Divine Hiddenness

Interesting.

>>If we have no good reason to deny (H1), then I think the argument from divine hiddenness is in trouble.

Assume for the moment that we have no good reason to think (H1) is false. That is consistent with, it seems to me, our also having no good reason to think that (H1) is true. In other words, having no good reason to deny a proposition doesn't mean we have good reason to affirm it. (e.g., I have no good reason to deny that the number of people on campus right this very instant is even. But...)

So I think that in order to show that the argument from hiddenness is in trouble, we'd have to have good reason to think (H1) true, rather than merely being agnostic about (H1).

Do you think we have good reason to think (H1) is true?

Onus of argument questions are tricky. But suppose it is true that the argument from hiddenness does not work if (H1) is true. Then, it seems, the denial of (H1) needs to be among the premises of the argument from hiddenness or needs to be implied by things that are among the premises of the argument from hiddenness. So it seems that it is the arguer from hiddenness that needs to show (H1) to be false.

I agree with you about onus issues being tricky.

It seems to me that (H1) would be true only if God did in fact exist--I can't think of any plausible reason it would be true if God didn't exist (though perhaps this is just a failure of imagination on my part).

This looks like a circular, unfalsifiable argument, almost an ad hominem. The contrapositive of (H1) is that if a person has not concluded the existence of god, then he or she fails in one or more of the epistemic virtues in the antecedent.

Thus as specifically an hypothesis, we have good reason to believe (H1) is meaningless, since it's unfalsifiable, unless we could in principle verify a person's adherence to the epistemic virtues independently of her belief in the existence of God.

As specifically a deductivist premise, it's equivocal: Neither affirming nor denying the premise entails a logical contradiction.

I'm unsure what specific version of the "divine hiddeness" (DH) argument you're referencing. The simplest form—there is no (neutral) epistemic basis for believing in the existence of God—would flatly contradict (H1).

Perhaps you might be discussing a variant of (DH) (which we might whimsically label as "divine coyness"): There is evidence for the existence of God, but it is refractory.

Alex,

Suppose that H1 is true. I think there still might be a hiddenness problem because of the plurality of religions. Suppose I do come to believe that (some) God exists. There is still a hiddenness problem insofar as God hasn't revealed which God he is to me.

Now, suppose that H1 were tweaked to H1*: Every adult [include caveats] will at some point conclude that the Christian God exists. Then we don't have a hiddenness problem.

But, there are problems with H1*. One is that the existence of the Christian God entails the resurrection of Christ. But why think that thinking through the Big Questions will lead one to that conclusion? (why not think, instead that grace leads one there, not intellectually virtuous thinking?)

Also, I have even less reason to believe H1* than I do to believe H1. I'm with Kevin in thinking that the only reason I'd affirm H1 (or, in this case, H1*) is because I affirm that God exists.

Tim and Kevin:

I agree that the only impressive reason to think (H1) is actually true is because one thinks God exists. But it likewise seems that the only impressive reason to think (H1) is actually false is because one thinks God does not exist.

Nonetheless, what I said seems to stand. To mount an argument from hiddenness, one needs to establish that "God is hidden" (this is of course shorthand for something like the claim that there is no neutrally available evidence for the existence of God, or that God is hidden if he exists), and to do so without presupposing God's nonexistence (else one begs the question).

But God is not hidden (in the relevant sense) if (H1) is true. Hence, in order to make plausible the claim that God is hidden, the proponent of the hiddenness argument must make implausible the claim that (H1) is true. But it is not clear how one can do that without presupposing the non-existence of God.

Alex:

I think the PDH would still be a problem even if H1 were true. Merely coming to believe God exists isn't the point of the argument. A good God would likely put himself and us in a position to relate to each other with love and this requires more than belief, but intimacy. So even if all people developed belief in God at some point in their life, this would be consistent with the absence of a loving relationship. But we should expect a good God to create the conditions not only for belief, but also a loving relationship.

Moreover, I think you are right that people can come to miraculously believe on the deathbed, so to speak. Shellenberg wouldn't deny this. But this is insufficient for two reasons. First, possibility doesn't mean probability and the argument needs probability. That is, H1 though possibly true, is very unlikely to be true. Second, even granting belief, their is the problem of the hiddenness of love throughout one's life and that, I think, isn't answered by supposing H1 is true.

But really, isn't H1 pretty clearly false? There have been lots of careful thinkers, I don't know, David Lewis, whoe didn't end up believing in God but were open to it. I mean Lewis believed in angels and demons in other worlds...he had to be open to it, and he was no knucklehead. We have very good reason I think to deny H1.

