Welcome to the Knowledge of God Prosblogion reading group! Each week, we will read a section of the book, and the section breakdown and ordering is as follows:
C. 1 (1-30), C. 1 (30-69), C. 4, C. 5, C. 2 (70-108), C. 2 (108-150), C. 3, C. 6.
Each Monday, a different Prosblogion contributor will write an opening post. Other contributors can post on that section two or three days later in the week. Everybody is welcome to read along in the book and comment.
It's a pleasure to kick-off all the fun. Let me summarize the main claims that I take Plantinga to argue for in my section.
I) If God exists, then it is likely that many people know that God exists.
II) If Christian belief is true, then it is likely that many people know that it is true.
III) If naturalism is true, then no biological organs function properly or improperly.
Plantinga's defends (I) and (II) as follows:
the proper functionalist conditions are necessary and sufficient for warrant; if the antecedents of (I) and (II) are true, then theistic and Christian belief are likely to meet those proper functionalist conditions; so theistic and Christian belief have warrant.
Although Plantinga specifies his argument to his own proper functionalist conditions (11-12), and while I myself think that something like his proper functionalist theory is true, I must painfully recognize that not everybody agrees. However, this isn't a problem, because it seems to me that Plantinga could have inserted any contemporary theory of knowledge into the argument, and (I) and (II) would have still come out true. So I have two questions:
Question 1: Given that Plantinga's proper functionalist theory of warrant is true, are there any good objections to Plantinga's arguments for (I) and (II)?
Question 2: Is there any plausible theory of knowledge according to which (I) and (II) do not come out true?
Note that if (I) and (II) are true, then one can't attack the reasonableness or rationality of Christian belief apart from its truth (see p. 13). That's a big deal.
I'll make some jabs on (I) and (II) by drawing from the literature on the semantics of knowledge. If contextualists are right, then whether it is correct to attribute knowledge to a Christian will depend on factors like the salience of error or the stakes for the attributor. If I am constantly worried about objections to Christian belief, it may be false when I say that "Billy Graham knows that Christianity is true", but it may be true when my unworried Grandma says the same thing.
This doesn't seem to me to be a problem for attributions of knowledge that God exists or Christianity is true any more than any other attributions of knowledge. So I don't see any special problem for (I) and (II) so far.
Suppose we follow the invariantists (McGrath, Fantl, Hawthorne, Stanley) who say that high stakes for a believer can make it so that one does not know that p, i.e., it will be harder for S to know that Christianity is true if there is much at stake for S for believing it. One might think that these theories predict that it will be harder for Christians in persecuted countries to know that Christianity is true because of what is at stake for them (possible death by torture). Here, it might make a difference as to which invariantist we're talking about.
Stanley seems to think that stakes the agent is ignorant of can make a difference to whether one knows (Knowledge and Practical Interests, 5). Now if Christian belief is true, then the amount that is actually at stake for accepting Christian belief is very little compared to all the good that results from accepting it on faith (according to Plantinga's model, p. 12). So on Stanley's view, I think that there wouldn't be such high stakes for the Christian, and so the Christian would still know.
Hawthorne seems to think that what matters for knowledge that p is whether one can use p as a premise in practical reasoning (Knowledge and Lotteries, 176) and Fantl & McGrath think that what matters is whether one is rational to act as if p (Phil. Review 2002). So I think that the question here is whether it is always rational for a Christian to act on his Christian belief (if Christian belief is true).
But it seems to me that if Christian belief is true, then it is likely that it is rational to act on one's belief that Christianity is true. Now for some, a little bit of temptation or the alluring pleasures of sin might make it seem costly to continue holding to one's Christian belief. Or in many countries, one puts their life on the line for their Christian belief; it does seem that the amount of evidence one needs in order to continue knowing that Christianity is true must be quite high for them (because there would be a higher degree of evidence needed to be able to act rationally on one's Christian belief).
Here, however, we can make another appeal to Plantinga's model, which states that Christian belief is sustained by the Holy Spirit's producing faith by way of divine revelation. If potential loss of one's life makes it harder for believers in countries of persecution to have the requisite degree of evidence (or justification or whatever) required to know (or to be rational in acting on one's belief), it is also the case that God could produce higher degrees of faith in one's life to meet this requirement. Not only is it possible that this happen, but it seems (if Christianity is true) that this is what does happen. I have encountered the strongest amounts of faith and degrees of conviction from people who have suffered the most for their Christian belief (mostly, these were Christians from other countries or Christians doing ministry work in the inner city or...). They seem to know more firmly than I the truths of central messages of Christianity. This is what I've gathered a posteriori. But just by way of a priori reasoning, it does seem that God would produce enough faith in an individual so that it is always rational to act on one's belief in Christianity.
