On Taking Lives

Mike,

Here is a case. At the cost of your life, you can save N or H. Let us suppose you have no special duties towards H. Then, I think, you have no duty to save H. It could also be that in a case like that, you are still permitted to save N. You could argue that if the N has lower moral status than H, then if you're going to put your life at risk for one of N and H, it has to be for H. But that is not obvious.

You can fix up the argument by supposing that there is no cost to you of saving N or H, and adding that to the antecedent in (4) of SNP+.

I am also not sure how (4) of NPT follows from SNP+.

The first part of my comment "Here is ... (4) of SNP+" referred to SNP+. The "I am also not sure" line referred to NPT, and yes, I should have said (3). Sorry for the confusion.

I wonder whether there is an ambiguity in (4) and (5) of the modified argument. For the argument to hold, the antecedent of (4) needs to read "If persons always had greater moral standing than non-persons" rather than "If there are ever cases in which persons had greater moral standing than non-persons"; and likewise, (5) needs to read "Being a person does not always confer. . ." rather than ". . .does not ever confer." The argument, it seems to me, does not tell against a claim, e.g., that it isn't permissible to save the Martian equivalent of a dog to a Martian that qualifies as a person.

Mike,

Two quick questions...I know 4 in NPT is simply asserted as a fact, but what constitutes a weighty moral reason and how is 'weight' attached to reasons?

I think this might have been mentioned before, but it seems the argument requires that the view in question not be "being a person is morally relevant" but "being a person is the *only* morally relevant fact.

The value that people place on newborns has, in my view, a lot to do with the potential these individuals have. It may be hard philosophically to see how this future potential gives anything value *now*, but I think that is what drives the intuition.

Suppose you knew the newborn would always remain a newborn, living a comfortable newbornish life for 69 years.

Is it obvious, in this case, that it is morally justifiable to save this perpetual Newborn over a 30something adult person?

I may well be missing your point, but it seems to me that if (4) is taken in the way you explain, then (5) does not follow, if, which I think you want, (5) means "Being a person does not by itself ever confer greater moral standing than being a non-person". Why couldn't someone who thought that the person/non-person distinction was sometimes important respond to you by saying, "You are right about the fetus example, but there are other cases where the distinction does matter"? You may well be correct that the personhood distinction doesn't underlie my Martian example; but accepting that one could in your example save the fetus doesn't require that one think the personhood/non-personhood distinction unimportant in the Martian case, and others like it. But if your conclusion was correct, and one thought one had an obligation to save the Martian person, one couldn't consistently think that the distinction
explained this intuition.

Mike
Thanks for two very interesting posts!!!

Does not this argument meet your criteria?
Saving Persons+
1a. On any standard list of morally relevant properties, a newborn N is clearly a non-person.
2a. On any standard list of morally relevant properties, a normal adult human being H is clearly a person;
3a. If persons have greater moral standing than non-persons, it would not be permissible for A to save N rather than H.
4a. Being a person confers greater moral standing than being a non-person. (intuitively known to be true)
5a. :. Given the exclusive options of saving the life of newborn N or saving the life of H, an disinterested agent A is not morally permitted to save N.

If we are relying solely on intuitions to generate the grounds for accepting a normative premise then 3a is warranted if there is an H that has that intuition?

Your position as stated, ["The interesting premise in Saving Non-persons+ is (3). But (3) seems clearly true; no one would consider blaming A for having done what he knows is a moral wrong in saving N (when I say 'no one', of course, my quantifier is implicitly restricted to those offering a disinterested, fair minded assessment of A's action). Consider then 'Non-persons Terminated'."] seems to me to beg the question. 3a may seem clearly true to a H using personhood as you suggest.

Also the phrase "no one would consider blaming A for having done what he knows is a moral wrong in saving N" seems incorrect unless we thought he wasn't doing something wrong in saving N, in which case what does it mean to say he knew he was doing wrong? Or does he simply not understand that saving N was not wrong. Anyway, I am still uncertain as to the soundness of your arguments, but my good will towards you remains strong.

You seemed to back away from a “weighty moral reason” in favor of “a very good reason”. This might put your argument on less sure footing because the two concepts function differently. I understand a weighty moral reason to be:

(WMR) The weight W of a morally relevant reason R is directly proportional to the probative force F it exerts on a moral claim M; a particular reason R qualifies as weighty if it exerts enough probative force F on a moral claim M to cause M to cross the threshold of genuine belief(i.e. assert M as true).

