Suppose the Vague Depravity Thesis is true. The thesis ensures that the transition between those agents that are irredeemably evil and those that are not is not discrete.
Now, suppose that we have a generous God who fails to save only those agents that are beyond redemption. And suppose only those agents are beyond redemption who are superdefinitely irredeemably evil (definitely irredeemable at every order of vagueness). If God must send every agent determinately to hell or determinately to heaven, does this generous God have a moral problem?
"Despite Your generosity, you sent me, S, eternally and determinately to hell, and you sent S' eternally and determinately to heaven. Given the Vague Depravity Thesis there is at least one way to precisify 'irredeemably evil' such that we both, S and S', are irredeemably evil. So I have been treated unfairly".
"How have I treated you unfairly? I saved everyone that is not definitely beyond redemption. Anyone on any borderline of being redeemable will be saved. But anyone who is not redeemable and not on any borderline of being redeemable will not be saved."