So supposing that the invariantists are correct, whether one continues to know that Christianity is true will be, to a large degree, dependent on the Holy Spirit's continuing to help produce one's degree of faith. And it is likely that this is actually happening if Christian belief is true. (I'm sure that reflections on the arguments for Christian belief could also help one have the evidence/justification necessary to be able to rationally act on one's belief. This is an important component too.)
So I don't think that there are any problems for (I) and (II) from the recent developments in the semantics of knowledge. If anybody can see another problem for (I) and (II) (or a problem with what I've just said), I'm all ears!
I have many thoughts on (III), but I think it's a different enough topic that someone else can post on it later in the week; if nobody else does, I probably will.
Hey Andrew,
You wrote:
It seems to me that Plantinga could have inserted any contemporary theory of knowledge into the argument, and (I) and (II) would have still come out true.
On its face, I don't see good reason to accept both of these claims. On most contemporary theories of knowledge (including Plantinga's, right?), someone can fail to know something if they possess undermining defeaters. I don't see any good argument for the claim that if God exists, it is unlikely that people hold undermining defeaters for their theistic beliefs. Now, you might think as a matter of contingent fact such defeaters do not exist, but that's an extra step.
It's a minor point. I'll be interested to see what you have to say about III.
If contextualists are right, then whether it is correct to attribute knowledge to a Christian will depend on factors like the salience of error or the stakes for the attributor....This doesn't seem to me to be a problem for attributions of knowledge that God exists or Christianity is true any more than any other attributions of knowledge.
Recall Stanley's example of getting to the bank on time, given bills that are coming due. Certainly, Christian's are in the same boat. Indeed, it is comparatively much more important to get the Christianity question right, since you have a lifetime of meaningless theistic practice or an eternity of regret, if you're wrong. Either one trumps not paying a bill on time. So the stakes seem pretty high in the Christian case.
Mike you raise an interesting point. What if the stakes are high for religiouse belief and apply that to inductive arguments against God's existence? That is to say, it is high stakes for christians to give up their belief, therefore any apparent evils may not be sufficient evidence for giving up belief in God (if you're wrong and decide to give up your belief based upon fallible justification you could spend eternity in hell), but that apparent evils happen may be enough for me to prevent evils in my every day life. The difficulty I have with Fantl, McGrath, Stanley and other pragmatic encroachers is that they differ on why exactly one doesn't know in high stakes cases; or what exactly is going on in these high stakes cases. Is it that the epistemic agent loses confidence in his belief? Or does what counts as "sufficient evidence" change as the stakes go up? Maybe both?
As for more semantic versions of contextualism, can one actually attribute knowledge to God, if we are fallible, human, knowers? It seems that me saying "God knows everything" or "God is a supreme knower" or "God knows my pain" is a false statement if contextualism is true since I am never in a God context. The statement I say would be attributing to God human knowledge. But God doesn't have human knowledge, he has God knowledge. This might be a problem for knowing God, since part of knowing God is knowing a supreme knowing being knows most things.
Hi Andrew!
Like Clayton, I can't wait to see what you have to say about iii.
By the way, this sort of "reading group" project is a great idea. My own efforts at starting a philosophy of nursing blog have languished due to non-participation by my (so-called) friends; may something like this could kick-start it again.
Is it that the epistemic agent loses confidence in his belief? Or does what counts as "sufficient evidence" change as the stakes go up? Maybe both?
I think F&M are opposed to describing their examples as losses of knowledge due to losses of confidence. As Hawethorne (?) observes, our knowledge ascription does not depend on whether the subject is a stick to his guns sort of guy or not. The model they seem to like is one on which the level of evidence sufficient to put one in a position to know can shift in response to practical matters (but practical reasons themselves seem not to constitute reasons to believe on their view--the reasons to believe are all going to be truth-related considerations.)
As for your other remark concerning stakes and arguments from evil, I think the point might be right. I'm not sure about contextualism and knowledge ascriptions to God. Why would it matter whose knowledge it is? Presumably a contextualist can say that we make true knowledge ascriptions to dogs (He knows his master is home.)
