Begin with these premises:
- Necessarily, if it is seriously wrong for x to do A in circumstances C, then it is appropriate that x be punished for doing A in circumstances C.
- Necessarily, if it is appropriate that p, then it is possible that p.
- Necessarily, only persons (individually or collectively) punish.
- Necessarily, only an existent person is appropriately punished for serious wrongs.
We can now take the argument in more than one direction, garnering interesting conclusions.
Say that "x strongly dies" provided x dies and never exists after that, and that "x strongly kills y" provided that x causes y to strongly die. Then:- Necessarily, it is seriously wrong for a contingent person to strongly kill all the members of some set S that contains himself when he knows that some members of S are innocent persons.
This is a great topic! There should be more discussion of philosophical arguments for immortality (things have gone down hill since Plato's time!--though this argument is more in the spirit of Kant)
But I am not persuaded. Why suppose that if it is appropriate to punish x it must also be possible to punish x?
Is it this?
1. Ought implies can
2. if it is appropriate to punish x, then x ought to be punished
Therefore,if it is appropriate to punish x it must be possible to punish x
But this is too strong. It implies we are morally obliged not to forgive or be merciful.
Also, the argument can be construed instead as a reductio of retributivism (I think)
Could an impossible action be appropriate? That's a good question. Could it ever be appropriate to draw a square circle?
Well, here's one problem with an affirmative action. An impossible supposition entails all propositions. Thus, if it is impossible to do A, then that one does A entails that one does A unjustly (and also that one does A justly). But it is not appropriate to do something that can only be done unjustly. (I'm not entirely convinced by this argument.)
Here's a related thought. If impossible actions can be appropriate, then, plausibly, the following would be an example. If I have promised to draw a square circle, then drawing a square circle is appropriate in light of the promise. But drawing a square circle entails breaking the promise, and nothing that entails breaking a promise is appropriate in light of the promise.
By "affirmative action" I meant "impossible action".
Why not just say that it would be appropriate to punish the malefactor if he were alive? That seems far more plausible to me than using this argument on its own as a proof of immortality.
Tim:
Suppose that suicide is wrong in circumstances C (granted, it's controversial to claim that suicide is always wrong, but it should not be controversial to claim that suicide is sometimes wrong, for instance when one has dependents or has promised something incompatible with it). Should we say: It would be appropriate to punish the person who committed suicide in C if he were alive? That sounds very odd.
maybe the statement "it is always appropriate to punish a wrongdoer" is too universal. If you replace it with "it is appropriate to punish a wrongdoer when possible" --then there is no problem. How is this second statement less plausible than the first?
There are also cases in which it would not be appropriate to punish a wrongdoer--when said wrongdoer is saving innocent lives--you don't interrupt him to inflict the punishment (in fact to do so would be positively wrong--inapropriate)
OK, fair enough. How about "it would be appropriate to punish him if he existed?" After all, that's your view, isn't it? That the person has succeeded in killing himself but still exists (in some sense) and hence *does* deserve punishment. Just modify it to say that he *would* deserve it if (contrary to fact) his successful suicide didn't annihilate him.
Alexander
Why does the question of punishment need to arise at all in this case? Given the fact that the malefactor has strongly killed himself it seems irrelevant to raise the idea of punishment in this case. And to pick up on the immortality twist, if that person's soul continues to exist then he has not been strongly killed, in fact no one has been strongly killed, so the notion of 'strongly dies/killed' seems unfounded if souls continue after bodily death.
I haven't yet had my morning coffee, but this doesn't sound odd to me:
(1) It would be appropriate to punish the person who committed suicide in C if he were alive.
I'd think that:
(2) It would be appropriate to punish the person who tried to commit suicide in C if he were alive.
I don't think it's always appropriate to punish successes more than attempts. At the very least, I don't think you deserve more punishment for successes than attempts that aren't met with success.
(1)-(4) together with (5) entails that it is impossible that a contingent person strongly kills all contingent members of some set S when he knows that some members of S are innocent persons.
