Skeptical theism and morality

Alex,

If skeptical theism is true, then we have good reason to accept (3). Let E be any actual evil. (1) It is true of nearly uncountable actual evils E (countless rapes, murders, burning fawns, deaths from horrendous diseases, etc.) that, if we are not in a position to prevent it, God does not prevent it, either. But (2) whether we are in a position to prevent it is, itself, irrelevant to its unforeseeable consequences. So if my presence does not itself affect the unforseeable consequences of an actual evil E, and had I not been present God would not have prevented it, then I have good skeptical-theist reason to believe that the unforeseeable consequences are sufficiently good that I too should not prevent it.

Mike:

I deny the irrelevance claim. I think the irrelevance claim becomes implausible once one realizes that among the many goods beyond our ken that God could be drawing out of evils, there will be goods that concern our moral development, responsibility and freedom. Some of these goods are even partly within our ken. In any case, if these goods are involved in God's justification for permitting certain evils, then it will matter whether an evil is preventable.

If an evil is preventable, then the presence of the evil gives us the good of having freedom to prevent the evil, for instance. This good is there whether or not we actually prevent the evil, and for aught that we know it is this good that justifies God in allowing that evil. But this particular good gives us no reason to refrain from preventing the evil, since it may be that the good of allowing us the opportunity of preventing the evil is sufficient to justify God, but the good of us having the opportunity of preventing the evil and the good of us actually preventing the evil in combination are greater than that God-justifying evil.

If we construe your argument as an inductive one, it fails in a different way. For aught that we know--we're doing skeptical theism after all--God has already prevented a much greater number of evils. There may be untold numbers of people who got cancer but were cured instantly when they prayed the Lord's Prayer. Supposing this is so, it is false that of the potential evils in our world, the majority have good consequences.

That many A's are B's is weak evidence for most A's being B's if on one of the relevant hypotheses under discussion there would be a relevant selection bias. But on the theistic hypothesis, we would precisely expect a relevant selection bias. Of the potential evils in our world, if theism holds, we would expect to see only those that either have good consequences or that are preventable by us (or both).

(There is a technical difficulty in what I said if, as I believe, God exists necessarily.)

My cancer hypothesis was unclear. I meant: They got cancer and didn't know it.

Alex,

These are all interesting points, but I'm trying to stay with typical assumptions of skeptical theists. So, no skeptical theists urges (or none that I know of) that there are unforeseeable goods that suddenly disappear upon the presence of someone who can prevent some evil. Why believe that? I'm looking south and plan to go south. By sheer chance, I glance northwood and notice a deer that I can prevent from burning to death. Are you suggesting that suddenly there are no unforeseen goods of letting the fawn suffer, whereas there would have been such had I not turned around? That's beyond all plausibility, isn't it? And second no skeptical theist urges (or, again, none that I know of) that God is going around preventing a lot of these evils (nudging fawns out of the way of fires, rescuing babies from floods, pulling guns from the hands of murderers and so on) and nobody is noticing. That too sounds just crazy to me. None of that is happening. Or, in any case, you're not going to get any nontheist (and these are mainly the folks arguing against skeptical theism) to believe it, since there is just no evidence for it.

Mike:

You may be right here that what I say is not what a typical sceptical theist is likely to say.

I actually think it's not at all unlikely that there are lots and lots of miracles we never find out about. In fact, on certain theistic but non-sceptical assumptions, this is what you would expect.

For, let's think about what a theist is likely to say about why God doesn't intervene miraculously all around us in obvious ways:
1. Such intervention would make the world around us too unpredictable for us to exercise much meaningful agency.
2. This kind of intervention would make faith not be much of a virtue.
3. We would likely become quietists if we saw such intervention around us.
4. It is objectively better for there to be more uniformity in the universe.

Now, (1)-(3) do not apply to miracles that we can't observe. (4) does, but perhaps (4) doesn't carry that much weight. If (1)-(4) are the best reasons why God doesn't do obvious miracles all around us all the time, then we would expect God to do hidden miracles all around us a significant amount of the time.

