Here's another argument for the existence of God:
- Logically necessarily, if an action is wrong, this is at least in part wrong because it wrongs a person.
- Locally necessarily, it is wrong to totally gratuitously painfully harm an animal.
- If God does not exist, it is locally possible to totally gratuitously painfully harm an animal without wronging a person. (This is a material conditional.)
- Therefore, God exists.
The argument will be valid, but I need to explain two technical terms: "locally necessary/possible" and "totally gratuitously".
A proposition p is locally necessary/possible provided that it holds in all/some "local" worlds, where a world is "local" provided that it shares laws and initial conditions with our world, and includes animals capable of being painfully harmed that are not persons.
A harmful action by an agent x with respect to a patient y is "totally gratuitous" provided that (a) x does not even hope that the action will result in a benefit to somebody or something other than x, and (b) if x at least hopes for a benefit b to himself, then that benefit is one of the following: (i) x's satisfaction of x's desire to cause a/the harm, or (ii) x's taking of pleasure in a/the harm, or (iii) the conjunction of (i) and (ii).
If I were an atheist, I would deny (1). (I do think that as a matter of fact (1) is true because necessarily there is a God, and necessarily God's goodness is attacked by any wrong.)
But let's assume (1)--Kantians, for instance, might well accept it. I think (2) is self-evident.
What about (3)? Do we have any reason to accept it? I think so. The denial of (3) is:
(-3) God does not exist and it is locally impossible to totally gratuitously harm an animal without wronging a person.
This implies that every locally possible totally gratuitous harming of a non-person animal somehow, of local necessity, manages to wrong a person. But which person? If there were a God who designed the animal, then this God would be a very good candidate for this. But if there is no God, what ar the options? I see three somewhat plausible options:
(A) The harming agent wrongs himself by harming the animal.
(B) The harming agent wrongs a non-supernatural designer.
(C) The harming agent wrongs a supernatural non-divine designer.
Let's think about these. Option (A) is Kant's view. It is generally true in our world that people who totally gratuitously harm animals thereby become more cruel, and thus harm themselves; people have a duty to become and remain virtuous, a duty to themselves, and thus in totally gratuitously harming animals they wrong themselves. However, if there is no God, then surely it is locally possible to have a situation where an agent knows he will cease to exist right upon triggering the totally gratuitous harm to the animal, and such an agent is not wronging himself by not harming his future virtue. Moreover, one can imagine that the agent has paid off a neurologist or a demon to ensure that the action leaves no trace on the agent's character. So there are cases where the agent himself is not harmed.
Now one might say that totally gratuitously and painfully harming an animal is an action the doing of which harms the agent, even if it does not affect the agent's future character. But the only reason to think that the action's doing harms the agent is because the action is wrong, and it is harmful to oneself to do something wrong. However, while this is true, it is not enough to satisfy (1). For it would be circular to say that an action is wrong at least in part because it wrongs a person when the way in which it wrongs the persons is by being the doing of a wrong action. For then the action would be wrong at least in part because it is wrong.
Options (B) and (C) will not work always. For surely there are locally possible worlds where there are totally gratuitously and painfully harmed non-person animals the harming of which does not harm the agent or any other natural persons and where no non-divine designer has designed these animals, but they arose in some other way (e.g., creation by a divine designer, evolution, etc.) So while option (B) and (C) may work sometimes, there are locally possible worlds where neither option will work.
The only plausible remaining option is, I think, a divine designer.
Now so far we've only shown the divine designer to exist only in those locally possible worlds in which some animal is harmed totally gratuitously and painfully in a way that does not cause any wrong or harm any non-divine being except for perhaps harming the agent by being the doing of a wrongful action. But now we can ask why the divine designer exists in those locally possible worlds. Surely it would be crazy to suppose that by inflicting totally gratuitous and painful harm the agent brings into existence the divine designer. In fact, it seems that the best explanation of why a divine designer exists in those locally possible worlds is that he exists in all locally possible worlds. And hence a divine designer exists in the actual world, too, which the atheist was trying to deny.
Thus, none of the alternatives (A), (B) and (C) are going to do the job. Hence (3) is true, it seems.