Kevin:

Thanks for good questions. First a quick point. If I were defending H1*, I would not be holding that it is thinking through the Big Questions that makes one conclude that Jesus was raised from the dead. But I might say--though I don't--that someone who sincerely seeks the truth, including thinking through the Big Questions, will find the truth, though the finding will only be by grace (and in fact the seeking would already have involved grace).

Anyway, there is some prior plausibility to thinking that if God existed, he would want everyone to know he exists. The hiddenness argument is based on this plausibility.

But there is much less prior plausibility in thinking that if God existed, he would want everyone to know subtle and difficult doctrines about his nature, such as the doctrine of the Trinity. So the plurality of religions problem may not be as plausible a problem as the hiddenness problem. (Also, to some extent, the problem will be alleviated if thinking through the Big Questions would lead to doctrines about God that rule out a number of religious options, such as polytheism or Buddhism.)

Now there is significant prior plausibility in thinking that if God existed, he would want everyone to know the doctrines that they need to believe to be saved. However, it only follows from this that God would want everyone to explicitly believe in the resurrection of Jesus if one thinks that explicit belief in the resurrection of Jesus is absolutely necessary for salvation. The latter claim is implausible simply in light of the fact that it ought to be possible for people who die in infancy to be saved.

One might try for a more restricted claim: explicit belief in the resurrection of Jesus is absolutely necessary for the salvation of an adult of normal intellectual capacity. But why might not implicit belief be sufficient? Abraham is the paradigm of faith even though, as far as we know, he did not explicitly believe in Jesus' resurrection.

What do I mean by implicit belief? Well, St Justin Martyr, in the second century, suggested that Socrates is in heaven as a martyr, because he died for Christ, and Christ is the Truth. Now "died for ..." is an intensional context. But we might say that "x died implicitly for y" is true provided that (a) there is a z such that "x died for z", (b) in fact y=z, and (c) y and z have saliently related descriptions (e.g., "Christ" and "Truth" are like that, since both descriptions make clear why this is worth dying for). We might say something similar about implicit belief in Christ. If I believe in the truth, and I love the truth, and I seek to follow the truth, then I am implicitly joined to Christ, perhaps. Likewise, if I believe that God has a plan for my salvation, then I implicitly believe in the resurrection, because in fact the resurrection is a relevantly salient constituent of God's plan for my salvation, and I believe in the latter.

I am not saying that this account of implicit belief is exactly right. But something about it seems right.

Christian:

What is your evidence for thinking David Lewis did not convert on the deathbed, perhaps after the loss of consciousness, under the influence of miraculous grace?

Also, an openness to an eccentric doctrine is probably different from an openness to a conventional religious doctrine. There is a pleasure in holding a doctrine that provokes incredulous stares--I know well that pleasure.

Alex:

What's your evidence that your not a brain in a vat?

I admit it's possible Lewis converted, my point is that it's unlikely. It's possible I'm a brain in a vat, but it's unlikely. Making a possibility salient isn't sufficient to make it probable or deserving of consideration. Plenty of people die as honest truth-loving atheists, and to deny this requires ignoring alot of evidence to the contrary.

Denying H1 isn't motivated by atheism at all, just experience of loved ones dying. However, arguing for H1 "is" motivated by theism, and it requires, so it seems to me, ignoring clear evidence to the contrary.

Hi Christian,

I have a couple quick points that may be helpful, if I may. (I hope to be understanding your argument.)

I think you are right to say that it *seems* as if some people die honest to goodness truth-loving atheists. Alexander (and anyone who accepts H1) can accept this. I take it that this is what leads you to maintain that it is *probable* that H1 is false. However, if H1 is true it is necessarily true, if false, then necessarily false. Appealing to probability, therefore, is not going settle this one.

Admittedly, it is going to be tough to provide a counterexample to H1 when it seems that it may be impossible to provide any evidence to the contrary of H1: what happens on the deathbed and shortly after a person takes her last breath? Our lack of evidence here seems to protect H1 from counterexample.

Finally, you say that it is improbable that atheists like David Lewis convert on their deathbed or after they die. Out of curiosity and the desire to understand, how do you figure such probabilities?

Christian:

I have no evidence that David Lewis died a theist. But I also have no evidence to the contrary. I also think this case is different from a brain in the vat case.

Let's take a fictional case, so we don't offend any relatives, etc. Professor Kwicinski, a philosopher who spent his life sincerely searching for truth, is dying. His last words are: "There is no God." Then he speaks no more.

But unless right after he uttered the words a laser blast annihilated his brain or the like, we are unlikely to have any evidence against the hypothesis that he survived seconds or minutes after the words were uttered. Nor is this like a brain in a vat case, where what seems and what is are different. Professor Kwicinski at this stage neither seems dead nor alive--he may not move, but we know that not all who are alive move, and no doubt some of his bodily functions are going. To suppose that he is alive does not go against any appearance that we have.