It is interesting that premises from SNP can be used to derive the conclusion in NPT that it is OK to kill an almost-newborn. But, the concept of “weighty moral reasons” is doing a lot of the heavy lifting in NPT; it is only if one has weighty moral reasons that premises 4, 5, and conclusion 7 go through. If moral reasons are conceived along (WMR) lines, then reasons are weighty in relation to their tendency to assert the truth of certain moral facts. Further, the probative force of a reason is determined by the total evidence E over which the reason quantifies. Different evidence will add different force to reasons in relation to different moral claims. Only if the force of the evidence, as instantiated by the reason, is enough to generate a true belief will the reason count as weighty. Thus, only then, will A be permitted to take the life of an H, N, or almost-newborn N. The upshot of this is that it holds agent A accountable to the total evidence of a given situation. The concept of “a very good reason” is unable to serve the same function.

A very good reason might be whatever reason a person can muster in support of a moral claim. If a person is in possession of a very good reason (i.e. a reason which is not necessarily linked to the total evidence of the situation but nonetheless seems very good), then one is permitted to perform the action (e.g. take the life of H) on grounds that might have been otherwise given the total evidence of the situation. Imagine a situation where Ted is walking by a burning house. The fire is the result of arson by a man named Octavo. Octavo waves over Ted to help him rescue people trapped in the house. As Ted enters the house he is led to a room where a newborn baby and a 33 year old normal adult human being are bound and gagged. Octavo holds a gun to Ted’s head, then he hands Ted a gun and tells him to shoot either the newborn or the adult in order to free the other. Octavo assures Ted that if he doesn’t perform the act all three of them will die. If he performs the act, only one will die and two will live.

Let’s imagine that Ted is a perfectly disinterested agent (i.e. his only interest is to do the right thing morally). Setting aside consequentialist considerations and considerations about Ted protecting his own life, wanting to do the right thing Ted realizes a very good reason to shoot the normal adult human being is that the adult does not have the future potential (in terms of livable years) that the newborn baby does. This echoes Gordon Knight’s concerns. Such a reason is a very good reason to shoot the normal adult human being. Because there is not a “normal” clause attached to the newborn let’s assume that the newborn has a congenital birth defect and will only live another 5 years max. This would be part of Ted’s total evidence and count as a reason to support the moral claim that the right thing to do is to shoot the newborn. But, Ted shoots the 33 year old and leaves the house with the newborn. On your account it would seem Ted has done the right thing if all that’s required is that one has a very good reason to take the life of a normal adult human being.

Yes, you're correct. I stipulated a plausible meaning for the concept of a "weighty moral reason", a concept your account seemed to rely on heavily. But, you clarified that all you were intending by "weighty moral reason" was a "very good reason". I tried to show that your non-controversial rendering is less effective than my rendering when it comes to the kinds of moral situations your argument seeks to handle. Preferring the concept of a weighty moral reason, though, still does not solve the problem of what constitutes a weighty moral reason and how weight can be attached to a reason. Because "a very good reason" seems to be found wanting are there any other plausible candidates for what you were getting at? Would the answer be found by cashing out a better version of the meaning of a “weighty moral reason”, perhaps a version that improves upon my stipulated version?

Mike
I do not see how (3a) and (3) are consistent with each other. Either personhood trumps or it does not and I am suggesting that other that having an intuition that (3a) or (3) is true you (nor I) have not given any reason to think that either of them are true or false. Using your criterion, if A1 has the intuition that (3a) is true then it will not be permissible for A1 to save N over H. However, if A2 has an intuition that (3) is true then A2 then it will be permissible for A2 to save N over H. Now, as you have asserted, your intuition leads you to think that (3) is clearly true. But, if that is the case then you need to explain why A1’s intuition that (3a) is true is not the correct intuition to have. It seems to me that you are relying on the consensus between those that have the same intuition much like Socrates relies on Crito agreeing that we should never do wrong and that to cause harm is to do wrong to ‘prove’ two of his major premises. But this approach only works if there is actual agreement. What I have been suggesting is that you need more to claim that your argument is sound then simply resting on agreement. (What would Socrates’ response have been had Crito said “No?”) I agree that your argument is valid, but until there is an argument for (3) that does not simply rest on what our intuitions are, I see no reason to merely agree that it is true. I do not think that a Kantian would accept it, at least without some explanation as to when it is permissible to discount personhood as the determining factor in what our obligations are. Furthermore, I think you need to make it clear why ‘permissibility’ is even normatively interesting when I think we should be discussing our obligations. Is that not the realm wherein the discussion of the relevance of personhood actually takes place? I do not think that one can claim that even if A is permitted to save N over H that A has an actual duty to save N over H. But if A1 thinks that her duties are determined by using the criteria of personhood then it must be the case that A1 is not permitted to save N over H. This is why I do not see any consistency between (3) and (3a).

