Folks may be tiring of the whole Christian-colleges-APA-JFP-discrimination-against-gays brouhaha, but I've written another letter about it, specifically about how the APA should respond to the petition. I'll put it below the fold.
Dear Fellow Members of the APA:
I write to urge a very moderate response to the recent petition asking the APA to either enforce its own non-discrimination policy in how its publication, Jobs for Philosophers, is administered or to rescind that policy.
Let's start with the APA's policy:
The American Philosophical Association rejects as unethical all forms of discrimination based on race, color, religion, political convictions, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identification or age, whether in graduate admissions, appointments, retention, promotion and tenure, manuscript evaluation, salary determination, or other professional activities in which APA members characteristically participate. At the same time, the APA recognizes the special commitments and roles of institutions with a religious affiliation; it is not inconsistent with the APA's position against discrimination to adopt religious affiliation as a criterion in graduate admissions or employment policies when this is directly related to the school's religious affiliation or purpose, so long as these policies are made known to members of the philosophical community and so long as the criteria for such religious affiliations do not discriminate against persons according to the other attributes listed in this statement. Advertisers in Jobs for Philosophers are expected to comply with this fundamental commitment of the APA, which is not to be taken to preclude explicitly stated affirmative action initiatives.
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The APA Board of Officers expects that all those who use the APA Placement Service will comply with the letter and spirit of all applicable regulations concerning non-discrimination, equal employment opportunity and affirmative action.
When this policy was adopted, it was decided both that the APA rejects all discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as unethical, and also that schools' religious affiliations do not shield them from this rejection if they do discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation (or on the other bases listed). Assuming the APA is not rescinding these decisions, the key issue in how this policy applies to the colleges in question is whether the policies of those colleges do discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
It seems quite clear to me that the policies in question do discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, on any reasonable interpretation of the APA's policy, for reasons I will give in the next paragraph. However, I understand how things can seem otherwise, especially to those who significantly involved in or connected with conservative Christian institutions or social groups, and who are now claiming that the policies in question discriminate only on the basis of sexual behavior, and not at all on the basis of sexual orientation. It is not always easy to determine when discriminating against those who engage in behavior characteristic of or natural to a particular group constitutes discrimination against that group, but surely it is possible to discriminate against a group by discriminating against those who engage in behavior associated with the group. In conservative Christian sub-cultures, where such discrimination (justified or unjustified) against gays is often severe and pervasive, it's easy to get used to standards for what constitutes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation that would be unreasonably high in other contexts. In some such discussions in conservative church settings (which I have had the frustration of participating in on several occasions) it often seems to get to the point that given only that it is possible for gays to refrain from certain banned behavior, it follows that it is only the behavior that is being barred, and they are not at all being discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation! However justified such standards may be in discussions within very conservative circles where discrimination against gays is the norm, it is not reasonable to interpret the policy of the APA, an organization that is not part of such a sub-culture (though a minority of its members are) in terms of such extreme standards.
So, by standards in terms of which it is at all reasonable to interpret the APA's anti-discrimination policy, do the policies of these schools discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation? These policies make it a term of employment that faculty refrain from engaging in sexual activity outside of heterosexual marriage. The policies do not simply ban those who are homosexual by orientation from faculty positions, and it is possible for those of such an orientation to refrain from sexual activity, let's grant. But these points mean only that by the extreme standards discussed in the above paragraph, the policies in question don't discriminate on the basis of orientation. But let's employ more ordinary, non-extreme standards. Then it seems clear that the policies do discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. It's pretty simple, really. These policies block the hiring and the continued employment of those of one orientation, but not another, for not giving up the type of sexual activity they are oriented toward. To be sure, the policies place limits - from various points of view, quite severe limits - on heterosexual sexual activity, too. But this is a case of limits, however severe, compared with an outright ban on the sexual activity one is oriented toward. That is a form of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. And since sex is a very important part of human life, at least for many, this is far from trivial discrimination.
For clarification, as far as I can see, schools would not run afoul of the APA's non-discrimination policy if they adopted, say, a complete abstinence policy that banned all sexual activity by all faculty. This would discriminate against those to whom sexual activity is especially important, but discrimination on that basis doesn't make the list of what the APA rejects. More realistically, schools that allow heterosexual sexual activity only within marriage could avoid discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation by requiring those who wish to engage in homosexual sexual activity to limit themselves to one sexual partner, perhaps requiring them to make a public commitment to monogamy with that one partner that approximates legal marriage as closely as possible, given current state of the relevant laws. Since legal gay marriage itself is not now possible in most states, simply limiting sexual activity to taking place within marriage is to engage in discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Or, of course, these schools could also avoid discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation simply by getting out of the business of regulating the private sexual activity of their faculty altogether.
I offer the above only for clarification; I am pretty confident that the schools in question will decide to continue to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, at least for the foreseeable future. They may have good reasons for so continuing, or this may be a mistake on their part. That's for them to decide. The APA has already determined that it rejects as unethical all discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, even if such discrimination is in various ways tied up with a school's religious identity. All we have to decide here is whether the policies in question do discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and, for the simple reasons given above, it's quite clear that they do.
So, what should the APA do about this discrimination? Though it's not in the end what I recommend, the action that seems to me most in tune with the rather bold words of the policy quoted above would be to ban the schools in question from advertising in JFP, and generally from using the APA's placement services*. But the petition circulating much more moderately asks for the APA to take one of two actions, and failing either of them, to take a third option:
We, the undersigned, request that the American Philosophical Association either (1) enforce its policy and prohibit institutions that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation from advertising in 'Jobs for Philosophers' or (2) clearly mark institutions with these policies as institutions that violate our anti-discrimination policy. If the APA is unwilling to take either of these measures, we request that the APA publicly inform its members that it will not protect homosexual philosophers and remove its anti-discrimination policy to end the illusion that a primary function of the APA is to protect the rights of its members.
Though I'm probably considerably more moderate than (and so not representative of) most other signers of the petition, what I would urge is option (2).
The direct practical effects of this decision are not momentous: No matter what is decided, schools will be able to advertise their positions in effective ways, and gay job candidates will eventually find out what jobs they are barred from, and it is not a great harm to have applied to a job one had no chance at. What's important here is what the APA is saying by its decision, to the schools in question, but also what it is saying to and about lesbian and gay philosophers. This fact seems to be recognized by Mark Murphy, the author of the draft letter# [# this link now takes you to the final version of the letter (with signatures), which includes a change in the portion I quote below]] that asks the APA not to change its JFP practices. Murphy focuses largely on how the APA would be "marking out" the schools in question if it opted for either (1) or (2). However, that letter (at least in its current form: it is a draft) puts a very heavy spin on what would be communicated:
To mark these schools as noncompliant is to assert of them that they are engaging in 'unethical . . . discrimination' -- it is for the APA to brand them, officially, as being, in their hiring practices, bigoted.
Please, let's not fall for that playground trick ("So, you're calling me a ____"). Though some signers of the petition would not hesitate to call the schools in question "bigoted" (and indeed, some have already used such language), others would so hesitate, and others would indeed go so far as to deny that that strong and rather incendiary term would apply, and it appears nowhere in the petition. And, more to the point, I'm quite sure that the "mark" placed on the relevant ads would not be explained in JFP in anything like this way: "Schools so marked are bigoted." At any rate, I would urge a different, much more moderate, explanation of the mark! Let's be fair here. The schools would indeed be marked, but the precise and accurate way to express how they would be "officially" "branded" is as: engaging in unethical discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. As I've stressed here, the "unethical" part has already been officially determined by the APA, if the policies do discriminate on the basis of orientation, which they do. As for the "discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation" part, as I've urged, that's pretty clear. By allowing these schools to advertise in JFP with such a mark, whether or not the schools decide to so advertise, the APA would be making sure to be sending about as muted a message as it could send, consistent with its decision to reject as unethical discrimination based on sexual orientation and the associated language about the JFP and the use of the placement service in its own policy statement. (Indeed, some might complain that such a message is so muted as to not make sense of the APA's policy.)
To not even mark these schools is either to in effect deny (very implausibly, to my thinking) that they discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, or to admit that all the high-minded words of the APA's policy are practically quite meaningless, and that the APA is unwilling to take even the smallest step against the discrimination that is clearly going on here: to simply call it what it is in the very venue (the JFP) in which the APA explicitly says it will enforce its own policy. In any case, it is to send a very disheartening message to our lesbian and gay colleagues. Better indeed, in that case, to remove the words "sexual orientation" from the policy, and stop the charade that the APA means what it says there.
Sincerely,
Keith DeRose,
lifetime APA member
* Monday, 9 March 10:30 a.m.: I struck through the above marked words after coming to think their inclusion was based on misreading, or at least a very doubtful reading, of the APA's policy. In particular, I came to think that "regulations" in the short, second paragraph of the quotation of the policy probably doesn't refer to the APA's own rules. So far as I know, the schools in question do comply with all applicable governmental regulations. (In spirit as well as in letter? It's often difficult to discern the spirit of regulations -- even when you know what all the applicable regulations are (which I don't).)
Incidentally, I am taking it that "discrimination" in the first quoted paragraph of the APA's policy is not limited to illegal discrimination, but encompasses "all forms of discrimination based on....", whether or not that discrimination meets legal standards for being barred. I am advancing no opinion on whether there is anything illegal about the discrimination these schools engage in (much less that it is clearly illegal), and, for the record, and for what little it's worth, I actually doubt that it is illegal.