Take, then, three seconds after the utterance of his last words, and consider the hypothesis that he was alive then and concluded, on the basis of a grace, that God does exist. In what way would this hypothesis go against appearances? The idea that someone is thinking without speaking or without being able to speak does not go against appearances. The hypothesis that in unusual circumstances (and being close to death is certainly an unusual circumstances for most of us) one changes one's mind about the Big Questions certainly does not go against appearances. Moreover, there is some reason to think that if God exists, God's grace would be particularly involved with a dying person.

It is also not at all a strange circumstance that at a time when one is undergoing significant intellectual change, one might say something and realize as one is saying it that it is false. But if the thing one says is the last thing one says, because then speech fails, then one cannot be expected to correct the statement.

So I think that in any single case we're not going to have much certainty that the person died atheist/agnostic. But maybe we can leverage our way up with numbers. There are many fully sincere truth-seekers who die atheist/agnostic after devoting most of their effort to the Big Questions, let us suppose. (The supposition may be false, simply because there may not be all that many people--atheist, agnostic or theist--who devote most of their effort to the Big Questions!) Let's say that we assign a probability of 0.5 to the hypothesis that Professor Kwicinski died a theist, and let us assign the same probability in each case. Suppose there are just ten such truth-seekers. Then, the probability that ALL of them died theist is (0.5)^10 = 1/1024.

This argument, however, fails, because you only get to multiply probabilities together when the events are probabilistically independent. But the events are not probabilistically independent, because if God exists, which we should assign a non-zero probability to (else we don't need the hiddenness argument), then all the events will happen.

I can't see that (H1), as formulated, is all that interesting. I think it needs to be revised to something like this:
(H1) Every adult who has at least average intelligence, is in at least normal epistemic circumstances (no brainwashing, for instance, and no living in a vat), and strives to figure out the Big Questions with intellectual honesty and openness to truth, practicing the intellectual virtues, putting in an amount of effort proportionate to the importance of the questions and having a firm resolve to strive to live by the truth should he find it, howsoever demanding that might be, will at some point conclude that God exists in an epistemically reasonable fashion.

However, if you work with this formulation, it seems you'll have to say that as a matter of necessity every virtuous epistemic agent will acquire evidence, e, such that possession of such evidence makes it unreasonable to doubt God exists.

It seems that to defend this view, you'd have to either say that the evidence that people acquire is so absolutely compelling that no one could reasonably doubt it (evidence, perhaps, of the sort we acquire for Moorean propositions) or reject the view that it's possibly rational for two subjects to take different attitudes towards the same evidence. I don't think anyone could plausibly assume that the kind of evidence we're given if we look is the kind of evidence I have for propositions like I have hands. So, do you have an argument that if it's rational for S to believe p on e, it's unreasonable for S' to doubt p given that S' also accepts e?

It also strikes me as somewhat plausible to think that any thoughtful and reasonably well informed person is troubled by the kinds and amount of evil there is in the world, which suggests that it's quite likely that the revised version of H1 is false. It will be reasonable to search and end up atheist, agnostic, or with evidence which could make acceptance of theism rational without rationally compulsory. And that, I think, is enough to get the problem of divine hiddenness off the ground.

Now, think about the folk that have died atheists and agnostics out there. According to your H1, they're epistemic sinners. I think we can still raise the problem of divine hiddenness in the following way. If you really think it's important to come to know God, it seems like a serious loss if you die without having done so. How serious an epistemic sin must one commit in order not to be rationally compelled to adopt theism? Likely all you need are some minor ones. If God would allow such major losses to stem from such minor flaws, given that God knows how flawed even the best of us are, it seems that God is allowing for a system in which the falls people suffer aren't proportionate to the vices that precipitated the fall. It seems that a loving God wouldn't allow for such tragedies. The problem surfaces again.

Alexander
One can make any claim one wants and assert that it is epistemically plausible (possible) if one does not have to provide some means to verify (or falsify) what is being asserted. (This is the point of the 'barefoot bum's' remark which unfortunately went unanswered.) Your example of Professor Kwicinski is a case in point. There is no way to verify what you assert might be the case. I think some of us are frustrated by this type of maneuering because it lacks what some of us think is a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of any propositional assertion; that it be verifiable or falsifiable. If you want to make these types of maneuers then those of us who disagree with H1 can simply assert that we are being deceived by an evil demon whose deception is so complete that it will never be detected. This is certainly consistent with everyting you have said re H1 (and elsewhere) so unless you can epistemically remove the conditional of being deceived then we have no epistemic basis for moving forward on the issue of God's existence. The discussion simply remains at the level of 'it might be possible so let us consider the inplications of this possiblity.' I think some of us, at least I do, want more then this when trying to understand the implications of 'the big questions.' It also happens to be the case that if I have to wait for grace to give me this knowledge then HI is false; I can certainly maintain honestly that God does not exist utilizng all the criteria you set forth in H1. I will be wrong, but I will be epistemically warranted in my maintaining the truth of my belief until I am graced by God to understand the truth. It is interesting to note that the evil demon gave give us the kind of grace you assert might happen by allowing us to know as we lay dying that we were deceived into believing that He was good. That would be the final horror.

