July 2008 Archives

Sympoze

I just launched a social bookmarking/content promotion site for philosophers. I'm calling it Sympoze.

We already have quite a few users signed up who are testing out the site. Everything seems to be working well. If you're philosophy Ph.D. or a graduate student in philosophy email me, and I'll set you up with an account.

If you're not familiar with social-bookmarking/content promotion, it's a great way for a group of people to collectively submit, organize, and rank online content. It then becomes a great way to find high quality online content. (Digg and Reddit are good examples).

A Digg-like site where user accounts are limited to philosophers gives everyone a great way to find (and collectively promote) great philosophy content online.

Note that everyone can view the submitted content and the rankings. The only features that are restricted to philosophers and require user accounts are submitting stories, voting, and the other social network features.

We now move on to Tooley's opening statement in Knowledge of God. My entry will discuss pp. 70-108. Next week's entry will discuss the rest of the chapter, which is a detailed presentation of Tooley's version of the problem of evil.

Let me start with a brief overview of Tooley's argument in pp. 70-108. Section I, "Some Preliminary Issues," discusses a smorgasbord of issues. In it, Tooley states that he is concerned with arguing against the existence of God, conceived as an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person. He seems to think that his arguments will also establish that there is no very powerful, very knowledgeable, and morally very good person. He then argues that it is far from clear that the gods that are worshipped by historical religions can be identical with God because these gods are arguably not perfectly good. He cites a variety of standard "difficult passages" in the Bible, as well as the doctrine that hell is a place of eternal torment where many people will in fact end up. Consequently, Tooley thinks that Judaism, Islam, and Christianity all face more forceful versions of the argument from evil since they not only have to deal with the standard problem of why their god doesn't intervene to prevent evils, but they also have to deal with the fact that their religious texts describe their gods as acting in immoral ways for what we would regard as poor reasons. The following quote sums up Tooley's view about these religions: "the existence of the god of Protestant Fundamentalism, or of Roman Catholicism, or of Islam, is not something that I would welcome, for it would mean that the world, while certainly not the worst imaginable, would be very bad indeed" (to be fair, I should add that Tooley says he would welcome the existence of God in the sense of an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being because the existence of such a being, "greatly increases, at the very least, the chances that the world is a very good one" (both quotes are on p. 74)). Finally, Tooley states that he will be arguing that the epistemic probability of the existence of God is low and he argues that it is better to argue about the epistemic probability of God's existence than about whether belief in God is warranted.

William Lane Craig wrote the cover story for this month's edition of Christianity Today. It can be found here. He speaks of a renaissance of Christian/theistic philosophy in secular academia, he reviews some of the main arguments for God's existence, and he talks about the relevance of arguments in today's "postmodern culture".

I've read about the need for good PR for philosophy over at Leiter's blog. One thing I'm happy about is that, in Christian circles, there's been an increasing amount of positive PR for philosophy, primarily by way of Christian apologetics. Lee Strobel's books The Case for Faith and The Case for a Creator feature interviews (and philosophical discussions) with professional philosophers such as William Lane Craig, J.P. Moreland, and Robin Collins. I rarely meet Christians nowadays who have never heard of Strobel's books, and a surprising number of them have actually read and enjoyed the books. Other Christian apologists who are not active, professional philosophers (e.g., Norman Geisler, Ravi Zacharias, Gregory Koukl, etc.) all speak with high regard for the value of philosophy. More recently, Pastor Timothy Keller's very popular book The Reason for God makes use of arguments that draw right out of the professional literature (mostly from Plantinga and Alston). I've found that many Christians walk away from reading/hearing these apologists with a higher appreciation for philosophy. Some enjoyed the arguments so much that they went into a full time study of philosophy. (I believe that many Talbott graduates fit this description.)

So I'm happy that there is this PR for philosophy in Christian circles. We can hope that this will contribute to good PR for philosophy in society generally!

In this section, Plantinga responds to Tooley's response to his (Plantinga's) opening statement. Got it? Obviously, we're deep in the dialectic at this point. Plantinga focuses on two issues. First, he argues that Tooley has not adequately addressed his complaint that material beings cannot think. Second, he takes issue with Tooley's response to the evolutionary argument against naturalism.

