Augustinian Theodicy, Part II

Let me offer the kind of intricate example that makes me suspicious of Expansion. (This is closely related to the example of mine that Jeff McMahan discusses in his paper.)

Suppose first that if the Smiths know (e.g., because an angel told them) that if they engage in marital activity, they will have a blind child, and suppose that the Smiths are not currently under an obligation to procreate. Now, assuming the Smiths are sufficiently well off and able to take on the burden of a disabled child, it is arguable that it is morally preferable for them to procreate even if the child would be blind, since they could ensure that the child's life is overall a good one (I think this criterion is automatically satisfied always, but I am not assuming that).

Then, given a choice between not conceiving and conceiving a blind child, the latter option is morally preferable.

But suppose instead the Smiths learn there is a third option. It turns out (maybe an angel tells them) that if they engage in marital activity only on Thursday, they will conceive a child who will not be blind, but if they engage in marital activity on Wednesday, they will have a child who is blind. Given the choice between three options, it is pretty plausible that the Smiths would do wrong to engage in marital activity on Wednesday, since if they're going to engage in marital activity, it should be only on Thursday, given what the angel tells them.

If what I said is correct, this is a counterexample to the conjunction of Expansion and Better-than-OK. For by Expansion, if conceiving the blind child is morally preferable to not conceiving under the initial two-choice scenario, it is morally preferable under the three-choice scenario. But if the couple is permitted not to procreate, then applying Better-than-OK under the three-choice scenario one concludes that it is permitted for the couple to conceive the blind child.

Since I think Better-than-OK is a necessary truth (an impermissible action cannot be morally preferable to a permissible one), if my analysis of the two- and three-choice scenarios is correct, Expansion must be rejected.

One way for the defender of Expansion and Better-than-OK to get out of the argument would be to hold that a couple is only permitted to refrain from procreating when it would be wrong for the couple to procreate. (This would be stronger than the Catholic teaching that a married couple is permitted to refrain from procreating only when they have "grave reasons" to do so.) This would make Better-than-OK inapplicable in the three-option scenario.

Another way would be to argue that a married couple does have a duty to procreate barring serious reasons not to. Hence if the couple is permitted not to procreate, they have serious reasons not to procreate. But, perhaps, once one adds to already serious reasons not to procreate the additional reasons generated by the difficulty in caring for a child who is blind, then one gets conclusive reasons not to procreate a blind child. A couple that would not have conclusive reasons not to procreate a blind would have to be moderately well-off, psychologically stable, etc., and such a couple would not actually have the serious reasons that would make refraining from procreation permissible. Therefore, for any couple for whom procreating a blind child in the two-choice scenario is permissible, non-procreation in the three-choice scenario is impermissible, and hence Better-than-OK does not apply.

Frankly, this case makes my head spin, and so I don't know what to make of it.

Let me end with the remark that thinking about this case may require distinguishing two versions of the three-choice scenario: (1) the hypothetical blind child and the hypothetical non-blind child are the same individual, (2) they are not the same individual. It seems to me that only in case (1) is the argument for the impermissibility of choosing to procreate the blind child deeply compelling. But maybe there is a sound argument for (2) from Kripkean essentiality of origins considerations. If so, then that would be a way of refuting this counterexample to Expansion.

It is a basic teaching of Western monotheism that God did not have to create and hence (a) is true.

It can't be that easy to establish (a), since once you have (a), the rest is fairly easy. I don't see much wrong with either principle you use. Expansion is a slightly strenthened version of the decision-theoretic principle, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and I'm pretty sure it's not seriously controversial. The problem with your inference to (a) is that it ignores competing arguments that seem (to me) at least as good. Consider Rowe's principle (B), for instance.

B. [](If an omniscient and omnipotent being actualizes a world w when there is a better world that it could have actualized, then that being is not essentially perfectly good)

As a gloss on what essential perfect goodness entails, (B) is pretty plausible. But (B) entails that God could not have actualized the default world containing all and only necessary beings/necessary states of affairs.
I'm not claiming that (B) is true (indeed, it can be shown invalid in models involving infinitely many improving worlds). But I am claiming that Rowe's argument from (B) against (a) is at least as reasonable as the Augustinian argument for (a) from tradition.
Incidentally, there are Schlesinger-like procreation arguments against Rowe's (B) similar to the one you note in the first comment above. As David Gauthier used to say, "I'm unmoved".

I'm having trouble seeing Augustine endorsing Expansion. For him, what makes an action the right one is that it's done out of the proper motivation, including acting out of the right desires. But which desire is the right one to act from depends on which desired thing has the most intrinsic worth, and when our order of priorities in our desires doesn't line up with what worth things intrinsically have we end up with people doing things that are wrong.