Now, I will admit that I am inclined to think that (3) is correct and that (3a) is misguided, but my reason for accepting (3) is based on the relationship that A has to N and that all things being equal it is our relationships, along with our role responsibilities and feelings with particular N’s and H’s that determined our duties to them. I think it would be permissible for A to save her 3 month old child instead of an adult stranger, but the problem becomes more complex with the adult is her husband. I suppose if I do not have a relationship, other then proximity, to either N or H it makes little difference whom I save, as long as I save as many as I can.

Anyhow, you have generated a great discussion and given me something to think about. I hope you write a paper on this.

Mike
But they are not both consistent in the closest world you suggest. Now, I think that the conditional in (3a) is removed by (4a) in which case (3) would be false (the conclusion of my arguement on saving persons). I should probably reversed my (3a) and (4a). Anyway, how does this bear on my assertion that more is needed then simply aggreement on intuitions to warrant that intuition as being true so that the argument is sound as well as valid? What reasion do I have to think that (3) is true?

Great to see what your thinking about and writing these days Dr. Almeida. I always enjoyed your classes.

Duane Miller
BA Philosophy 99 UTSA

Mike
You write: “The reason you have to think that (3) is true is that, after careful consideration, it definitely seems true. That is how moral theory goes. It is evidence that a moral proposition is true that it strongly seems so. These are our "considered moral judgments", in Rawlsian terminology, and they serve to test moral theories for their coherence with such judgments.”

This seems to lead to relativism because what is accepted as being true is some coherence criterion that ties beliefs together base on what one has previously accepted as being true. Certainly we can modify our beliefs as experiences warrants, but if we simply rely on internal coherence with our other beliefs there is nothing to keep us out of a very relativistic moral theory in which case both (3) and (3a) could be true relative to which ‘web of belief’ (3) or (3a) belongs.

How do you handle the racist who says “non-whites are not morally equal to whites is something that strongly seems to be true, therefore it is true.” I do not think we want to claim that the only difference between the racist and non-racist is their intuitions about what is right. I would think that an adequate moral theory should be able to do a better job of handling these differences by being able to offer a reasonable explanation as to why what the intuitions of the racist imply is wrong. Not having read Rawls in a few years, if I recall correctly, he rejects any theory that relies solely on intuitions as the foundation of an adequate moral theory as not being able to prioritize our intuitions, or our considered judgments for that matter, in a lexical ordering stating the order in which they should be applied. Although an adequate moral theory needs to be consistent with what we think is true in a state of reflective equilibrium, it is not our considered judgments that result in our ability to do a lexical ordering of our ‘intuitions’ but rather our ability to make choices in an adequate defined state of impartiality that he describes in his thought experiment of the original position and the veil of ignorance. ‘Considered judgments in a state of reflective equilibrium’ in not the end point of moral theory, it is the starting point. My problem with your argument is that you do not provide this necessary perspective regarding how we justify our intuitions, but seem to be willing to simply think that if they are strongly thought to be true (or in a ‘state of reflective equilibrium’ to use Rawlsian terminology), then they are true. If that is the criterion then it seems that anything can be justified. But, his two principles are not simply the result of an intuition we have, but the result of a rational thought process that moves beyond simply intuitionism and provides a rational foundation for arguing against other belief systems that may be internally coherent.

Hi, Mike. I should say upfront that I haven't really read all the comments to your previous post, so sorry if this repeats things that were brought up. (I did quickly skim through them, and I *think* my question didn't come up.)

I had problems with the first premise of the first argument. I wonder whether I might not be understanding it correctly?