Alex,

In your response to me (at least I think it was to me, though you said it was to Kevin in the post-no big deal), you reply to my H1* with talk about what God would want us to believe if he existed. You focus primarily on things that are necessary for salvation. But, the problem of hiddenness doesn't require such a strong foundation as what's necessary for salvation. We can also put it this way: If there is a great good to be had in the earthly life of knowing and loving God as best we can, and God wants us to have that good, then why doesn't He make it more obvious to us? Why all the hiddenness if God wants us to know and love him? We needn't focus on either subtle doctrines (the intricacies of the Trinity that you mention) or necessary conditions for salvation. That's part of why I chose the resurrection of Christ. It isn't overly subtle, and there's a lot about it and its meaning for a believer's life in the Bible. So, while I agree with in what you say about subtle doctrines and about necessary conditions for salvation, I think they miss what I took to be the problem of hiddenness.

Also, as for implicit belief. Suppose Mother Theresa never once said or thought that she lived for truth (i assume here that "lived for" and "died for" behave similarly). Though, she did daily think that she lived for Christ. On your account of implicit belief, it is true that she lived for truth. I think that's right.

But, suppose your fictional professor Kwicinski never once thought or said that he lived for Christ. Though, he did daily think that he lived for truth. On your account of implicit belief, it is true that he lived for Christ. I think that's false.

One reason why the first might be right and the second wrong is implicit belief may have a counterfactual condition as well: if mother Theresa had been asked, she wouldn't have denied living for truth, but if professor Kwicinski had been asked, he would have denied living for Christ.

But, that reason can't work. Socrates would have denied dying for Christ, had he been asked, though, on your reading, he implicitly died for Christ.

So, why is it that Mother Theresa implicitly lived for truth but Prof. Kwicinski did not implicitly live for Christ. Or, do you think Prof Kwicinski did implicitly live for Christ?

Clayton:

Either it is or it is not possible for God to bring it abou that Professor Kwicinski will believe in the existence of God in an epistemically responsible manner. If it is not possible, then the argument from hiddenness fails, since we can't complain that God doesn't do the impossible!

Now maybe you could say that it's possible, but not on the deathbed. But that does not seem plausible. God can increase the speed of Professor Kwicinski's intellectual functioning if need be, he can improve his ability to make logical connections between ideas, he can have prepared the way for this in all kinds of ways, etc.

All that said, I do think that there are perverse ways of construing evidence, that there is a phenomenon of silencing the voice of one's conscience, etc.

In the face of a God who is striving to make sure one has sufficient belief for evidence, I doubt that it would be true that a "minor" offense against intellectual virtue would suffice for remaining an unbeliever.

John:

The argument from hiddenness requires the denial of (H1). So far I haven't seen any counterargument to this claim. True, (H1) is unverifiable. But so is its negation. Thus the argument from hiddenness is also based on something unverifiable.

Tim:

I am just not impressed by the idea that God would necessarily want everybody to know explicitly about the resurrection, and would want to do this to such an extent as to override other considerations (such as the benefits of faith).

First, a quick and somewhat flippant response: The doctrine of the resurrection of Christ was just as true in the time of Abraham as it is now. Yet we have no evidence that God wanted Abraham to know this doctrine.

Second: In some sense all truths tell us about God. (Thus, that there are horses tells us that God created horses.) So somewhere a line needs to be drawn as to what we can expect God to make us all know and what we cannot. Your suggestion is that we draw the line at the doctrines that are relevant to the life of a believer. But in some way, just about any doctrine can be relevant.

Maybe we draw the line at the doctrines which are necessary for being in communion with God and living a fully flourishing life. But a flourishing human life is a life of love of God and neighbor. Knowing that God exists and is perfectly good may suffice for living a life of love of God and neighbor, given grace. Professor Kwicinski may well have already been living a life of love of neighbor, with one last--but crucial--piece being needed to fall into place to bring out what was implicit in that life (remember that St John says that we love God if and only if we love neighbor; this suggests that there must be an implicit love of God in those who love neighbor; perhaps this is insofar as neighbor reflects God).

On Socrates and Professor Kwicinski, I think what one implicitly is committed to (epistemically or morally) can depend on the content of the world, and not just internal states. So I think there is a sense in which if Socrates loves the truth, then Socrates implicitly loves Christ, since Christ is the truth. And if Socrates implicitly loves Christ, he also implicitly believes in Christ.