Clayton,
I think you're right about the defeaters point, and I was wondering whether I should get into it in my opening post. In the Philip Quinn vs. Plantinga literature on properly basic belief in God, one of the things that come out is that while ordinary lay people who haven't been exposed to all the religious diversity or post modernism or certain types of evil might not have defeaters. On Plantinga's model, they come out as knowing (so I and II still come out true for many people). But Quinn points out that that doesn't help us in academia who have all sorts of potential defeaters or arguments against Christian belief. I suppose that's why Plantinga spends so much time in the last 4 or 5 chapters of Warranted Christian Belief trying to respond to those defeaters.
Hi Mike,
Just for the record, the Bank case is DeRose's, although Stanley later makes use of them.
I actually didn't catch exactly how you were trying to apply the Bank case to Christian belief. Also, if you were referring to Stanley's version of the bank case, well, Stanley had five versions of the Bank case, and I'm not sure which one you were talking about.
I also wasn't sure if you were talking about Christians as attributors of knowledge or the subjects of knowledge. And while you were talking about contextualists, it seemed to me that you might be talking about the invariantists. (But I dealt with the invariantist points in the other paragraphs, and much of what I said there about how Christians could still have knowledge when there are high stakes could apply to attributors of knowledge.)
Yes, right, I do have in mind the invariantists and what you say about them vis a vis belief in Christianity. You say this,
Suppose we follow the invariantists (McGrath, Fantl, Hawthorne, Stanley) who say that high stakes for a believer can make it so that one does not know that p, i.e., it will be harder for S to know that Christianity is true if there is much at stake for S for believing it.
I think there are high Christian stakes that have nothing to do with threats from others for having Christian belief. I said this,
. . . it is comparatively much more important to get the Christianity question right, since you have a lifetime of meaningless theistic practice or an eternity of regret, if you're wrong. Either one trumps not paying a bill on time. So the stakes seem pretty high in the Christian case.
Right, Stanley uses a number of "getting to the bank" cases, but I'm not sure we need get into Stanley scholarship to make the point here. Let's see. It is supposed to be relevant to whether I know the bank is open on Saturday that I have an important bill to pay (say, I'm the high stakes person). So there is something riding on my being wrong about the bank hours.
The analogous situation in the Christian case is that there is something riding on my being wrong about Christianity. If I'm wrong about the bank being open on Saturday, then a bill doesn't get paid (or I get an overdraft or something). Bad news. But if I'm wrong about Christianity being true, then either I've spent a lifetime in pointless theistic practice (very bad news) or I'll have an eternity of regret (also very bad news). Well, how so?
Suppose I'm a believer and I'm wrong about Christianity. In this case, I wasting my time with all of this pointless worshipful behavior. All the genuflecting is doing nothing but making my pants baggy. But suppose I'm a non-believer and I'm wrong about Christianity. In that case I'll spend eternity regreting my folly. I don't say that I'll wind up in the storied hell-for-non-believers, but I will deeply regret what I've done.
So whether I'm a believer or not, there's something very important at stake if I don't get my Christian belief right. And what's on the line seems more important than making sure a bill gets paid. Let me know if that's any clearer.
Mike,
Okay, hopefully this won't get gobbled up. Yep, it's clear, and here's my response. In my opening post, I granted that high stakes (such as from persecution or having to give up certain sins) might make it so that it's harder for a believer to have the evidence required for knowledge. But then I said that if Christian belief is true, then, as is outlined in Plantinga's model, the Holy Spirit will produce in the Christian the faith required to have warranted belief. I'll add that this may be either directly in the believer's heart, but it may be by way of events in the believer's life, the believer's time of prayer, her time of fellowship w/other believers, her having a deep and meaningful time of worship and experiencing of God, or through her time reading the Bible or experiencing nature. This might all seem fanciful, but if Christian belief is true, then not only does it seem possible that this happens, but it seems that this is what actually happens to believers all around the world.
(I also mentioned that the evidence needed for warranted belief might even come about (as I already mentioned) by way of our thinking a lot about Tim O'Connor's recent version of the cosmological argument or our thinking about the historical arguments for the resurrection of Jesus.)
Now you mentioned some other costs for taking on Christian belief: meaningless times of worship and baggy pants. But couldn't the above considerations apply just as well here? It seems to me to be so. So I don't see any problem for I and II coming from invariantist considerations.
Andrew,
Yes, I recall you saying that. It looks like you agree with invariantists (or are willing to take the practical considerations seriously) and urge that if Christianity is true and Plantinga is right the additional evidence needed (in high stakes cases) to believe God exists will be forthcoming. Do I have that right?