1. On any standard list of morally relevant properties, a newborn N is clearly a non-person.

There are *some* lists I've seen on which a typical newborn is clearly a non-person, but I think it's far from true that that's so on *any* standard list. In fact, I've heard those lists that would have the result that newborns are non-persons objected to precisely on those grounds. Sometimes the objectors take it that newborns are so clearly persons that this result of the theories in question (those that would rule them non-persons) is positively *absurd*. What often follows are alternative lists of what are the morally relevant properties that make for persons -- often involving such features as the potential to develop the features appealed to in the "absurd" accounts; membership in species, some important subset of which have the features appealed to in the "absurd" accounts; etc. -- something that gets newborns (and some other cases) into the realm of persons. (My use of quotes around "absurd" doesn't indicate that I think the accounts in question are actually correct: I don't think that I would go so far as to myself call them "absurd," but I do find them prima facie implausible, and I haven't seen what I take to be good reason to reverse my initial judgment.) Are these newborn-friendly lists somehow all "non-standard"?

Your first argument here (SNP+) looks like it's aimed at showing the moral unimportance of personhood. But in setting it up (in the previous post), you express doubts about the "standard" accounts of persons, and propose this:

"For the moment, though, let's assume the list is correct"

This suggests that the arugments here might be interpreted as operating under the stipulation that certain theories of personhood (theories that are often considered positively absurd by their opponents) are correct, and SNP+ should not be read as an argument against the moral importance of personhood, but rather that personhood *would* be unimportant if such crazed theories of personhood were correct. Is this in line with your intentions? And is your second argument here (NPT) also intended to take place under the highly dubious assumption that some "absurd" theory of personhood is correct? Well, I guess so, given the first premise of NPT.

So, are you actually endorsing such a "standard" theory of personhood, and relying on it in your argument? (But then what about your pessimism at the start of your earlier post? And talk about counter-intuitive! I don't think "Tyical newborn human babies are not people" would do very well on x-phi surveys!) Or is this intended as a reductio of such "standard" theories of personhood? Or are we just *stipulating* that we will (perhaps quite at variance with the ordinary meaning of the words) use "person" to mean something that satisfies the "standard" theories?

John...You raised the classic “no contact with reality” objection to coherentist methodology. This concern is sometimes imported into discussions about reflective equilibrium (RE), but this concern is assuaged by considering RE as formulated by Daniels (1996). As you stated: “if we simply rely on internal coherence with our other beliefs there is nothing to keep us out of a very relativistic moral theory.” On Daniels' RE model, coherence and consistency are the “minimum” criteria required for achieving reflective equilibrium, but our beliefs are not relativistic because they must be adjusted in response to significant input from prevailing theories (theories of the persons, theories of the role of justice in society, etc.). These background theories are the third element in the ordered triple of . Further worries about, as Appiah (2008) has stated, that RE is designed to, “simply give our old prejudices a haircut and a shave” are mitigated because the reasons supporting the background theories cannot be coextensive with the reasons supporting the considered judgments. That is, background theories must “go beyond” considered judgments. Achieving coherence between the ordered triple is how wide RE is reached. This is the only form of RE that is truly justified. Otherwise, it is subject to the concerns you raised. As Mike discussed RE (i.e. simple coherence between judgments and theories) your concerns are valid. Being charitable, though, I’ll assume that Mike meant Daniels’ extension of the method when he stated, “The Rawlsian approach to moral theory is not to be identified with Rawl's approach in TOJ. It is adapted from TOJ and used almost exclusively among those who do moral theory.”

Mike...I still think you have not answered John’s concern that: “My problem with your argument is that you do not provide this necessary perspective regarding how we justify our intuitions, but seem to be willing to simply think that if they are strongly thought to be true (or in a ‘state of reflective equilibrium’ to use Rawlsian terminology), then they are true.”

In response to him you simply reasserted the strength of your intuition that saving N is permissible. What John is after (I think) is not a reassertion of your confidence in your intuition and how because of its strength it would make sense to revise the moral theory in the direction of the intuition; rather, what he is after is the independent justification Daniels’ described at the heart of wide RE. So, what background theories of personhood are in your ordered triple , and how are the reasons that support these theories not coextensive with the reasons that support your intuition?

Mike and Keith
I do not mean to butt in, but I need to comment on this claim: "I'm certain those taking the survey would think it's a trick question of some sort, since the answer is (I think) pretty obvious. But notice that the response to this point in the comments above is more or less, who cares what most people think."

If one asks, "are typical newborn human babies people?” most people would probably answer in the affirmative. The problem is, are they interpreting 'people' to mean 'human being' or 'person?' And of course one could test that out. Your (Mike’s) argument rests on the notion that even though some would make a distinction between 'human being' and 'person' such that there may be persons who are not human beings and some human beings who are not persons, ultimately this distinction does not confer greater moral standing on persons over non-persons because of what the 3rd premise states.