Alex:
OK, this is valid, and you think it's sound too. But you point out the obvious problem yourself:
"If I were an atheist, I would deny (1). (I do think that as a matter of fact (1) is true because necessarily there is a God, and necessarily God's goodness is attacked by any wrong.)"
So, you accept (1) because you already accept the conclusion of the argument. So the argument is question-begging.
To put it another way: I think that most folks will think that at least part of what would make it wrong for me to gratuitously torture a kitten to death with a cheese grater is the horrible suffering that the kitten undergoes. Kant would disagree, but so much the worse for Kant.
If that's so, then a person should think that, if God exists, then (1) is true, and if not, then (1) is false, especially when one considers the sorts of scenarios you bring up. And so, the argument you present for God's existence is unsucessful.
Gratuitous animal suffering as an argument for the existence of God? Well I admit it is cute, but I think that it is a non-starter.
Mainly because as Tim points out, there are excellent reasons to reject 1. My suspicion is insofar as your argument is plausible it trades on the problematic association between moral status and persons. Insofar as 1. is plausible this is why. Indeed this is surely only a logical necessity if by person we mean "being with moral status". But if this is the case then 3 is likely to be false, if it is wrong to harm animals, then this could indicate that... animals have moral status.
Tim:
I don't think the argument begs the question against everybody.
For instance, I don't think it begs the question against a Kantian who has a commitment to (1) independent of a commitment to the existence of God.
I guess the sort of intuition that supports (1) is that to have rights one must have responsibilities, and to be wronged one must have rights. Ferrets and salmon don't have responsibilities and hence don't have rights, and hence cannot be wronged.
Moreover, there is this argument. To be wronged by a physical harm, one must have a welfare that the physical harm decreases. To have a welfare, one must have second order desires, or so Frankfurt says. Thus, animals incapable of having second order desires can't be wronged.
I reject both the Kantian and the Frankfurtian line myself, and so this is only an ad hominem argument.
Alex:
OK, fair enough, although I think that the universe of Kantians/Frankfurtians for whom this argument would give non-question-begging reasons to believe in God in pretty small--especially as they'd also have the options of either rejecting (2) as always being the case (at least for the odd sorts of cases you describe), or of repenting their ways and accepting that animals have direct moral standing.
FWIW, I think that the intuition that "to have rights one must have responsibilities" is misguided--Norcross puts it nicely when he says that this line of thought confuses the requirements for being a moral *agent* (being rightly subject to moral appraisal, which requires a certain level of rational control over one's actions) with those for being a moral *patient* (deserving of moral considerations, for which the ability to feel pain, for instance, is sufficient). See section 6 of this paper.
Alex
Am I missing something here? It seems that if 2 is true, 1 must be false.
Tim:
While I agree that the Kantian and Frankfurtian should in the end reject (1), to do that would seem to require basically a complete abandonment of the Kantian or Frankfurtian view, rather than merely some tweak. Thus, the Frankfurtian would have to give up either internalism about what matters--and this internalism seems absolutely central to Frankfurt's position--or else have to say that the satisfaction of first order desires is a part of welfare even absent second order desires, which is subject to many counterexamples. The Kantian will, likewise, no longer be able to say that ethics can be generated simply from considerations of autonomy or of universality.
On the other hand, to accept a necessarily existing designer of all living things might well involve a much smaller revision of beliefs. Of course this will depend on the particular individual in question.
John Alexander:
I don't see that (2) entails the negation of (1). One can have both (1) and (2) if one accepts that there is a God and every act of totally gratuitous painful harming of an animal is a wrong against God and in part because of this is wrong. One can also have both (1) and (2) if one could defend--and my argument about the possibility of the harming being one's last action puts that into question--the traditional Kantian position that cruelty to animals is a wrong to the humanity of the agent herself.
Alex
If you are using God as the person who is harmed in order to make 1 true then the argument is, as Tim said, question begging. You write, "If I were an atheist, I would deny (1). (I do think that as a matter of fact (1) is true because necessarily there is a God, and necessarily God's goodness is attacked by any wrong.)" It seems that if you are givng an argument for God's existence then the truth of the premises of the argument cannot rest on there being a God; necessary or otherwise.
