February 2009 Archives

Alexander Pruss mentioned this counterpetition toward the end of the previous discussion, but I decided I'd put it up front for more to see.

The distinction the counterpetition strikes me as a relevant distinction; it's actually the distinction I tried to make in the earlier discussion. Here's what I said.

A school can have a policy against adultery without having a policy against those who have an orientation to act adulterously. Probably better, a school might discriminate against those who use pornography without discriminating against those who have an orientation to use pornography. (And the number of the latter is legion.)

But do such policies violate the spirit of the anti-discrimination clause as the original petition suggests? Consider the following scenario. Suppose the APA had a clause which said that you could not discriminate on the basis of whether or not you have an orientation to look at pornography. Now suppose a school has a policy which discriminates against those who view pornography. It's not at all obvious to me that such a school would be violating the spirit of the APA clause which I am imagining.

Are there any disanalogies between my scenario and the current issue?

I've been thinking what open future (OF) views can say about the modality of statements about the future. There are two OF semantics, which I'll call N and F. Suppose Curley now exists, and that Curley's freely taking the bribe is open. On the N semantics, Curley will freely take the bribe is neither true nor false. On the F semantics, it is false that Curley will freely take the bribe. The N semantics requires denial of excluded middle. The F semantics requires denial of the principle that, basically, not(will(p)) iff will(not(p)).

Suppose now that we say that a proposition p possibly/necessarily/impossibly is V iff p is V in some/all/no worlds, where V is a truth value or a logical combination of truth values like "neither true nor false", which I will abbreviate "ntnf". Let p be the proposition that Curley will freely take the bribe. On the F semantics, p is false in every world. For in some worlds Curley's freely taking the bribe is open, and in those worlds p is false by that semantics. And in all other worlds, it is determined that Curley won't freely take the bribe (e.g., because it is determined that there is no Curley, or that nobody will ever offer Curley a bribe, or whatever). So, in every world, p is false, and so p is necessarily false.

On the N semantics, things are more interesting. In worlds where Curley's freely taking the bribe is open, p is ntnf. In worlds where Curley's freely taking the bribe is not open, p is false. Therefore, on the N semantics, p is possibly ntnf and possibly false, and necessarily not true.

So what's wrong with this? Well, one thing is that as Geoff Pynn pointed out in the previous discussion of open futurism, the open futurist surely wants to say that p is a "future contingent". But if p is necessarily false, as it is on the F semantics, then that's endangered. And if p is necessarily not true, then it's also in a bit of trouble.

A friend of mine who wishes to remain anonymous took an account of the dialogue between Plantinga and Dennett at last weekend's APA. I know that many were interested in this, so I am copy/pasting it below. The account is opinionated (i.e., the author openly expresses his perspective on what went on throughout the account), and it is heavily sided in favor of Plantinga and against Dennett. So I welcome any disagreements about what went on in the comments section.

How important was such a meeting, and of what worth is discussion about it? Did Plantinga or Dennett take away anything new by way of argument or philosophy from the meeting? Probably not. Did anybody in the audience learn anything new by way of argument or philosophy? Maybe; perhaps some people there never heard some of Plantinga's arguments, and they learned something new.

So I'm not sure how important the meeting was from the standpoint of philosophy. But I'm interested in reading/hearing discussion about the meeting to get a better idea of how theism and atheism are perceived by the philosophical community. I'm curious to hear how atheists might have perceived what went on at the meeting. So comments from that standpoint (and not necessarily only that standpoint) are welcome.

The account of my friend begins below:

The new Philosophical Gourmet Report rankings of graduate philosophy programs are out, including the rankings for the best programs in philosophy of religion, which are here.

