Tom Flint offered an interesting objection at the MPR Workshop to mereological models of the incarnation. Suppose that human beings are body-soul composites. The broad concretist position is that the Incarnation involved the Son of God assuming a concrete, body-soul composite. Let the body soul composite be Christ’s human nature (or CHN). The specific mereological model treats the Incarnation as a substance—that is, the divine substance—gaining a part. The Incarnated being then is the composite of the divine substance and the CHN (the body-soul composite or the human being). Flint notes that while this model helps resolve lots of interesting problems, it finds a serious objection in the well-known “growing problem”. Suppose it is just a contingent fact that the Incarnation occurred. Let w be a world in which the divine substance is not incarnated. Flint urges that we would want to say that (a) is true.
a. The Son in @ = the Son in w
But no doubt (b) is also true, since Christ is not incarnated in w.
b. The Son in w = the divine substance in w.
And since the divine substance exists necessarily, (c) is true.
c. The divine substance in w = the divine substance in @.
But it follows from (a)-(c) that (d) is true.
d. The Son in @ = the divine substance in @.
But (d) is false! The Son-in-@ is the mereological composite of the divine substance + CHN. What to do?
Flint mentioned that he assumes throughout the Plantingan position according to which propositions asserting the transworld identity of A and B are true just in case A and B share all of their world-indexed properties. But one implication of the Plantingan view, contrary to this argument, is that (a) is false. The growing problem is not a problem. This is good news for the mereological view of the Incarnation, but bad news for Plantinga. Why is (a) false? It’s false because the Son-in-@ does not share all of the world indexed properties with the Son-in-w. We can derive both (e) and (f).
e. The Son-in-w has the property of being a proper part of the Son-in-@ in @.
f. The Son-in-@ does not have the property of being a proper part of the Son-in-@ in @.
So it is false that the Son-in-@ = the Son-in-w. The larger implication is that nothing could be identical to a proper part of itself. This sort of mereological essentialism is bad news. It is pretty obvious that the table T is identical to my table T+ whose uneven legs I might have repaired. Of course, what is obvious varies widely (not to say suspiciously) in these discussions.
the careful concretist should deny (b). Items non-identical in some possible world are identical in none. So the relation between the Son and the divine substance in w is constitution, not identity (cf. Eleonore Stump on the post-mortem relation between persons and their souls).
It's hard to imagine folks reflecting on the history of the doctrine of the Trinity affirming proposition (b) above. To say that the Son is *identical* to the divine nature is to say either that Father and Holy Spirit do not share the divine nature with the Son, or that the Son is somehow contained in, part of, or underlying the Father and the Spirit. The first claim is inconsistent with Trinitarian orthodoxy. The second claim, so far as I know, has never been endorsed and is wholly unmotivated. So it's hard to see why there's a real problem here.
It's hard to imagine folks reflecting on the history of the doctrine of the Trinity affirming proposition (b) above. To say that the Son is *identical* to the divine nature is to say either that Father and Holy Spirit do not share the divine nature with the Son, or that the Son is somehow contained in, part of, or underlying the Father and the Spirit.
Hi Mike,
I should note first that the argument was directed against a first pass for concretists and second it is from a draft paper. In any case, (b) doesn't say that the Son is identical the divine nature. It says that the Son-in-w is identical to the divine nature in w. That is, worlds where the Son is not incarnated, he is identical to the divine nature. I don't think the argument was designed to be sensitive to Trinitarian issues, since it looks like the same sort of mereological objection can be run if the Son in w is identical to an x in w that meets specific Trinitarian concerns.
. . .the careful concretist should deny (b). Items non-identical in some possible world are identical in none.
Well, assuming there aren't contingently identical objects. But it doesn't seem obviously mistaken that I might fail to be identical to Mike-minus (left hand) in @, where Mike-minus (perhaps) does not exist. Mike-minus is just an arbitrary undetached part in @. But identical to Mike-minus in w, where I've lost my left hand.
>Well, assuming there aren't contingently >identical objects. But it doesn't seem >obviously mistaken that I might fail to be >identical to Mike-minus (left hand) in @, >where Mike-minus (perhaps) does not exist. >Mike-minus is just an arbitrary undetached >part in @. But identical to Mike-minus in w, >where I've lost my left hand.
