Odd question of the day...

It seems that Scripture and tradition hold human beings to have dominion over the earth. So if the earth is a conscious individual, it is the sort of individual over which we can appropriately have dominion. Depending on how strongly one takes this dominion and on other issues, one might conclude that the earth cannot be on par with us intellectually, and cannot exceed us.

Do you think there is some special issue in the case of the earth, as opposed to other rocky objects such as Mount Everest, or a particular grain of sand? It seems to me that the same thing can be said about each: we have no reason to think they are conscious, but something physically just like that (leaving aside the question whether it would be the same individual then) could be conscious.

Here's a perhaps interesting question: If the earth were conscious, would this have any environmentalist implications? I think not obviously, apart perhaps from uncontroversial claims such as that we shouldn't break the earth up into several pieces. It would depend on exactly how the conscious processes of the earth are embodied. If they're constituted by magma in the core, what we do or don't do with trees, global warming, etc., might not hurt the earth at all. If they're constituted by the winds, then climactic change might hurt the earth, but we really have no way of knowing what sort of climate the earth feels best in: maybe it likes it hot, maybe it likes it cold, who knows?

Alex, given that pagans are not unlikely to attribute personhood to such objects as mountains that is a good extension of the issue.

It seems that the same Humean assumption that thoughts and desires could be realized in rock works for pain as well (multiple realizabilitiy is multiple realizability). But even without that the thought could be that the Earth and/or Chomolungma (The Tibetan name for Everest "Goddess Mother of the Snows"), are made sad by environmental irresponsibility.

The application here might be described as pastoral. Someone believes that Chomolungma is a personal being and refers to her as a "godess". Is the problem here--for the Orthodox Christian--philosophical or theological or both. It seems to me that the problem is *merely* philosophical. I think there's no good reason to think that the Kumbu monolith is conscious, but that's a philosophical point.

One potential theological objection comes from your dominion point if Chomolungma is supposed to be a goddess deserving of praise. I don't think that's too bad though. If it were the case that the mountain were a personal being then there might be a basis for veneration like unto the saints (similarity would vary with the alleged basis for veneration of the goddess), and the dominion could be just the charge of responsibility to care for the parts.

As long as the pagan can admit that there is a Supreme God who is the creator of all us other gods, then I see no distinctively *theological* barrier to the pagan proceeding into the Church.

Trent,

I think there is at least one fairly serious theological problem with pagans entering the Church while persisting in their belief in, and veneration of, other "gods." St. Paul addresses idol worship at some length in First Corinthians, and has this to say: "...what pagans sacrifice they offer to demons and not to God." (10:20) The implication is that pagan gods--Chomolungma included, I suppose--are demons. It would be perverse to offer veneration to a demon of the sort we offer to saints.

Maybe there's a loophole. The discussion in 1 Cor 10 has to be harmonized with the discussion in 1 Cor 8, for example, where St. Paul says idols are nothing (and thus, presumably, not demons). I don't have a good interpretation of these passages myself, so I don't know exactly how this harmonization would go. But I think it would have to be undertaken before one could render judgment on your question. Of course, if the harmonization issued in an interpretation according to which St. Paul is teaching there are no "gods" like Chomolungma, that would provide a barrier of a different sort to the pagan entering the Church while still believing in that god.

And then, of course, there's the question of the teaching of the Fathers and Doctors, the Popes, and the Councils. I expect a good many Church Fathers addressed the issue of pagans coming into the Church, but I'm not sufficiently well versed in patristics so that I could point to any good sources.

This all has to do with the question of whether a pagan can enter the Church while retaining veneration for "gods" other than God. I take it that's a distinct question from the intial query: whether there's a theological reason to rule out the possibility of the earth being conscious in some way. I don't have any thoughts on that, though I liked Alex's post.

Trent:

If the earth is conscious, it might be hurt or saddened by some things. But how can we know what those things are? Maybe the earth hates forests, in much the way that we hate having fungi growing on us, and hence it delights in deforestation? :-)

On the veneration side, I think the last time the issue was very seriously discussed was in connection with the Jesuit missions to China. The question was whether Chinese Christian converts could participate in rituals where ancestors were venerated. I think that the Jesuits in the field argued in the affirmative, but the pope at the time came down on the negative side (not infallibly, I suspect).