That's too strong, isn't it? It is impossible to strongly kill all members of such a set IF you're also a member of that set.
"x strongly dies" provided x dies and never exists after that, and that "x strongly kills y" provided that x causes y to strongly die.
Suppose x strongly kills x and some innocent people. Why is it impossible to punish x? Even if x never actually exists again, he possibly exists (leaving Lewisian assumptions aside). So he's possibly punished.
Alexander
Of course I stated the obvious in my remarks on immortality. What I should have said is that simply because (1) is warranted does not mean that we will always be able to punish X for doing A. We cannot use the desire to punish as an argument for immortality is so far as some desires are thwarted by reality. Also if the soul is immortal does this rule out the idea of us being contingent beings? If souls are timeless are they then necessary? It does not follow that if my body is contingent that my soul must also be contingent. Furthermore, if souls are immortal and cannot be seriously killed then what sense does it make to say we should not kill? It would seem that we cannot kill anyone if we cannot kill what makes them them. X cannot intentionality take that which cannot be taken, so what would we be punishing X for? There has been no crime. If we modify the idea of killing to reference only the taking of a contingent physical life, then this would be our definition of 'seriously killing.' But we can understand this, and what it entails, without referencing a soul that could be punished. We would simply say that if X failed to kill herself when she killed the others we would retributively punish her for what she did. We can assign guilt and blame, which is a form of punishment (I think) even if we cannot punish X directly with a punishment that fits the crime. So it seems that (1) can be satisfied although the punishment will be less then what was deserved.
Mike:
Yes, you're right. The initial conclusion is that it is impossible that a contingent person strongly kills all contingent members of S when he knows that some members of S are innocent persons and when he is a member of S. I think the plausibilistic steps in the argument continue to goes through.
It is not possible to appropriately punish someone for strongly killing all the members of S when he is a member of S. For, a necessary condition on appropriately punishing someone for doing A is that he in fact did do A. And if he strongly killed all the members of S, then he is not there to be punished.
But my argument as it stands is incorrect, since it is possible that someone be punished for something he didn't do. Instead, (1) needs to say that it is appropriate that x be justly punished, and we need a premise that one can only be justly punished for something that one in fact did.
John:
If souls are immortal, then the reason killing is wrong is not that it terminates one's existence, but something else, such as that it destroys the body, or deprives one of valuable earthly life, etc. Since over most of the past two thousand years, most people in the Western world have believed that (a) murder is seriously wrong and (b) death is not the termination of existence, there would be a significant onus of argument on someone who claimed that (a) and (b) are incompatible.
Alexander
I do not think that solving issues comes down to a vote. (a) and (b) are compatible. So is (a) and (b') death is the termination of existence. We do know that either (b) or (b') is true, but which one is the true one? Your argument does not resolve this issue. It presupposes, if I understand it correctly, that (b) is true. But (1) in your original argument does not support that (b) being true anymore then it supports (b') being false. It may simply be the case that x seriously kills everyone including herself and will not punished for doing so, because there is nothing (no one) left to punish.
It seems to me that arguments that simply demonstrate compatibility (and consistency) do not get us very far along the road to knowing what is, in fact, the case. Do we, or do we not have souls that are immortal? Your argument does not address this, but it does rest upon being able answering it affirmatively.
John:
Now I am confused. My argument does not presuppose (b). Rather, it concludes to (b). One can phrase it as a reductio of (b'): if to kill is to end existence, then not all immoral deeds can be punished, but all immoral deeds can be punished, since it is appropriate that all immoral deeds be punished.
It is not possible to appropriately punish someone for strongly killing all the members of S when he is a member of S. For, a necessary condition on appropriately punishing someone for doing A is that he in fact did do A. And if he strongly killed all the members of S, then he is not there to be punished.