Given that, it seems that Augustine must accept the following possibility. A is the right choice given two options, A and B, because the desire behind doing A is better than the desire behind doing B. But once C is thrown into the mix C is the right choice because it's what someone desiring a higher thing than the desires behind either A or B would choose. That flows right out of Augustine's ethics. How isn't it a counterexample to Expansion?

Jeremy, you write,

How isn't it a counterexample to Expansion?

To get a counterexample to EXP, you need a case where A is preferred to B in, say, {A, B} and A is not preferred to B in, say, {A, B, C}. In the case you offer (if I'm reading it right) you have A preferred to B in {A, B} and C preferred to A in {A, B, C}. But that's perfectly compatible with EXP. I don't think anyone would deny that the addition of another option C might involve adding an alternative that is better than any previously available. What is controversial is claiming that the addition of C alters the relative value of the other options, A and B. But I agree that there are some tricky examples that try to show this.

Dear Mike:

Rowe's principle is incompatible with standard understandings of grace in the Christian tradition as something that God did not have to offer us. Thus, it relies on an understanding of moral perfection different from the one involved in the traditional Christian concept of God.

Of course if Rowe can give a good argument for his principle, then he will thereby be giving a direct argument against the existence of God as conceived of by Christianity (and almost surely Judaism as well).

Alternately, I can proceed as follows. Either there is no best of all possible worlds or there is. If there is no best of all possible worlds, then a being that behaves in accordance with (B) cannot be perfect, since whatever the being does, it does wrong. Suppose now there is a best of all possible worlds. Let W be that best of all possible worlds. Then either W either does contain a copy of our universe or it does not. If it does contain a copy of our universe, then for all we know, we are in that copy, and thus for all we know, we are in W and the problem of evil is dissolved. (This is a bit quick. There are some probabilistic considerations. But I can fix all that.) Suppose W does not contain a copy of our universe (a universe is a maximal spatiotemporally connected aggregate of contingent beings). Let W* be a world consisting of all the concrete stuff from W plus a copy of our universe. Then W* is better than W, assuming our universe is overall better than nothing. But W was supposed to be the best of all possible worlds, so this possibility is not a real possibility.

Suppose now there is a best of all possible worlds. Let W be that best of all possible worlds. Then either W either does contain a copy of our universe or it does not. If it does contain a copy of our universe, then for all we know, we are in that copy, and thus for all we know, we are in W and the problem of evil is dissolved. (This is a bit quick. There are some probabilistic considerations. But I can fix all that.) Suppose W does not contain a copy of our universe (a universe is a maximal spatiotemporally connected aggregate of contingent beings). Let W* be a world consisting of all the concrete stuff from W plus a copy of our universe. Then W* is better than W, assuming our universe is overall better than nothing. But W was supposed to be the best of all possible worlds, so this possibility is not a real possibility.

This is indeed quite quick. We are back to the assumption that a world containing island universes (one of which includes our on-balance good universe) must be the best. There are all sorts of dubious assumptions built into this claim. It is simply false that every on balance good world can be combined with every other on-balance good world in the best collective cosmoi. Neither is it obvious that there are indiscernable (or duplicate) universes: i.e., it's a clear violation of one version of LeibLaw and not open to simple assumption.
Your account here sounds very Lewisian, but, for individuation reasons, he does not allow island universes. He substitutes for island universes near-island universes (peninsular universes, if you will) that really compose a single universe. So you'll have to add as well assumptions rejecting principles of organic unity. The problems just go on.

Here's a counterexample to expansion.

Before me is a box with a red button and a green button. The green button is broken. If I push red, I save one life. If I refrain from pushing red, 5 people die. Suppose now that my option includes pushing green. If I push green, 1000 people are saved.

So, initially, pushing red is preferable to not pushing red.

But, pushing green is preferable to pushing red "and" pushing green is a way of not pushing red, so not pushing red by pushing green is preferable to pushing red.

We'll need to get into individuation, but then Expansion will depend upon the plausibility of the principles of individuation it relies on.

OK, I was misreading Expansion then.

Mike:

While it is false that every pair of on-balance-good worlds can be combined, the following appears plausible: given any pair of distinct on-balance-good possible worlds A and B, there is a world W that contains a copy of the contingent content of A and a copy of the contingent contents of B. I say that x is a "copy" of y iff x and y have all the same purely qualitative properties. (In particular, x is always a copy of x.) A property is purely qualitative provided it doesn't involve haecceities, de re references or other forms of direct reference.

Alternately, I could just rely on the following intuition. Let W be any world. Then there is a world W* whose contingent portion consists of the contingent portion of W plus one more happy disembodied individual causally disconnected from all the contingent beings in W, and W* is better than W.

Christian:

I was implicitly assuming, though I should have made it explicit, that the choices in T are mutually exclusive.

Here's another simple argument against the existence of a best of all possible worlds. Let W be a best of all possible worlds (for reductio). Then, plausibly, W contains at least one finite knower, k. Let p be a practically irrelevant but true mathematical proposition that k does not know. Let W* be a world just like W but where k knows p. Since knowledge is good, W* is better than W.