And maybe I don't need to argue that there are such miracles to undercut the inductive argument. Maybe all I need to argue is that we have no reason to deny the presence of such miracles?

"I'm looking south and plan to go south. By sheer chance, I glance northwood and notice a deer that I can prevent from burning to death. Are you suggesting that suddenly there are no unforeseen goods of letting the fawn suffer, whereas there would have been such had I not turned around?"

A good question. If Molinism is true, then we would expect God in his providence to have planned all of the history of the universe around the truth-values of conditionals of free will, and hence we would not be surprised if there was such dependence. There is unlikely to be anything like pure coincidence. So, no, it's not a coincidence that you glanced northward in a Molinist world. Rather, it is likely to be all an intricately interconnected system.

The same is probably true if divine compatibilism holds.

If Molinism and divine compatibilism is false, then it may seem unlikely that God planned the history of the universe around whether you were going to glance northward. But not quite. Where you glance is not much of a moral choice. We glance hither and thither typically (though not always) without that being of moral significance. But even if Molinism and divine compatibilism are false, theism holds God to be provident. One of the ways God can exercise providence absent Molinism and divine compatibilism without destroying significant free will is by determining (whether directly or through chains of causes) things that are not exercises of significant free will. Thus, yes, God might have made sure you that glanced northward.

Pious people tend to say that there is no such thing as a coincidence, and I think they are likely to be right even if Molinism and divine compatibilism are false.

Indeed, the following hypothesis seems quite plausible to me. Supposing that there is no God-justifying good otherwise available to be drawn out of an evil, God either miraculously prevents the evil himself if this can be done in a hidden way or else God makes it possible for someone to prevent that evil.

It may be, however, that what I said is not something a sceptical theist can say.

But I think the sceptical theist is very likely to say that if God exists then likely there is intricate interconnection between events in the world, an interconnection whose details are beyond our ken. Creaturely opportunities to prevent evils are going to be a part of the nexus.

Mike:

Two more comments. You are right that the atheist won't believe in the hidden miracles. But the dialectic situation seems to be this. You and Graham are arguing that sceptical theist, by her own lights, has no reason to prevent evils. But then it doesn't matter whether the atheist will or will not believe in the hidden miracles. What matters is whether the sceptical theist will agree that they are unlikely. But I think the sceptical theist is quite unlikely to agree with that. The sceptical theist is big on the idea that the world is both axiologically and non-axiologically richer than it seems, interconnected in surprising ways. The sceptical theist by her own lights cannot agree that hidden miracles are unlikely. And if she cannot agree that hidden miracles are unlikely, she will not agree that by her lights most potential evils have good consequences, so that there is a negative correlation between foreseen and unforeseen effects.

By the way, Mike, if you haven't done so already (maybe I missed this bit in your paper with Graham), you should write up the argument in your first comment. I think it is a particularly perspicuous way of putting your objection to sceptical theism to say that if sceptical theism is true, then there is likely a negative correlation between foreseen and unforeseen effects, and if there is likely a negative correlation there, then not only do we have no reason not to intervene to prevent evils, but we have reason not to intervene. I haven't seen this formulation in the literature, but it's not a literature I know very well.

Alexander: Regarding your example of a person who gets a cancer and does not know it but says the Lord's Prayer and God takes away the cancer; I have a very small point here to make. I see no epistemic difference from the point of view of the observer between 1) God performs a miracle that no one sees and will never be able to verify even in principle and 2) there was no miracle. It seems that both are possibly true (not simultaneously of course) or are at least consistent with the example you posit even though the evidence appears to support 2 over 1. This problem is inherent in the issue of God removing many evils without anyone knowing that He has done so, or ever being able to know that He has done so. So, what reason do I have to believe 1 over 2 other then faith?