I am also advancing no personal opinion as to whether or not, or to what extent, this discrimination is morally justified, though I am writing against the background that it's settled APA policy that all discrimination based on sexual orientation is rejected as unethical, even where that discrimination is due to the religious values of the schools involved. (Indeed, to my own thinking, whether and to what extent this discrimination is morally justified is a matter that is likely to vary greatly from school to school, depending upon, among other things, the exact nature of the goals this discrimination is supposed to serve, and the extent to which these goals are vigorously pursued generally -- but also, where these goals are taken to represent central Christian values, ultimately on tremendously controversial matters of how well they do represent central Christian values. My own views here are very complicated and in many places unsettled, often involving multiple levels of evaluation (what's right policy given certain broader goals vs. whether those broader goals are themselves justified, etc.) and I didn't want to muddy the waters with them, especially since I haven't looked into the important details of these policies and how they're practiced in the schools in question. E-mails I have already received indicate that some readers are quite certain -- though also quite wrong! -- about what my views are on this matter. (I've also already received some very responsible and thoughtful e-mails from some who disagree with me.) My (perhaps vain) hope is that this quick glimpse into my own very murky thinking might cut off some of the unwise speculation on my real views here. "Well, if you're not speaking to whether these policies are illegal, and you're not speaking to whether they're immoral, what are you writing about here? About how the APA should act, given its stated policy and given what's going on.
Keith, this is an excellent letter, and I’m pleased to see it posted. A couple of quick thoughts on the topic.
First, on the conservative Christian community. It is clear that Biblical authors, and quotes attributed to Jesus himself, have strong things to say about the relationship between divorce and remarriage on the one hand and adultery on the other. Without some contextual treatment of what is being claimed, conservative Christians have a difficult time explaining how welcoming most groups are about remarrieds into their fold, in light of how unwelcoming they tend to be toward GLBT's. Catholics probably have a more consistent approach here because they have more to go on than simple exegesis, but most evangelical groups do not adopt a contextualist approach and yet behave in a way that requires it. I won't go into all the details of the argument here for this conclusion, but one of the reasons I’ve moved away from such approaches is that I find no coherent strategy for deciding what is contextual in the moral attitudes and commands in Scripture and what is universal, in a way that yields the cultural artifact that is the local evangelical church in America. (Here, not only treatment of remarrieds, but attempts to explain away the head-covering of women in I Cor are almost comical at times for the lack of careful thinking.) And once we start down the contextual path here (as I think we ought to, at least in the cases I mention), it's not difficult to find contextual explanations for attitudes in Scripture toward non-heterosexuality. For one, just think about the mandate to be fruitful and multiply, a mandate evangelicals don't embrace as a general rule, and yet which could provide a suitable contextual basis for explaining prohibitions of a variety of sexual activities (in the past, being fruitful gave obvious advantage to a group, since too few offspring risks the elimination of the group or species; we obviously don't have *that issue* anymore). Regardless of the plausibility of this particular contextualization of the prohibitions in question, the failure to look for such possibilities, when they are looked for explicitly in other cases, is a failure in need of an explanation, and morally disturbing explanations come so easily to mind.
Second, some Christian groups, especially Catholics, have an easier path here. If one endorses, say, natural law theory as part of one’s official theology, then the distinction between theology and ethics is harder to sustain than it is outside such circles. And such views have some philosophical standing that simple appeals to what the sacred texts say do not (given the points about contextuality above). Even so, I think the implications of the policy statement are fairly clearly against even such natural law religious groups (for me, the crucial issue is that same-sex marriage laws, once in place, will not be honored by such religious groups, and so the ban on extra-marital relations will affect one of the protected classes in the APA policy statement in a negative way), so if the APA wants to exempt groups on the basis of recognizing the respectability of their philosophical underpinnings, the present policy has to be changed.
This issue is I think the central one for the APA to think about, but if anyone should be clear that there is a distinction between religion and ethics, it should be philosophers! Just because you say that the two are intimately connected in your religion doesn’t give you a free pass to discriminate against protected groups on the basis of some articulated moral aspect of one's theology, and just because you hold to one of the ethical theories with a long and fairly respectable tradition in our discipline doesn’t exempt you from the anti-discrimination policy.
Finally, even if one grants Murphy’s worries concerning the act/orientation issue, there is a competing issue that ought to cause more distress than it does among the groups in question. Acknowledgement and addressing of the social realities that affect such individuals is required, in line with what we expect Christian responses to be to the plight of widows and orphans. Who is subject to the most damage here, and who is least likely to suffer considerable harm? Institutions are not human beings, and the human beings in question are at considerable risk in our society, and suffer considerable hardship already. The calls of the oppressed need to be heard, and those of us who do not suffer from discrimination need to stand symbolically and otherwise with the oppressed here. The response of the conservative Christian community is as shameful here as it has been over the past couple centuries, being a bastion of racism, sexism, and discrimination of a wide variety. No one should be surprised when those discriminated against roll their eyes in derision when hearing defenses of the practices of conservative Christian institutions. Even if one sides with Murphy's arguments here, one ought to acknowledge the difference between having a defensible standpoint and having the moral authority to defend it. The institutions in question (I'm thinking here primary of conservative Protestant institutions, since I know them best) do not act in ways to stop the discrimination and abuse of the protected classes mentioned in the APA policy, leaving appeals to the act/orientation distinction discomfiting at best. (I should note that this last point is not aimed at Murphy or any signatories of his letter or the counterpetition; I am speaking of the institutions whose practices are the subject of the original petition).
If the APA does not act, the reason will be financial, I am certain. The powers-that-be have a financial incentive to avoid confrontation with such institutions, and are likely to use whatever thin thread of justification can be found to sustain present practice. I suspect those of us supporting the original petition will need to create a financial incentive in the opposite direction, and I'm happy to join in such an effort if it is needed.
However, this resolves itself, the Society of Christian Philosophers should develop an alternative forum for advertising jobs in Faith and Philosophy. This sort of political correctness and attempt to shove a particular worldview down religious people's throats (what irony) is only going to get worse. I am not suggesting that Christian philosophers should retreat to a Christian ghetto but rather that we should fully develop Christian institutions (like SCP and Faith and Philosophy) in a way that minimizes the damage to Christian colleges and educators by the "cultural wars."
Keith,
This is, in my opinion, an excellent letter. In particular, I think it's important to point out that while some would wield the asterisk to imply bigotry there is nothing inherent in the APA's decision to apply the dreaded asterisk that suggests that the APA is thereby playing the 'bigot' card.
Jimmy,
You wrote:
This sort of political correctness and attempt to shove a particular worldview down religious people's throats (what irony) is only going to get worse. I am not suggesting that Christian philosophers should retreat to a Christian ghetto but rather that we should fully develop Christian institutions (like SCP and Faith and Philosophy) in a way that minimizes the damage to Christian colleges and educators by the "cultural wars."
I'm hoping that you could clarify. Suppose the APA decides to conform to the demand that the petitioners are making either by revising their policy or by placing an asterisk next to the institutions that are knowingly advertising in the publication of an organization that officially condemns their hiring practices for being discriminatory. How precisely is this PC? Isn't this freedom of association? The APA has no more right to modify the practices of these institutions than these institutions have to modify the APA's practices and I don't see that the petitioners have lost sight of this fact. I also don't see that the APA would lose sight of this fact if they followed Keith's advice.
Perhaps you don't like that the APA has decided to make sexual orientation one of its protected categories, but that seems like a separate issue than the issue that Hermes' petition addresses and Keith's letter speaks to.
"These policies block the hiring and the continued employment of those of one orientation, but not another, for not giving up the type of sexual activity they are oriented toward."
I pointed out in the other thread that, by this standard, it would be discriminating against sober alcoholics to refuse to hire non-sober alcoholics. After all, we'd be saying to all alcoholics that they couldn't drink as they are oriented, while non-alcoholics are allowed to drink as they are oriented. Since the entirely reasonable practice of not hiring non-sober alcoholics is obviously not discriminatory against sober alcoholics, the above-quoted reason for thinking the colleges in question are discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation is mistaken.
I think that the correct view is probably this: refusing to hire people who engage in behavior B discriminates against those who are B-oriented only if B is not (in some sense) a bad behavior.
If this is right, then the question whether the institutions in question are in violation of the APA policy turns on whether homosexual activity is bad. The original petition is thus taking the stand that conservative Christians are mistaken to think that there is anything wrong with homosexual activity.
However justified such standards may be in discussions within very conservative circles where discrimination against gays is the norm, it is not reasonable to interpret the policy of the APA, an organization that is not part of such a sub-culture (though a minority of its members are) in terms of such extreme standards.
I'm not sure I follow that. The severity of the standards adopted is a function of (among other things) the immorality of what is prohibited. It's not a severe prohibition that prohibits faculty from even one instance of flashing students, however disposed one is to do so and however intimately connected to one's well-being it happens to be. Only if you think the APA takes a stand on the degree of morality/immorality of the prohibited action would you conclude that APA standards on what constitutes orientation-discrimination in this case are not consistent with the standards these colleges impose. But the APA takes no stand, or none that I know of, on the degree of morality/immorality of the prohibited action. It is consistent with what the APA takes a stand on that the prohibited action is regarded by these colleges as a serious moral wrong. And if it is regarded as a serious wrong, then their standards are no more severe than their standards prohibiting flashing. This is a long way of saying that you seem to be begging the question here. What am I missing?
Mr. Midnight,
You wrote:
I think that the correct view is probably this: refusing to hire people who engage in behavior B discriminates against those who are B-oriented only if B is not (in some sense) a bad behavior.
If this is right, then the question whether the institutions in question are in violation of the APA policy turns on whether homosexual activity is bad. The original petition is thus taking the stand that conservative Christians are mistaken to think that there is anything wrong with homosexual activity.
I think this isn't quite right. The APA defines what it considers "discrimination" and has just as much prerogative to do so as these Christian institutions have the right to define what they consider "immoral conduct". Given the APA's definition of discrimination, a school that wouldn't hire homosexuals as a matter of policy is engaging in a form of differential treatment that the APA has deemed to be discriminatory in an objectionable way.
You can sign the original petition even if you think that there is something wrong with homosexual activity. You can, for example, sign that petition because you also think that there is something wrong about the APA's current practice which is to have a policy on the books that it apparently refuses to enforce. (For the eleventy billionth time the petition calls for the APA to either adhere to its own policy OR admit that it won't enforce it and change their policy accordingly.) You can, for another example, sign that petition because you think that while there are reasonable people who think that homosexual behavior is immoral it nevertheless is not the sort of thing that should figure in hiring decisions. (I think that eating meat, not giving vast sums to charity, and raising your kids to believe that homosexuality is immoral is immoral, but I don't think that schools should hire only people who subscribe to my moral code. I would think that there's a kind of objectionable discrimination taking place if people who were raising their kids to believe that homosexuality is wrong were denied employment for that reason.)
