Strong skeptical theism

But sometimes we can find PJRs--for instance, Christ's salvific sacrifice provides a PJR for Christ's crucifixion.

But this is wildly question-begging. Who thinks we actually find a God-justifying reason for allowing that suffering in the salvation it provides? To see that, you would have to see the necessity of it. But no one sees that this was necessary to salvation (excepting perhaps God); no one sees that an Anselmian perfect being could not have chosen another way. Of course, Christian's believe that it was somehow crucial in the salvific economy, but I don't know one who claims to see the necessity of it.
Skeptical theists do claim that we should not observe God-justifying reasons for such evils. As far as I know, every one of them denies (*). The discussion here, however, might be confused by the appeal to PJR's. Skeptical theists do not deny that we can find some justification for some evils, even lots of justification. So we can find PJR's. What we should not find are God-justifying reasons for evils. And if we do find reasons that would justify a perfect being in permitting evils, then that is evidence against either God's existence or (more reasonably) against skeptical theism.

Mike:

I find it quite implausible that the finding of God-justifying reasons, or putatively God-justifying reasons, should be harder if God exists. And yet that is what the denial of (*) would say.

Anyway, as for the case of salvation, I think you raise a very good about what "find" means. Suppose "find" just means "get the God-justifying reason right", with no requirement that one know one got it right. Then my example works, assuming that in fact our salvation justifies God in permitting Christ's sufferings.

But perhaps "find" means "get the God-justifying reason and right and know that you got it right". Nonetheless, I can get do this. For I can know that the Scriptures are true (e.g., through reformed epistemology, or by one of the standard apologetic arguments). And I can (let us suppose) know, through exegetical work, that Christ died for our salvation. Putting this together, I will know that our salvation is a God-justifying reason for Christ's sufferings.

Perhaps, though, the case is not sufficiently clear exegetically. Nonetheless, there are a few other times in Scripture where a reason is given for an evil. Any one of these cases will suffice for my argument. E.g., John 9:3.

I find it quite implausible that the finding of God-justifying reasons, or putatively God-justifying reasons, should be harder if God exists. And yet that is what the denial of (*) would say.

Alex,

There is a good reason why you find it implausible. This is because the same bit of evidence counts against the skeptical theist's God (a God that does not reveal his reasons or purposes to us) but counts in favor of a God that reveals His reasons. So, there is no doubt a sense in which finding God-justifying reasons for evils counts as evidence that God exists. But finding such evidence counts against a particular conception of God--the one the skeptical theists tell us is inscrutable.

Mike,

You're right.

So, now, let's take the instances in Scripture where we are given reasons for God's allowing an evil. I suppose the skeptical theist can say that these instances are the exception rather than the rule, and hence for a randomly chosen evil, it is still unlikely that a God-justifying reason could be found.

I wonder, though, how plausible skeptical theism is if we can actually give a God-justifying reason for the greatest evil that has ever taken place, namely deicide?

Alex
I find it hard to imagine that God can be killed if He exists so your example of deicide seems unrealistic. So, let us take a very small example of evil. Bob is walking by a river and near the bank of the river where Bob is there is a baby drowning. All Bob needs to do is to bend over and pick up the baby in order to save it. Bob chooses to watch the baby drown. Has Bob done anything wrong? Most of us would agree that he has done something wrong and might utilize the Principle of Agent-causation Responsibility (PA-cR) and Principle of Non-malfeasance (PN-m) for justifying our assertion.

Now imagine that Bob is not there, but that God is. God chooses not to save the baby. Has God done anything wrong? If we know that PA-cR and PN-m are part of our moral knowledge, then this is knowledge that God must also have. If Bob is the cause of the baby drowning because he chooses not to save it, then God is the cause of the baby drowning if He chooses not to save it. If Bob ought not to cause unnecessary and avoidable harm, then God ought to cause unnecessary and avoidable harm.

The only way that PA-cR can be shown to be wrong is to demonstrate that the agent is not the cause of the consequence. Clearly the agent, Bob or God, is the direct cause of the baby drowning so it is the case that if Bob should save the baby then God should save the baby if He is the only moral agent present. The only way that PN-m can be shown not to apply is to demonstrate that the harm is necessary and unavoidable, but it is not clear how this can be down in this situation. To appeal to God’s greater knowledge as a justification is to beg the question because we must share all the knowledge associated with moral principles if they are to be considered knowledge. This follows from set theory. If p is true in x (human knowledge) then p must be true in x+y (God’s knowledge).

I wonder, though, how plausible skeptical theism is if we can actually give a God-justifying reason for the greatest evil that has ever taken place, namely deicide?

Alex,

I'm all in favor of abandoning skeptical theism. Theists just don't need that to defend against (seemingly) gratuitous evil.

Incidentally, I know that when Bill Rowe is offered scriptual reasons for evils, he begs off. The ground rules for the debate are considered violated when we move past the thinner philosophical conception of God. So Bill concedes that his evidential argument cuts against thin conceptions, not thick conceptions (Ric Ott has a nice paper on this in IJPR). On the other hand, Bergmann and Rea do introduce some scriptural reasons to argue that God is not bound by the familiar moral rules to prevent evil. So I guess I'm not sure when it's fair game to introduce them.

Mike,

It certainly seems fair to introduce Scriptural considerations when arguing against a sceptical theist who accepts Scripture, wouldn't you say?

On what basis should one accept scriptual considerations as having any epistemic value one way or the other regarding the problem of evil and the existence of God?

John:

I think that by default all testimony has some epistemic value. It will not have any epistemic value if we can show that the person from whom the testimony comes is either untrustworthy or incompetent in the area in question. So if somebody tells me that God told him that there are aliens on Mars, this has some epistemic value--it is evidence in favor of the claim that there are aliens on Mars--unless I can show that the person is untrustworthy (dishonest or insane) or incompetent.

Alex

I agree that testimony by default has some epistemic value, but alone it cannot suffice. At some point we require independant confimation that what is asserted is true as opposed to being simply believed. People can certainly believe that something is true which turns out to be false. So what is the role of testimony regarding that status of Scriptual considerations, or reasons? Person A in the Bible asserts x. Why should I accept what is being asserted as being true?

John:

Whether we should accept x just because A says x depends on (a) our judgment of the honesty of A, (b) our judgment whether x lies within A's competence, and (c) whether we have independent evidence against x and if so how much of it there is. I actually think the default is to accept testimony unless we have positive reason to be suspicious.

I think that for most of us, enormous amounts of our knowledge rest solely on testimony. Solely on the basis of testimony, I believe that Saturn has moons, that Beijing is the capital of China, that there is such a planet as Uranus, that images on CRT are produced by electrons hitting the CRT, that kangaroos are indigenous to Australia, that colds are caused by viruses, that many computer chips are made of silicon, that George W. Bush is the president of the United States, etc. For each of these claims, only a small minority of people has reasons beyond testimony for believing them.