Mike: Why should not the skeptical theist err on the side of caution and remove evil if one is in a position to do so regardless of what God appears to be doing. I am inclined to see skeptical theism in the same light as the person who is uncertain as to what action to perform, for example sending money to feed the hungry or refrain from dong so. It seems to me that prudence would suggest that we act as if we should send the money, even though we are uncertain that we should. If this is so, then why not act to remove evil even though we have no reason to think we should (in the sense of being obligated) to do so?

It seems to me that conjectures about what consequences are going to occur from a decision and action result in an epistemic equilibrium regarding the various possible outcomes listed by Alexander in his post. They all seem equally plausible given the evidence.

Alex,

It might matter that we note the context in which skeptical theism was introduced. Recall that it is a response to the evidential argument from evil. Skeptical theism (ST) is supposed to undermine the "noseeum" inference on which (at least some) evidential arguments from evil depend. ST informs us of the following,

". . .we should reject the claim that, if after thinking hard, we can’t find any God-justifying reason for the permission of some horrific evil, then it is likely that there is no such reason".

Graham and I offer a parodic argument which effectively urges that if that's so, then,

". . .we should reject the claim that, if after thinking hard, we can’t find any human-justifying reason for the permission of some evil that ordinary moral practice enjoins us to prevent, then it is likely that there is no such reason."

Note that neither argument depends explicitly on the correlation hypotheses you describe. But you can probably read the ST argument as claiming that we do not know, on the basis of what we observe and given our cognitive limitations that (3) is unlikely or false. But I want to note that they are the ones that introduce this line of argument. What we do is show that it generalizes in unacceptable ways.

Mike: Why should not the skeptical theist err on the side of caution and remove evil if one is in a position to do so regardless of what God appears to be doing

John,

It is precisely the problem that we do not know what side caution is on. We have as much reason to believe, given skeptical theism, that we would be preventing (overall) a very great good if we prevent the evil as we have that we would be preventing (overall) a terrible evil. The side of caution might be the side that urges not preventing the evil. On the other hand, ordinary moral reasoning puts the side of caution with preventing the evil. Our argument is that ST paralyzes our moral reasoning here in unacceptable ways. Specifically, we argue,

". . . if that’s right, then it seems that ordinary moral reasoning is imperilled: for, if our failure to find a human-justifying reason for the permission of some evil that ordinary moral practice enjoins us to prevent tells us nothing at all about whether there is a human-justifying reason for the permission of that evil, and if there is nothing else that tells us whether there is a human-justifying reason for the permission of that evil, then there is nothing at all that tells us whether there is a human-justifying reason for the permission of that evil. And if there is nothing at all that tells us whether there is a human-justifying reason for the permission of that evil, then, [we claim], it seems that our ordinary moral practice, which ex hypothesi enjoins us to prevent the evil, fails to operate within the bounds of reason."

Mike
I see your point and I agree that it paralyzes our moral reasoning so that morality would lose any rational foundation what-so-ever if it is true.
I wonder if skeptical theism is not, in fact, a morally worse position then atheism if we cannot have any rationally defensible reason to act because we cannot decide which side caution is on. At least the atheist can base her action on the intuition that we should eliminate evil if we are in a position to do so, all else being equal. This seems to square up nicely with common morality as you suggest.

Not to really show my ignorance, but... what does skeptical theism have to say about the moral teachings of Jesus which indicate that we should act to eliminate evil, or at least aid those that are suffering? Is Jesus wrong?

Also, can you suggest a couple of articles defending skeptical theism so I can increase my knowledge. Thanks

Mike:

I am not the world's best reader. I missed the parodic aspect of your argument, and I apologize.

I think the parodic formulation, however, has special difficulties. It might be that it makes no sense to talk of human-justifying goods beyond our ken. If a good can be human-justifying, then it can't be beyond our ken. I am not committed to this claim myself (but then I am not a sceptical theist either!), but it seems a reasonable one.