Now, just to be clear, I signed that petition because I think that there's nothing wrong with homosexual conduct. But, I can appreciate that you don't have to share that view to sign the petition. I realized that after reading it.
I promise that I am not going full-in on this discussion thread; interested folks know already what I would say to Keith's letter. But I have to pose a question to Clayton, who writes:
The APA defines what it considers "discrimination" and has just as much prerogative to do so as these Christian institutions have the right to define what they consider "immoral conduct". Given the APA's definition of discrimination, a school that wouldn't hire homosexuals as a matter of policy is engaging in a form of differential treatment that the APA has deemed to be discriminatory in an objectionable way.
Clayton, where does the APA define what it considers 'discrimination'?
Clayton,
You said:
"The APA defines what it considers "discrimination" and has just as much prerogative to do so as these Christian institutions have the right to define what they consider "immoral conduct"."
I'm not sure I understand what you've written here. I think that you mean to say that the APA has the power to stipulatively assign a meaning to 'discrimination'. That's just obviously not true, at least not if they want to continue speaking English, a language in which that word has a meaning already. Surely 'discrimination' in the APA policy was not intended as a technical term.
You don't need to repeat yourself. I am well aware that your view is that a conservative Christian could reasonably sign the petition. I've offered an argument against that view, and it seems to me that you are not responding to the argument. I'd really like it if you'd try again.
You can't reasonably sign the petition if you don't think that the institutions in question are discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. And my claim is that whether the institutions are discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation depends on whether homosexual behavior is in any sense a bad thing. That's because I think that reflection on the alcoholic case suggests that, where B is a bad behavior, refusing to hire people who engage in B is not discrimination on the basis of B-orientation. So if that behavior is a bad thing, then the institutions do not discriminate. So if you're a conservative Christian who thinks homosexual behavior is a bad thing, then I think you shouldn't sign the petition, since I think you should in that case not agree that the institutions are discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.
Hey Mark,
I had in mind this passage:
The American Philosophical Association rejects as unethical all forms of discrimination based on race, color, religion, political convictions, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identification or age, whether in graduate admissions, appointments, retention, promotion and tenure, manuscript evaluation, salary determination, or other professional activities in which APA members characteristically participate. At the same time, the APA recognizes the special commitments and roles of institutions with a religious affiliation; it is not inconsistent with the APA's position against discrimination to adopt religious affiliation as a criterion in graduate admissions or employment policies when this is directly related to the school's religious affiliation or purpose, so long as these policies are made known to members of the philosophical community and so long as the criteria for such religious affiliations do not discriminate against persons according to the other attributes listed in this statement. Advertisers in Jobs for Philosophers are expected to comply with this fundamental commitment of the APA, which is not to be taken to preclude explicitly stated affirmative action initiatives.
The APA Board of Officers expects that all those who use the APA Placement Service will comply with the letter and spirit of all applicable regulations concerning non-discrimination, equal employment opportunity and affirmative action.
It does not define "discrimination", but does specify what it considers to be discriminatory.
Mr. Midnight,
I don't know why you'd say, "I think that you mean to say that the APA has the power to stipulatively assign a meaning to 'discrimination'." What I said was that the APA has the power to say what it regards as discriminatory. Since the APA is pretty clear about what they _believe_ to be discriminatory, I can't see why questions about the objective status of certain behaviors matter when it comes to _interpreting_ their policy. It might matter when it comes to _evaluating_ their policy, but that's a different matter isn't it? Now, I'm going to go out on a limb here and say that you don't like their policy. That seems like a good reason to rewrite the policy, not keep it as is.
Now, I suspect that we disagree about the merits of a policy that treats a hiring practice as if it is discriminatory in a morally objectionable way one that insists that all employees refrain from homosexual conduct. This is, I think, a separate issue because the petition calls for the APA to either apply its existing policies or rewrite them. But, we can talk about that as well. (You seem to think that "discrimination" is by definition morally objectionable. I disagree. I think I know what Jeff Jordan is asking when he asks if it is okay to discriminate on the basis of homosexuality and I don't think that question can be settled conclusively by the meaning of "discriminate". I'll use your usage, however, because I'm a really sweet and accommodating guy.)
You said "whether the institutions are discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation depends on whether homosexual behavior is in any sense a bad thing", but I disagree with this. You seem to working from the view that an institution is not discriminating against those who engage in homosexual conduct if homosexual conduct is bad in some way. Consider two conditionals: if homosexual conduct is wrong, you shouldn't raise your children to think otherwise. If homosexual conduct is not wrong, you shouldn't raise your children to think otherwise. I think these conditionals are probably true. Maybe we disagree about which has a true antecedent. Perhaps we could agree in spite of this that it would be inappropriate for a school to fire someone for raising their children to believe the "wrong" thing about homosexual conduct. If it would be discriminatory either way but only one kind of parent is engaged in behavior that is wrong, I think we've seen that there is no inference from "A policy is discriminatory" to "The behavior that the policy discriminates against is permissible".
I think we've seen that there is no inference from "A policy is discriminatory" to "The behavior that the policy discriminates against is permissible".
I don't think anyone is committed to that general inference. Suppose, hypothetically, that gay sex is a serious moral wrong and in clear violation of the express mission and moral commitments of the relevant colleges. Let it be as bad morally as the daily routine of criticising your child so severely that he breaks down in tears. If the administration at the children's psychiatric ward which employs you terminates your employment (for refusing to stop or seek help), I would not consider that even mildly discriminatory. Similarly, in the hypothetical case under consideration, I would not find the college's refusal to hire you, for moral reasons that are as good, even mildly discriminatory. The hypothesis concerning the degree of (im)morality of the conduct in question seems pretty important here.
Clayton,
You say that this passage
does not define "discrimination", but does specify what it considers to be discriminatory.
Well, yes, in the sense that it specifies discrimination on the basis of religion to be discriminatory, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be discriminatory, and so forth. But no one could get any information about what counts as discrimination from this passage.
One thing that I should have said the first time I entered to pose that question to Clayton. Keith, thanks for putting this letter out here. No one's position on this issue should be immune from pointed questioning, and I appreciate your just saying directly where you think rival views, including my own, have fallen into error.
Mike,
I don't think I disagree with your example, but it seemed that Mr. Midnight was suggesting that the APA cannot say that refusing to employ 'practicing' homosexuals is discriminatory without thereby taking a position on the moral status of homosexual conduct. I just don't see that. But, I think I also agree that few would be committed to the contrary view. The issue just isn't as simple as I thought Mr. Midnight was making it out to be.
Perhaps most who signed the original petition believe that homosexual conduct is not morally problematic, but I see no inconsistency in the views of someone who thinks that it is morally problematic but signs that petition. Maybe Mr. Midnight is right and there is an inconsistency or maybe I've just misread Mr. Midnight's views, but I'd need to see more to be convinced.
To DeRose and Kvanvig:
I’ve taken the side of Plantinga, MacIntyre, et. al. on this issue and I’m going to do my best to make clear why I reject the reasonings the both of you have offered.
On DeRose’s dismissal of the relevance of the orientation/behavior distinction. This argument apparently employs a peculiar understanding of “discrimination” that I regard as indefensible. Yes, discrimination on the basis of behavior makes it harder for those naturally oriented towards that behavior to be hired. That seems enough to constitute “discrimination” towards the orientation on your view. But jobs such as lingerie modeling, field combat, professional athletics, etc. make it more difficult for those (women) with a natural orientation to certain behaviors (childbearing) to be employed. Employers in those professions do not discriminate against women or certain orientations and this is because the behavior in question would affect job performance. Or rather I should say they don’t discriminate against women or their orientations in the normal sense of the term “discriminate” and that is why I find your use of the term so perplexing. Whatever the APA originally meant, it’s pretty clear that they didn’t have your meaning in mind and hence they have not been caught with their foot in their mouth.
For Christian educators, their job essentially involves promoting and encouraging certain lifestyles and practices. The reason you don’t see practicing homosexuals in Christian schools is pretty much the reason you won’t see 8 month pregnant paratroopers…it’s not any natural orientation that is being singled out for abuse. Where certain behaviors (naturally oriented or not) negatively affect essential aspects of one’s potential occupation, it is not always an unethical discrimination against persons with those orientations when employers take that into account.
Regarding Kvanvig’s attack on “long and fairly respectable” ethical traditions. Much of Kvanvig’s post assumes that DeRose’s charge of inconsistency by the APA holds up. It didn’t. But where he grants the orientation/behavior distinction (for argument) he highlights the issue of compassion. Important issue…but the fact that we ought to be more compassionate to, say, prostitutes doesn’t really incline me to think Christian colleges should hire them or what the APA should rule on that issue. Moreover, I think conservative Christians need to be leery when their critic makes a call to Biblical living (citing widows and orphans passages) and also indirectly attacks them for promoting bibilical living (by calling the APA on them for hiring practices necessary to their mission).
Much as I like a good counterexample, the reformed/unreformed alcoholic example is offensive to me. Protected classes are so protected because of the history of how such groups have been treated. I've never questioned the legal right of institutions to bar certain types of individuals from their community. But Murphy's distinction between act and orientation doesn't fit at all with this distinction, and it is a good thing it doesn't, since conservative Christians are so willing to overlook what are regarded as serious sins in other cases (as noted in my first comment). To see defenses of this sort for the practice of discrimination is disheartening in the extreme, and I can well imagine Jesus remarking about casting the first stone.
I don't endorse such a position, but it is well-known that Christian institutions do not bar what they consider to be sinful behavior from participation in the institution in question. And it is wise not to, for the obvious reasons. So, when you pick your favorites among those to be ostracized, what is the explanation of your choices? I doubt, for conservative Christians, that there is any perceived Biblical mandate to ostracize some and accept others. So, once again, we look for alternative explanations, and really disturbing explanations are not hard to find.
