May 2008 Archives

Here's a link to a recent debate between William Lane Craig and Louise Antony on whether or not God is necessary for morality. It was interesting for me since reading Craig's debates and apologetics works helped get me into philosophy, and Antony was one of my professors when I was an undergraduate at The Ohio State University. Both are moral realists and affirm that there are objective moral truths. I didn't find Craig's arguments that God is necessary for morality to be convincing.

However, here's one of his arguments which has some intuitive appeal and that I'd like to explore. He points out that if God does not exist, then there is no ultimate moral accountability. People will not ultimately get what they deserve, whether this be reward for a life well lived or punishment for horrendous evils. This seems to me to be correct. If naturalism is true, then even if there are objective moral truths, people will not ultimately get what they deserve.

But is there any reason to think the following?

1) If there are objective moral truths, then there will be some ultimate moral accountability.

There is no doubt something less satisfying (at least emotionally) with the naturalistic worldview, but I don't know if I can think of any good reasons to believe that (1) is true. And if (1) is false, there is no problem for the naturalist.

Could we defend (1) just by appealing to intuition? Do most humans have a deep intuition that wrongs must be righted and vice versa? But this intuition is weak at best. I would hope for some more argument. Any suggestions?

There is a relatively new blog on philosophy of time here: http://www.philtimesociety.typepad.com/, and it is supported by the Philosophy of Time Society. There haven't been too many substantive philosophical posts, but I thought that readers/contributors of Prosblogion might be interested in joining the blog (and adding some substantive philosophical posts!) In joining the blog, you also automatically become a member of the Philosophy of Time Society and you are supposed to get a copy of Chronos, a philosophy of time journal. (However, a recent e-mail said that all members might not get Chronos, so I'm not sure if that last part is right.)

Just got my advance copies of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion I. The Oxford link is here, which has the table of contents for your perusal.

Word has it that quality of critical essays on material in the book goes up when you own your own copy!

So there's the theistic explanation for the fine-tuning of the universe and the many-universes atheistic explanation. One of the criticisms that theists have made of the many-universes atheistic explanation is that there is no independent evidence that such universes exist. I was wondering if anybody's put forth the idea that all of David Lewis' reasons for believing in concrete possible worlds are reasons to believe in many universes. With Lewis' possibilism in place, we have a response to this criticism. (I'm sure that's not the only response; anyway, this is the response I'm interested in.) Does anybody know if anyone has written on the connection between Lewis' possible worlds and the many-universes hypothesis?

It's often considered arrogant and false to say that one way of living is superior to another. As a Korean American, there are certain ways that I live life (in relating to family, work, food, etc.) that are different from the ways most other Americans live life; but I wouldn't say they are superior - that would be false and arrogant.

But there are certain ways of living that many would agree are superior to other ways: living in community with other people that we love and are loved by is a better way of living than living in denial of the existence and worth of other people. This seems quite plausible to me.

Let's take this another step. It seems to me that in the same way, Christians are committed to believing that their way of life is superior to that of atheists. As Christians, we (I speak as a Christian) believe that we have a committed relationship with God, the most valuable and worthy being possible. We believe that God loves us, and he loves us so much that he would send his Son to endure a horrible death so that we could be reconciled to him. We believe that God the Holy Spirit lives inside of us and is with us. We believe that we can converse with God, through praying to him and through hearing from him (minimally, from the Bible). There is a 'way of living' that incorporates these specifically Christian beliefs into one's life, and I will call that 'the Christian way of living'. (I admit that this is a little vague; maybe I'll have the chance to clear it up in the discussion; I think that there is something to the notion.) Atheists deny that God exists and that God does any of these things with or for humans. So atheists do not live the Christian way of living.

It seems to me that in the same way that it is plausible to think that a person who denies the existence and value of other people is living a way of life that is inferior, so should the Christian think that the atheist is living an inferior way of life by not living the Christian way of life. And I think that this is an interesting and surprising conclusion, though some may find it completely obvious. I'm still trying to get clear on my thoughts on the matter, so comments are welcome.

Warning! Shameless plug to follow...

In the last few years I've looked at numerous syllabi used in philosophy of religion courses. Besides the usual caveats, grading scales, and policies, these syllabi often make nods towards the objective of thinking philosophically about religion. However, 'religion' is, in almost all cases, largely restricted to western theism. One of the challenges of breaking out of this mold is that most introductory textbooks and readers are geared towards philosophy of religion in the western context. Up until now it has been difficult to know where to start if you wanted to include more non-Western sources. Enter Andrew Eshleman's edit volume Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: East Meets West from Blackwell. The volume has a nice selection of readings from names that we've all come to know like Swinburne, Plantinga, Mackie, Alston, Rowe, Hick, Craig, Paley, and more. Interspersed throughout each section though are selections from Hindu, Daoist, Confucian, and Buddhist, thinkers. Frankly this is a book that has probably been long overdue.

Full disclosure: Eshleman was one of my professors as an undergrad and I read drafts of the introductory material for the book. However, I'd have plugged the book in any case because such a volume deserves to be brought to broader attention.