Consider this well-known situation from Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons.
. . .A women is three months pregnant when her doctor gives her both bad and good news. The bad news is that the fetus she is carrying has a defect that will significantly diminish the future child's quality of life--although not so adversely as to make the child's life utterly miserable, or not worth living at all. The good news is that this defect is easily treatable. All the women has to do is take a pill that will have no side-effects and the future child will not have the defect.
Parfit plausibly argues that, in this situation, we would all agree that the woman should take the pill, and that she does wrong if she refuses to take it. That seems exactly right to me. It would be a monstrous thing to do not to take the pill. But why? The argument must be that the fetus has a legitimate complaint in the case in which she does not take the pill. Here's Parfit.
Suppose the women does not take the pill. . . . and that as a result [the] child has a significant disability. It would seem that [she] has done something wrong. The . . . woman has harmed her child. That child can say to her mother: 'You should have taken the pill. If you had done so, I would not now have this disability, and my life would be significantly better.'
I propose the following principle.
K. If the mother harmed her child in not taking the pill, then she would have harmed her child in taking it's life.
It is difficult to see how (K) could be mistaken. If I harm a fetus in diminishing the quality of its future life (by failing to take a pill) then I harm the fetus in removing it's future life entirely.
So we are left with two options.
1. (i) Refusing to take a pill that would prevent a serious diminishment in the quality of life of a fetus provides the basis of a legitimate grievance against the mother and (ii) killing the fetus provides the basis of a legitimate greivance against the mother.
2. (i) Refusing to take a pill that would prevent a serious diminishment in the quality of life of a fetus does not provide the basis of a legitimate grievance against the mother and (ii) killing the fetus does not provide the basis of a legitimate greivance against the mother.
But it seems pretty evident that, between (1) and (2), (1) is much more plausible than (2). But my generous colleagues will no doubt take the time to tutor me once again.
Mike,
Although I was initially inclined to agree with your argument, I subsequently decided that it is possible to resist your conclusion in the following way, you said:
"it would be a monstrous thing to do not to take the pill. But why? The argument must be that the fetus has a legitimate complaint in the case in which she does not take the pill."
But Parfit says:
"That child can say to her mother: 'You should have taken the pill"
These two statements are not equivalent. In the case Parfit has in mind, it seems, a future individual will have a legitimate grievance against the mother for her monstrous incompetence; but in the abortion case there will be no future individual to bring the grievance.
For some reason I never realized this until now but ethical discussions in logic make great use of casuistry. I wonder if that's really a good and/or helpful way to do ethics.
K. If the mother harmed her child in not taking the pill, then she would have harmed her child in taking it's life.
It is difficult to see how (K) could be mistaken. If I harm a fetus in diminishing the quality of its future life (by failing to take a pill) then I harm the fetus in removing it's future life entirely.
Mike, (K) seems plausible to me. But in your explanation of why (K) is plausible there seems to me to be a confusion. For in (K) you refer to a "child", whereas in your explanation you refer to a "fetus". And one could accept that the mother would harm her child, without also accepting she would harm her fetus. The idea would be that children can be harmed, and fetus' cannot be harmed. For a child has interest, and a fetus does not. And this may be for a number of reasons. Perhaps this is because a child is a person and a fetus is not, and only persons can be harmed. Or this could be because a child is conscious and a fetus is not, and only conscious things can be harmed. Thus, one could accept (K) without accepting your explanation. They could accept (K) without accepting that either (1) or (2) is true. For (K) refers to harms to a child, and (1) and (2) refer to harms to a fetus, and it is not clear that a fetus can be harmed, whereas it is clear that a child can be harmed.
So I think that not taking the pill and killing the fetus that would otherwise become a child, may both be wrong. And both may be wrong because they involve harm to a child. But from this claim one can also accept that not taking the pill or killing the fetus, would each involve no harm to a fetus, for a fetus cannot be harmed.
Mike
I must admit I do like your argument and cannot readily see a problem with K. However, just to provide a basis for a differnet line of discussion is there any reason to think that K is wrong? Imagine that God has decided to create the body a being such that it will be deformed (or allowed it to be deformed by not correcting the problem Himself) so that the soul that inhabits the body and other people that will come into contact with that being will have the opportunity to learn important life lessons. In this instance it would not be defensible to give the pill because it would interfere with God’s plan. Interfering with God’s plan by giving the pill would be harming the child and possibly others. Many people believe that evil is a test from God. It is seen as a necessary condition for some important goods. Would not taking the pill negate the importance of the test by negating God’s plan? Also, it would seem that if this is plausible, then the defective being would not have a claim against the parent, but should thank the parent for not interfering with God’s plan. The problem would be that if the mother does interfere then she will harm the child’s future life but not allowing it to take advantage of the opportunity to learn life’s lesson.
K1. If the mother does not harm her child in not taking the pill, then she would not harm her child in taking it's life.
Now, I will admit that without placing the issue within a context that involves God and what is possible re God’s plan that your argument seems to me to be sound.