Hi Jon,
I really don't think that the "imagine Jesus" suggestion was a good one. Jesus had a staff of 12 that was "employed" in some sense (Judas kept the money bag). Can you imagine Jesus enlisting a practicing homosexual for these ministry roles? I doubt anyone thinks he would. But if he wouldn't then it seems to me that his practices of hiring on persons for ministerial positions is just as discriminatory towards a persecuted minority as the hiring practices of those colleges whose "discriminations" you think the APA should flag as unethical.
Also, I think DeRose's argument against the orientation vs. behavior distinction apparently flawed. If a woman has a natural orientation to childbearing behavior, an employer can refuse to hire her if she exhibits that behavior AND it affects her job performance (military, swimsuit modeling, etc.). DeRose's argument assumes that if behavior discrimination is orientation discrimination in effect, then the distinction is moot. That's not true in cases where certain behaviors affect job performance...and the promotion of certain values is typically a part of the job description at Christian schools.
Mark,
I guess I now know what it's like to be in a Socratic dialogue! You wanted to know the essence of discrimination and I'm just giving you examples. Sorry, I clearly missed the point of your question. I had never intended to say that the APA gave an account of what discrimination consisted of, but only a list of conditions under which they would regard some institution as engaged in objectionable forms of discrimination.
Clayton,
The Socratic dialogue bit is funny. But I'm not objecting to helping someone see what a term means by giving a bunch of examples. (I think one can be helped to see what justice is to know that it involves repaying debts, doing one's bit for the community, and so forth.) What I deny is that being given an example that is described by using the very concept to be elucidated counts at all as informative. And that's all that the APA's paragraph does.
And maybe it doesn't need to do more. I was just questioning your claim that "The APA defines what it considers 'discrimination.'"
(I hope this doesn't count as going 'full-in.')
The reason you don’t see practicing homosexuals in Christian schools is pretty much the reason you won’t see 8 month pregnant paratroopers…it’s not any natural orientation that is being singled out for abuse. Where certain behaviors (naturally oriented or not) negatively affect essential aspects of one’s potential occupation, it is not always an unethical discrimination against persons with those orientations when employers take that into account.
But isn't the question at least in part one of consistency on the part of these institutions? I think Jon's point is cogent; the NT has some pretty harsh things to say about divorce and remarriage (except under certain very specific circumstances, i.e., marital unfaithfulness). I'd be curious to hear what sort of hermeneutic is going to allow the evangelical schools in question to say that re-married faculty (who don't meet the relevant criterion) aren't engaging in a practice--adultery--that could (on the institution's own premises) plausibly be considered harmful to their roles as Xian educators. (I haven't actually read the relevant policies, but I'm assuming they don't prohibit re-married individuals from having intercourse with their spouses.)
Clayton,
I responded before, but I guess my post got lost.
You said:
"You seem to working from the view that an institution is not discriminating against those who engage in homosexual conduct if homosexual conduct is bad in some way."
This is not my view. The institutions in question are clearly discriminating on the basis of homosexual conduct, whether that conduct is in some sense bad or not. Rather, my view is that, they are discriminating on the basis of _orientation_ (in addition to conduct) only if the conduct in question is not in some sense bad. So, in other words, I am suggesting that behavior-discrimination entails conduct-discrimination only if the relevant conduct is not a bad thing. The main motivation for this is reflection on the alcoholic case.
"Mr. Midnight was suggesting that the APA cannot say that refusing to employ 'practicing' homosexuals is discriminatory without thereby taking a position on the moral status of homosexual conduct."
Not quite. I was suggesting (to edit your words) that the APA cannot say that refusing to employ 'practicing' homosexuals is _discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation_ without thereby taking a position on the moral status of homosexual conduct.
"Since the APA is pretty clear about what they _believe_ to be discriminatory, I can't see why questions about the objective status of certain behaviors matter when it comes to _interpreting_ their policy."
I'm interpreting the letter of the policy, as interpreted in English. I think that this policy does not express the attitude of the majority of APA members. I agree with the policy, as interpreted in English, but not with the attitude of the majority of APA members. What the words of the policy mean, and whether what their content is reasonable, is (I think) independent of the attitude of the majority.
Troy,
I do not find it at all difficult to "imagine Jesus enlisting a practicing homosexual for these ministry roles?" Why do you?
As I read these discussions about the various petitions and letters, It appears that many people are interpreting the phrase "any form of discrimination" differently than I think they should. They seem to understand the word "discrimination" in some wide sense such that any time someone makes a hiring decision based on criterion x that this constitutes discrimination on the basis of x I do not believe this notion of "discrimination" matches the language in the policy. The policy's concept of "discrimination" (in the APA sense) seems much narrower. You can sometimes use a criterion for judgment without it being a case of "discrimination" (in the APA sense.)
I find this choice of words from the policy enlightening:
it is not inconsistent with the APA's position against discrimination to adopt religious affiliation as a criterion...
By the plain English, anyway, they are not making an exception for religious institutions. Rather they are highlighting the fact that no exception is needed. The APA conception of discrimination is such that it would not be and act of discrimination against Jews (for example) to refuse to hire them for a job at a Christian College. I think this is correct, I would not describe that as a case of "acceptable/ ethical discrimination" but rather simply not a case of discrimination (in the relevant APA sense.)
Religious affiliation is highlighted for special consideration. But I do not see where it is marked off as the only case where it would not be discrimination to use one of the "protected" classes as a criterion for a decision. Indeed, there are probably many such cases.
For example, they label as unethical "all forms of discrimination" based on disability. Consider the blind person who applies to drive a bus. Since it is clearly not unethical to require a bus driver to see, and since they have not left open the possibility of "ethical discrimination" this must simply not count as discrimination (in the APA sense.) By mentioning "disability" in the list they do not mean to bar consideration of disabilities in all cases. More likely it is only in cases where the disability is not relevant enough to the job. The legal standard of "reasonable accommodation" comes to mind.
I think we could imagine cases in which it would not be any form of discrimination (in the APA sense) to consider a potential employee's "political convictions." Consider, for example, a think tank or public policy center. Once again, it seems in cases where the trait is central to the job's task, that it is not discrimination (in the APA sense) to consider that trait when hiring.
Also, note that they do not make an exception for affirmative action programs. Rather they simply note that avoiding discrimination (in the APA sense) does not preclude such initiatives.
All this to say...
An argument misses a few steps if it moves from the fact that some Christian Colleges consider a job applicant's sexual orientation and or behavior, to the conclusion that this counts, ipso facto as discrimination (in the APA sense).
Oops. I meant to say "_conduct_-discrimination entails _orientation_-discrimination only if the relevant conduct is not a bad thing."
The problem I have with this argument is that you're not respecting the difference between "orientation" and "action". Perhaps you feel that in this case it isn't worthy of respect, but the fact remains that they are different things. If the problem is that protecting orientation is ineffectual because what really needs protection is behavior, then you should be petitioning the APA to amend its guidelines to explicitly include "sexual behavior" (or however you would describe it). Massaging words to mean what we wish they meant rather than what they do mean is creeping political correctness.
Can you imagine Jesus enlisting a practicing homosexual for these ministry roles? I doubt anyone thinks he would.
A homosexual in a committed, monogamous, emotionally mature and fulfilling relationship? Why not? I think your doubt reflects some whoppingly substantive interpretive assumptions. Not saying they're indefensible; just that they need defense.
Troy, I think your response ignores the crucial claim I made, the one about contextualization of what is prohibited in Scripture. The context you mention is not our context, and what one says about it won't be relevant to our context without lots of argument that you and nobody else is giving. Moreover, I think you and I both have no legitimate basis for limiting our imagination about what Jesus might or might not have done--as indicated in the texts, his behavior is full of gracious responses of the sort that stunned observers. We see harshness in his response only when he's attacking commerce in the temple and when he's responding to pharisaical attitudes. And it isn't hard to see the attitudes of the institutions in question as carrying on that long tradition.
This letter is excellent.
I think to an outsider this whole debate has a scholastic air to it. People demonstrate exceptional powers of disctinction-making, without appearing to take the issues with moral seriousness. I think it would concentrate the mind wonderfully to imagine there being a large number of Christian colleges that prohibit gay behavior, not just 5-6. So--say it's 20%. As far as I know, gay people do not take jobs at gay-intolerant colleges,and would not even in this scenario. So their job opportunities would be much reduced. Imagine also, just for fun, that many Christian businesses and landlords took the same position--no gay behavior allowed. In short, imagine the sort of policy under discussion was widespread enough to have a major impact.
Two questions. Could anybody seriously think that the APA policy never meant to do anything to protect gays from the sort of reduced opportunities they would have in this scenario? Did they really mean to give precedence to religious freedom at these colleges, at the expense of protected groups (people with gay orientation) having a much harder time finding employment?
Second, am I really supposed to think there's something virtuously Christian about the colleges, business owners, and landlords in this scenario? In effect, they leave gay people without jobs and without housing. Is that what "hate the sin, love the sinner" could possibly mean?
I'm awfully relieved to read the letter and further comments from Christians, which provide some reassurance that some Christians really do care for the oppressed. Independent of whether homosexuality is some sort of a sin, I don't see how it can be right for gay people to have a much harder time finding jobs and housing. To those who can't take such real world problems seriously, I recommend a viewing of the fine new movie Milk.
I'm traveling much these days (Spring Break for me now), so I'm not able to keep close tabs on this discussion. I think Jon raises some considerations that are extremely important to issues concerning what the policies of Christian organizations should be (as well as to the current question of apa policy).