In general, the issue of what kinds of ceremonies converts could participate in was one the Jesuits were very interested in. For instance, they put a lot of work into investigating the significance of native rituals in ~17th century Canada in order to figure out if converts could participate.

I am guessing that one would have to decide these things on a case by case basis.

Nonetheless, the veneration of a non-existent person seems problematic...

P. Toner,

If the Earth were conscious and had the kinds of powers that pagans attribute to them, then it would be fair to say that she was a goddess. I also think the Saints have powers sufficient to be classified as gods. One sense of "god" is to be a personal being capable of the manipulation of nature on a broad scale. This is the sense in which a Saint or an Angel can correctly (in English) satisfy the predicate "is a god". The same would go for Gaia if there is such a person. *Whether* there is such a person doesn't seem to me to be a distinctively *theological* issue.

Since the Saints are gods and can be venerated there would have to be special reason not to be able to venerate other gods. C.S. Lewis is a literary god to me and I certainly venerate him. The metaphor only slightly changes the situation. The fact is he is a person of extraordinary powers which I hold in extremely high esteem. If Gaia exists I see, at this point, why someone couldn't venerate her (and it would be rational to do so if one had good reason to believe she had the kinds of powers commonly attributed to her).

I had already stipulated that our noble pagan couldn't see natural gods and goddesses as opposed to Creator God. We don't know the exact nature of the worship on the Areopagus but one presumes that it was in such a way that it was frequently in a way that excluded the proper role of YHWH. Another important disanalogy is that it seems that they hadn't previously heard the truth about YHWH.

Trent:

I think a god has the power of manipulating nature on his own, rather than by interceding with another. (Argument: Suppose that a tribe believes that Jim is a really effective priest of the river god, i.e., Jim is able to get from the river god whatever Jim wants, because Jim knows the right ceremonies. Then, the tribe is committed to believing that Jim has all of the manipulative power of the river god. But it is not the case that the tribe is committed to believing that Jim is a god.) The saints' ability to heal the sick and do all the other wonderful things that are reliably reported is entirely dependent on God's hearing their prayers. Hence they are not gods.

Angels are a different matter...

I'd add to Alex's point that we don't venerate the saints and angels because of their power, but, rather, because of their holiness. Satan is a god, by Trent's definition, and a particularly powerful one, but obviously, he doesn't merit veneration. (I don't say this to imply that Trent disagrees! :-) )

The main quarrel I'd have with your last post, Trent, is that when you stipulate that the pagan doesn't see his natural god as opposed to God, I think you're missing the real point. If the Church teaches that pagan gods are demons--which is at least, prima facie, the teaching of St. Paul in 1 Cor--then whatever the noble pagan believes about his god, that god is _in fact_ opposed to God. (Again, it's an open question whether I've got St. Paul right. But to decide that, I think we'd have to engage in some detailed exegetical work rather than theological speculation.) Thus, the point about not owing veneration to the Devil is quite relevant. If Gaia is indeed a demon, then it is wrong for the noble pagan to venerate her. I've given some scriptural support for the antecedent, and I think we'd have to settle that issue, then, before we moved any further.

Yes, for the record Satan certainly is a god in the natural sense I mentioned (and of course it would have to be Chisholmed to be an *analysis* as Alex points out). The power part was the qualification for satisfying the predicate "is a god (or goddess)" not the criterion for veneration. That's a different matter. Most pagans I know think of Mother Earth as a pretty saintly figure. They think she loves us and wants the best for us and does things to make the world a better place for us even at a sacrifice to herself. (Sancte Gaia, ora pro nobis?) At any rate, I stipulate that this is part of the case I want to consider.

The point I think you're missing--p. toner--is that the operative definition of "god/ess" isn't the one typically at use in the Scriptures and so the Pauline condemnations simply don't automatically apply. And surely not all false gods are demons else Paul would be proclaiming demons: "*That which* [Greek "ho"] you worship in ignorance I now proclaim to you."