Another special difficulty is that the sceptical theist has some reason to think that if God exists, the world would be morally deep, i.e., interconnected in such wise that there would be goods beyond our ken justifying various things within our ken. The claim, then, is that if God exists, we would expect to see lots of apparently God-unjustified evil that is in fact God-justidied, because that is just what morally deep worlds look like.

However, there is no parallel argument that we would expect to see lots of apparently human-unjustified evil that is in fact human-justified.

One might try to argue for this by claiming that evils that are God-justified are also human-justified. Thus, one could try to mount the following argument. If I don't prevent E, then either God will prevent E, or God will have a justification for not preventing E. If God prevents E, no harm has been done by my not preventing E. If God doesn't prevent E, then no harm has been done either, because as it turns out there was a good justifying permitting E to occur.

Note that this argument (I don't know whose it is; I think I once heard Jon Kvanvig worrying about it) has nothing to do with sceptical theism--the argument only uses theism simpliciter.

Anyway, the argument is fallacious, because God's reason for not preventing E could involve values that I cannot coherently aim at while not preventing E. For instance, if God's reason for not preventing E is the value of my freely prevent E, that value is one I cannot coherently pursue while failing to prevent E!

Alex, you write,

However, there is no parallel argument that we would expect to see lots of apparently human-unjustified evil that is in fact human-justified.

The parodic argument assumes that the skeptical theist is right about the world being "morally deep" (as I think Wykstra says somewhere, where he is paraphrasing Newton contra Bacon in arguing that the world is "physically deep") or having goods we know nothing about. Once we grant that, we run the parodic argument wrt ordinary moral reasoning and get these bad results. Does that make sense? So we do not want to parody the entire argument the ST offers.

Mike,

But moral depth does not make (3) likely, and it is (3) that one needs to undercut ordinary moral reasoning.

Moral depth by itself, without that added-on stuff I was talking about, either justifies (1) or justifies suspending judgment between (1), (2) and (3), and in particular having no epistemic preference between (2) and (3).

If we get (1), I'm done by my original post.

Suppose that instead of (1), I get a suspension of judgment, with neither (2) being preferable to (3) nor (3) to (2). When forced to act, I should, I think, act as if equal probabilities were attached to (2) and (3). But to act as if equal probabilities were attached to (2) and (3) is the same as to act as if (1) were true--the supposed correlations in (2) and (3) cancel out.

... what does skeptical theism have to say about the moral teachings of Jesus which indicate that we should act to eliminate evil, or at least aid those that are suffering? Is Jesus wrong?

John, some skeptical theists try invoking these to solve the problems ST generates. But we argue that while God's commands are all-things-considered good reasons for typical theists to perform the commanded actions, they are not good reasons for skeptical theists. The skeptical theists have to weigh those commands along with the vast numbers of goods beyond our ken. We urge that if one accepts that God could have reasons beyond our ken for permitting the rape and murder of children, then how can one reasonably deny that God could have reasons beyond our ken for commanding us to do that which we have outweighing reasons not to do? But if God could have reasons beyond our ken for commanding us to do that which we have outweighing reason not to do, then it is not true that God’s commands provide us with all-things-considered reasons for action.

When forced to act, I should, I think, act as if equal probabilities were attached to (2) and (3).

I'm not assuming moral depth. They are (and I thought you were....weren't you?). In any case, we make no such assumption. We concede the assumptions that the ST makes. Maybe we are at cross purposes here.

Alex,

Let me make this clearer. I think I see better what you're saying here,

. . . it is (3) that one needs to undercut ordinary moral reasoning

The ST claim that is supposed to undermine our ordinary moral reasoning wrt what God should do is here,

". . .we should reject the claim that, if after thinking hard, we can’t find any God-justifying reason for the permission of some horrific evil, then it is likely that there is no such reason".

According to ST, wrt God, we should reason as though (3) is true. But if we should reason as though (3) is true wrt God, we say, then we should do so wrt the rest of us.