I'm sorry I haven't been able to respond to various critical points that have been raised (but the discussion seems to have gotten along just fine without me!). In the few minutes I have before leaving on another little trip (down to central New Jersy, returning home tomorrow morning), a few words about 'discrimination' -- words *relevant to* several of the comments (and also to Mark Murphy's account in his draft letter), but that (admittedly) don't directly respond to the specific thoughtful critical points that have been made:
Yes, the understanding of that term I'm urging is quite broad, but such an understanding seems called for by the nature of the (really very bold) statement we're dealing with. I am thinking in small part here about the inclusion of the words 'all forms of' toward the start of the statement, which very easily could have been left out (I would *love* to hear a recording of the discussion of whether to include those words!), but in much larger part about the explanation that follows later in the statement. That discussion makes it clear that the makers of the statement are thinking very hard about the specific goals and purposes of religious schools and how they interact with issues of discrimination, and that (so far as this anti-discrimination policy goes) they are deciding that these schools may indeed "adopt religious affiliation as a criterion," but only if it doesn't involve discrimination on any of the bases listed in the policy (which includes sexual orientation). Given that explanation, it seems to me extremely strained to suppose they are using 'discrimination' in such a way that a policy can be made to not count as 'discriminatory' if it can be adequately justified by reference to the religious purpose of the school adopting it, or (related) if the what's being discriminated against is itself wrong, or is an orientation toward something wrong. I don't think you can plausibly issue the bold words of this statement unless you're deciding that either what would be discriminated against by the relevant polices isn't wrong, or, at least, that it isn't wrong in any way that would make discrimination (in the quite broad use of that term I'm urging here) against it not count as 'discrimination' (to put things rather tendentiously). (Sorry about all the confusing negatives in that, but I *think* it parses out ok. If there is an extra and/or missing negative, please insert and/or remove so as to make my words an utterly convincing defense of my point of view!)
Kvanvig, et al.,
Concerning the divorce and remarriage issue: aren't those Christians that are applying to Wheaton etc. that have divorced and remarried assumed to have repented of that sin? Sure, they shouldn't have done it, but now that they have there is a good case to be made for them not going back to their first wife/husband. Unfaithfulness is a legitimizing ground for divorce (the divorce exception clause in Matthew), and you will have made vows to your second spouse, and returning to your first spouse will cause unnecessary pain, etc.)
But I can't think of anything that would excuse someone who proudly and openly indulged in homosexual practices - they can't be thought to be all that repentant.
Hi Luke and Jon,
Luke, thanks for the thoughtful reply. I've posted this challenge elsewhere and it seems difficult to get anyone to rise to meet it...the challenge of course is that employers are ethically entitled to take personal behavior (naturally oriented or not) into account where the behavior is salient to essential job performance.
Yes, consistency is important. But there are three points worth bearing in mind. (1) Has anyone checked to see if these schools do not have plausible responses to the charge of inconsistency here? (2)Even if these schools allow certain non-biblical behaviors a pass, does the Bible put all sins on a par? It seems clear to me it doesn't. And although I agree with JK that there are perhaps some nasty motives often involved in singling homosexuality out, that does not mean that the Apostle Paul can be dismissed for singling this out as illustrative of man's fallen state (Rom 1). And MOST IMPORTANTLY (3)even if these moral and religious traditions have flaws (who doesn't?)that doesn't prove that they violate APA policy. The APA needs to avoid inconsistency here too.
Well, according to jb, JK and Luke, there's no good reason to think Jesus would not hire on a practicing homosexual. I think that's incorrect and that the evidence for my view is good. Jesus' hiring on of a tax collector shows how little his context inhibited his choices here. Second, whatever else we can say about him, he was a 1st cent. Palestinian Jew with moral attitudes generally similar to those around him. And it's not true that Jesus only showed harshness towards the Pharisaical...he was harsh in rebuking Peter, the unbelieving (shaking dust from feet, etc), towards Herod (that fox/vixen), perhaps towards his own family, etc. So the weight of evidence is on the side of my negative answer to the question. I'd invite you to disagree...but are any of you so bold as to say my assessment is in any way "inconsistent?"
Last Point. I think this inconsistency charge very far removed (even if true) from the charge of an unethical hiring practice or violation of the APA standard. By the argument I referred to in the first paragraph here, the attempt to break the behavior vs. orientation distinction in cases where job performance is affected by behavior. It seems that some persons are tempted here to say "Yes, but if the employer is inconsistent in the following way..., then..."
Have I got you right? Let me know, fill in the details and I'll see if I think it holds up.
Hi KD.
I happy to see you post a bit of reflection on the importance of how ‘discrimination’ is used...might I offer a few words in defense of the APA to the charge that perhaps their intended use of the term is ‘strained?’
Alistair Norcross has cleverly protested that (Leiter blog, February 25, 2009 at 09:40 AM) any job that discriminates against those who don’t pee standing up (a behavior) is clearly discriminating on gender (in light of the natural orientation of members of that gender to that behavior). I’ve responded that his point is not obviously correct; what if the job was for a model for male catheter insertion? Or, even more provocatively, what if the job involved a role in a fetish-porn-flick essentially involving peeing a certain way (I won’t go into details).
There are three points worth highlighting here. (1) It seems apparent to me that if the behavior affected job performance, the discrimination is permissible. Promotion of certain lifestyles is certainly a part of the job of certain Christian educators. (2) This seems to me to be a very UNstrained understanding of what ‘discrimination’ of an impermissible sort amounts to. To press an accusation against them seems, to me, to involve straining terms. (3) In the latter example, any protests that I offered regarding “how” the porn producers formulated their ethics, whether they were consistent or whether they harbored secret gender animosities would be irrelevant to whether they discriminated unethically. Ad Homimen Circumstantials wouldn’t impress me here.
Whatever ethical considerations limit discrimination, it seems clear to me that one cannot set a bar for religious institutions higher than it sets for fetish-porn producers.
Any protests to 1-3 or the analogy to the hiring practices of Christian colleges and APA compliance? I'd love to hear em.
To give Clayton a hand on the APA defining discrimination, isn't the policy to disallow differential treatment of parties based on a certain set of enumerated grounds? As I read the rule, discrimination is equivalent to differential treatment (with respect to "graduate admissions, appointments . . .") on any basis. The list of grounds then delimits the kinds of discrimination the policy condemns. This may not fit with ordinary uses of words such as 'discriminatory' as a term of condemnation, but it seems to fit the passage. (If being unethical were built into being discrimination, what would be the point of saying these kinds of discrimination are unethical as the rule does?)
However, this resolves itself, the Society of Christian Philosophers should develop an alternative forum for advertising jobs in Faith and Philosophy. ~Jimmy
I would be very surprised if a significant percentage of members of the SCP wanted to take up Jimmy's suggestion. The SCP is not, as far as I know, the Society of Fundamentalist Christian Philosophers.
Keith DeRose and Jonathan Kvanvig are both members of the SCP, for example, and I have no reason to believe that their thoughtful and measured responses are not the sort of responses most members of the SCP, who are by and large thoughtful, would have.
Can you imagine Jesus enlisting a practicing homosexual for these ministry roles? ~Troy
I wasn't aware that Jesus condemned homosexuality. So sure, I can imagine this. Of course, you might try to insist that he condemned it "under another guise", but then you'll be wading in a quagmire of theology and doing your best to duck an apparent responsibility to stone people. That you can't imagine this is an interesting fact about your psychology, but that's all.
I think that the correct view is probably this: refusing to hire people who engage in behavior B discriminates against those who are B-oriented only if B is not (in some sense) a bad behavior. ~Mr. Midnight
This seems false. Suppose being oriented to not tithe is in fact bad. Refusing to hire people who do not tithe may well count as discriminating against people who are oriented against it. Why shouldn't it?
It seems to me that there is little pressure to treat discrimination as a normative concept. The APA is, of course, committed to the claim that some kinds of discrimination are bad, and they have determined that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is bad. And I see no reason why they cannot make that determination even if it is in fact bad to be sexually oriented in a certain way, much like they could decided that discrimination on the basis of tithing-orientation is bad even if not tithing is bad.
Perhaps you are using "in some sense" to generate massive latitude for yourself. I would grant that if behavior B is demonstrably (to the satisfaction of reasonable parties) horrifyingly bad, then discrimination against those who engage in B would not be discrimination on the basis of B-orientation. But now you will have to argue that homosexual behavior is horrifyingly bad. More on this in a moment, since this is getting at what I take to be the position of the majority.
I pointed out in the other thread that, by this standard, it would be discriminating against sober alcoholics to refuse to hire non-sober alcoholics. ~Mr. Midnight
If being a non-sober alcoholic is demonstrably horrifyingly bad (and I suppose this will depend upon the extent and publicity of the alcoholism), then it would be perfectly reasonable to refuse to hire non-sober alcoholics. To the extent that your example has force, it has force only because being a non-sober alcoholic is being taken to be demonstrably awful.
I think the vast majority of philosophers (though certainly not quite 29/30) see these attempts to counterexample the claim that the policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation rather than mere discrimination on the basis of sexual behavior as a wholly disingenuous ex post facto rationalization designed to preserve a practice for which there is no good argument.
The argument I suspect the vast majority of philosophers would endorse is as follows (the major premise is a complicated mouthful, I know):
In general, just discrimination in hiring practices on the basis of behaviors reasonable people take to be highly relevant to the subjective quality of one's life and not obviously harmful to others requires meeting a fairly high burden of proof to the effect that the discrimination is warranted because either (i) it is required for fulfillment of one's professional duties or (ii) it is the kind of behavior that is so perverse/dangerous/harmful reasonable people can at least agree to disagree over whether anyone could be permissibly fired (or not hired) for engaging in it.
I'd like to see someone defend the claim that it's part of the professional duty of a *philosopher* to not engage in homosexual activity. For now I'll assume nobody wants to do that.
So it is precisely because (ii) is something you cannot adequately defend (for behaviors that meet the conditions above) that the members of the APA, by and large, claim that this kind of discrimination is unjust. The only arguments for the conclusion that homosexual behavior is perverse, harmful, and/or dangerous are really pathetic. And your beliefs, justified or warranted though they may be, aren't enough.
None of this depends upon the claim that homosexual behavior is morally permissible (which, of course, I think it is). None of this is to say that you can't justifiedly or warrantedly believe that homosexual behavior is an abomination. It's to say you have to do MORE than that to get away with being a quietly tolerated discriminator. It's to say that reasonable people don't want you discriminating on the basis of it because you have failed to meet the burden reasonable people think you ought to have met if they're going to quietly put up with your continued discrimination.