These two statements are not equivalent. In the case Parfit has in mind, it seems, a future individual will have a legitimate grievance against the mother for her monstrous incompetence; but in the abortion case there will be no future individual to bring the grievance.
Adam,
This is more or less where I expected discussion to go. Here's my response. Either the fetus F is related in the right way to the child C (i.e. a way that makes the F and C the same being, or sufficiently close to the same being) or F is not related in the right way to C. For the sake of brevity put that as premise (1), using the identity sign. We could run the same argument assuming that F and C are two stages of the same being. It would just take longer.
1. (F = C) v ~(F = C)
When the mother fails to take the pill at t, it might be that C does not exist at t. If so she does not harm C. Her failing to take the pill causally affects F at t and F's development.
2. M's failing to take the pill causally affects F and F's development.
Now either M's actions harm F or they do not.
3. M harms F or M does not harm F.
4. M harms F (Assume)
5. F = C (Assume)
6. M harms C from 4,5 Leibniz's Law
So if M's actions (which causally affect F) constitute a harm to F and F = C, then M harms C.
But suppose M's actions do not harm F.
7. M does not harm F (Assume)
But assume that (5) is true.
5. F = C
In that case, if it is urged that M harms C, then we have a violation of Leibniz's law. If M harms C and C is related in the right way to F, then M harms F. So suppose that (5) is false. So, (8),
8. ~(F = C) (Assume)
But if (8) is true then (6) is false. What the mother did to F happened before the existence of C. So that (perhaps harm) to F cannot be considered a harm to C. C is not related to F in the right way for LL to hold.
And one could accept that the mother would harm her child, without also accepting she would harm her fetus.
Christian,
I reply to both you and Adam above. See the argument in more or less standard form.
John,
You're pointing up counterfactual worries for the problem of evil. Take any evil E such that the theist claims God is justified in permitting E. E might be the death of an infant that you arrived 20 seconds too late to prevent. Consider the closest world w to ours in which you are not 20 seconds late. Would it be bad for you to prevent E in w? I say no. But if it isn't bad for you to prevent it in w, then it is bad for God to permit it in @. So, I'm not so worried about these sorts of theistic objections to (K).
What happens if we modify the thought experiment a bit to include the idea that the defect that the fetus has will lead to its death before its birth. Let us further assume that the pill will only remove the possibility of its death and that the life of the being that results will be as described in the original case as if the pill has not been taken. Let us assume that the mother takes the pill because she believes that an avoidable death is a worse harm then living a life with severe disabilities. This is consistent with K.
However, all thought experiments are designed to make a point that is known to the creator of the experiment and is intended to draw out some intuitions from the reader that the author desires. In Parfit’s Pill the phrase “although not so adversely as to make the child's life utterly miserable, or not worth living at all” makes it not possible to consider the idea that the child’s life is utterly miserable and not worth living. To make (K) plausible one must accept this restriction so as not to be able to entertain the possibility that the resulting life is not worth living. But this begs the question in so far as without it being true that there is not life that is so utterly miserable and not worth living, (K) will not be a plausible moral principle.
The question is, is it possible for a real mother faced with the reality that her child will have severe disabilities to be able to come to the conclusion that that life would be utterly miserable and not worth living? Let us imagine a situation where a mother has to decide upon the overall quality of her child’s life and to decide if that life is worth living. Is it a life she would choose for herself? If she would not so choose, is it not then true that (K) is false because she believes that she would harm her child by taking the pill and allowing it to live. Ultimately the question becomes, why should we even consider Parfit’s thought experiment, for unless it is true that no life is so utterly miserable that it is not worth living, the problem that leads to (K) does not arise.
Mike,
Doesn't the problem you raise disolve if we agree that one can have an obligation to future individuals?
Suppose it is prior to conception that the mother has a condition that will inevitably lead to a serious birth defect to any child she conceives. She chooses to conceive and give birth anyway.
I think the child in this case can hold her mother to account, even though her not taking the drug occured prior to conception
I should have added, it is possible to harm future individuals, which might be more to the point.
I can bury a bomb in my backyard and harm people well into the future
I think the child in this case can hold her mother to account, even though her not taking the drug occured prior to conception
Hi Gordon,
If this is the non-pill case, Parfit argues that this is mistaken. The child would not have been born at all, had the mother not chosen to get pregnant. So, the child has no complaint, or so says Parfit.
If it is true that failing to take the pill prior to conception would constitute a harm to the child, then it would constitute a harm to the fetus, too. The causal consequences of not taking the pill terminate in the fetus, IF the fetus goes out of existence before the child comes into the existence. Or, so I argue in Parfit Pills Plus.
If she would not so choose, is it not then true that (K) is false because she believes that she would harm her child by taking the pill and allowing it to live.
The principle (K) says,
K. If the mother harmed her child in not taking the pill, then she would have harmed her child in taking it's life.
I'm not sure I see the counterexample to (K). K does not entail that every time a life is taken it constitutes a harm; the principle is restricted to situations like the one Parfit describes. It says if it is a harm in the Parfit case not to take the pill, then it is also a harm in that case to take the life of the fetus.