". . .we should reject the claim that, if after thinking hard, we can’t find any human-justifying reason for the permission of some evil that ordinary moral practice enjoins us to prevent, then it is likely that there is no such reason."

Mike: This is a fascinating discussion and one that is generating in me great interest to learn more, but until that happens I would like to pursue some lines of reasoning that perplex me. You make a distinction between the typical theist (TT) and the skeptical theist (ST). I presume that the TT is one who thinks that there is sufficient reason (i.e., derived from God’s Word and/or Jesus’ teachings) to believe that we should act to eliminate evil while the ST would deny that such sufficient reason exists. Some observations/questions:
1) How would the ST handle the Fall and original sin? On your account Adam and Eve would not have any sufficient reason not to eat the fruit derived from anything that God commanded them to do. God’s command in this situation would be insufficient to rationally ground A and E’s actions. Does ST undermine Divine Command theory to the point where we not longer have sufficient reason to accept the 10 commandments or the Great Commandment as action guiding rules simply because we think they are what God commands of us? I presume that a basic tenet of theistic (TT) belief is that if God, who is completely good, commands us, his ‘sheep’ to use a well-known metaphor, to do x, then x is what we morally should do and that we can be negatively sanction by God for failing to do so.
2) Does ST undermine free-will as a defense for God allowing evil? It seems that if we want to maintain that we are accountable and morally responsible for our actions that are the result of choices that we knowingly and freely make and that we could have chosen not to do if we had so decided then it seems to me that unless we can establish a normative link between free-will and morality then we lack any epistemic foundation for understanding what ‘knowingly and freely’ means re human beings and their actions. It seems that it is axiomatic that a rational person needs sufficient and accurate data upon which to make a decision and that if one is deceived or coerced into performing an action then one is not morally responsible for that action. I think it could be argued that if God fails to give us information sufficient to make a rational decision on how we should act, but He possesses this information then He is deceiving us. If He is not deceiving us, He is certainly not providing us with sufficient data required to make an informed decision and that would mitigate our moral responsibility. Why then would God give us reason and free-will?
3) How can we ever determine if what we are doing is right or wrong? What reason do we have for even making a distinction between right and wrong/good and evil? We think that rape and murder are examples of evil, but why? If rape and murder could lead to a greater good then they would be instrumental goods in so far as they are necessary for that good to result. ST seems to result not only in moral paralysis, but it does not even provide a coherent explanation for this paralysis. It seems that ST opens up the real possibility that we can have no knowledge, or rationally justifiable belief, regarding the nature of good and evil or God’s moral nature. This problem ties in with the general epistemic problem I have with relying on consistency between various propositions as a criterion for believing that something is the case. The fact that the existence of evil (assuming we know what evil is) is consistent with there being a God who is completely good who has a sufficient reason for allowing evil to exist seems to fall apart within a ST framework. A God who is completely evil could be doing exactly what a completely good God would be doing if His reasons for acting our beyond our ken. Simply positing that God is completely good as a basic theistic tenet does not solve this problem.

Sorry, I did bnot attach my entire commetn to the last one. Boy, did I ramble.

4) If we have no reason to believe that x or -x is the case, which seems to be the logical conclusion of ST regarding what we morally ought to do, does this not simply cancel out the theory the results in our inability to decide which is the case. Logic requires that either x or -x, but -(x and -x). I think one could ague that ST results in an epistemic situation where we have to conclude that x and -x is the case based on the available evidence (I have reason to believe that both are true), which is ruled out by the Law of Non-contradiction.
5) Why should we think that the moral knowledge God possesses is beyond our ken? There does not seem to be any requirement derived from His omniscience that would necessitate there being anything He knows regarding morality that we cannot also know, if we simply pay close attention. If we know that rape and murder are evil, God knows this also. If we know that what makes rape and murder evil is that they violate a person’s inherent dignity and value as rational being possessing free-will, then God know this also. If we know that we should treat people in what Buber refers to as an I-thou relationship as opposed to an I-It relationship, then God knows this also. I think it can be argued that we do in fact know these things especially if we accept the Buber distinctions. If this is correct, then it seems that ST is wrong.
6) Lastly, even if we stop some evil from occurring and this results in a greater good not occurring, so what? Does that mean an evil results? I do not think so. Besides, ST seems to make sense only in a compatibilist framework and I see no reason to understand free-will, or God’s complete knowledge, in that context