Nevertheless what you say is a non-seqitur or at least necessitates a de re/de dicto distinction (which is to say that, unrestricted, it is a non-sequitur): Suppose that it turns out, mirabile visu, that Saint Francis was an incarnate demon and all the stories of his holiness were false. There's nothing *culpably* wrong with my veneration of him. The *rational* thing for me to do is to venerate him since I'm ignorant of his demonic status. So *even if* Gaia turned out to be a demon (and I'm not sure it's even possible if the pagan is capable of direct reference to the Earth (assuming no planet is a demon) there would be no relevant barrier--at least I've not heard of one yet--to her entering the Church venerating her under that description (the description of her as the saintly Mother Earth (a more powerful but fallen creature--perhaps somewhere between humans and angels--in the great chain of being which is God's kingdom)).

Trent,

Two things. First, I haven't claimed that the Pauline condemnations automatically apply. I've claimed that they're relevant, and need to be taken seriously into account in this kind of discussion.

Second, I haven't made any claims about the culpability of the noble pagans. But whether the noble pagan who is--all unawares, and without any evil intent--actualy a demon worshipper is culpable is one question. Whether the Church should allow such a person to receive the sacraments of initiation is, it seems to me, an entirely different question. I'm only talking about the latter point. Perhaps I haven't been clear enough about that.

Trent:

Non-culpability is insufficient as a criterion. Take Crazy Jim, who sincerely believes that God told him that every person in the Dallas phone book who has the string "ec" in their last name is an evildoer sentenced by God to death with Jim being appointed executioner. We may imagine that Jim is not culpable in his serial killing spree (insanity may help). But nonetheless, prior to the sacraments of initiation, surely we would require him to stop these activities.

Moreover, I suspect the tradition is fairly clear that each of the deities of the pagans is either nothing, or God under a mistaken description, or a demon. The pagan who becomes a Christian ought to accept the Christian tradition here.

Alex, I wasn't suggesting that non-culpability was sufficient, I was only showing that there was a very important difference between the subject in question and other obviously-bad cases of demon worship.

I can't see how tradition could speak in advance here.

Really the term "god" is not essential to the case since by the same definition the Saints are gods and the Church doesn't eschew them. The person in question just thinks there's another really neat person in the world in addition to the one's you and I believe in, and they think that person worthy of especial veneration--in a way only slightly greater than some of us have for C.S. Lewis ;-) And they just happen to think that that person is also a planet (or a mountain, or a tree).

I'm not trying to be thick-necked when I say I don't see why such a person shouldn't get through RCIA (and not just the one's showing Gandhi films all hour!). At least not for distinctively theological reasons. :-)

Trent:

Beliefs that the sun, the earth, etc., are divinities were, I assume, standard parts of the beliefs of pagans that both Israel and the Church have faced. The judgment of both has, I think, been quite negative in all of these cases.

Trent - interesting discussion. I think it is worth considering the nature miracles, for example, the calming of the storm. The elements are described as obeying Jesus because of his authorities - there seems to be an element of animism in this description. I certainly wouldn't want to argue that Christians should take this as evidence for the truth of animism, but it suggests a compatibility, at least.

One might also consider the Canticle of Saint Francis, and the Song of the Three Young Men from (deutero-canonical section of) Daniel. In both these cases, parts of creation join us in praising God.

I can't agree with Trent's definition of 'god': okay, it is one definition of 'god', but not, in my opinion, a good one. What we need to ask, I think, is how we would decide whether a word of another language should be translated into English as 'God' or 'god'. In The Arabian Nights, djinns are personal beings with great power over nature, but they are not gods because they are not considered fit objects of worship. Odin and Thor are worshipped, Ice Giants are not, hence the former are properly described as 'gods' in translations of Norse Literature.

I think it is better to think of Earth as our sister, joining us in praising God, rather than our mother. One reason for this is that the use of the term 'Mother' suggests someone who everyone should venerate, as though those who do not acknowledge her are sinful - but veneration of the Earth has never been central to Christianity. Theologically, the whole human race are our brothers and sisters, but we are not expected to remember each individual by name in our prayers.

