral terms may simply not be the best world prudentially or in terms of individual welfare.
It does strike me as raising standards inordinately high to claim that God must actualize the morally best world globally and then add that he must also actualize the best world for each inhabitant in terms of his well-being or in prudential terms.
I agree that this sets the bar too high. But I'm not sure Adams herself insists on this. It's more workable to say that God must do whatever God can to ensure that each agent's life is on the whole a good for that agent (rather than the best it could possibly be). And God might be able to do this by guaranteeing, or at least doing his best to bring about, salvation for all. I don't see how Adams can get everything she wants without universalism.
I don't see how Adams can get everything she wants without universalism.
Suppose Plantinga rejects universalism (as I'm sure he does). Let S be a person that is instantiated, suffers evil and dies unsaved. Let S' be as person that undergoes the same, but dies saved. How is S used as a means to the salvation of S'? Even if S had never existed, S' would have been saved.
I'm not sure what to say about how this maps on to the MMA v. AP discussion, since I took MMA to be interpreting AP such that what does the justifying works is the global or mega-state of affairs of being a very good I&A world. And I'm not sure how this trickles down or relates to individual well-being. AP seems to think that the value of these worlds consists more in properties God instantiates rather than how individual creaturely well-being is affected. It could be both, though it would be nice to hear a story here.
It seems to me we can come up with cases where Plantinga's God would be treating people as means. I think we need to hear more about the case you propose before we can say one way or the other. But don't you think there can be cases where A orchestrates some state of affairs in which everyone acts libertarian freely, but in which A nonetheless uses some of those creatures merely as means toward ends A desires? These cases seem clearly possible to me. One big issue, in my mind, is whether double effect works, and whether we can get the Molinist/foreknowledge God on the right side of things so far as God's actual creative activity.
Mike,
I think that you would agree that God in creating allen, who is about to sin, is performing an act that is a necessary condition for Allen's sining. so if no Allen, no sin.
Even in the example you give. Yes I am not responsible for Sally lying to me, if I ask her a question knowing that she will lie. But suppose I also know this: If sally lies, she will suffer painful electrocution. Then don't you think in asking the question you hold some responsibility for Sally's fate?
actually, (I post faster than I think) that is not the best example, since its so disproportionate.
Suppose that being unfaithful has as a logical and morally correct consequence the failure of a marriage (divorce). Suppose you know your friend is easily tempted by attractive people who like him, so you intentionally put this friend, Joe, in a position in which there is maybe a 50% chance (here its not even a matter of knowledge) of his being unfaithful and all the bad consequences happen. Would you be a good friend to do this? would you be acting in a loving manner?
Luke, you write,
What can Plantinga say to them? It doesn't seem very satisfying to say: 'Look, your existence and suffering is justified b/c God wanted to create an I&A world of great value.
No, I think he has to be able to say, for any such person, that his own redemption is thereby made available to him. It cannot be that some are certainly condemned and others not, for the sake of an overall very good world. In other words, I think the falisty of universalism is just a contingent fact.
Suppose you know your friend is easily tempted by attractive people who like him, so you intentionally put this friend, Joe, in a position in which there is maybe a 50% chance (here its not even a matter of knowledge) of his being unfaithful and all the bad consequences happen. Would you be a good friend to do this? would you be acting in a loving manner?
I'm not sure that sort of case is fair to Plantinga. He wants to say that there is some greater good that is made available to you (and to others) by placing you in a situation in which, as a matter of contingent fact, you go wrong. To make the analogy better, you'd have to assume that in going wrong the agent actually manages to strengthen his marriage, or something along those lines. Some greater good has to result, and it has to be possible for that very person to enjoy that greater good.
Wouldn't the example be one in which you strengthen someone else's marriage. In the case we are considering, you make the wrong choice (and God knows it) presumably such people do not benefit themselves. If God did not know what choice you would make, then you can say that God is giving you a choice, a potential benefit. but its not really a potential benefit if God knows that the person in question will not take it. (it may be a real potential from the agent's perspective, if they really are free, but not from God's)
Suppose Plantinga rejects universalism (as I'm sure he does).
I wouldn't be so sure.
I wouldn't be so sure
I guess in the closest worlds where I'm more familiar with Plantinga's current eschatological views, I'm perhaps less sure. Can you get me to that world? Here I'm going on what Adam's seems to believe and on not having seen that view in print. But it may all depend on what one has in mind. I don't think he'd say that it's impossible that all should be saved. But I'd be surprised if he didn't say that, as a matter of contingent fact, we're not all saved.
in _Oh Felix Culpa_ he seems open to universalism, but sort of dances around it.
Gordon, you say,
Wouldn't the example be one in which you strengthen someone else's marriage. In the case we are considering, you make the wrong choice (and God knows it) presumably such people do not benefit themselves
The greater good is the Incarnation and the atonement. It is the sins of those who go wrong that are atoned for and who, presumably, can be redeemed. So there is this greater benefit for the very ones that go wrong which is made available by the very act of going wrong.
