October 2008 Archives

I set out to prove that God morally ought not to actualize the best possible world. I conclude that, since God ought not to actualize the best possible world, the existence of no best world presents no interesting problem for theists. This should be very good news for theists, since the prevailing view is that there is no best world.

Let E be the state of affairs of Smith having hurt himself in some minor way. Let G be the state of affairs of N + 1 persons being deliriously happy (for non-negative N). Suppose the conjunctive state of affairs (E & G) is on balance good or positive (even for N = 0). Here’s a proof that (G & E) cannot fail to obtain in the best possible world, despite the fact that E is an instance of gratuitous evil.

Begin with these premises:

1. Necessarily, if it is seriously wrong for x to do A in circumstances C, then it is appropriate that x be punished for doing A in circumstances C.
2. Necessarily, if it is appropriate that p, then it is possible that p.
3. Necessarily, only persons (individually or collectively) punish.
4. Necessarily, only an existent person is appropriately punished for serious wrongs.

We can now take the argument in more than one direction, garnering interesting conclusions.

Say that "x strongly dies" provided x dies and never exists after that, and that "x strongly kills y" provided that x causes y to strongly die. Then:

5. Necessarily, it is seriously wrong for a contingent person to strongly kill all the members of some set S that contains himself when he knows that some members of S are innocent persons.

(1)-(4) together with (5) entails that it is impossible that a contingent person strongly kills all contingent members of some set S when he knows that some members of S are innocent persons. For suppose w is a world where the fell deed is done. Then, it is true at w that it is appropriate to punish the malefactor by (1). But it is impossible for the malefactor to be punished by (4), and hence it is not the case that it is appropriate for him to be punished. Thus, w is not a possible world. But why is w not possible? I think the best explanation of this impossibility is that it is impossible to strongly kill a person. And the best explanation of why that is so is that it is impossible for a person to strongly die.

Just a quick reminder that the 2008 Pacific Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers—featuring papers from Prosblogion contributors Andrew Moon and Kevin Timpe—will be held next week at UC Riverside. The program is now online (with most of the papers available for download), and if you like what you see it's not too late to register!

Hope to see you there.

Bear with me as I try to decide whether I believe this. Here's a principle on wronging persons/person-stages that I think is true.

P. For each additional, intentional and malicious moral wrong A that B freely does to person(s) S, B becomes morally worse.

After considerable discussion and dispute with PB contributors, I think I can put my worry much more clearly. Here it is.

1. Let A1 be an action of B that intentionally, maliciously and freely wrongs person S1 at time t. (Let's say that B irradiates S1 causing serious disease D.).

2. Let A1' be an action of B' that intentionally, maliciously and freely wrongs person S1' at t'. (A1' irradiates S1'.).

3. At t2, God instantaneously replaces all of S1's memories and cells resulting in S2'. (S1' is not identical to and is not an earlier stage of S2'.)

4. Had B not performed actions A1, then S1 would not have had disease D.

5. Had B' not performed A1', S1' & S2' would have had disease D.

Why do I find it next to impossible to believe (6), despite the principle P, which I think is true?

6. B' is morally worse than B (assuming, of course, that they were otherwise moral equals).

Even adding premise (7) doesn't make an important difference (to me).

7. B' knew that God would instantaneously replace all of S1's memories and cells after S1' was irradiated.

In fact, I don't that B' wronged S2' at all! That is, I don't believe there were two wrongs, one to S1' and another to S2'. And that is why B' is not worse than B. Or, I find it difficult not to see it that way.

Suppose the Vague Depravity Thesis is true. The thesis ensures that the transition between those agents that are irredeemably evil and those that are not is not discrete.

Now, suppose that we have a generous God who fails to save only those agents that are beyond redemption. And suppose only those agents are beyond redemption who are superdefinitely irredeemably evil (definitely irredeemable at every order of vagueness). If God must send every agent determinately to hell or determinately to heaven, does this generous God have a moral problem?

"Despite Your generosity, you sent me, S, eternally and determinately to hell, and you sent S' eternally and determinately to heaven. Given the Vague Depravity Thesis there is at least one way to precisify 'irredeemably evil' such that we both, S and S', are irredeemably evil. So I have been treated unfairly".

"How have I treated you unfairly? I saved everyone that is not definitely beyond redemption. Anyone on any borderline of being redeemable will be saved. But anyone who is not redeemable and not on any borderline of being redeemable will not be saved."

In Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer defends:

(PC) If it seems to S as if P, then S thereby has at least prima facie justification for believing that P (p. 99)

What's an example of somebody who doesn't have such prima facie justification? Huemer gives the example of a religious believer. He writes,

Compare the case of religious faith. Suppose a person has been presented with a certain wafer, which for all the world appears to be an ordinary piece of bread. Nevertheless, he believes it is a part of the body of Christ. Why? Because he has been told very solemnly, by an authority he respects, that this belief is essential to his religion. But why does he accept that religion, when it contradicts the evidence of his senses? I am not speaking here of those Catholics who have sophisticated philosophical arguments to defend their religion, but of the average Catholic, who takes his beliefs on faith.