Alex
Then it seems that the rational position to take re the problem of hiddeness regarding the existence of God is to suspend the argument. If the X and -X are equal regarding epistemic value then it seems pointless to draw any conclusion that we think may have epistemic value regarding X or -X. The problem with many philsophical arguments is that they a nice job of drawing implcations from 'if-then' scenarios, but they do a pretty poor job of removing the 'if.' I take it that we would like to know which one of X or -X is true.
John

Alex,

Suppose it's possible that God brings it about Professor Kwicinski will believe in the existence of God in an epistemically responsible manner. That's consistent with it's being possible that God doesn't. According to H1, anyone who is sufficiently epistemically responsible and virtuous will conclude that God exists. It's not the claim that they might. I still haven't seen how you've even bothered to establish the 'must' claim. (I can't see how you've done much to motivate the 'might' claim, for that matter.)

Anyway, is your position that anyone who thinks about it and remains agnostic is not just unreasonable in a minor way, but unreasonable in a major way? If so, you'd have to say that it's unreasonable to suspend judgment having tried to deal with the argument from evil. That position strikes me as so absolutely untenable I can't think you're seriously suggesting this.

Sorry for the delay...

Jeremy: You said "However, if H1 is true it is necessarily true, if false, then necessarily false."

But the formation of a belief is contingent. I don't see why you think H1 is necessary. Surely God could, if she wanted, keep herself hidden if she had a good reason.

"...what happens on the deathbed and shortly after a person takes her last breath? Our lack of evidence here seems to protect H1 from counterexample."

Suppose the hypothesis is that after one takes her last breath one turns into a soul and travels around the galaxy on the back of an electron. Do we not have evidence against this?

Suppose, instead, that just before death the devil tempts everyone to become an atheist. Is that not possible? The point is just that belief in God is a stable belief and doesn't just suddenly change, and smart people sincerely claim to be atheists, and they die and this is common. Evidence suggests that sometimes atheists pass on. I don't see what is problematic about this at all. And it has nothing to do with one's theoretical commitments, it just happens all the time.

"...you say that it is improbable that atheists like David Lewis convert on their deathbed or after they die. Out of curiosity and the desire to understand, how do you figure such probabilities?"

I guestimate. There's been millions of atheists, suppose half of them were seeking the truth, half of those left had the relevant virtues...that leaves like 250,000 people...then either they did or didn't convert, so I assign 1/2 probability to the claim that each person converts on the deathbed...that leaves about 125,000 dead atheists...and that seems quite generous to me, especially if Buddhist count as atheists, and people that were around before Judaism, and on and on...

Alex:

You wrote "But unless right after he uttered the words a laser blast annihilated his brain or the like, we are unlikely to have any evidence against the hypothesis that he survived seconds or minutes after the words were uttered."

But even atheists die suddenly, like in car crashes. And just suppose the brain monitor is flatlined after professor Kwicinski declares her atheism...isn't that a pretty good reason to think she's dead?

"The idea that someone is thinking without speaking or without being able to speak does not go against appearances."

Maybe I was confusing, but I agree with this. My point is that the BIV scenario doesn't go against appearances, but it's unlikely. Similarly, the miraculous conversion of the atheist doesn't go against appearances though it's unlikley. I was rhetorically looking for you to give me a reason not to be a total sceptic if you're going to buy into these possibilities miraculous possibilities, since it seems to me the BIV is relevantly similar to the idea that every atheists truth loving atheist eventually believes.

"Moreover, there is some reason to think that if God exists, God's grace would be particularly involved with a dying person."

Here there seems to be an argument. I don't happen to see why God would be particularly interested with the dying, but if the posterior probability is high, then okay, there is something here. Though, this defense depends upon particular commitments that others might not buy into. I'm willing to hear how this story might go.

"This argument, however, fails, because you only get to multiply probabilities together when the events are probabilistically independent. But the events are not probabilistically independent, because if God exists, which we should assign a non-zero probability to (else we don't need the hiddenness argument), then all the events will happen."

I think the argument works. But there is a typo in your last sentence, so I din't catch why you think God's existence makes the conversion events dependent? They strike me as independent. Either way, we can still multiply dependent events, though its not as simple, and it's questionable how likely one conversion event will be on another.

I still think an important question is lost in all of this, however. Even if God reveals himself to everyone, some at the time of death, we still have the problem of hiddenness. Where was he during one's life? It's quite surprising, perhaps just as surprising, that a good God would be absent for nearly all of one's earthly life if he's primarily concerned with having a nice relationship.

Christian:

As for sudden death, if God exists, sudden deaths are no surprise to him, and so he can ensure that the person has some time just before death, if that's what is needed.

