I was talking w/Alan Rhoda at the Central APA, and I discussed with him the following counterintuitive implication of versions of open theism which say that all future contingents (or sentences about freely willed acts) are not true.
me: I bet that Curley will take the bribe tomorrow.
Alan: I don't think he will.
me: let's bet!
Tomorrow comes. Curley takes the bribe.
me: I was right!
Alan: I guess you were!
It seems that when I say "I was right!" I am ascribing truth to the sentence I uttered the day before. And intuitively, I speak truth when I ascribe truth to the sentence I uttered the day before. And if it is true that I correctly ascribe truth to the sentence I uttered the day before, then I did speak truth the day before. But some versions of open theism are committed to the counterintuitive implication that I did not speak truth the day before (i.e., utter a true sentence).
Two points: not all versions of open theism have to deal with this (e.g. Hasker's). Secondly, I take this only to be some degree of negative evidence against open theism; perhaps there is more positive evidence for open theism.
I've heard this objection a lot in conversation, though I haven't seen it in the literature. If I were an open theist, I'd just say that ordinary people have false views about the future, and so they are speaking incorrectly in these cases. Are there better ways out of this problem? Has there been any literature on this?