Also I am not clear on what it means to say that "God's goodness is attacked by any wrong." I think this claim needs to be argued for. It seems that if God is good and he knows that any harm to another being with moral status is an attach on his goodness why would he create a world were evil must exist? It would seem that he would be intentionally harming himself by creating such a world and that does not make any sense if he is completely good. Unless of course he is not being wronged by the harm others cause, but that you seem to deny or 1 would not be true.
Hi Alex,
Here's a proof that your argument could not convince any atheist, no matter what their moral view. The general problem is that any atheist that accepts premise (1) must reject (3). So no atheist could accept all of the premises of your argument. Here's the proof.
Suppose the atheist, accepts (1), which he must do to be convinced by your argument. If he accepts (1) then he must reject the consequent of (3) in (3C) below. This is because (1) entails not-(3C). But since he is an atheist he must affirm the antecedent of (3) in (3A) below.
(1) N(if an action is wrong, this is at least in part wrong because it wrongs a person)
(3C) M(wrong an animal & not wrong a person).
(3A) God does not exist.
So the atheist that accepts (1), must accept (3A) and must also accept not-(3C). But, (3A) and not-(3C) entail not-(3). So the atheist that accepts premise (1) of your argument cannot accept premise (3) of your argument. But then no atheist could be convinced by the argument.
John:
My own reasons for accepting (1) are such that the argument, as directed at me, is question-begging. However, whether an argument is question-begging depends on its target. The target here is a Kantian or Frankfurtian, which I am not, and it does not beg the question against them.
Mike:
(3C) is not the consequent of (3). The consequent of (3) does not mention the WRONGING of any animal, but only the totally gratuitous painful harming.
(3C) is not the consequent of (3). The consequent of (3) does not mention the WRONGING of any animal, but only the totally gratuitous painful harming.
Right. I abbreviated the consequent to (3C) on the basis of your claim in (2). So given (2), (3C) is the consequent of (3). I guess that's important to note.
My argument is amended. Any atheist that accepts (1) and (2) cannot accept (3).
Mike:
Your argument would work equally well for any valid three-premise argument for the existence of God. Anybody who rejects the conclusion of a valid three-premise argument and who accepts the first two premises cannot accept the third premise while continuing to reject the conclusion.
Alex,
There's some truth in that. But there is obviously more to the objection. Consider an atheist that accepts (1). Obviously, he must have reasons R for accepting (1) that are independent of any commitment to God existing. Now suppose that an atheist accepts (2), as anyone who has thought about (2) for a second would. Accepting (2) does not require that he add to his reasons R some theistic belief. So far he has no reason at all to reject atheism, not a single reason. But he has all the reason in the world to reject (3). Obviously, R gives him reason to deny the consequent and atheism gives him reason to affirm the antecedent.
The exercise basically shows that the argument cannot succeed unless there is good reason to believe (1) that entails theistic belief. So I guess the cautious conclusion would be that the argument could not convince an atheist unless there were good reasons for believing premise (1) that entailed theism and no good reasons for believing (1) than were consistent with atheism.
Dear Mike:
But how can the atheist reject (3)? Then he has to hold that somehow it is locally necessary that any totally gratuitous painful harm to an animal also in some way wrongs a person. This seems close to absurd. After all, if atheism is true, then among locally possible worlds there will surely be ones where someone is the only person and where he totally gratuitously inflicts painful harm on some non-person animal without wronging himself (except in a way posterior to the wrongness of the action).
The cost of a denial of (3) to an atheist is high.
But how can the atheist reject (3)? Then he has to hold that somehow it is locally necessary that any totally gratuitous painful harm to an animal also in some way wrongs a person. This seems close to absurd.
Alex,
I was trying to avoid the objection that (1) would be found question begging by atheists. So, I assumed that an atheist might find some reason or other R to believe (1). I confess, I don't know what R might be. I wanted to know what would happen if there were such an R. So what would happen? It looked plain to me that, given this assumption, he would have no reason at all to accept (3).
Now your objection here is very interesting. You want to say that there is no atheistic reason R (such as the one I assumed) to accept premise (1). Because if there were an atheistic reason to accept (1), there would be an atheistic reason to reject (3). There would be reason to believe that ". . .any totally gratuitous painful harm to an animal also in some way wrongs a person." But you say of this claim that . ."[t]his seems close to absurd". Suppose it is absurd, what then? In that case the atheist must concede that he has no atheistic reason to accept (1). Your objection here entails that there are no reasons R to accept (1) that are consistent with his atheism. Instead of rejection (3), he should reject (1). If this is so, then it should be noted that Tim's initial intuition about the problem with this arguemt was right.