As for independence, the reason there isn't independence is that on one of the hypotheses under consideration there is a God who is interested in the conversion of all. Suppose that the probability of the existence of such a God is at least .01, and suppose that there are a million who have died throughout history satisfying the conditions of H1. Given the eixstence of such a God, there is a likelihood that God would ensure H1 holds (God might not do so, but he might well). Let's say that likelihood is at least .01 again. So, there is at least a likelihood of (0.01)(0.01)= 0.0001 that H1 holds. BUt if independence holds, then the probability of H1 is much less than 0.0001. Hence independence does not hold. :-)

The issue of why these people didn't come to the requisite conclusion earlier in life is a good one. However, the earthly life would be but an infinitesimal fraction of eternal life. I am not sure it makes such a big difference in the big scheme of things whether the person took 70 years to become a theist or 7 years.

Clayton:

H1 is only necessary if the claim in the argument from hiddenness that God would will everybody, or everybody who seeks sincerely enough, to believe that he exists. But that claim about God's will does not seem to me to be a candidate for a necessary truth. It may have some plausibility, but God would be free to create a universe full of contented mathematicians who never look beyond mathematics.

Clayton:

"Anyway, is your position that anyone who thinks about it and remains agnostic is not just unreasonable in a minor way, but unreasonable in a major way?" -- To defend what I've been saying in this thread I need the claim that to remain agnostic in the face of whatever evidence God could throw at one on one's deathbed (including, for instance, conceptual arguments, plausible theodicies, etc.) would require major unreasonableness. I am not actually affirming any of this stuff--it is all conditioned on the claim in the argument from hiddenness that God would will every reasonable person to explicitly believe he exists, and this I am not sure of.

As to the problem of evil, now speaking in persona propria, etc., here's what I think. First, there is a good deductive cosmological argument for a necessarily existing First Cause from a self-evident Principle of Sufficient Reason. Together with teleological considerations one gets the idea that the First Cause is a person. That argument is unaffected by the problem of evil unless we know how to show that any intelligent, necessarily exisitng First Cause would have to be perfectly good. (At the moment, I do not know for sure if we know how to argue this; St. Thomas thought he could, but I do not understand his arguments sufficient to judge of them.)

Second, I am impressed by the fact that there is very good reason to think that if theism is true, human life lasts forever. Therefore, I think the theist can avail himself of the possibility of all kinds of afterlife compensation considerations. Now, these do not take care of all the problems. But I think they lower the bar for a theodicy. I will post on this separately.

Alex
In H2 and H3 you make a factual claim about people receiving sufficient evidence that God exists and use a non-factual 'perhaps' experience to support it. I am curious as to the epistemic legitimacy of using a non-factual 'perhaps' experience to support the epistemic warrant of a 'factual' claim. It seems to me to be unwarranted, but I might be wrong and would like to know if I am.

Also, if one receives sufficent reason that God exists so that H1 is true can we determine anything about the nature of this God such that we end up with a standard theistic conception, or is it possible that the God that is revealed to us by these types of "perhaps" experinces is consistent with God being a evil demon? In short, if I accept H1 as being true can I consistently maintain that God may be evil.

Alex:

I agree God "could" make sure everyone, at some time in there life, knows him. The claim that he does is consistent with the way things appear. And if people live eternally, 70 years of hiddenness probably isn't the greatest tragedy.

I'm at a loss how to respond since it seems to me there are many people who never come to believe in God. Here's a try, however. Perhaps there is a schmod, and on the deathbed he gets people to believe in him, instead of God. Or, perhaps there is a schlod, and instead of schmod or God, schlod gets people to believe in him...Each of these hypotheses is consistent with the way things appear, but mutually incompatible, and so we should distribute credence between them if we give credence to any of them. If this is right, then H1 will receive an extremely low credence, something less than .00001, and this independent of the issues wrt 'independece'.

As far as I can tell, this argument is sound. We hence need a reason to think that either (1) there are no schmods, or (2) even if there are they would not be interested in converted us, (3) it's very, very likely that God exists and would allows scmods to interfere.

I take it I can describe schmods that play this role, beings just like God minus some degree of perfection . And so H1 is in trouble.

Christian:

Well, here's one intuition that might be helpful: there is a necessarily existing creator iff there is a necessarily existing God.

The idea that there should be a necessarily existing being that lacks some divine perfection but has all the others, for instance, seems outlandish.

More importantly, the hypothesis of a necessary being that has some but not all the perfections is a more complex hypothesis in the sense that it is simpler to say that the necessarily existing being has all perfections (just as it is easier to say that all matter attracts than, say, that all matter other than mountains of gold one mile in diameter attract, even though the empirical evidence we have for the law of gravitation is consistent with the latter hypothesis).