Keith is surely right to insist that the meaning of the phrase "all forms of discrimination" in the APA's statement is pretty broad. In particular, he is surely right that the APA's statement is incompatible with the argument that a school's employment policies can never count as discriminatory if the policies promote the school's religious purposes, or if they are necessary in order to allow the school to express its disapproval of a type of conduct that the school's religious tradition regards as wrong. Moreover, it is not hard to see why the APA would wish to disallow this sort of argument.
Suppose that some religious tradition (such as certain conservative forms of Islam or Christianity, perhaps) held that it was profoundly wrong, and contrary to the tenets of their religion, for women to give ethical teaching to men. Then a college that adhered to this religious tradition might wish to restrict ethics teaching positions to men only. Surely the APA would insist that this policy still counts as "unethical discrimination" -- even though the policy clearly promotes the religious purposes of this college, and indeed is necessary if the college is to express its religious belief that it is wrong for women to give ethical teaching to men. For this reason, I completely agree with Keith's interpretation of the APA's use of the phrase "all forms of discrimination".
By the way, Keith, it might be helpful if you could say more about why you favour option (2) rather than option (1). It could be helpful to have some more discussion of the relative merits of these two options. (As I said in my recent post about this on Brian Leiter's blog, I would really prefer option (3) -- the APA's getting out of the job advertising business altogether. But the petition understandably focuses on more easily realizable options.)
Ralph, I agree with you in preferring option (3), not only because of this issue, but because the APA does such a poor job with respect to advertising positions. I also wonder about the legal ramifications of the APA doing either (1) or (2) above, and whether institutions either barred or marked because of violating the policy would or could seek an injunction or sue for damages. I don't know the answer to these questions, but going with your option of removing job advertising from the functions of the APA would eliminate these issues.
This is just small comment on something I found interesting.
Erik urges that the APA could not have intended a broad reading of "discrimination" because they included disabled people in their set of protected class, and clearly the APA could prohibit schools from not hiring a blind person to drive a bus. This would make sense if the APA were in the business of helping bus drivers find employment. However, to my knowledge, this is not part of the APA's goals. The APA posts job listings for philosophers/professors. So far as I know, there is no disability that would prevent someone from being a capable philosopher/professor in the same manner that being blind would prevent someone from being a capable bus driver. As the APA is only concerned with philosophers, it could well have intended a broad reading of "discrimination."
Yet, the idea that having homosexual relations effects your job performance remains, for Troy explains that the philosophy professor positions at Christian colleges involve "promoting and encouraging certain lifestyles and practices," namely, distinctively Christian lifestyles and practices. That is, the Christian colleges aren't looking merely for philosophy professors, but Christian life-coaches. As people who engage in homosexual acts cannot be good Christian life-coaches, then they can rightly be excluded from such positions.
I think Troy's point is an apt one. However, as I've stated above, the APA listings are supposedly for positions as philosophy professors, not Christian life-coaches. Christian colleges can hire all the life-coaches they want, for all I care, but I don't think they should advertise openings for those positions in the APA. Perhaps a Christian life coach quarterly would be a more appropriate forum.
As I read the rule, discrimination is equivalent to differential treatment (with respect to "graduate admissions, appointments . . .") on any basis.
Clearly it can't be that broad since that would preclude (most) affirmative action initiatives. And the policy explicitly denies that it should be interpreted in such a way that would preclude affirmative action programs.
It seems to me that however you interpret 'discrimination' it has to be in such a way that affirmative action does not count.
There is another alternative, and one which is likely given the nature of language written by committee. And that is that the policy itself may equivocate on the terms. It may not be possible to consistently interpret the passage.
In that case, then Keith may be right suggest that we error towards the most broad, bold interpretation.
But doing so makes it a silly policy in that it would mean that a public policy institute could not ethically consider an applicant's political convictions.
Troy, I think you fail to distinguish several points. The "Christian life-coach" model is an excellent picture of what Christian colleges look for, and legitimately so. But just as I'd object to a business favoring the hiring of ruthless anti-environmentalists for the sake of profit, just so I object to certain pictures of what a Christian life-coach is supposed to look like. What is needed is a defense of the portrait you paint of such an individual, and your remarks simply ignore the points I made about contextualization of Biblical imperatives.
Of course, the mere fact that CC's favor some Christian standards over others (e.g., it is rare to find a lifestyle code that bars gluttony or sloth) doesn't show that they are discriminating. But it is equally obvious to anyone paying attention over the past hundred years that the conception of the model Christian found in conservative protestant groups is a cultural artifact: don't drink, don't dance, don't chew, etc. That fact requires serious caution in the listing of standards of behavior, when CC's attempt to specify what they want for a life-coach. One of the cautions needs to take account how easy it is for cultural prejudices to cloud one's judgment on this issue, and here again, paying attention to the history of such lists is disturbing in the extreme: inferior races, opposition to civil rights, banning of interracial dating and marriage, the treatment of women, etc. Conservative Christians have a distinctively bad track record on the most important social justice issues in the history of the U.S. In light of this history, it is not surprising to find the possibility of contextualization ignored.
CC's can choose whatever conception of a life-coach they think is demanded by their faith, but they shouldn't be surprised when they are ostracized for their actions.
MHart writes:
"Concerning the divorce and remarriage issue: aren't those Christians that are applying to Wheaton etc. that have divorced and remarried assumed to have repented of that sin? Sure, they shouldn't have done it, but now that they have there is a good case to be made for them not going back to their first wife/husband. Unfaithfulness is a legitimizing ground for divorce (the divorce exception clause in Matthew), and you will have made vows to your second spouse, and returning to your first spouse will cause unnecessary pain, etc.)"
This view is, I think, the proper one for such colleges to take, but you can't get it the ipsissima verba of Jesus. When Jesus speaks, he uses a continuous present tense: "Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another woman commits adultery, and the man who marries a divorced woman commits adultery." Given the tense, it isn't clear why the wrongness isn't ongoing. That is, it isn't clear from what Jesus is reported to have said why remarrieds are not continuing to commit adultery.
Of course, there are interpretive strategies that can be used to avoid this conclusion. My point isn't that there aren't any such strategies, but to point out the need for them. And I know how the strategies work, too: such groups work hard to avoid condemning such people, so there is an ethical component to the interpretive strategies. It is an ethical component I applaud, since even our lives end up, let us say, messy, that doesn't entail that we will continue to do wrong when we live in light of what we have become.
My point has been, however, that once the blinders are removed concerning the true nature of the interpretive strategies being used, inconsistencies become really obvious. And the inconsistencies here are among the most disturbing possible, given the long history in conservative protestantism of discrimination, prejudice, and bigotry.
This is not to enter into the fray; this is just to thank Keith DeRose for a heartening letter. I signed the original petition thinking that I'd be perfectly happy with option (2), understanding the asterisk along the lines of the existing asterisks, which are used to indicate that an institution is being censured by some body for some reason or other, possibly for something that happened some time ago. In light of an existing asterisk, I've always thought that the reasonable thing to do was to look into the specifics of the case. (I think NYU was censured at some point? That wouldn't have stopped me from applying for a position there.) I don't see any reason why new asterisks shouldn't be treated in much the same spirit.
Adam:
So far as I know, there is no disability that would prevent someone from being a capable philosopher/professor in the same manner that being blind would prevent someone from being a capable bus driver. As the APA is only concerned with philosophers, it could well have intended a broad reading of "discrimination."
I guess I have in mind various mental disabilities such as Social Anxiety Disorder, Bi-polar, schizophrenia, etc.
Take, for example, an otherwise capable philosopher with a severe social anxiety disorder such that they are incapable of standing in front of students to give a lecture. A broad reading of the APA would suggest it is discrimination (and thus unethical) to consider this inability when hiring an instructor.
Maybe that is their intent.
Hi Troy,
(2)Even if these schools allow certain non-biblical behaviors a pass, does the Bible put all sins on a par? It seems clear to me it doesn't.
I'm not at all convinced that the Bible makes adultery 'less sinful' (or whatever) than homosexual acts per se (mostly because I'm not at all convinced that the most plausible reading of the texts rules out homosexual acts in the contexts of certain forms of relationships).
I find your reading of Rom. 1, which seems meant to support your claim that homosexual acts are 'more sinful' than adulterous acts, pretty strained. First, it's controversial whether Paul is making categorical claims about the permissibility of all homosexual acts in this text. But even if he is, I don't see any reason at all to infer that he thinks these are worse than other forms of sin. 'Being illustrative of' doesn't entail 'being the worst of its kind' (or something like that). Even with a conservative plain-sense reading, I just don't see how it supports your view.
Second, whatever else we can say about him, he was a 1st cent. Palestinian Jew with moral attitudes generally similar to those around him.
Disagree. His attitude toward women is fairly revolutionary for the time. His repudiation of armed revolution wouldn't have been very popular with many Jews either. He engages in actions that many Jews would have seen as morally questionable ('breaking' Sabbath laws, etc.). I'd need to hear more about why you think this.
And it's not true that Jesus only showed harshness towards the Pharisaical...he was harsh in rebuking Peter, the unbelieving (shaking dust from feet, etc), towards Herod (that fox/vixen), perhaps towards his own family, etc. So the weight of evidence is on the side of my negative answer to the question.
I actually think that this point, taken in conjunction with your earlier claim that Jesus was basically morally conservative, works the other way; it provides some support (though not very much) for thinking that Jesus wasn't all that worried about denouncing homosexual conduct. If Jesus was morally conservative and in the habit of calling out certain types people or actions, and if (as is the case) we have reason to think that homosexual conduct was something that Jesus would've been exposed to and familiar with, we have some reason to expect Jesus to call out homosexual conduct. But in none of the sources we have does he mention homosexual conduct; not once.
Not trying to pass off an argument from silence as decisive or anything. But again, it seems to me that you've got all sorts of controversial assumptions driving your view. Thanks for the interaction.