For any prospective philosophers of religion looking for good graduate programs, or for potential advisors of such prospective philosophers of religion, who might be reading this, I have a suggestion of a program for philosophy of religion to consider that (again) didn't make this list: Rutgers. (Others may have other suggestions, and might leave them in the comments.) Many of the programs that are listed seem to be on the list primarily due to the presence of one philosopher who works in the area. Well, Dean Zimmerman, at Rutgers, is a absolutely top-notch philosopher, and he is really into philosophy of religion, and it seems to me he would be an excellent guide and advisor in the area. I imagine Rutgers didn't make the list because Dean is best known for his work in metaphysics, where most of his best papers have been. And it looks like he will continue to be a committed metaphysician (metaphysicist?). But while he hasn't done as much work in philosophy of religion as in metaphysics, he's done some fine work there, too, and he seems to be very much into philosophy of religion (as well as metaphysics) now, and he knows the area very well. Plus, in going to Rutgers, you will be going to one of the very best overall philosophy programs in the English-speaking world. (See the overall rankings here.) Of course, that also means Rutgers is probably a very difficult program to get into (and Rutgers reports here that they admit only 2-3% of applicants), so I guess this is primarily a suggestion for extremely well-qualified prospective philosophers of religion.

Another hot tip: With Marilyn and Robert Adams going to the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, that program is suddenly an excellent choice for philosophy of religion, too. (This change was just announced, and so isn't reflected in even the new PGR.) And Chapel Hill is also a very strong overall program (see again the overall rankings).

Prospective philosophers of religion should probably inquire into job prospects in philosophy for candidates with that area of specialization before committing to that path. Last I heard, it was supposed to be a bad AOS for getting an initial job when one goes on the job market. But I don't know how accurate that impression of mine is. (I believe that issue has been discussed here on this blog?) I do believe (but, again, am not sure) that philosophy of religion is often a very helpful AOC (area of competence) to have: Many programs would like to offer courses in the area, and so would welcome someone who could teach it, but don't want to use up one of their slots on someone who does it as their main thing.

I was talking w/Alan Rhoda at the Central APA, and I discussed with him the following counterintuitive implication of versions of open theism which say that all future contingents (or sentences about freely willed acts) are not true.

me: I bet that Curley will take the bribe tomorrow.
Alan: I don't think he will.
me: let's bet!
Alan: okay.

Tomorrow comes. Curley takes the bribe.

me: I was right!
Alan: I guess you were!

It seems that when I say "I was right!" I am ascribing truth to the sentence I uttered the day before. And intuitively, I speak truth when I ascribe truth to the sentence I uttered the day before. And if it is true that I correctly ascribe truth to the sentence I uttered the day before, then I did speak truth the day before. But some versions of open theism are committed to the counterintuitive implication that I did not speak truth the day before (i.e., utter a true sentence).

Two points: not all versions of open theism have to deal with this (e.g. Hasker's). Secondly, I take this only to be some degree of negative evidence against open theism; perhaps there is more positive evidence for open theism.

I've heard this objection a lot in conversation, though I haven't seen it in the literature. If I were an open theist, I'd just say that ordinary people have false views about the future, and so they are speaking incorrectly in these cases. Are there better ways out of this problem? Has there been any literature on this?

Let's grant that if sceptical theism is true, then for any evil E, we have no reason to think that the prevention of E will lead to an overall better result than letting E happen, so the fact that we do not see God preventing E is not evidence against the existence of God, since we have no more reason to think that God would prevent E than that he would not. The standard objection is that then we have no reason to prevent E, since we have no reason to think that the overall result will be better if we prevent E.

This objection is mistaken. Suppose I offer you a choice of two games--you must play the one or the other. Each game lasts forever. In Game A, you get pricked in the foot with a thorn on the first move. In Game B, nothing happens to you on the first turn. And that's all you know. (You don't know if God exists or anything like that.) Which game should you choose?

You should probably say you have the same probability of doing better by playing Game A as by playing Game B. Why? Well, let Games A* and B* be Games A and B minus their first steps. You know nothing about Games A* and B*. (You don't know if the first step is a sign of what it is to come, or maybe the sign of the opposite of what is to come, or completely uncorrelated with what comes later.) Now given a pair of infinitely long games about which you know nothing, the overall difference in outcome utility can be minus infinity, plus infinity, undefined, or finite. The likelihood that this difference would be within a pinprick is zero. But if the difference is not within a pinprick, then A is better than B iff A* is better than B*, and B is better than A iff B* is better than A*. Since we know nothing about A* and B*, we should not say that it's more likely that A* is better than B*, nor the other way around. So, the probability that A would give a better result than B is the same as the probability that B would give a better result than A. (This calculation assumes Molinism. Without Molinism, it only works for deterministic games, or as an intuition-generator.)