What you need to provide is some good reason to accept (1) that does not assume theism is true. Is there a good reason to accept (1) that does not assume theism? Here's an idea. There might be good social contract reasons to accept (1) that do not assume theism. At least some social contract theorists give indirect moral standing to non-persons, nature, art, etc. But the problem again is that a social contract theorist that is not already a theist would also reject (3). The short story is that, without the assumption of theism, those who accept (1) will not accept (3). I assume that everyone accepts (2).
Dear Mike,
I don't see how the atheist social contract theorist could reject (3) without saying something absurd. Isn't it absurd for an atheist to deny the local possibility the following scenario: there is no God, and Jones is the last person in existence, and as his last action, Jones totally gratuitously tortures a dog?
Couldn't someone with a view similar to Descartes or Kant on animals deny 2? I know they thought it was generally a bad idea to torture animals, but someone holding their view on animals might not go that direction.
Jeremy:
I suppose the view of some Cartesians would be that (3) is false, because animals are not conscious, and hence simply cannot be painfully harmed.
I am not sure this is completely satisfactory, because (2) remains true even if one drops "painfully". In fact, I think it is wrong to totally gratuitously harm a plant.
(Variant argument: It is wrong to totally gratuitously destroy a whole species. But if God doesn't exist, then sometimes no person would be wronged by totally gratuitously destroying a whole species.)
I suppose a Kantian might deny (2), but note that nonetheless in practice persons are generally also wronged by the painful harming of animals. Thus, totally gratuitously torturing animals would be OK in some counterfactual situations, but in actual situations it's always wrong. Such a Kantian could then say that the intuition that totally gratuitous torture of animals is necessarily wrong is a mistaken jump from what is actually to what is necessarily.
Alex,
I guess I am just missing the point so I will speak as an atheist; I am not a theist so I guess that makes me an atheist.
#3 is is true. So what. Person A gratuitiously harms an animal. A enjoys seeing it suffer. A has not been harmed because she is increasing her enjoyment. If fact the gratuitious harm of the animal is good for A. Therefore premise 2 is false.
What does this have to do with God's existence? How does 4 follow from 1-3? I do not see it!
You switch between 'harm' and 'wronged' in your premises. Is it possible to harm something with moral worth without wronging that thing? I am not concerned with harm that is necessry for a greater good because in those cases we would see the harm as a good. What would happen to your argument if you took out "wrongs a person" and replaced it with "harms a person?"
Fianl comment (maybe)
You are addressing this argument to Kantians and claining that it does not beg the question against Kantians. I do not see this.
I take it that you think that in order to be a Kantian you must believe in God. Let accept this as being true. So a Kantian would maintain that the person being wronged in premise 1 is God. Why? Because they believe in God and God is a person. Isn't this begging the question if one is trying to prove that God exists? Shouldn't an argument for God's existence be a universlly applicable one that would apply to all persons, not just Kantians, or someone who already accepted 1 as being true because they think that God exists and is a person?
John:
There is nothing wrong with an argument aimed at a particular group of people.
The conclusion follows from the argument as follows. From (1) and (2) it follows that:
(4) Locally necessarily the totally gratuitous painful harming of an animal wrongs some person.
But (4) is the negation of the consequent of (3). Hence (3) and (4) entail the existence of God by modus tollens.
I move back and forth between harm and wrong in a careful way that does not affect the argument. The Kantian will not grant that non-person animals (NPAs) can be wronged. But she should grant that NPAs can be harmed, in a sense of "harmed" that has no immediate moral consequences. After all, we can say that the computer was "harmed" by having coffee spilled on it. Likewise, the Kantian should admit the possibility of NPAs feeling pain, and hence of being painfully harmed.
As for the claim that torturing an animal can be pleasant and hence good for the torturer, I carefully defined "totally gratuitous" to include this case. Even if it is good for the torturer (a dubious proposition; not all pleasure is good), it is surely wrong.
Here's a different, perhaps more transparent, way to formulate the argument:
(i) Necessarily, any wrongness in an action is there at least in part because the action wrongs a person.