But doesn't your view imply that if anyone is having difficulty retaining his belief in Christianity or getting to a belief in Christianity, then that constitutes evidence that Christianity is false? On the view you seem to be advancing, there should never be a worry about having sufficient evidence for Christian belief, since the holy spirit is always to the epistemological rescue. But this is difficult to believe, since fallen away Christians could not be more common. So the holy spirit response to the high stakes challenge is not so convincing. Maybe I've missed something.
Hi Mike,
So we want to know if the beliefs of Christians are warranted given that they're true, i.e., we want to know if Christians know it's true given that it's true. I phrased it a little bit differently in (II), but I think it gets at the same point.
Now for some Christians' beliefs, where their belief would be harder to form because of high stakes, I think that the Holy Spirit produces faith in the believer. And even if we took out the practical interests stuff, it is still an important part of Plantinga's Aquinas-Calvin model that the Holy Spirit plays a crucial role in the forming of Christian belief. So your objection (which I still need to get clear on) might apply to the model even apart from considerations about practical interests.
Now I don't get your criticism. Do you think I'm saying that the Holy Spirit will always produce this faith in everybody? Well, I don't think that. I said if Christian belief is true, then the Holy Spirit is producing faith in believers around the world all the time. What's the problem with that? Of course I don't think that the Holy Spirit produces such faith in everyone; I'm not even sure if the Holy Spirit can produce it in everyone. But just to be clear, that's not my position. I'm inclined to think that in some cases, there are other necessary conditions for faith in addition to the Holy Spirit's work (e.g., an openness of heart, a surrender of will, an acknowledgement of sin, something else?), and in other cases, we simply don't know why God's doing what he's doing. But I don't think that this counts against (II). So I hope I've made my position clearer.
Andrew, you say this,
. . . Well, I don't think that. I said if Christian belief is true, then the Holy Spirit is producing faith in believers around the world all the time. What's the problem with that?
Ok good, that's exactly what I took you to be saying. Here's the problem (since you asked me). If you want me to take seriously the holy spirit response to a very real epistemic problem (that is, if you're not just speculating that the holy spirit could work in this way and if you are not just using the holy spirit response as a sort of theistic defense) then we really need some explanation for why there are so very many fallen away Christians. Doesn't that make sense? I mean, why are so many Christians simply not getting the message? I'm not talking about non-Christians. Why do so many Christians find it so difficult, so often, to believe the Christian message? I'd go so far as to say that any thinking Christian would find it very difficult, very often, to believe this message. Plantinga himself finds it difficult to believe the Christian message, if his autobigraphy is to be believed! These seem like obvious questions to ask, IF you want to use the holy spirit response to solve a very real epistemic problem. I don't know, don't these seem like serious worries for the holy spirit response? Or did I misunderstand you again?
Mike,
I'm afraid I still don't see the problem. It might be good to make sure, though, that a bit of progress has been made. You would take the problem you are raising to be a problem for Plantinga's model(which appeals to the Holy Spirit), right? And this is a problem that can be raised independently of anything about practical interests? (Notice that you didn't even have to mention practical interests in your last comment.) Then if your problem is a problem, it's also a problem (arguably) for Aquinas and Calvin (from whom Plantinga draws his account), and possibly for the Bible and most of traditional Christian theology. In all of these, I believe that the Holy Spirit plays some significant role in our coming to really believe (or continue to believe) the main parts of the gospel. So you've got something very substantive and interesting as a problem if you're right. (Btw, I got a whiff of dejavu; my discussion w/you in that last post about EAAN was another example where you saw a problem that I didn't take to be a problem.)
Let's take this a step at a time.
1) If Christian belief is true, then it is likely that the Holy Spirit plays an important role in many people's coming to have Christian belief.
Do you have a problem with this proposition?
Apologies for weighing in late, but I just received my copy of the book today. I have to say that I think it's a loss that Plantinga doesn't spend more time spelling out his positive epistimic account. One of the things I find troubling is that Plantinga doesn't give much of an account for Moon's proffered proposition. Plantinga says that knowledge of God is a three part process 1) the establishment of the testimony of the scripture, 2) the invitation and inner working of the Holy Spirit, and 3) the repair of the Sensus Divinitatis. Plantinga places the emphasis on 2 as producing faith (certain belief) in a proper functioning fashion. I'm puzzled by this in a number of regards.
1. Why isn't 1 sufficient for knowledge? We typically think that we can have warrant and knowledge transmission via testimony, and arguably, most people come to know God via testimony. Why does the work of the HS need to figure in here?