Rather, you fall under the description "Mike minus" in w, but are necessarily identical with yourself in both worlds. This is a case of contingent predication masquerading as a case of contingent identity, I think. To have a serious case of contingent identity, you need a possible world in which you and Minus both exist and are distinct, and another in which you and Minus are identical- which I have reason to concede you've given me only if I have reason to prefer this reading of the world in which you and Minus coincide to one involving coincidence and constitution. So: which is worse metaphysically, letting identity go contingent or recognizing a constitution relation? I suspect that the metaphysical commitments needed to make sense of the former (e.g. perhaps counterpart theory or eternalism) would strike many as heavier.
To have a serious case of contingent identity, you need a possible world in which you and Minus both exist and are distinct,and another in which you and Minus are identical- which I have reason to concede you've given me only if I have reason to prefer this reading of the world in which you and Minus coincide to one involving coincidence and constitution
This is not a serious enough case? I gave you a world in which I am identical to mike-minus, and a world in which I'm not. But suppose we go the dualist (constitution/identity) route. In the actual world I apparently have lots of things all of which count as constituting me. I'm consistuted by mike-minus, mike-earless, mike-toothless, and mike-plus. I see no non-arbitrary way to choose which is my actual constitution. The fact is there is really nothing gained by treating these things as mike-consituters or treating them as mikes-at-a-moment.
>In the actual world I apparently have lots of things all of which count as constituting me. I'm consistuted by mike-minus, mike-earless, mike-toothless, and mike-plus. I see no non-arbitrary way to choose which is my actual constitution. The fact is there is really nothing gained by treating these things as mike-consituters or treating them as mikes-at-a-moment.
whatever your reasons for eliminating undetached parts, they carry over to the mass constituting Mike. Whatever your reasons for saying you're identical with Mike rather than Mike-plus- i.e. for refusing to consider the extra atom among your parts- they carry over to a case for not including it among the atoms constituting you. Why this mass rather than others, among all the candidates that might be constituting you? Beats me, but why this set of parts among all others as the ones composing you? There are difficulties here, clearly, but I don't see that they are any worse for a constitutionalist than for someone who only recognizes composition.
It doesn't make any sense to put forth a "problem" for a model of the incarnation that relies on the denial of a central thesis of the doctrine of the Trinity. That's like putting forward a "problem" for evolutionary theory that presumes the falsity of the most important things we believe about genetics. And noting that the "problem" relies on the claim that "the son-in-w" = the divine nature doesn't help either; for traditional Trinitarians will say that there is no world w such that "the son-in-w" is identical to the divine nature. Contingent identity will, of course, help if a constitution problem ever manages to get off the ground here in the first place; but Flint won't go for contingent identity, and neither would most anyone else working on those issues. (Lewis and Gibbard are notable exceptions, of course; but Gibbard's view is quite similar to Lewis's in the end, and Lewis explicitly denies that his view, strictly speaking, implies contingent identity.
It doesn't make any sense to put forth a "problem" for a model of the incarnation that relies on the denial of a central thesis of the doctrine of the Trinity.
It does make sense if the alleged problem is independent of these crucial theses. As I was trying to point out above, the problem seems to require only that the son-in-w be identical to something x in w. I'm assuming we can agree about that. This something x in w is such that (x + CHN) constitutes the son-in-@. And we have the same problem for the mereological approach to the Incarnation.
Mike,
"...the problem seems to require only that the son-in-w be identical to something x in w. I'm assuming we can agree about that. This something x in w is such that (x + CHN) constitutes the son-in-@..."
No, the problem requires more than that the son-in-w is identical to some x in w. For, after all, it's trivial that the son-in-w is identical to the son-in-w. But that premise won't do as a substitute for b in the argument above. Moreover, the son-in-w = the son-in-@ = the son; so your claim that 'this something x in w is such that (x+CHN) constitutes the son-in-@' boils down to the claim that the son is (actually) such that (the son + CHN) constitutes the son. That's sort of like saying I'm such that (me+my left half) constitutes me. Maybe that's true (depending on how you understand '+' here), but it's not especially problematic.
The son-in-w is the unincarnated son. I don't want to quibble about what that is, but I do know it lacks Christ's human nature (CHN). So let it be (x - CHN).
b. The Son in w = (x - CHN) in w.
So, rewrite (c) correspondingly,
c. (x - CHN) in w = (x - CHN) in @.
Now (d) looks like this,
d. The Son in @ = (x - CHN) in @.
But the Son in @ = (x + CHN), so (d) is false. (d) follows from (a)-(c), where (a) is as above,
a. The Son in @ = the Son in w.
That is what was presented as a problem. But, as I argued in the post, (a) is false (for Plantigan reasons). Just to be clear, this is not my argument, nor do I think it's cogent. Our discussion, if I'm following it, is whether the argument depends on any trinitarian assumptions. It seems it doesn't.