(ii) Necessarily, it is wrong to totally gratuitously and painfully harm an animal.
(iii) Therefore, necessarily, the wrongness of totally gratuitously and painfully harming an animal is there in part because the action wrongs a person.
(iv) The best explanations of (iii) all imply the existence of a God.
(v) Therefore, probably, God exists.
This formulation explicitly focuses attention on (iv), which in the previous formulation was implicit in my subsidiary argument for (3).
I am interested if people can come up with counterexamples to (iv).
Note that pantheism would be an excellent explanation of (iv). Stipulatively, I will allow that "God" in the conclusion of the argument can be either a theistic or a pantheistic God.
Alex
You write: "Even if it is good for the torturer (a dubious proposition; not all pleasure is good), it is surely wrong."
How so? Is it not possible (as you have used the word 'possible') that there is a local world that has one person (not God, or God if it is completely evil) and one animal and that the person gets pleasure from torturing the animal. It would not be wrong in that world. So there is a possible world were torturing is good.
If this world is possible, then premises 1 and 3 would be true, but 2 would be false. If that is the case then 4 does not follow from 1-3.
So the counter-argument would be:
1) premise one as stated
2) Locally necessarily, gratuitiously harming an animal does not necessarily wrong any person.
3) premise 3 as stated
4) Therefore God does not exist.
Dear John:
I am amazed that you think it would be OK to torture an animal in that world. Wouldn't you think that a person who does that is vicious?
Dear Alex
Of course I do, but I am not in that world. I am only claiming that in that world, that being would think it is alright. (It is certainly conceivable that at some time only that world will exist.) From my world he is vicious, but for his, he is not. This, of course, is extreme relativism concerning truth and ethics. The problem is that we have escape from relativism and account for the universality of our belief that torturing animals is not correct without needing God to ground the argument in, or we would be begging the question if we are trying to prove God's existence as being compatible with our belief that torturing is wrong, but that in orde to do tha latter we need to believe in God for the idea 'that torturing animals is wrong,' to be true. Now one can argue that we have indirect duties to animals following Kant without having to rely on the metaphysical presumption that God exists. If the CI and associated concepts are truths of reason, then we do not have to rely on believing in God as a rational being in order to ground this concept. We only need to believe that we are rational beings and that all rtional beings (including God if he exists) will accept the CI as a truth of reason. Now, if this is the case, then premise 1 of your argument is not known to be true even if one is addressing Kantians because I am not convinced that all people who would accept the CI need to also believe in God. Kant did, but he might have been wrong in that matter, with the CI still being a truth of reason,etc.
I think my counter-argument stands until it can be demonstrated that the idea of 'torturing animals is wrong' is true independently of God's existence. Until that is done premise 2 of your arguemnt is false, or at least not known to be true.
Here is a question for all: Assuming Kants CI to be correct and that we have indirect duties to animals because of the claim that how we treat animals will affect how we treat persons. If we treat animals cruelly the we will become cruel, if we treat them kindly, we will become kind. Is it not possible that a person could be cruel to animals at time1 and at time2 come to realize that he is not a good person and become a better person because of this realization? If this is possible then it is not true that all people who treat animal cruelly will necessarily become more cruel, or that is it bad for them in the long run to become cruel. Some may, in fact, become kind towards all living things and would not have become as kind had they not first tortured animals. This is certainly a side issue to Alex's post, but I think it is a intersting possibility. Would Paul have been Paul if he had not first been Saul? How else does one explain redemption and forgiveness? (What great moral concepts!)
I don't see how the atheist social contract theorist could reject (3) without saying something absurd.. .Isn't it absurd for an atheist to deny the local possibility the following scenario: there is no God, and Jones is the last person in existence, and as his last action, Jones totally gratuitously tortures a dog?
Alex, no, it's not absurd at all. Recall, (2) is true in those worlds too. So the action has to be "wrong", and not just harmful. If it is wrong, and social contract theory is true, then it is wrong because it indirectly wrongs some party to the contract. Therefore it wrongs some person.
Mike:
Surely if atheism is true, then there are locally possible worlds where there is only one person (if Christianity is true there aren't any such worlds, since every possible world contains at least God and hence at least three persons). That one person is not under any social contract, and hence has no obligations if social contract theory is true. In particular, such a person is not doing anything morally wrong even if he totally gratuitously painfully harms an animal, and hence (2) is violated.