In the previous two weeks both Andrew and Kevin have detailed Plantinga's three pronged attack on naturalism as an alternative to theism. In this post I'll try to sketch the main thrust of Michael Tooley's response, though much of what Tooley has to say by way of criticism has come up in the comments to earlier posts. There are number of deep issues that I don't touch on, but that I'd be happy to discuss in the comments.

P.Z. Myers's Retaliation

| 27 Comments

In a story that concerns the interesting question of how we should take into account the beliefs (especially the religious beliefs) of others that we take to be false in deciding how to treat those people, a University of Central Florida student walked out of a Catholic Mass on June 29 with a consecrated communion wafer. Given their beliefs, this is a rather big deal to Catholics, some of whom seem to have reacted very strongly against the student. Bill Donohue and the Catholic League became involved, calling on the University to take strong action against the student. The biologist, P.Z. Myers, of the University of Minnesota, Morris came to the defense of the student in this post of Myers's blog, Pharyngula, and called on readers to steal consecrated wafers from Catholic churches so that he could publicly desecrate them, posting pictures on the web. Donohue and the Catholic have taken note of Myers's blog post, and seem to have begun something of a campaign against him. From what I understand, despite some very negative encounters with some of those who protested his actions, the student himself was nonetheless able to hear the appeals of others who explained to him why the matter was so important to them, and he responded humanely, returning the wafer.

Readers here may have heard of this case already, because it entered the world of philosophy blogs when Brian Leiter wrote about it in this blog post. However, Leiter's position seems to me very one-sided, so I thought I would post a different perspective. (Thanks to Matthew Mullins and Prosblogion for allowing me to use this forum. For those who don't know, I should make clear that I am a Christian, but not a Catholic, so readers can know where this commentary is coming from.)

In particular, Leiter seems to me to go way too easy on Prof. Myers. To put my opposition in context, please note that I do not support any efforts to get Prof. Myers fired or disciplined at his job over this incident, that I agree with Prof. Myers that the reaction against the Florida student by many was too strong, and that I find it admirable that Prof. Myers would come to the student's defense. However, Myers's proposed retaliation, which would hurt many Catholics who are completely innocent in this whole matter, strikes me as extremely nasty. To my thinking, it is morally more problematic than anything Donohue has yet done in this case. I can understand those who might disagree with that comparative judgment of mine, but have a hard time understanding the judgment of those who see the matter as so one-sidedly favoring Myers as Leiter seems to see things.

Myers's retaliation hurts Catholics because of beliefs they hold that he disagrees with, and, admittedly, it's not easy to say, in general terms, just how we should take the beliefs of others into account in deciding how to treat them. However, Myers's retaliation seems so aimed at hurting innocent parties and so incapable of producing any good, and, well, just so nasty, that this seems an easy call. So readers can judge for themselves, here's the relevant paragraph of Myers's post (follow the link above to read the whole thing):

So, what to do. I have an idea. Can anyone out there score me some consecrated communion wafers? There's no way I can personally get them -- my local churches have stakes prepared for me, I'm sure -- but if any of you would be willing to do what it takes to get me some, or even one, and mail it to me, I'll show you sacrilege, gladly, and with much fanfare. I won't be tempted to hold it hostage (no, not even if I have a choice between returning the Eucharist and watching Bill Donohue kick the pope in the balls, which would apparently be a more humane act than desecrating a goddamned cracker), but will instead treat it with profound disrespect and heinous cracker abuse, all photographed and presented here on the web. I shall do so joyfully and with laughter in my heart. If you can smuggle some out from under the armed guards and grim nuns hovering over your local communion ceremony, just write to me and I'll send you my home address.

Is he perhaps just joking? To some extent, this is clearly all a joke to Myers. But it doesn't seem to be just a joke in the sense that it's clear nobody should really steal the items and send them to him. The Washington Times reports:

In an interview Friday, Mr. Myers said he already had received "a double-digit number" of positive responses, from people saying that they would try to get consecrated Catholic hosts for him and that the writer already had one.

"Enough that I could sculpt a statue of them," he said, declining to say what he'd do to desecrate them. "I've got a few ideas, but I want to keep the surprise."