Now if the reasoning in the anti-sceptical-theism argument is sound, you have no reason to choose Game B over Game A, since you have equal probabilities of doing better with A as with B. But in fact, despite this equality, you should choose Game B. For since you know nothing about what Games A* and B* are like, the expected value of Games A* and B* should be the same--even if it's infinite, or even if it's undefined. (Think of doing this with non-standard arithmetic.) So you have two options: first a pinprick, and then something with a certain (perhaps undefined) expected value; or just something with that same (perhaps undefined) expected value. And of course you should choose the latter--you should avoid the pinprick. The lesson here is that while beliefs are guided by probabilities, action is guided by expected values.

I was going to write a post on the subject of the APA petition, but Andrew beat me to it. That said, I notice that on the Leiter thread, people in support of the petition are quite certain of the rectitude of their views, whereas people urging caution, or rejection, of the petition, use much more cautious/defensive language. Moreover, almost all of the people who support the petition use their real names, whereas many of the people opposed to it, or who urge caution regarding it, write in anonymously.

Assuming I'm right about this, I wonder what it amounts to? I think this:

Many, if not all, traditionally Christian (and, I imagine, Jewish and Muslim) philosophers are afraid of posting their thoughts on this matter. First, they are afraid of being personally attacked. "Fear of personal attacks" should be construed broadly: it doesn't refer just to being scared of what your colleagues will say or think of you; it refers also to fear of the emotions that will arise within you upon being personally attacked. That is, you may be afraid that you will write something in emotion-induced haste.

Second, I bet a lot of traditional Christians are in fact unsure what is wrong with same-sex relations. They accept that people should not have sex with members of the same sex, and/or that people should not marry people of the same sex; but they don't really accept or understand any of the rationales offered for why. Or perhaps even stronger, they side with a lot of the philosophers posting in Leiter's thread, and their beliefs on this score are an abiding source of tension for them.

Third, assuming that philosophers in support of the petition will in fact personally attack someone who publicly defends the propriety of the APA's position, is this behavior warranted? Many philosophers, including Christian philosophers of all stripes, seem to think that there are cases where personal attacks are appropriate. I can't remember where she said this, but I recall G. E. M. Anscombe writing that there are some positions so corrupt that they shouldn't be met with arguments but rather with disgust, condemnation, or something of that sort. I'm actually inclined to disagree with Anscombe on this score. I think that such condemnation is rarely productive in philosophical debate, and I think there are indeed good arguments that can be offered in favor of lots of positions that most people hold unreflectively (e.g., a lot of people look at necrophilia with disgust, and think that no one should engage in it. But why? I bet a lot of people won't be able to offer very good answers to this, other than just to say that it's disgusting. But a clever philosopher could quickly, I think, move most people to aporia over this). In other words, I think a lot of the philosophers posting in Leiter's thread are not behaving as they should. But I might be rash in saying this--after all, how would I feel if people were defending philosophy departments that, say, required their theistic students to sign statements giving up their theism under threat of expulsion? I should think I'd be very dispirited if even a few philosophers supported such a notion, and I would quite possibly describe them as bigoted. Of course, under such circumstances I don't think it would be appropriate to use such language, even though I think it would be factually correct.

EDIT: I should add, in elaborating my third point, that I thought it inappropriate to make personal attacks on people at least when you are trying to convince them of the wrongness of their position. Thus, calling discriminating Christian universities bigoted in the comments section of The Leiter Reports is not itself inappropriate, and, to the extent that the language is factually correct, fine, perhaps even to be encouraged. Now that I think about things a little more, though, whether it's appropriate to call a person bigoted depends not only on whether he actually is bigoted, but also on whether such remarks are liable to convince him. There could definitely be some people who, when described as bigoted by people of good will, will rethink their positions. In such cases, then, calling a spade a spade is fine, perhaps even recommendable.