There is, of course, the question of the Virgin Mary. From a Protestant perspective, what I've said would point to the conclusion that she is to be thought of as our sister, not our mother. From a Catholic/Orthodox perspective, it could be said that since Mary is our Mother, the Earth is not. Mary holds a unique place in the order of creation, in virtue of which she can be given the title 'Mother', a title that should not be devalued by being bandied about carelessly. (Of course, the Church is our mother, a Mother Superior is a Mother and my mother is a Mother - but I'd still be cautious about extending the use of this term too far).

As for pagans becoming Christians, my personal answer would be as follows.
If a pagan becomes a Christian and continues with rituals that honour the Earth and other elemental forces, either they did not consider those forces to be gods, in which case they were not truly pagan, or else they are failing to be truly Christian. Whatever devotion they paid to pagan gods should be transferred to God, but to think of beings they once worshipped as brothers and sisters joining them in worship of the one God, and to include them as such in prayers and rituals would be acceptable. (Hyperdulia of pagan goddesses could become hyperdulia of the Virgin Mary in Catholic/Orthodox Christianity, but I confess that I find it hard to draw the line between hyperdulia and worship).

Ben, it looks like maybe we have a different approach to the philosophy of language. "god" and "mother" admit of many different senses. I think our lexicon is very dynamic (Not that Peter Ludlow should be impugned by any of my nonsense!). "god" is a fair word for such a being as I've described. And if you described the role of saints to most non-Christian cultures with the concept 'god' they'd recognize them as gods. One of the great things about Orthodox Christianity is that it has a new and exalted concept of deity.

From the inside Hyperdulia and worship have totally different phenomenologies. Promise.

Alex, yes quite right but in all the cases that I have any historical knowledge of either those divinities were contrary to YHWH or were replaced almost wholesale with Catholic Saints. From what I can tell different ages and regions of the Church have reacted quite differently to indigenous religions. In this case I've been wonder about, the veneration needn't amount to anything like "a religion" any more than the "cult of C.S. Lewis" of whcih I am a member is really some kind of cult (well...maybe that's not a good example. :-)

So suppose someone thought that since Saint Francis preached to the birds, they must be persons. So they believe in another group of people than we do. And then they believe that because even the stones cry out, stones must be persons. They end up thinking that some particular bird, an albatross say, has led a boat to safety on many occasions (mistaking different birds for the same) over several generations. They dub it the Sacred Albatross and take it to be a messenger from God, little lower than an angel. The set up websites for the Sacred Albatross, write poems praising the SA, and have meetings once a week to discern what they take to be messages from the flight patterns of the SA, thinking that God might have a special revelation for them. I think a similar story could be told about some folks who--for whatever reason--think Chomolungma protects their village and who upon hearing the Gospel conclude that she must be a being created by God just for this purpose. Thus they continue to thank her for her faithful service to God and to ask her to favors. Saint Chomolungma? Why not? [In the same sense of Erasmus's Saint Socrates and "modern" nun's Saint Gandhi, not the strict sense.]

I would try to talk them out of this apparent nonsense, but the only reasons I can find at this point are ones that are philosophical, not theological. Now I might find *some* fodder in Alex's suggestions in that he or Tim can probably find some councils or Fathers or Doctors of the Church or just some important theologians who specifically disavow there being any animate geographical formations or sub-human fauna (or flora), but I don't think that would be enough evidence for someone who already took themselves to have reason to believe in such persons.

Nevertheless, perhaps I should modify my thesis to saying that I've got no very good (certainly not conclusive) distinctively theological reasons against the kind of paganism I've described. Though I do take myself to have pretty good philosophical reasons. :-)

Trent - as far as differences between hyperdulia and worship are concerned, my confusion dates back a long time. When I was a child, I read a book about Egyptian religion, and came to the conclusion that the Virgin Mary was a goddess. I was very proud to have figured this out (J.G. Frazer would have been impressed, I know) and went to tell my mother. She told me that this was a heresy, and that one could be excommunicated for saying such things.