But it might be possible for me to do a bit better than that. There are two plausible theories about what the necessary existence of a creator would be like. On one theory, to claim that the creator exists necessarily is to say that there is a sound ontological argument for his existence. There is some plausibility in thinking that a sound ontological argument would also establish divine perfection. On the second theory, the Thomistic one, that the creator exists necessarily is explained by his being fully actual, with his essence and his existence being identical. In Aquinas there is an argument that once one grants this, it follows that the creator is a perfect being. I do not know if this argument works, but there is some plausibility to thinking that it does.

So, there is some plausibility in thinking that if there is a necessarily existing creator, there is a necessarily existing God. Moreover, the best reasons for thinking there is a creator are based on some variant of the principle of sufficient reason, and this principle is going to imply that the creator is necessarily existing. If this is right, then it is plausible that if there is a creator, then there is a necessarily existing God.

Hence, the schmod hypotheses aren't nearly as plausible as the hypothesis that God exists.

Here's a different way of putting it. The hypothesis that God exists fits into larger and moderately well worked out theories that include a sketch of an explanation of why God exists, why creation exists, what the meaning of life is, etc. The alternate hypotheses are not like that. Generally, we prefer hypotheses that fit nicely into larger theories.

What about Spinoza's conception of a necessary being that is not a creator?

Alex,

"there is a necessarily existing creator iff there is a necessarily existing God."

But that's then just stipulative. A creator needn't be perfect. It's not analytic. I see no empirical evidence for the claim.

I don't know why the idea that there is a necessarily existing being that is not perfect is outlandish. Take the number 2. Take the property of being a thing. Perhaps space is necessary. But none of these things are perfect. I'm not even slightly inclined towards you intuition, but say more, maybe I'm missing something.

"the hypothesis of a necessary being that has some but not all the perfections is a more complex hypothesis"

I don't see why. Compare two humans, one who has an IQ of 41, the other of 42. Is the hypothesis that one exists more complex than that the other exists? I don't see why. Keep running that argument for possible human IQ's and we have a counterexample to your claim above, unless the necessary existence of God is relevant to the simplicity point, but again, I just can't see why.

"There is some plausibility in thinking that a sound ontological argument would also establish divine perfection."

Maybe. I've just never seen such an argument, any references?

"that the creator exists necessarily is explained by his being fully actual, with his essence and his existence being identical"

That's a mouthful. I just don't understand it. Is there an important contrast between full and partial actuality? Can an essence be identical to something's existence? Maybe...but I'd have to hear more details.

"I do not know if this argument works, but there is some plausibility to thinking that it does."

As for myself, I've never read an argument for God's existence that was even slightly persuasive to me, though I think the teleological argument "may" give us a good reason to think that there is a designer of some sort. I'm agnostic about the existence of a designer on its basis.

"the best reasons for thinking there is a creator are based on some variant of the principle of sufficient reason."

I just think PSR is very, very implausible. I haven't kept up with the post vanInwagen critique of it though, any references?

"Hence, the schmod hypotheses aren't nearly as plausible as the hypothesis that God exists."

This doesn't follow. Perhaps God has schmods working for him, for all we know. That there are schmods is consistent with the existence of God. Let the mind roam, hypotheses are easy to develop. Make them angel-like or demon-like or devil-like...souls that haven't crossed over...etc.

"Generally, we prefer hypotheses that fit nicely into larger theories."

Agreed. But it's easy to develop a schmod theory that's equally large. I could do that if you doubt it...

But whatever, if your response is the best one, it reveals a crucial weakness. That defense of H1 depends upon a whole bunch of theoretical commitments, whereas a denial of it doesn't at all. I say you should lower your credence in your previous commitments in light of the implausibility of H1, you stick to those commitments and raise your credence in H1. One can always do this. For example, if one's commitments entailed that homosexual sex is wrong, one could raise one's credence in this claim rather than lowering one's credence in one's priors. Okay. I say so much the worse for one's priors. One is doing a modus ponens when rationality requires a modus tollens. Admittedly, I don't know how to prove that other than stomp and shout: are you really going to suggest that all people are theists at some point? are you really going to suggests gay sex is wrong? these claims should be data, falsehoods that is, from which to develop a theory, not acceptable and unforseen consequences of a theory.

Sorry. But that's consistently my reaction to our conversations, for what that's worth. But again, I admit that I do not know how to reconcile this. I don't know how to argue for the correctness of my modus tollens. Suppose there is an argument the conclusion of which is that we don't know we have hands. If somebody then says "See, we don't know!!!" I just don't know what to say. I say "See, a premise is false in the argument!" And on and on...the circle will get bigger, but the problem, so far as I can tell, remains the same. Any thoughts? How would you get someone to share you view if they do what I think your doing amd if I'm right, I'm doing from your perspective?