John:
You ask good questions and give a plausible argument that Kant's account of the indirect wrongness of harming animals doesn't work in every case even in our world.
Surely if atheism is true, then there are locally possible worlds where there is only one person (if Christianity is true there aren't any such worlds, since every possible world contains at least God and hence at least three persons). That one person is not under any social contract, and hence has no obligations if social contract theory is true.
Only if you deny (2) are such worlds possible. But as I've said (2) is obviously true. But then there cannot be such worlds.
Dear Mike,
It is also obvious that (*) if atheism is true then it is locally possible for there to be worlds with only one person capable of totally gratuitously hurting animals. This and (2) are more obvious than the truth of atheism or social contract theory. Thus, to deny (*) in order to hold to atheism or social contract theory is irrational.
But I can also make the following move. On a plausible social contract theory, if all persons other than me died, I would no longer be bound by the social contract. But it is plainly locally possible for all persons other than Uday Hussein to die (we know this empirically, by knowing that there are indeterministic processes which could result in, say, the brain cells of everyone else turning cancerous). If so, then UH would not be bound by the social contract, and if social contract theory is true, it would not be wrong for UH to totally gratuitously torture animals.
It is also obvious that (*) if atheism is true then it is locally possible for there to be worlds with only one person capable of totally gratuitously hurting animals.
I don't take modal claims like that to be obvious. As I mentioned, the truth of that claim depends on what other modal claims are true. For instance, (2). But I'm certain many others too that we haven't considered.
But you add this,
On a plausible social contract theory, if all persons other than me died, I would no longer be bound by the social contract. But it is plainly locally possible for all persons other than Uday Hussein to die. . .
If so, then UH would not be bound by the social contract, and if social contract theory is true, it would not be wrong for UH to totally gratuitously torture animals.
You already know that the argument goes just as well the other way. (2) is evidently true. I've no doubt you agree with that. Denying (2), to paraphrase Anscombe, would simply "exhibit a corrupt mind" (she once said in response to anyone who denied that harming innocent individuals was wrong). Since (2) is true and (by hypothesis here) social contract theory is true, there are no worlds in which gratuitous harm does not indirectly wrong some person.
I'm simply suggesting that this line of argument is not out of the question. I am not urging that it has to be right. I have no idea if its right. Modal reasoning is so deceptive.
Mike:
1. But don't we have good empirical evidence for thinking that the scenario I sketched is possible? I.e., we know that cancer kills people, that cells can randomly turn cancerous, etc., and so every person but UH could die, if there are no supernatural persons. This is causally possible given how things are, and hence logically possible.
2. Don't forget that there is a way of holding on to (*), (2) and social contract theory, namely by accepting theism and positing a social contract between God and people. This seems more reasonable than denying (*).
But don't we have good empirical evidence for thinking that the scenario I sketched is possible? I.e., we know that cancer kills people, that cells can randomly turn cancerous, etc., and so every person but UH could die, if there are no supernatural persons.i>
Right. But I also have excellent empirical evidence that everything has at least some small flaw. Does it follow that there is a world in which everything has some small flaw? Despite the excellent empirical evidence, most (Anselmian) theists would say no, there is no such world. And despite the excellent empirical evidence, most Platonists would say no. Every world includes ideal triangles, for instance, in additional to their sublunary cousins the instantiated triangles.
I would say, reasoning similarly, that if (2) and social contract theory is true (leaving aside divine social contract theory), then no, there is no such world, despite the excellent empirical evidence for there being one.
Dear Mike,
Sure: there is that entailment. But here it seems modus tollens is the right way to go. The proposed conclusion goes against excellent empirical evidence, and I think the empirical evidence here is much stronger than the philosophical evidence for social contract theory or for atheism.
Dear Alex,
Maybe this will help. I now appeal to nothing other than empirical evidence in defense of an unexpected modal position.