As a seminarian, the problem continued to bother me - I discussed it with my spiritual director. I suspect that helps explain my strictness about words in this context - nothing in my philosophy of language suggests that words cannot be dynamic and have more than one meaning, but something in my experience leads me to be particularly careful about certain words. Also, I think that you are giving the word 'god' a new meaning.

I'm not convinced, anyway, that pagans would recognize saints as gods.Let us consider Greek and Roman beliefs. Here, at least, we are on firm ground in saying that 'deus' 'theos' is the correct term to translate our 'god'. I think it is more likely they would see them as heroes, or maybe demi-gods. This is particularly likely because, after all, posthumous activity of saints is a matter of them praying to God: they are intercessors rather than actors. I could be wrong, but I suspect that if one asked about the role of Herakles as a demi-god, he would do a bit more than present requests to Zeus.

Further evidence may be found from the case of Santeria. African slaves identified Catholic saints with figures from the religion of the Yoruba tribe known as the 'Orissa'. Everything I've read about the Yoruba emphasises that Orissa should not be considered to be gods, because they are merely servants of Olodumare, God, who is never approached directly. Or consider the Norse example. As I recall, according to the Prose Edda, the Frost Giants will defeat the 'gods' in battle, so they are pretty powerful. Still, they are not 'gods'. Or to be more precise, (he writes, after a quick glance at Wikipedia), it is customary to describe the Aesir and Vanir as 'gods', but the Jotnar as 'giants' when translating Norse mythology. I think this is a good custom, because it uses the English word in such a way as to help us understand the relationship the Norse readers felt they had with the Aesir, Vanir and Jotnar respectively. Similarly, it would be a whopping error to translate 'djinn' as 'god', even though they are ascribed great powers, because, once again, it would misrepresent the relationship.

Ben:

That sounds exactly right.

We use "god" metaphorically for beings that are God/god-like in some way: "i am one of the biggest fans of garry kasparov, i mean he is the god of chess" (from a google search for "god of chess"). Cf. Psalm 82. In these usages, I think it feels metaphorical, and the metaphor derives its force from the fact that it is but a metaphor.

Trent, one might argue, is trying to have it both ways: he is using "god" in the way in which it is metaphorically used, when the context (the continuation of a pagan's beliefs) may require a literal sense.

Trent just doesn't think language divides so nicely. Trent thinks our lexicons are very dynamic. Trent is also very much a functionalist: Saints do what gods (supposedly) did. :-)

That I wasn't confusing the metaphorical should be clear from my flagging that use with the C.S. Lewis examples (cf. Alex's Kasparov example (though a chess fan of just my age might want to take that more literally!).

And our Eastern Orthodox brethren will not be so quick to ascibe Psalm 82:6 to mere metaphor. I did refer to thesosis in my posts. That's not mere metaphor.

This does serve to highlight one point that I think emerges from such considerations, which I mentioned, and which I'm very fond of: that Christianitiy has greatly exalted the notion of divinity. The kind of divinitiy had by the Christian Godhead blows away anything anybody ever thought of!

Trent - its been an interesting discussion, and I expect we've taken it as far as it will go. I just don't think that saints do what gods supposedly did. As I understand Canaanite religion, Baal did not just ask El to make the rain come, he made the rain come directly using his own power. A Roman who thought St. Anthony would find lost objects would think of him as a god, or demi-god perhaps. A Roman who is told that St. Anthony has to ask a higher being that an object might be found probably would not.

Ben, though all the Saints do is done via the power and will of God--they are not different from us in that regard--it is not necessarily the case that all they do is to ask God to do it for them. In later high views of Zeus all the lesser gods do is done dependent on him.

It's not out of the pale of orthodoxy that Saints act with a kind of immediacy consistent with being necessarily within the will of God.

Also, the Saints do much more than find lost items. Saint Nicholas is said to have calmed a storm, some to have raised people from the dead. Padre Pio is said to have bilocated. I'm not testifying to the truth of these claims here, but just adding a few examples that come quickly to mind of the power Saints are said to have. But thanks for the stimulating discussion.