John, you write,

How would the ST handle the Fall and original sin? On your account Adam and Eve would not have any sufficient reason not to eat the fruit derived from anything that God commanded them to do. God’s command in this situation would be insufficient to rationally ground A and E’s actions.

I think this, and similar questions you ask, are the basis for a reductio against ST. That is, ST would undermine sufficient reasons not to eat the fruit. For all we know, given ST, God has very good reasons to command us to do things that it would be on balance better for us not to do. But since (most reasonable people hold) there is no on balance better reason not to observe a command of God, ST is false.

How can we ever determine if what we are doing is right or wrong? What reason do we have for even making a distinction between right and wrong/good and evil? We think that rape and murder are examples of evil, but why? If rape and murder could lead to a greater good then they would be instrumental goods in so far as they are necessary for that good to result. ST seems to result not only in moral paralysis, but it does not even provide a coherent explanation for this paralysis. It seems that ST opens up the real possibility that we can have no knowledge, or rationally justifiable belief, regarding the nature of good and evil or God’s moral nature

This provides a similar basis for a reductio. The fact is that you do know that letting your pet or a fawn burn to death is wrong. I actually don't know anyone who believes otherwise. I actually don't want to know anyone who believes otherwise! If ST implies that we do not know that, I take it as a reductio against ST.

Mike,

Interesting discussion, everyone. I'm no Skeptical Theist, if I were to describe my position it would be more along the lines of a Subject Sensitive Invariantist theism; where "sufficient evidence" depends on one's stakes and practical concerns, it seems that under this epistemic thesis one can have a limited skepticism in particular contexts, where stakes are high or perhaps dependant on particular practical interests. So i do have tentative leanings towards a skeptical theist response to the evidential problem of evil; that is to say we just don't have enough evidence to think that the particular noseeum assumption that is required for the evidential problem of evil is true. But if I doubt that the nossuem assumption required for the problem of evil, does this mean that one can doubt all assumptions requiring nosseum assumptions? I think not, but i have no general argument for this conclusion. It just seems that some noseeum assumptions one can epistemically have their doubts about, and some shouldn't doubt other noseeum assumptions. The latter I take you to have a compelling argument for, and you seem to think that the noseeum assumption for the problem of evil fall in that category. But the problem is i'm not sure that the noseeum assumption for the problem of evil is really in the category of the latter noseeum assumption that we shouldn't epistemically doubt. So one question I have i whether you have a compelling argument for why we should assume the noseeum assumption for the problem of evil falls into the category of the noseeum assumption we shouldn't have a doxastic doubt about?

I'm also unconvinced that if we should reason as though (3) wrt God, then we should do so wrt the rest of us. What do you think of Swinburn's insight that (also Trakakis and Nagasawa) there are certain moral roles that some have that allows us to have rights over others? For example parents seem to have rights to discipline their children, strangers do not. Police, are allowed to lock people in cells, where ordinary citizens are not. Similarly, God ,as creator, may have particular rights over others that we do not. But, if that's true then by occupying a particular role, God could permit evil E, but we should not because we do not occupy that particular role. So, even if ST is true and there are good reasons beyond our ken for permitting E that presumably God has, these reasons do not justify us in permitting E because we do not have those reasons.

So, why think the following premise (GMP) true:

(GMP) if we should reason as though (3) is true wrt God, then we should do so wrt the rest of us.

What do you think of Swinburn's insight that (also Trakakis and Nagasawa) there are certain moral roles that some have that allows us to have rights over others?