2. Plantinga first claims that warrant is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties; faculties that are reliable in the proper environment. Plantinga then goes on to say that the proper functioning of the HS isn't part of our "natural and original epistemic endowment." However, if that is the case then how is it that a believer is warranted if the belief doesn't come from their own cognitive achievement? What is the connection between the work of the HS and the believers cognitive function? We can imagine a belief forming virus who's proper function is to implant the knowledge the FSM in the minds of its hapless victims, but we wouldn't call that knowledge.
Matthew,
A more full and complete account is in Warranted Christian Belief, which I left at my other home. (Someone w/the book could probably fill in more of the details.)
Mike,
As an additional point, I just noticed that on Plantinga's account, the Holy Spirit produces faith in response to the accepting of the offer of salvation (p. 9). But of course, up until then, the Holy Spirit is doing a lot of work in the believer. I doubt that this helps much w/the problem.
Andrew,
I read the footnote pointing to WCB too. Part of my point, besides wanting the answers, is that you might expect more of the details to be filled out here in this book. He isn't at this point doing much for the case of one having knowledge of God.
This is a comment on how pragmatic encroachment may affect the truth of Andrew's (II). I wonder if Pascal's wager plays an interesting role here. A premise of the wager is that believing that God doesn't exist or suspending judgment about God's existence has worse consequences for me if God exists, then believing that God exists if he doesn't. So, not believing that God exists (i.e. disbelieving or suspending judgment) is riskier than believing. Suppose this is true for theism in general and Christianity in particular (nonbelievers either go to hell or they don't have anywhere near as fulfilling an afterlife for eternity). If increased pragmatic risk for taking a doxastic attitude produces a higher standard for being justified or warranted in taking that attitude, then it follows that in order to be justified or warranted in not believing that God exists, one needs to have better evidence (or more of whatever is required for justification or warrant) to either disbelieve or suspend judgment than one needs to believe that God exists. Furthermore, since belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment are the only doxastic attitudes one can take towards a proposition, it seems that if the justification or warrant standards for two of the three go up, the standards for the other attitude must go down.
So, if there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, it looks like theists in general (thus including Christians) will actually have an easier time coming to know theism (or Christianity) if it is true (since they will have an easier time being justified or warranted). So, pragmatic encroachment doesn't at all challenge (II), it in fact supports it.
Furthermore, since belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment are the only doxastic attitudes one can take towards a proposition, it seems that if the justification or warrant standards for two of the three go up, the standards for the other attitude must go down.
Joshua, I wonder why you say this. Certainly I might have finer-grained attitudes. My betting behavior might well reveal that my credence for God's existing is .52. Is it true that I believe simpliciter that God exists? I don't know. Maybe I just borderline believe simpliciter that God exists.
A premise of the wager is that believing that God doesn't exist or suspending judgment about God's existence has worse consequences for me if God exists, then believing that God exists if he doesn't.
This is interesting. But I don't think that I havev to believe that God exists to get all of the benefits in Pascal's Wager. In fact all I need is mixed strategy that places some finite positive probability on God existing in order to have an infinitely positive expected utility. So, a credence for God existing of, say, .0001, has the same expected utility as the credence is 1 for God existing. This is Hajek's line, and it seems plausible.
Matthew,
Hmm, I wonder why he even went into all of the specifically Christian points in the first place (since the topic was simply knowledge of God). I think that his model of our coming to have knowledge that God exists is more clear and straightforward. Human beings are equipped with a sensus divinitatus which (in the absence of malfunction) will trigger and produce belief in God in appropriate circumstances (e.g. in nature or in guilt or thankfulness, etc.). That's far simpler.
As a guess, maybe he brought the Christian stuff in because he wanted to preemptively guard against objections Tooley might later bring. Having the more complete model with reference to sin and the Holy Spirit has more explanatory power in explaining why some people may not believe or it may help in responding to PoE. Just a guess.
Andrew,
Sure, but the model you allude to doesn't seem to be the model on offer here because the SD doesn't seem to come into operation until the end.
Here is a further worry for bringing in talk of the Holy Spirit. In the opening Plantinga talks about theism as commonly held by Jews, Muslims, and Christians alike. I take it that there is good reason to think that if Christians know that God exists, then Jews and Muslims have such knowledge too. However, if the HS is producing faith in response to accepting the offer of salvation, then what's the story for Jews and Muslims? I don't think one would want to say they are accepting the offer of salvation. Perhaps one could argue that the metaphysics is such that the HS still plays a role, but that seems a bit stretched.