Trent - one last comment I thought of. We all know the difference between monotheism and monolatry. I sometimes say that Orthodox and Catholic Christianity are forms of polylatry: only one God, but with many cults. It could also be applied to Hinduism.

Given the dynamism of the lexicon there's probably a sense in which "polylatry" applies. Of course, at the official ecclesiastical level that term will be rejected and certainly any right-thinking orthdox Catholic or Orthodox will have a concept of worship which makes "polylatry" not apply. The "worship" we give God has enough in common with the "worship" we give authors, chess players, and Saints to use the same morpheme. However, the property it expresses in the orhtdox case is not a higher grade of the property expressed in the looser sense: it's a different property altogether.

This does serve to highlight one point that I think emerges from such considerations, which I mentioned, and which I'm very fond of: that Christianitiy has greatly exalted the notion of divinity. The kind of divinitiy had by the Christian Godhead blows away anything anybody ever thought of!

Even Judaism? Or are you speaking really of the Judaio-Christian tradition in general and not specifically Christianity?

The finding of lost objects is a non-trivial task, not to be disparaged. Empirical observation never reveals the objects moving through space after asking St Anthony's intercession. On the contrary, the object is seen where it is, as if it had always lain there. This may require backwards causation or near instantaneous movement through space or some kind of masking. And, yes, the siccess rate is--for me--uncanny.

The finding of lost objects is a non-trivial task, not to be disparaged. Empirical observation never reveals the objects moving through space after asking St Anthony's intercession.

Alex,

Am I misreading this? Are you suggesting that your prayers are answered by objects literally moving through space to some easily observable location? I have an hypothesis that is less fun. My guess is that you are locating the object (perhaps with some help, this is the intercession part) rather than the object locating you. But of course, your hypothesis is testable. Remain in place and ask for intercession.

Matt, yes, even over Judaism. The tri-unity of the Godhead is a form of divinity even higher than their YHWH concept.

Of course, I'm a social Trinitarian so I have a "high" view of the Trinity. A Latinist or other modalist will just have names for different roles, so it wouldn't be any higher (sorry, couldn't resist ;-)~ No retaliatory polytheist jokes allowed!

Credit where credit is due, it was Jeremy that left the comment about Judaism. That said, I'm puzzled by the notion of higher concepts of divinity. Perhaps you could treat us to a post on the ranking of such concepts. I think the monotheism of Judaism was rather radical for it's time and place. Your social polytheismtrinitarianism would have appeared rather mundane when set among the other triadic traditions in the ancient world.

Matt, nice one. :D

"I think the monotheism of Judaism was rather radical for it's time and place."

So was my mullet in highschool. Some great things can even be better though. :-)

Serioiusly though, *surely* you think the Christian concept of the Trinity--whether Social or Modal, I mean Latin--added something to the concept of God. Monotheism got richer.

Mike:

I have no idea how my prayers are answered. The problem is that I typically find the objects in fairly close vicinity to where I pray. There are a couple of possible hypotheses:

1. I have a subconscious idea where the lost objects are, and, for subconscious reasons, I only pray when I am near them, in order to preserve my faith.

2. Prior to my prayer, God, foreknowing my coming prayer, inspires me to go near the lost object, so that I would be able to find it soon after praying.

3. God transports the object from its hiding place without anybody noticing this.

4. I am misremembering or misjudging when I think the objects tend to be close to where I pray. I have been keeping mental track of overall success rates at finding objects after St. Anthony's intercession, but I haven't been noting the closeness deliberately--I am just going from hindsight. So maybe it is simply that God inspires me to move fairly swiftly to the object after I pray.

Now here is an interesting question. You think that the hypothesis 4, that God inspires me in searching for the object, is more likely than hypothesis 3. My own gut reaction agrees with you. It seems, thus, that we feel that miracles are more likely to occur in a mind than out in the big wide world. But what reason do we have to think mental miracles more likely than extra-mental miracles? It is no harder for an omnipotent being to move a book from one room to another than it is for him to inspire me to go find it.