Most people have very reasonably concluded, on the basis of empirical evidence, that there are no extended simples. That is, there is nothing that is both extended and non-composite. If there are simples, empirical evidence strongly suggests, they must be non-extended points (something like mathematical points). Does all of this evidence show that extended simples are impossible? As it happens, no. As physicists now seem to be telling us, we cannot divide up space into any regions more fine-grained than Planck squares. There is no such sub-region smaller than a Planck square and so obviously nothing could occupy such a region. C. Jenkins discusses this interesting metaphysical possibility here http://longwordsbotherme.blogspot.com/search?q=extended+simples. Again to show that there is nothing decisive for modal epistemology from empirical evidence.
Dear Mike,
I think it is one thing to use empirical evidence to conclude that something is impossible (that's often quite shaky as you rightly point out) and another to conclude that something is possible (especially locally possible). We routinely use empirical evidence to conclude that something is causally possible, which entails logical posisbility. We look at Jones' bulging muscles and the small stick and conclude that it is possible for Jones to lift the rock.
In particular, any recombination of DNA in cells of humans seems physically possible given what we know about microphysics--the molecules can just do their (unlikely but possible) quantum leaps. This includes a combination that involves every human cell not in UH becoming cancerous and none of the ones in UH becoming cancerous.
"Here's a different, perhaps more transparent, way to formulate the argument:
(i) Necessarily, any wrongness in an action is there at least in part because the action wrongs a person.
(ii) Necessarily, it is wrong to totally gratuitously and painfully harm an animal.
(iii) Therefore, necessarily, the wrongness of totally gratuitously and painfully harming an animal is there in part because the action wrongs a person.
(iv) The best explanations of (iii) all imply the existence of a God.
(v) Therefore, probably, God exists.
This formulation explicitly focuses attention on (iv), which in the previous formulation was implicit in my subsidiary argument for (3).
I am interested if people can come up with counterexamples to (iv)."
Alex I would still like to know more about what definition of 'person' you are using in premise 1 & 3?
As I said above, I think 1 can only be true if you don't mean person qua rational free willed individual, but instead qua something/one who has moral standing in their own right.
Isn't the rather obvious counter-example to 4 that the best explanation of this is that whatever you mean by person, animals (at least of the kind we are bothered by gratuitous cruelty to) are persons to? This would seem a far simpler explanation.
Dear David,
Well, what the definition of "person" will be will depend on the particular ethical view underwriting (1) or (i). On the Kantian view, a person will be a rational agent. On the Frankfurtian view, a person is someone capable of second order desires. On the social contract view, a person is a being capable of entering into negotiations and contracts.
On none of these views will a rabbit be a person. But it is wrong to totally gratuitously painfully harm a rabbit.
Actually, I think it is wrong to totally gratuitously harm (whether painfully or not) any animal, even one that no one can reasonably say is a person, like a fly. (Pulling wings off flies is vicious and not just a sign of being a vicious person.)
(By the way, my own preferred definition of a person is a being of a kind capable of exercising rationality (whether or not the particular individual is capable of exercising rationality).)
Dear Alex
I agree entirely, but then surely these views will simply entail that (ii) is false.
This seems as plausible an option as to accept the conclusion of the argument.
Alternatively perhaps some second order explanation of the wrongness of (ii) can be found such as the classic Kantian explanation.
You reject the Kantian explanation (rightly in my view) because it doesn't explain all cases of gratuitous harm to animals as wrong. But couldn't a Kantian simply bite the bullet and suggest a revision of (ii) to something like:
(ii*) almost always it is wrong to totally gratuitously and painfully harm an animal.
Of course the simpler still route is simply to reject either (i) or these ethical views, if they commit us to (iii) isn't it a simpler explanation to hypothesise that the badness of gratuitously harming animals is because it is wrong to harm sentient beings with no justifying reason, than to need a God to explain the wrongness of this behaviour.
On a meta-level note, I am curious why you think it would be a wrong against God to cause unnecessary suffering to an animal? Again if the animal doesn't matter morally in itself then why should God be bothered? If it is simply disrespect for the designer then does your view not imply there is nothing worse about destroying an animal than a rock for example?
Dear David,
Well, in persona propria, I think it's innately evil to cause unnecessary suffering to an animal, and every wrong is also a wrong against God.
However, I also can say this. Animals have natural functions, and they were created by God with these functions--their teleology, like all genuine teleology, originates in God (the Alpha and Omega--the arche and telos of everything). It shows disrespect to the God who created us and these animals to totally gratuitously impede the natural functioning of the animals.