Nonetheless, though, I think there's a kind of civility that it's important to maintain in such arguments, at least when you're writing to someone. You don't want someone to accept your position out of fear, and you don't want them to reject your position out of defensiveness. Instead, you should want, if you're a philosopher, your interlocutors to focus on the reasons you offer for your position rather than on the consequences that their beliefs and conduct will have on your assessments of them.

There's a good deal of discussion on Leiter's blog on the subject of Christian universities (including Wheaton University, Azusa Pacific University, Belmont University, Biola University, Calvin College, Malone College, and Pepperdine University), their policies involving those who engage in homosexual behavior (and drinking and nonmarital sex generally), and whether such universities should be allowed to advertise in the JFP. I thought that many readers of this blog might be interested. Not all of the discussion is very fruitful.

I remember a discussion like this happening a year or two ago. This time, a petition is being started to get the APA to ban those universities from advertising in the JFP.

-edit- My last two sentences are misleading. See the first two comments below.

Could God have an excuse for not preventing gratuitous evil? I think so. In the original version of the Free Will Defense it is argued that, possibly, moral agents freely bring about some instances of evil, E. Let’s stipulate the following,

P1. An instance of evil E is justified iff. it is not possible that E is prevented without producing an outcome that is overall worse.

P2. Instances of evil that are not justified are gratuitous.

P3. God is justified in not preventing an instance of evil E iff. E is justified.

P4. If E is not justified, but God cannot prevent E without producing an outcome that is overall worse, then God has an excuse for not preventing E.

Instances of moral evil in the free will defense are such that they all satisfy (P4). The evil that moral agents produce is not justified according to (P1) because it can be prevented without producing an overall worse outcome. The agents themselves can prevent it, for instance. But then by (P3) God is not justified in not preventing E, either. But the moral evil is also such that God cannot prevent it without interfering in the exercise of the libertarian freedom of moral agents and producing an outcome that is overall worse. So by (P4) God has an excuse for not preventing the moral evil E.

So we should read the free will defense as illustrating how God might not be justified in allowing moral evil, but might be excused for allowing moral evil. Here’s an analogy: the suffering you are experiencing as a result of your toothache might well be gratuitous, since it can be prevented without producing an overall worse world. But I have an excuse for not preventing it, since were I to try to do so, I would make the outcome overall worse.

J. Howard Sobel says some really interesting things on presumptive atheism. I wonder if any of these are true.

There is no general presumption against the existence of deities according to which atheism follows by default in the absence of good argument for theism… . (Logic and Theism, p. 401 ff.)

In the absence of good reasons to believe that God exists, it seems odd to say that I cannot rationally believe that he doesn’t. I say this fully aware that there are cases in which absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. I’ve never been persuaded that this is such a case. It seems rather the absence of evidence for such a being is indeed evidence that no such being exists.

But Sobel continues,

There is a presumption against a god of love, a god that would have us love it and would to that end make itself known to us. Prior to the establishment of reasons for the existence of such a god, there is, I think, a presumption against that existence. (Logic and Theism, p. 606, nt. 2)

Why is there any more presumption against the god of love than there is against most other gods? I guess I don’t see why it follows from the assumption that G is a god of love, that G is any more likely to make itself known to us than the god of peace or justice would.

A god would have to satisfy several logically independent conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for godliness. If that’s right, then an arguing atheist can make his case by showing that conditions in some proper subset G’ of the set G of these necessary and sufficient conditions for godliness are not all satisfied by any one being. An arguing theist cannot make his case in a similar manner. He must show that the conditions in G—and thus those in each of if its non-empty proper subsets—are all satisfied by some one being.(Logic and Theism, p. 606, nt. 3)

Again, why is it more difficult to show that something instantiates all of the relevant properties than it is to show that some subset of those properties is inconsistent? There are just two possibilities. Assume the properties are compossible: in that case the theist’s task is easier, and the atheist’s task more difficult. Assume the properties are not compossible: in that case the atheist’s task is easier, and the theist’s task more difficult.