Maybe the idea here is that we have a deep conviction that God prefers to work through us. That makes sense.

Certainly *I'm* the last person you want to be asking that question of. I'm inclined to think that concepts have hard edges such that we can't add to the concept, but only to our understanding. That said I think ST's and LT's both offer different concepts of God, neither of which I'm certain is monotheistic or Christian. I am more likely to think that these competing concepts take something away from the monotheist concept.

At this point I should plug Dale Tuggy's blog Trinities since he does a bang up job on these topics.

Hi Alex,

'It seems, thus, that we feel that miracles are more likely to occur in a mind than out in the big wide world.'

Could you explain how (3) constitutes a miracle? That seems counterintuitive to me; I've never thought that God gently nudging or inspiring us requires miraculous intervention.

Even if it does, there seems something more miraculous--there seems to be a whole lot more natural law bending going on--in (3) then in (4), which could explain our reaction.

Could you explain how (3) constitutes a miracle? That seems counterintuitive to me; I've never thought that God gently nudging or inspiring us requires miraculous intervention.

I think it might, Luke. There are problems like God thereby adding energy (and so matter) to a closed system, and that is in violation of physical law. That cannot happen barring a miracle of some sort. Or, so it sure seems.

I haven't thought about this much (really, at all), but mightn't there be views of God's relation to the world on which God plus the world constitute the closed system? Something like panentheism might yield this conclusion, no?

Hi Luke,

I guess there might. I had in mind a supernatural conception, where God enters into nature on occassion to help Alex find his keys... :)

I'm inclined to think that concepts have hard edges such that we can't add to the concept, but only to our understanding.

But certainly you want to leave room for both semantic and metaphysical surprise. Maybe there are "hard edges", but I'm not sure we have a good idea what they are. Sorensen asks what we should do with the concept of 'being a moon' should Io, a moon of Jupiter, itself acquire a moon. Would the moon of Io also be a moon of Jupiter? That is, is the concept of being a moon transitive? I honestly don't know. But I think it is a mistake--one easily illustrated with even simple concepts such as being a moon--to think (and I realize that you weren't suggesting this) that we have a good grasp of the hard edges of our more interesting concepts, such a being omnipotent or perfectly good. We don't. And it becomes clear that we don't when we try appying the concept in unfamiliar contexts as Sorensen suggests.

I don't have any disagreement with what you write Mike. I could have made the comment with out the remark, but I was thinking of folks who talk of broadening concepts. My point is that I don't think ST adds to our understanding of the God concept. Rather it introduces a new concept Sod, which is only similar to God. I'm also inclined to think that STians unconsciously switch between talk of God and Sod. But I suppose we digress...

My point is that I don't think ST adds to our understanding of the God concept. Rather it introduces a new concept Sod. .

I didn't think we were disagreeing either. And it is perhaps a digression, but it is really important to ask how someone might know that he is, on the one hand, (i) discovering some hitherto occluded metaphysical feature of God or, on the other hand, (ii) introducing discussion of a different being (Sod). People line up interestingly on this issue, I think. You can find in Sobel and Mackie, for instance, an incredible faith in what we can know of these concept of God from the armchair. So, both are fairly quick to say to those that diverge from the armchair concept (or, the competent speaker concept) that they simply aren't talking about omnipotence, or simply not talking about omniscience, etc. On the other side there is the view that you can learn a lot more about these concepts when you apply them in unfamiliar contexts. So, for instance, consider the concept of an omniscience in the context of vague predicates. John Hawthorne has a nice paper on this. Would an omniscient being know all indefinitely true propositions, all definitely true propositions or what? I'd suggest that we could really learn something about omniscience by considering these contexts. We could learn something we would never have known relying on our linguistic competence with the word 'omniscience'. You can do the same thing with moral perfection in contexts of necessary moral dilemmas. So the general idea on this side is that envisaging new contexts of application illuminates these concepts. The more imaginative we are, the more we can illuminate the concepts. Of course, I take these to be metaphysically illuminating as well.
But, to return to your question, we really should be conscientious about when we are introducing some new concept and when we are learning something new.