Another approach is this. Aquinas faces the following problem when looking at our love for God. On the one hand, the best kinds of loves are ones that selflessly seek to benefit the beloved. On the other hand, God is always already perfectly happy. Aquinas' solution is to note that there is an indirect way of benefiting an individual, by benefiting those whom that individual loves. Thus, we love God by benefiting fellow human beings whom God loves. We can say the same thing about non-humans. God cares about the sparrow and the lily, and to wantonly destroy the sparrow and the lily is to indirectly harm God.
Here is a more questionable but deeper idea. In the case of a pantheistic deity, it is not hard to see how by totally gratuitously harming the mouse one is wronging God. But I wonder if something similar cannot be said in the case of a theistic God. God is involved in continually sustaining creation in existence. The natural functions of the animals function in and through God's sustenance of them. I wonder if there isn't a sense to be found here for the claim that somehow by harming the animals one is wronging God.
"It shows disrespect to the God who created us and these animals to totally gratuitously impede the natural functioning of the animals."
I thought you might go the teleological route :) The problem being here, is there any difference between gratuitous impeding the natural functioning of animals and other things such as plant? To me it seems fairly obvious that there is, the gratuitous harming of animals is significantly worse than the gratuitous harming of plants. But it is hard to explain what this difference is if what makes the impeding wrong is just the teleology since in both cases this can be equally violated.
In terms of the deeper idea, I like it but, as with all divine sustainer accounts, the stronger you make this, the more difficult it is to avoid the argument from evil.
Still very interesting to ponder.
Dear David,
It may be that different creatures matter to different degrees, perhaps depending on the value of their tele, or on their complexity, or maybe on some ontological criterion (e.g., mind and matter being more than just matter), or on the ways in which they realize similarity to God. Thus it is more wrong to totally gratuitously harm (tgh) a cat than it is to tgh a from, and that in turn is more wrong than to tgh a worm, and that in turn is more wrong than to tgh a plant, and that in turn is more wrong than to tgh an amoeba, and that in turn is more wrong than to tgh a virus (if viruses are capable of being harmed at all).
I am a 21 years old. I have spent much of my short life atttempting to to decipher arguments regarding whether god exist or not. I am an atheist. I suspect that these arguments are over my head a bit, but can someone explain what god has to do with a human being's ability to empathize with an animal. I don't see how one needs god to to feel empathy.
Jonathan:
Some philosophers, most notably Kant, think we can only have duties to persons (rational agents). This kind of a view creates a problem with regard to things like the duty not to torture animals. Which person do we owe them to?
I am suggesting that if one for some reason accepts the view that we have duties only to persons, one can still uphold the idea that one should never torture animals, by supposing that one owes this to God, who is a person.
Thank You for responding to my question. I appologize for seeming a bit dense, your answer seems obvious after i read the statements through a few times. But, it seems to me that if their is a God, then it is wrong to harm animals; though it is not necessarily wrong to harm animals because their is a God. Even without God their are many alternative philosophies which would make very good arguments that harming animals is wrong.
For example,
Keep statements 1,2,and 3. Followed by 4;if one considers the pain of the animal being gratuitously harmed as a pain which one finds personally repulsive, then one can conclude that gratutitously harming animals is wrong.
5;Then God may not exist.
statement three would still remain true, though it may not support the final statement it also does not exclude it.
Jonathan:
Do you think the wrongness of an action follows from its personal repulsiveness? Some uncontroversial ordinary things people do in the bathroom are repulsive...
I take your point. however, as I started to consider the validity of my own argument I realized that my argument violated the 2nd statement. Thinking on the topic more I have to wonder whether it is not inherantly wrong to gratuitously harm anything.(I think this means that I am rejecting the first statement of the argument) Particularly when one is aware that the the object being harmed is experiencing pain or suffering. The knowledge of that pain and suffering must come from ones own ability to feel pain and suffer. In which case the individual inflicting the pain is aware that his/her action is wrong. It is an inferred knowledge from ones own experience of being wronged. If the individual is not aware of of the pain or harm he/she is inflicting, then i would argue that the action is not gratuitous(or wrong) but unfortunate. Which may mean that I am also rejecting the second statement. So, I think I may be rejecting the entire argument. Although I must admit I am far from finished with my thoughts on the subject.