I'm sure I'd wonder how we could know that, suddenly, given our alleged cognitive limitations. It is again STers trying to have it both ways. Not to run the entire argument again--since I think it is clear how this will go--but why think that what appears to be our moral roles are in fact the roles we are supposed to adopt given all that we do not know morally according to ST. Or, to put it another way, if my moral knowledge is so limited that I do not know whether God should prevent this instance of rape and terrible torture, then how on earth am I supposed to know that I have a specific moral role that demands my prevention of it?

Ray and John,

I'm happy to answer these questions, but you should probably be directing questions to Alex. It's his post, not mine, and I'm beginning to feel like I hijacked it.

I did, but it went unanswered. You are the one who did answer. What can I say, other then your questions and comments must have been more interesting and to the point then mine?

But, I will give it another shot.

Alexander;
What is the epistemic value of any claim that cannot be verified (or testable, or falsifiable)? Your example of someone who unknowingly has cancer that God takes away when she says the Lord's Prayer is not verifiable, even in principle. There is no way to determine its epistemic value, other then its consistency with other propositions accepted as being true, i.e., God could perform miracles that no one will ever know about. But other then faith way should anyone accept the latter proposition as being true? If it is simply consistent with another proposition accepted as being true, then we seem to be at an epistemic impasse; there is no evidential reason to accept, or deny, any proposition regarding God's activities that might occur unknowingly to us. What value does this have in our understanding God (assuming He exists) and what our relationship is to him? It seems that once again we are establishing a conceptual framework that distances ourselves from the possibility of having a personal relationship with God, if we cannot verify his presence in our lives. (I am leaving aide for the time being the problem that this can even occur. I am willing to grant that many people claim to feel God’s presence in their lives, etc. and am willing to accept this as evidence.)

Furthermore, why should we think that God has knowledge we do not also possess regarding morality? Everything that has been said by Mike and you is consistent with there being no God or there being a God who is evil and not good. These would seem to cancel each other out as warranted strategies for understanding God, etc. But, putting this aside, why cannot our knowledge of morality (if we can have it) be identical to God's knowledge? (This would certainly being us closer together if God is completely good.) This would not entail, or even imply, a limitation on His omniscience if by omniscience we mean, in part, that God possesses knowledge of all things knowable, which must include what we in fact know. Unless this question can be answered without relying on some other proposition that is also unverifiable, it seems that ST and ‘noseeum’ type arguments cannot even get off the ground and that we are simply left with (what I consider to be epistemologically uninteresting) claims of consistency. Sooner or later we need to rest our beliefs on something that is not simply consistent with other beliefs that are consistent with other beliefs, etc. or we are left with a giant circularity (or faith). This is problematic for those of us who lack faith.

Here is a question: is lack of faith essentially an epistemological or a psychological issue?

For, let's think about what a theist is likely to say about why God doesn't intervene miraculously all around us in obvious ways:
1. Such intervention would make the world around us too unpredictable for us to exercise much meaningful agency.
2. This kind of intervention would make faith not be much of a virtue.
3. We would likely become quietists if we saw such intervention around us.
4. It is objectively better for there to be more uniformity in the universe.
Alex and Perhaps Mike,
Why do we think that most divine action and also prevention of evil is miraculouse, in the sense of miracles that violate natural laws? It seems plausible, as I think Alex suggestests, that God acts both naturally and miraculously to prevent evil. This may be just a thought experiment, but God might act naturally in the sense of in conjuction with humans to get what he wants done. Maybe directing our attention to the seemingly gratuitouse evil around the world so that we might prevent it, or stop it before it becomes worse. Given that God can act through natural means, it seems that one could use your points, Alex, to give good reasons why God might prefer to act naturally as opposed to miraculously. And if God prefers to act naturally then it would seem that God would prefer to work with us, embodied natural agents, to prevent evil. Anyways, I'm not sure how these points might add or subtract to the conversation, but i thought i'd throw them out there, maybe they might spark an idea or two. Any thoughts?