I hope that this is a joke at least to the extent that Myers won't follow through on his sick plan, but it will be very revealing to see people's reactions if he does. In any case, if a joke, this would seem a rather nasty joke -- perhaps to be compared with those who would publicly ask for others to raid burial grounds sacred to Native Americans and send them remains so that they might publicly desecrate them. ("They're just frackin' bones!") "Wickedly funny"?

For the record, I'll paste below the fold the e-mail I sent to Prof. Myers on July 11. It now appears to me too smug and sanctimonious in tone, but I stand behind the position there expressed:

Of Plantinga's three anti-naturalist arguments in this chapter, I found his argument against materialism the most persuasive (for me). Perhaps it is because I very much strongly share the intuition he is expressing. Consider the works of philosophers of mind like Colin McGinn (on cognitive closure), Joseph Levine (explanatory gap), Ned Block (the China argument), and John Searle (the Chinese room argument). It seems to me that the intuition that Plantinga is pointing us to is what is driving many of the arguments of these philosophers of mind, and I find that this intuition compels me against materialism.

The crux of Plantinga's argument against materialism, I think, is in this passage (where, in talking about contents, he's talking about belief-contents):

Call for Papers

The Society of Christian Philosophers
Pacific Division

presents

Mind, Body, and Free Will
October 30th, 2008 – November 1st, 2008
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, CA

Plenary Speaker: Richard Swinburne (Oxford University)

Plantinga gives three main arguments against naturalism in the opening chapter of Knowledge of God. These are:

  1. naturalism cannot accommodate the idea of proper function (and since warrant essentially involves proper function, if naturalism were true then no one would have knowledge),

  2. naturalism leads directly to Humean skepticism, the condition in which you have a defeater for whatever you believe and cannot sensibly trust your cognitive faculties, and

  3. naturalism cannot accommodate belief; if naturalism were true, no one would believe anything (19).
The first of these was the focus of Andrew's earlier post in this series. Below the fold, I want to summarize and raise some points about (ii) and (iii).

Plantinga's Hitler Case

| 17 Comments

Suppose Hitler won the war. Furthermore, there were certain nonAryans who had a mutation such that everything they saw was tinted green and caused a harsh pain. Let 'G' denote this new property of their eyes. Hitler enjoyed this suffering, so he allowed these nonAryans to survive. After a few generations, nonAryans with eyes like ours died out, and the nonAryans with these mutated eyes continued to survive. This mutation spread throughout the population.

Consider one such creature, m. Plantinga asks, "But wouldn't it be wrong (not to mention crazy) to say that m's visual system is functioning properly? Or that its function is to produce both pain and a visual field that is uniformly green? Or that the resistance medical technicians who desperately try to repair the damage are interfering with the proper function of the visual system?" (p. 26) This example seems to work against any evolutionary theory of proper function.

Here's one worry for this example.

This is another post about the first thirty pages of Chapter 1 for our Knowledge of God reading group. I hope Wednesday isn't too early to start chiming in with posts. I'm going to focus on that item (iii) that Andrew Moon mentioned in his first post.

In chapter one of Knowledge of God, Alvin Plantinga argues that naturalism cannot account for proper function. According to Plantinga, proper function requires intelligent design.

The Proper Function Argument Against Naturalism
  1. If naturalism is true, then there is no proper function (with respect to human beings).
  2. There is proper function (with respect to human beings).
  3. Therefore, naturalism is not true.
    (Note: I'm oversimplifying this. I'm translating all of Plantinga's talk about naturalism can't accomodate proper function" to "there is no proper function" - this oversimplification has no bearing on the puzzle I want to raise.)

I'm interested in the assumption that motivates (1). The thesis is roughly:

Proper Function Requires Design Thesis

(P) If S functions properly, then S has an intelligent designer.
(P) is incompatible with what seems to be perfectly acceptable talk about God. It seems to make sense to talk about God functioning properly - especially if we're working with the concept proper function that we all have and use in ordinary life (p. 23).

If God exists, then God functions properly. If God functions properly, then (P) is false - because presumably God does not have a designer. 

I think the main problem for the argument I have given will be whether or not we can sensibly talk about God functioning properly.&title=<$MTEntryTitle$>','resizable,location,menubar,toolbar,scrollbars,status'));">

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews today published William Rowe's review of Plantinga & Tooley's Knowledge of God. A remarkably nice bit of timing on the part of NDPR!

AdSpace

Archives

Powered by Movable Type 5.04