Erik,
Fair enough. Add to what I said above a qualification that discrimination means differential treatment (with respect to admissions, hiring, etc) not for affirmative action purposes. And then the rest of the suggestion looks the same. In effect the policy would disallow differential treatment in hiring, admissions, etc. on the basis of the listed categories unless it was to address discrimination against or under-representation of often discriminated against groups.
I think that allows a non-equivocal reading.
Hi Adam and J. Kvanvig,
Thanks again for your replies; I think your responses, though thoughtful, have “lost the plot.” The issue was DO Christian organizations discriminate in ways that the current APA statement identifies as discriminatory?
To Adam: Thanks for introducing a helpful term “Christian life-coaches” into the discussion (“life-models” might be better still). You’ve suggested that JFP exclude postings for jobs that essentially involve these extra commitments or duties.
This raises two questions: first, why? Suppose Peter Singer starts an organization for the promotion of Vegetarianism and wishes to aquire a philosopher who can both model and philosophically defend this lifestyle. What grounds does the APA have for excluding this? Second and more important, how would current APA policy legitimate this exclusion? Once my point regarding the defensibility of discrimination where behaviors affect the ability of the applicant to perform the job in question is granted, I think this game is up…the original petition was wrong.
To Kvanvig: I’ll grant that you have some grounds to “object” to certain hiring practices. And, for sake of argument only, I’ll grant you that Christian institutions have a poor moral track record, haven’t clearly discerned “contextual” versus “universal” moral truths in Scripture and haven’t defended the priority they give to some moral issues over others (drunkenness over gluttony, etc.).
But to the point…the APA policy does not affirm your claims here. It does not say that those who dispute you are wrong. Further, even if it did, it does not claim that those in the wrong on this issue should be (to use your term) “ostracized” for unethical activity. To illustrate, even if the APA policy explicitly claimed that arguments for vegetarianism were hopelessly deluded that would be insufficient to mandate that those who believed otherwise (and whose hiring practices, like those I depicted above, reflected this conviction) ought to be stimatized in any way.
I grant you your conclusion that Christians should expect to be ostrasized over this issue. But the onus of moral responsibility is on those who stigmatize or ostrasize to be as clear and honest as possible regarding their grounds for doing so. To simply claim that the APA policy mandates this “bears false witness” so to speak. Those who exclude, ostracize or stigmatize are morally obligated to greater care in ascertaining their grounds for doing so…which was, I think, precisely the point you were making against the Church?
I am apparently a discussion-thread akratic.
Mark van Roojen's 'differential treatment' standard is implausible. Either it means that a different standard is imposed on candidates in the protected class, or the standard that is imposed on all candidates imposes a heavier burden on the candidates in the protected class. On the former reading, these schools do not discriminate, because they all apply the same 'no sex outside traditional marriage' standard to all. On the latter reading, the definition of discrimination leads to absurd results, including that all APA schools discriminate, because it is harder to fulfill the duties of a philosophy professor when one is 102 years old than when one is 30.
Mark van Roojen asks whether having a 'moralized' definition of discrimination defeats the point of rejecting discrimination as unethical. Not quite. The unjustified disproportionate burden standard suggests a presumption: if a certain hiring policy produces a disproportionate burden on a protected class, then it is up to the person hiring to explain why they are employing a standard that produces this result, and whether they could achieve their otherwise legitimate purposes with a non-burdening standard.
Ralph Wedgwood imagines a case in which "some religious tradition (such as certain conservative forms of Islam or Christianity, perhaps) held that it was profoundly wrong, and contrary to the tenets of their religion, for women to give ethical teaching to men," and instituted a hiring policy in line with this belief. He notes that "surely the APA would insist that this policy still counts as 'unethical discrimination.'" I think that's right. But this doesn't show anything. The policy he is imagining targets women as such, and so falls under an entirely nonmoralized criterion of discrimination.
Jean K. suggests that all of this discussion is scholastic and shows inadequate moral seriousness. I am disinclined to think that paying attention to distinctions and arguments is any indication of moral unseriousness. But note that the petitioners try to achieve their moral aims by making a claim about what this organization's rules require. To answer these, one has to make arguments that the organization's rules do not requires any such thing.
I am entirely in agreement with Jon Kvanvig's discussion of the various interpretive difficulties concerning the proper Christian understanding of sexual conduct. I look forward to these same arguments being carried out by an APA subcommittee, as it tries to decide whether a school's particular way of rendering Scripture on these points is adequately reasonable. Because surely the APA will want to follow adequate procedures of inquiry before it decides whether a school's hiring policies are insufficiently reasonable to satisfy the presumption against those that produce a disproportionate burden?
Mark,
I take it your point is that you think the differential treatment standard is implausible because it would not rule out discrimination against gays for having sex outside marriage since that won't be one of the listed objectionable grounds, even though on the intended reading distinguishing on this ground will be discrimination. And you charitably and rightly take me to want to rule that out. That might be good reason to prefer a rule included unequal and disadvantageous burdening of groups that are already discriminated against as a kind of discrimination.
But suppose we stick with the differential treatment standard. It seems to me to be discrimination by that standard if I at once refuse to recognize gay marriage and count gays (who may have tried to get married, may even be married in some states and who also may be recognized as married by some denominations) unmarried for purposes of my rule. You might reply that it is the law that discriminates in what it recognizes as marriage, but it seems hard to make that reply when the hiring institution also is a supporter of that law. At the very least it would seem to me to be hard to show that the basis was only that they were unmarried and having sex and not that they were gay besides. A rule can be formulated in order to exclude members of a certain group, even when it does not explicitly mention group membership as the criterion.
Did I get your point in my first paragraph? And I'm guessing you won't be persuaded by my response to it, but right now I'm inclined to think it is right.
"To the extent that your example has force, it has force only because being a non-sober alcoholic is being taken to be demonstrably awful."
I don't think that being a non-sober alcoholic is necessarily awful. And it definitely does not need to be horrifyingly bad. I mean, it's always bad for sure, and it certainly can be awful, and maybe even horrifying. But it doesn't have to be. And I think it is obvious that there is nothing wrong with discriminating on the basis of alcoholic behavior, even in cases where that behavior is not demonstrably awful, but merely bad. It is also obvious that such a policy does not unjustly discriminate against sober alcoholics. Maybe we just disagree about that.
"wholly disingenuous ex post facto rationalization"
Why do you think I'm being disingenuous, and about what? I don't get it. What am I supposed to be rationalizing? I realize you are probably trying to insult me here, which is fine with me. But I just don't even follow what you're talking about.
"Suppose being oriented to not tithe is in fact bad. Refusing to hire people who do not tithe may well count as discriminating against people who are oriented against it. Why shouldn't it?"
I think you mean to say "suppose that not tithing is in fact bad." That's how to make the example speak to my argument, anyway. The problem with the example is that it is hard to get the intuition I want without using a behavior that is uncontroversially bad, unlike not tithing. Better case: suppose (as seems quite plausible!) that cheating on your spouse is bad. Is refusing to hire people who cheat on their spouses discriminatory against people oriented towards cheating? Surely not. Another example: suppose that downloading music for free is bad. Is refusing to hire people who do that discriminating against those inclined to do it? Doesn't seem so. Not to me anyway. And this last example makes it especially clear, I suggest, that the behavior in question need not be horrifying, or even awful. Bad is enough.
Being a "product" of a Christian liberal arts college (though not one specifically mentioned in the petition.) that required students to sign a "lifestyle statement The argument about marriage vs. sex oustide of marriage strikes me as a likely red herring.
At the college I attended heterosexual behavior, such as dating, hand holding, kissing, etc. is permitted outside of marriage. But the corresponding homosexual behavior is not.
For those curious for an example the entire "Lifestyle Statement" can be found here
The portion relevant to this discussion is buried way down in the "Responsibilities for Behavior" section:
Scripture also prohibits certain behaviors and community members should avoid them. They include backbiting, cheating, dishonesty, drunkenness, gossip, immodesty of dress, lying, occult practices, profanity, sexual promiscuity (including adultery, homosexual behavior, pre-marital sex), theft, and vulgarity (including crude language).
Troy, I'm sorry you are having trouble understanding, so let me be as clear as I can be:
I want bigoted, discriminatory treatment on the basis of sexual orientation to stop. When behavior toward groups has the kind of history that LGBT's have suffered, it is legitimate for them to be mentioned as protected classes, as in the APA statement. That puts the burden on any person or institution that engages in activity that negatively impacts a protected class to justify their actions. There are two grounds Christians use to justify their behavior: Biblical interpretation and natural law theory. I haven't argued against natural law theory here, since it is pretty obvious that the literature has not been kind to it. Defenders disagree, of course, but groups are entitled to act on the basis of their best judgment about such a defense. The other ground is one you've cited, and I've been giving you reasons for thinking that these grounds are inadequate. If they are inadequate, institutional discrimination based on those grounds should be censured. (And here, unlike in philosophy, there really are burdens of proof, and here the burden is on those who engage in practices that negatively impact protected classes, so granting that the Biblical bases used haven't been formulated well enough is a sufficient reason for ignoring such defenses.)
That leaves only the act/orientation distinction Mark Murphy has been pushing, but as I remarked very early on, that distinction can't do the work it needs to here, because I think we all know what will happen when gay marriage becomes more common: those in such committed, monogamous relationships will not be treated the same as heterosexuals. I'd be happy, though, for the APA to exempt any institution willing to state for the record that I'm wrong. So, I conclude that the APA should either censure institutions (exempting only those just mentioned), or change its policy so that sexual orientation is no longer treated as a protected class. Of these, I favor the former, since I want discrimination to end.
Anyway, for whatever it is worth, I've had my say and I'm done with it. I will end by expressing my deep desire that the Christian community devote itself to the cause of justice and less to the cause of defending discrimination.
Keith DeRose said:
"Please, let's not fall for that playground trick ("So, you're calling me a ____"). Though some signers of the petition would not hesitate to call the schools in question "bigoted" (and indeed, some have already used such language), others would so hesitate, and others would indeed go so far as to deny that that strong and rather incendiary term would apply, and it appears nowhere in the petition."