Christian:

The defense of the claim that for aught that we know H1 is true does not involve much in the way of the controversial commitments. The defense of the claim that H1 is true does involve such. But to refute the argument from hiddenness all I need is the claim that the defender of the hiddenness argument has not shown H1 to be false.

I agree that some folks find the idea of the necessary existence of numbers plausible. But the necessary existence of a concrete, causally efficacious being seems intuitively different.

Moreover, consider that a theory that held that the number 17 had necessary existence but that no other numbers did would rightly be seen as truly absurd. Why? Because the property of being the number 5 is not somehow metaphysically special. It seems exactly on a level with the property of being the number 17. It is highly plausible that if the number 17 has necessary existence, then all positive integers do. On the other hand, I can imagine a theory (not a very good one, but not entirely crazy) on which the number zero has necessary existence but no positive integers do. There might well seem to be a way in which the number zero is different from positive integers. For instance, one might think that numbers are to be identified with equivalence classes of sets of actually existing material entities. If so, then because the empty set always exists, the number zero has necessary existence, but no positive integer does.

Likewise, when we look at the concepts of beings with different combinations of perfections, the idea of a being that has all the perfections stands out, in kind of the way that the idea of zero stands out when we think about nonnegative integers. In exactly the same way that it would be reasonable to think that if the number 17 exists necessarily, then every positive integer exists necessarily, so too it would be reasonable to think that if some particular possible schmod exists necessarily, all possible schmods exist necessarily, since they all seem metaphysically on par. If so, then there is only one schmod hypothesis, not an infinitude of them.

On the other hand, the hypothesis of a being that has all perfections, like the hypothesis of a being that has no perfections, stands out in terms of simplicity and non-arbitrariness, not just being one among many hypotheses that are on a level with each other. (Of course one might think that the hypothesis of a being that has all perfections is also like the hypothesis of a being that has no perfections in another way, viz., by being impossible. But that would need to be argued for.)

On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, someone at my Department has recently published what seems to be the only contemporary analytic book on the subject. Maybe it will lead to some further development of the state of the art on the subject.

The issues of modus ponens and modus tollens plague all of philosophy. In the end, I think one has to practice the intellectual virtues and do one's best. I do think, however, there at times are objective facts about when one should employ modus ponens and when one should apply modus tollens. I have no idea what grounds such facts. It might be that the only account to be given of them is teleological (reason has a natural telos to assert some but not other propositions) or theological. If so, this would be a good argument for supposing telos and/or theos.

By the way, there are sound ontological arguments iff God necessarily exists. Whether there could be an ontological argument that is not only sound but "good" or "persuasive" is an open question. Currently no such argument is known.

--Alex

"The defense of the claim that for aught that we know H1 is true does not involve much in the way of the controversial commitments."

I think we know H1 is false. I think we know that people die as lifetime truth-seeking atheists. I don't think that for all we know, H1 is true. However, one can always jack up the requirements for knowledge and say, according to them, we don't know H1 is false. This is what I believe you are doing when you appeal to the possibility of deathbed conversions for all lifelong atheists. To say that it's consistent with our evidence that all atheists are appeared to by God just before death and that we must exclude this possibility to know H1 is false, is to require of knowledge something that knowledge doesn't require.

That's why I appealed to BIV scenarios since we can't exclude them, but intuitively, we know we have hands. Thus, if you're going to be consistent and say we don't know H1 to be false, you should be a sskeptic about nearly everything, certainly about God's existence.

"If so, then there is only one schmod hypothesis, not an infinitude of them."

I didn't follow this argument exactly. A few things. First, I haven't heard a good argument for the claim that God is a necessary being, though I'm happy to take it as an assumption. Second, we can build into the schmod hypothesis that these infinitely many other Gods are necessary beings. Or, we needn't make them Gods, but angels that whisper in people's ears before they die. All that is relevant is the claim that some other thing intervenes before God gets to the dying atheist.

"the hypothesis of a being that has all perfections, like the hypothesis of a being that has no perfections, stands out in terms of simplicity and non-arbitrariness."

I'm not convinced that simplicity is truth-conducive, but I can take that as an assumption too. However, I don't think a deistic God is less simple or more arbitrary than a Christian God. Similarly for a naughty God. And though a decent and slightly wimpy God may be more arbitrary, in some sense of arbitrary, than a perfect God, I don't see those copnsiderations amounting to an argument. Let me build into the schmod hypothesis that God made schmods and they ran amuck...

Oh, and I'll check out that book on PSR. Looks good!

"I think one has to practice the intellectual virtues and do one's best."

And we can defer to others and suspend judgment when we disagree, unless we have a good explanation of why the other party is mistaken. Though even this issue is full of theses that people disagree about:)