If univesalism is true, then your point holds. but if universalism is not true, then there are some individuals who do not benefit from the atonement. Now, you say, "well that is their own fault, they had the opportunity, and it was good of god to give them that opportunity." To this i say that, assuming divine foreknowledge, this opportunity is a sham opportunity. If god knows someone is not going to take it, how is offering it to him going to do any good?"
I think we just have different intuitions on this.
To this i say that, assuming divine foreknowledge, this opportunity is a sham opportunity. If god knows someone is not going to take it, how is offering it to him going to do any good?"
I'd think that's confused. Here are two cases.
1. I offer you the opportunity to accept God as your savior. You refuse.
2. God offers you the opportunity to accept him as savior. You refuse.
There is no better opportunity to accept God--no greater freedom, no better chance of accepting, etc--in case (1) than there is in case (2). Everything is the same with respect to your choice situation. The fact that God knows what you're going to do does not make it a less than completely free choice. It would be very odd to say, "yes, I refused. But if Almeida had asked me instead of God, I'd have had a real chance of accepting". That's not true. If I had asked you instead of God (or if some angelic being had asked you, not knowing what you'd say) you would have had the very same chance of accepting.
Given God's knowledge base, the chance is zero (if God knows I will not accept)Given your knowledge base, the chance is higher than that.
I don't actually think foreknowlege and freedom are compatible, but that is a seperate issue. I am trying to say that even if the agent is free, from *God's* perspective, the offer of salvation is a sham, if God really does know that it will not be accepted.
I am trying to say that even if the agent is free, from *God's* perspective, the offer of salvation is a sham, if God really does know that it will not be accepted.
Yes, I know you're trying to say that. Bracketing the worries arising from foreknowledge (I incidentally see no such worries. Most of the discussion to the contrary here--Hasker has a lot, and so do many others--seems like one red herring after another) the fact that God knows you will freely X and I don't, does not make the offer a sham (I'm not entirely sure what that criticim comes to, but no matter).
You might be thinking: if he knows I'll do X, then I must do X. I couldn't do Y. But of course you could do Y, even if he knows you will do X. And if you were to do Y, then you'd actualize a world in which he knows (and knew all along) that you'd do Y.
Mike,
Suppose Bill and Sue accept salvation only if Ted rejects salvation, where Ted freely rejects salvation, and where Ted's rejection of salvation is somehow closely and intimately tied to Bill and Sue's coming to accept salvation.
I'm not sure the Molinist/foreknowledge God wouldn't be using Ted as a means to Bill and Sue's salvation. If God intends Bill and Sue's redemption, he must also intend the means to their salvation. If Ted's rejection of salvation is closely enough tied to their acceptance, etc. I'm not convinced that Ted's freely rejecting salvation gets God off the hook. I agree that if Ted's freely rejecting salvation somehow wound up being to his benefit, God would be in the clear. But it's hard (given traditional views about the afterlife) to see how that would work in this case.
As an aside, I don't recall Plantinga invoking an agent-centred requirement in his discussion. I'm not sure he thinks sufferers must themselves be compensated for their suffering in order for God to justifiably permit it. Also, some Molinists might resist cashing out the view in the way you seem to want to--where what justifies God is the mere possibility that agents accept redemption. Some might take seriously Craig's suggestion that all not saved in this world are transworld damned (I personally don't).
Suppose Bill and Sue accept salvation only if Ted rejects salvation, where Ted freely rejects salvation, and where Ted's rejection of salvation is somehow closely and intimately tied to Bill and Sue's coming to accept salvation.
It depends on the nature of the tie. I'm not sure Plantinga could concede that such a case is possible on the assumption that everyone is lib. free.
As an aside, I don't recall Plantinga invoking an agent-centred requirement in his discussion. I'm not sure he thinks sufferers must themselves be compensated for their suffering in order for God to justifiably permit it.
Of course, I didn't say that either. I said it has to be possible for everyone to so benefit. As a matter of fact, (probably) not every one does.
I thought you were assuming something agent-centered in one of your responses to Gordon above. My bad.
Do you really think foreknowledge makes no difference to intention? I find it plausible that if I foreknow w. certainty that ~P, I'd have a really hard time intending P. I'm not even sure I could hope that P. Maybe I could wish that P. But I just don't see intending it. Maybe there are counterexamples, though ...
Mike's basic point seems correct to me. Even if we allow that some people would be displeased at being "used" this way, and that therefore there would be something wrong with it, there will also be people who are quite happy to help with God's plan. Call the happy people group A and the disgruntled group B. Some possible worlds will have both A and B, but some worlds will have only people from the A group. God simply has to create one of those B-less worlds.