The problem with studies of what people think is not "who cares." Rather it is why should we care. This is the point that I have been trying to drive home (ineffectively it appears). Even if 90% of the respondents agreed with the third premise all this demonstrates is that 90% agree with the 3rd premise. It has not demonstrated that there is any reason to think that it is true that can be used against the 10%. This is due, I think, to not having an error theory, (but I could be wrong in that). Without an error theory, simply saying that it rests on a strongly held intuition will not do because the 10% can claim their intuitions are also strongly held. Now of course we are dealing with what is ‘permitted’ and as I suggested before that seems weaker then saying that A must, or is obligated, save N, so that it might be possible to argue that if saving N is permitted, not saving N is equally permissible because saving N is not an obligation. Is that your point (or one of them)?

When you responded to me as follows: "What's called for is an explanation of what's gone wrong. What is not required is that I show that the racist intuition is actually wrong" you seem to be agreeing that some explanation of what went wrong with the dissenting % of people is needed. I do think that part of that explanation would be an explanation as to why your intuition is correct and the other not But, somewhere along the line we have to run out of "turtles" or it is simply "turtles all the way down" and we have answered nothing.

One last thing, what do mean by ‘disinterested’ when referring to A? If someone is completely disinterested why would she want to do anything towards N or H? Wouldn’t she need to have an interest in N to want to save it? If others have brought this up, I apologize.

Mike (et. al.): What a great couple of posts!!! I am enjoying the dialogue (and learning a thing or two).

Thanks very much for your very helpful answers to my posts; I think that I understand better what you mean by "isolating" being a person. You think that if it is permissible to save the fetus rather than the adult human being in your example, even though the adult is a person and the fetus isn't, then being a person does not morally count for anything. To my claim that being a person might still count in other cases, you say, since it doesn't count in this case, it can't be being a person simpliciter that counts in those cases, if it does.

I think your conclusion follows only if you assume that in assessing obligations to save lives (or, if one doesn't think the case involves an obligation, assessing moral praiseworthiness of saving lives), you should add up, or accumulate in some other other way, the factors that give the prospective beneficiary moral standing. Thus, since in your case the fetus and adult are tied in their human being score, if someone says you can save the fetus he must have added zero points for personhood. Otherwise, the adult, who is a person, would come out on top and there would be an obligation to save him. But one need not adopt this view of assessing obligations; even if you think it is the correct view, it is an additional premise. Thus, I don't think that your argument by itself shows that someone who thinks one can permissibly save the fetus must think that being a person doesn't simpliciter count as a morally relevant property.

Consider this case. You have a choice between rescuing two women, where the only relevant difference between them is that one is pregnant. If someone thinks it is permissible to rescue the woman who isn't pregnant, do you think that he is committed to the view that being a fetus does not confer moral standing?

Right, John. But just to be consistent, if you disagree, all that shows is that you disagree.

Mike: Of course, I agree with this. I guess my issue has always been that even if we take intuitions as evidence of something being true (I do accept this)is this ultimately sufficient to warrant us into thinking that what the intuitions reference is in fact true? The problem, for me, is that if relying on intuitions is what we are left with to support our claims, we can only demonstrate that X% agree and Y% disagree, but offer no explanation for explaining this disagreement other then a variance within the various conceptual schemas, all of which may be internally coherent. We can never find an objective basis for resolving the differences that would lead us to think that one is true and the other false. We seem to be committed to ‘turtles all the way down.” Is this not relativism?

First, if it's made more explicit the way more mature persons are embedded in a social network, the intuitions SNP+ trades become less clear. Here is premise 3 of SNP+, revised:

3*. Given the exclusive options of saving the life of N, a newborn in a family of five, or saving the life of H, a husband in a family of five, an disinterested agent A is morally permitted to save N.

I think it's far less clear that 3* would accurately match the preponderance of intuitions.

Second, premise 6 of NPT is vague. There certainly are numerous important moral differences between a newborn and a blastocyst. Is a blastocyst an almost-newborn?

Moreover, even if we're talking about the difference between a one-minute old newborn N and an almost-newborn N- TBD in t-minus one minute, the state of affairs in N's case arguably involves important moral differences: She has been embedded in a social world, felt her mother's touch and tasted from a much fuller breadth of sentient experience. Perhaps these differences are not dispositive. But they aren't nothing.