Jon Kvaning said:
"Troy, I'm sorry you are having trouble understanding, so let me be as clear as I can be:
I want bigoted, discriminatory treatment on the basis of sexual orientation to stop."
When Kvaning and others refer to standards set by Christian colleges as “bigoted” and insists that such bigoted discrimination STOP, it is quite hard to see how that “strong and rather incendiary term” as DeRose puts it, should not also apply, by extension to those who defend the “right” of those colleges to set such standards without sanction. Kvaning appears to be considerably more comfortable slapping the label of “bigot” on those philosophers who have signed the counter-petition, including, I suppose, such philosophical luminaries as Alvin Plantinga and Alasdair McIntyre. My question for Kvaning is: Do you think philosophers like Plantinga and McIntyre are “bigots”for signing the counter-petition?
My question for DeRose is: Given what Kvaning believes about Jesus—that he would have been fully “welcoming and affirming” (as they say nowadays) of practicing homosexuals, why is not the term “bigot,” perfectly apt for the likes of Plantinga and McIntyre? After all, if I’m following Kvaning’s train of thought, the Plantinga and McIntyre defense of Wheaton and Calvin etc. —their defense of the right of these colleges to “discriminate” without sanction-- is not only invidious and irrational, it is anti-Christian. According to Kvaning it is he, and not Plantinga or McIntyre, who is the truly faithful disciple of Jesus. If Jesus would be “welcoming and affirming” of practicing homosexuals, then only a “bigoted” Christian would take the opposite position and refuse to follow Jesus. Given all this, why would it not be fair game for a Plantinga or McIntyre to reasonably conclude that Kvaning IS, indeed, calling them bigots. And if they did, why would this be a “playground” trick?
Finally, wouldn't it be bigoted and discriminatory for a Christian college or any other college to privilege (in some way) homosexual activity in a committed, monogamous relationship, as Kvaning puts it, over homosexual activity that was not monogomous and not committed. Isn't this preference for monogamy and committment nothing more that a sheer act of bigotry and discrimination against homosexuals who prefer more daring sex--multiple partners maybe even anonymous partners and all that. And if Kvaning endorses this tame style of homosexual activity over the other, if he finds something "wrong" wth the latter, does that make him a bigot?
Just wondering!
Keith P.,
I don't see that John Kvanvig's expression of the thought that people who discriminate against gays are bigoted in any way undermines the paragraph of Keith DeRose's that you quote. Keith D. says that some of the petition signers have claimed that it is bigotry to discriminate against gays but that the petition does not say that. Keith is talking about the petition and John is speaking for himself. No contradiction there. (For the record I think this kind of discrimination constitutes bigotry, but I think that people have an amazing ability to be bigoted in some ways and admirable in others so my condemnation of this sort of discrimination in no way amounts to an all in judgement about the moral worth of people who endorse it. And I signed that petition, so I'm also one of those like John who Keith talks about in the course of pointing out that our views need not be held to endorse the petition.)
Furthermore, I don't think you have to think that defending the rights of people to act in bigoted ways necessarily entails that one is oneself bigoted. I would defend the bigoted action from sanction myself if the APA was the government telling those institutions not to discriminate or face criminal sanction. And I don't think that would make me a bigot. But asterisks are not criminal sanctions and the APA is not the government. So I think it is appropriate for the APA to do what Keith D. suggests. And I think you need not attribute bigotry to those who disagree to defend Keith D's reasonable position.
And for what it is worth, about the issue Keith's proposal raises about appropriate sanctions, I like the asterisks more than outright refusal to take the ads because I think it is useful to remain in dialogue with people with whom one disagrees and also because I think the resulting social pressure will have greater effect over the medium and long term than outright shunning. That's an empirical claim though and I could be wrong about that.
I said I was finished, but Keith P.'s rendering of my position is so far afield that it needs correcting. When I was summarizing the fundamental argument for Troy, it was a general argument whose first premise invokes the obvious point that bigotry and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is widespread. It does not make any claim about Christian colleges or about signers of the counterpetition or any such thing. The argument I summarized simply begins with a statement of my desire that bigotry and discrimination based on sexual orientation stop, and I'm certain this same desire is what led to the inclusion of sexual orientation in the APA statement. I am certain there are bigots at Christian colleges, and perhaps some institutional behavior at some such colleges constitutes bigotry, but nothing I wrote included any accusation of the sort. The same point applies to signers of the counterpetition.
So, to be clear: because of the history of treatment of such individuals, the APA is warranted in listing sexual orientation as a protected class. Too much of this treatment has been by Christians and Christian institutions, but this fact is not implied by the first point, which is the only point I made. And as to the last argument Keith P. gives: no. The group identified is not a protected class, and the preference for committed monogamous relationships does not burden any protected class differentially. (And please don't confuse this argument with any policy statements that I would or would not endorse--it is an argument about whether policies pass scrutiny, not an argument for the policies themselves.)
Ralph: My reason for preferring option (2) over (1) is very much in line with Mark's (from two comments above): It's a way to (possibly: of course this depends on whether the schools decide to advertise in the JFP if their ads will be asterisked) stay engaged (or at least to express willingness to stay engaged) with the relevant schools while still making the appropriate ruling that the schools involved are in violation of the APAs anti-discrimination policy. The moderateness of (2) -- that it doesn't simply rule outright against any of the parties, or at least doesn't rule against the colleges as strongly as another very salient option that could have been taken -- appeals to me in this case. But for those who don't know, I should disclose that I am a graduate of one of the colleges in question, and personally have a warm spot in my heart for several of the schools (and their missions), for a variety of reasons, and that can be influencing me here.
I guess I am confused. I thought Professor Kvaning-- having signed the petition and having defended doing so in public-- was saying that there was something wrong with the policy of Christian Colleges who "discriminate" against prospective faculty on the basis of sexual orientation or practice.
I THOUGHT that in his declaration about wanting to end bigotry and discrimination, he was referring to the kind of "discrimination" being practiced at places like Wheaton and Calvin. I THOUGHT Professor Kvaning was arguing that there could be no rational (or Christian--we'll leave that aside for the moment) grounds for such discrimination.
Maybe he doesn't believe any of this, but if he did, it would, I would think, lead straight-away to the reasonable conclusion that anyone who would support or defend the "discriminatory” policies of these schools would be a bigot. Certainly, Professor Kvaning would not hesitate to use that term for a prospective employer who refused to hire someone because of his or her race. Why would he object to the same label with regard to sexual orientation or practice? If Plantinga and McIntyre defend the right of Wheaton, Calvin et. al. to discriminate in this way, I fail to understand why the label of "bigot" wouldn’t fit them quite nicely.
I would only add that the author of the petition, Professor Hermes, seems to have the courage of his convictions. Here's what he says:
“To avoid offending those Christians who love their neighbors, and who leave the judging for God, I will hereafter refer to statements like these as statements of discrimination instead of statements of faith.”
http://www.dallasvoice.com/instant-tea/2009/02/24/uta-prof-leads-online-petition-drive-against-anti-gay-schools/
I can understand why Hermes and like-minded colleagues believe that those who defend such "statements of faith"—Plantinga, McIntyre and the rest-- are bigots for defending the right of schools to discriminate against gays. I can understand why Christians such as Plantinga and McIntyre and the leadership of these colleges might reject the charge that they are bigots because they believe that homosexual practice is radically disanalogous to race. What I find baffling is those who believe there is nothing objectionable in homosexual practice --or "disordered" in same-sex attraction, as the Vatican calls it--but who are not so willing to call a spade a spade—or a bigot a bigot. In short, I can't understand why Professor Kvanding doesn't agree completely with Hermes et. al.
So, tell me again how someone (e.g., Plantinga and McIntyre) can support and defend such invidious and irrational faith-based discrimination against practicing homosexuals and not be a bigot?
"If Plantinga and McIntyre defend the right of Wheaton, Calvin et. al. to discriminate in this way, I fail to understand why the label of "bigot" wouldn’t fit them quite nicely."
Hate to jump in, but this just doesn't follow. You can support an institution's right to discriminate w/o discriminating yourself. Further the word "bigot" is rightly avoided on practical and moral grounds. On moral grounds, because the word implies general condemnation of a person's character. I would like to think that most or all who support these discriminatory policies are not motivated by hatred, but are simply mistaken in holding on to a dogmatic belief. The proper way to discuss this issue is with gentleness, not name calling. It is also not going to help the cause of gay rights (and especially the cause of gay students who do attend conservative Christian colleges), to make these colleges feel defensive.
What is required is sober discussion among Christians, especially those employed or enrolled in these colleges, about these discrimatory policies. Maybe this controversy will encourage that discussion.
"If Plantinga and McIntyre defend the right of Wheaton, Calvin et. al. to discriminate in this way, I fail to understand why the label of "bigot" wouldn’t fit them quite nicely."
Huh?
bigot, noun: a person obstinately or intolerantly devoted to his or her own opinions and prejudices ; especially : one who regards or treats the members of a group (as a racial or ethnic group) with hatred and intolerance
Keith P: "You're a bigot" goes well beyond "You engage in discriminatory behavior." If you agree, it should be very easy to see how one can think that people are engaged in discriminatory behavior without thereby thinking they're bigots. But if you don't agree, then, since you think they mean the same thing, you should have no objection to complying with my very sincere request that you stop insisting on putting the word "bigot" into the mouths/thoughts of those who are not themselves using it. Why not just be content to say that we think this is discriminatory behavior? We'd have no objection to that attribution, and you should think nothing is lost, since that, according to you, has all the meaning of "bigot" already? To many of us who are sensitive to the difference in meanings, it matters. And the luminaries you keep bringing up defended the right of those engaged in the behavior to engage in that behavior without sanction -- which is quite another thing yet again. So, why not just say that we think they are mistakenly defending discriminatory behavior? I, for one, would appreciate it.
Kvanvig quite clearly explained his claim already.
I've got to get to back to work. With more than 18 hours since the last comment, seems that things have died down here, anyway.