Here is an argument against Molinism, which while valid, is fallacious in an interesting way. This argument is an improved version of one that I have earlier defended.

1. God brings it about that x is in circumstances C because of God's belief that x would freely do A in C. (Hypothesis for reductio)
2. If y brings it about that p because of y's belief that q, then y's bringing it about that p because of y's belief that q is causally prior to p's holding. (Premise)
3. If x freely does A in C, then x's being in C is causally prior to x's freely doing A. (Premise)
4. If E is causally prior to F, and the occurrence of E entails the occurrence of F, then E deterministically causes F. (Premise)
5. That x freely does A is not deterministically caused by anything. (Premise)
6. p is entailed by its being the case that God does B because of God's belief that p. (Premise)
7. Causal priority is transitive. (Premise)
8. God's bringing it about that x is in circumstances C because of God's belief that x would freely do A in C is causally prior to x's freely doing A in C. (By 1, 2, 3 and 7)
9. That God brings it about that x is in circumstances C because of God's belief that x would freely do A in C entails that x freely does A in C. (By 6)
10. God's bringing it about that x is in circumstances C because of God's belief that x would freely do A in C deterministically causes x's freely doing A in C. (By 4, 8 and 9)
11. 10 contradicts 5.

What is wrong with the argument, I think, is the seemingly innocent (4). Claim (4) commits a mistake that I have identified elsewhere, the mistake of thinking that one can define concepts conjunctively. Deterministically causing is not just a conjunction of causing and logically determining (i.e., entailing), just as causing intentionally is not just a conjunction of causing and intending. The standard example for the latter is something like: George is pointing a gun at Bob and intends to kill Bob, and George's intention to kill Bob causes his hands to shake and accidentally squeeze the trigger. Then George intended and caused Bob's death but did not intentionally cause Bob's death. For x to intentionally cause B, it has to be the case that x intends B and x causes B, but these two facts also have to be related in the right way. Likewise, for A to deterministically cause B, it has to be the case that A causes B and that the occurrence of A entails the occurrence of B, but these two facts also have to be related in the right way.

I don't have a counterexample to (4). It could even be that (4) is true for some deeper reason. But as it stands, with (4) being presented simply because of its intuitive plausibility, the argument is fallacious in the following sense: Its plausibility rests in part on a cognitive fault of the interlocutor. The cognitive fault is that we have a tendency to accept conjunctive characterizations like (4) when we should always be suspicious of conjunctive characterizations, because just about always one needs the conjuncts to be satisfied in an appropriately related way. I think this may be because our minds automatically assume an appropriate connection between conjuncts, even if a statement does not give one. Consider "He pressed the trigger and the gun went off." We automatically assume that the speaker is telling us that the gun went off because of the pressing of the trigger. But no such claim is made.

Suppose we fix up (4) by adding that the entailment must be appropriately related to the causal claim. But now (10) cannot be derived, because we don't have an argument that in that case the appropriate relation holds.

Over at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, George Mavrodes has a very nice, rather involved (at least, compared to what is typical at NDPR) review of the Louise Anthony-edited volume, Philosophers without Gods.

The following argument is valid:

1. One only knows what it is like to echolocate if one has had echolocatory experiences.
2. God has never had echolocatory experiences.
3. Therefore, God does not know what it is like to echolocate.

Here, by "echolocatory experiences" I mean "apparent echolocatory experiences"--hallucinations also count.

Were it not that God in fact has probably seen red, through the Incarnation (unless Jesus was color-blind), I could have substituted "see red" for "echolocate".

But even though the argument is valid, it is a bad argument. The only reason to think (1) is true in the case of God is to think that (1) is a necessary truth. But there is good reason to think (1) could be false. Here is one possible counterexample to the necessity of (1). Suppose superbats are a species of intelligent aliens who can echolocate (the reason I'm not working with bats, is because I don't know if bats know anything). Fred is a superbat whose echolocative sense has always been completely nonfunctional. George is a normal superbat. Dr. Black, our friendly local neurosurgeon, transplants some of George's memories of echolocation into Fred's brain. Then Fred has apparent memories of what it is like to echolocate. And as long as he knows that they are apparent memories of echolocation, he knows what it is like to echolocate, even though he has never had an apparent echolocatory experience. (If we are psychological personal identity theorists, we need to assume that too many memories haven't been transplanted into Fred.)

Many readers will be interested in these great looking seminars at Calvin College. I'll list the titles and dates here and the details below the fold.

*Flame of Love: Social Science and Theology on the Great Commandment, July 13-24, 2009.

*Deliver Us from Evil: Genocide and the Christian World, June 22 - July 10, 2009.

*Philosophical Reflections on Liturgy, June 22 - July 10, 2009

I've heard from older, experienced professors that doing a dissertation on or specializing in philosophy of religion may hurt your chances of getting a philosophy job or getting tenure at a secular university. It's better to focus on some other subject and then do philosophy of religion after you get tenure.

Is this true? If so, why? It doesn't make sense to me; it seems that schools would want professors who could teach philosophy of religion.