The fact that he was a member of S and so does not now exist, and will not ever exist again, does not entail that it's impossible to punish him. It is possible to punish him, since, despite the fact that he will not ever exist again, it is possible that he exists again. There is a possible non-actual world in which he exists and is punished.
What am I missing here?
Compare: It is true that I am not, and will not ever be 6'5" tall. But surely I'm possibly 6'5" tall. I might have taken hormone injections, for instance.
But that's a possible world where he didn't commit the crime, and hence he is not justly punished there.
But that's a possible world where he didn't commit the crime, and hence he is not justly punished there.
What do you mean? Even if it is true that will never exist again, he is nonetheless possibly resurrected. In that world (which of course will not be actualized, given your other assumptions) he has committed the crime and is punished. So he's possibly punished.
Maybe you want to say that, very strictly speaking, in worlds where he is resurrected he cannot be punished for his crime because his crime was to strongly killing everyone in S. In the world where he is resurrected, he did not strongly kill himself, so he did not technically commit the crime. Two points. He can certainly be punished for strongly killing everyone else in S. And it might also be true that he can be punished for strongly killing everyone in S. It might be true that the closest worlds in which he is punished for killing everyone in S, he is not a member of S. That can be true even if he is actually a member of S.
Alexander
"...but all immoral deeds can be punished, since it is appropriate that all immoral deeds be punished."
The fact that y (punishing immoral deeds) is appropriate says nothing about y ever happening. Appropriateness does not entail can. If it does, then there are immoral acts that are not appropriate to punish because there is no one to punish. It might be appropriate to punish x for killing all other x's, including himself, but I can not punish x because x no longer exists, therefore punishment is inappropriate. I think you would need a premise that states that everything that is appropriate must happen so that if it is appropriate for me to punish x then I must be able to (can) punish x. But, I do not see how this can be argued given your premises. That is why I said earlier that the question of punishing x does not arise if x no longer exists. This is why I think an unstated premise of your argument is actually what you are trying to argue for. Given your premises, the correct conclusion, I think, is that there are immoral act that cannot be punished because there is no one to punish.
Actually, I think your 1st premise is wrong. It needs the qualifier that x exists. If x no longer exists then (1) is false in so far as it would not be appropriate to punish that which we cannot punish because it no longer exists.
John:
See my response to Gordon Knight's comment for an argument that an impossibility isn't appropriate.
I think the best way for the person who rejects my conclusion (that strong death is impossible) to escape the argument is to qualify (1) by saying that punishment is appropriate if it is possible. But this weakens the link between the immoral and the punishable perhaps too much. (By the way, some folks will prefer if (1) talks of the unjust instead of the wrong. The argument should still work.)
Mike:
Does your second suggestion take set membership to be a contingent matter?
Alex,
I don't think so. He would still be a member of S, but S would not be the set of persons he strongly kills. Certainly, he could have strongly killed some other set/collection of people, no?
Mike:
But then he can't be justly punished for strongly killing the members of S.
I took your objection to be that he cannot be punished for the people he strongly kills, a group that includes himself. Isn't that the worry? If so, I note that the group he strongly kills might fail to be S. The group he strongly kills might be in S', and he can be punished for that.
But then he can't be justly punished for strongly killing the members of S.
Yes and no.
1. He strongly kills the members of S and possibly he is punished for what he does wrong.
2. Not possible that he strongly kills the members of S and he is punished for what he does wrong.
I realise I'm a bit late here (story of my life; still...). I agree that the best way for the person who rejects Pruss's conclusion (that strong death is impossible) to escape his argument is to qualify (1) by saying that "Punishment is appropriate if it is possible".
However, it will (presumably) be mainly atheists who will "want" to oppose to the idea of an afterlife. And once the atheist affirms the premise "Punishment is appropriate if it is possible", the conclusion "Punishing an all-powerful being is not appropriate" seems to follow fairly naturally--which needless to say is not particularly atheist-friendly: especially if we can strengthen (1) into something like
"Punishment is appropriate iff a seriously evil deed has been comitted".