Alex
I have a problem with the Better-Than-Ok principle. If B is preferable to A from a moral point of view, then A would not be viewed as a permissible option. It seems to me that the force of 'the problem of evil' is that it posses a problem regarding choices to be made by a moral agent. (see an earlier comment I made to a different thread that you were developing) If a moral agent knows that B is better then A then she would choose B if she is a good moral agent.

As far a s possible worlds is concerned, why do we need to consider God's choices only relative to the possible worlds He could create? It seems to me that God, if He exists, can do pretty much what He choices to do regardng what to create as long as He has the power to bring it about. The word 'can' refers to 1) be able to do something, 2) having the knowledge to do something, and 3) having the right to do something. Without some serious begging of the question, we can only say re God that He was able to create this world, had the knowldge to create this world, and 3) had the right to create this world. The fact that any world exists does not tell us anything about the moral nature of God, only His power to bring something about.

From my point of view, the problem of evil is of little interest re possible worlds in so far as God created what he wanted to and to ask if this is the best of all possbile worlds, or could there be a better world is to ask a pointless question. That might be a little harsh) We are stuck inside the world we inhabit and we have to understand evil (and goodness) within the context of our experiences, not try to second guess God re what we think His nature is and what He should have done re creating the world He did. It is difficult enough to understand why God would not eliminate evil that only He can eliminate if He is a completely good moral agent. (Again, I refer to my earlier comment in another thread.

Thaanks for some very stimulating threads.

Thanks for the comment, John.

"If B is preferable to A from a moral point of view, then A would not be viewed as a permissible option." - Giving my last ration of food to a friend while on a lifeboat is morally preferable to eating it myself, but it is permissible to eat it myself. There are going to be such things as supererogatory actions, unless one is utilitarian or the like.

Christian, your example entails a contradiction. To make your example work you assume that there are two instances of "not pushing red". One instance of not pushing red is not pushing any button at all (call that N1) another instance of not pushing red is pushing green (call that N2). Now consider the situation when pushing green is an option. There you say that not pushing red is better than pushing red. You mean, of course, N2 is better than pushing red. But it is still true (even when pushing green is available) that N1 is worse than pushing red. But N1 and N2 are both instances of not pushing red. So, it follows from your story that not pushing red is both better and worse than pushing red..!@#

Mike & Alex,

First, you're right Mike. And Alex, I was assuming alongside you that the options are exclusive in T.

Here's the thing: That the contradiction can be derived and that we need exclusive options just raises the problem I meant to. How do we divide the relevant options so as to avoid the contradiction while preserving, say, intuitions about individuating options?

This is upstream from your main point Alex, but it seems to me nonetheless interesting.

Alex
I agree that there are supererogatory actions (your example fits), but I do not think the problem of evil refers to actions that would be classifed as such. My obligation to pull the drowning baby out of the water is not supererogatory, but is a duty that is derived from guidng my actions according the requirements of a moral principle that I accept as being true, i.e., the principle of mutual aid. It might be the case that in a set containing all my actions (performed and otherwise) that it is permissible to keep my suit clean for an upcoming interview, but that loses is permissiblity if I need to get my suit dirty to save the child even if I am on my way to the interview. I think that most of us would agree that it would not be defensible, under those circumstances, to argue that keeping my suit clean is permissible as an alternative to saving the child. Hence the 'Better-than-ok' principle seems to be context driven and really serves little purpose in understanding what we ought to do in concree situations.

My problem is that if I know that I ought to save the baby, then any moral agent knows she ought to save the baby, all else being equal. I do not think that 'expansion' works here. If I know that x is derived from p in S, then it must be the case that x is derived from p in S + T (T being things God knows that I do not). The issue is with the epistemic status of p; If I know p then God also knows p regardless of what else He knows. I will admit that I might be on shaky grounds here and that 'expansion' might actually work to explain why God does not have to save the baby, but I then wonder what it is that I actually know. Maybe you can shed some more light on this.

Here's the thing: That the contradiction can be derived and that we need exclusive options just raises the problem I meant to. How do we divide the relevant options so as to avoid the contradiction while preserving, say, intuitions about individuating options?

Certainly, no counterexample can individuate events coarsely enough to generate a contradiction. I guess the question is whether there is a counterexample that individuates events finely enough to avoid contradiction. I can't off hand think of one.
The larger metaphysical debate between coarse-grainers and fine-grainers seems to me irresolvable.

Let me try a different tack against the Rowe principle. Suppose that we lived in a world with a trillion extremely happy persons, leading deeply meaningful mutually interacting lives, in a world of intricate beauty, and with there being no evil. Suppose, further, we knew that we lived in such a world (e.g., because we had perceptual powers that far exceed ours, so that we were capable of seeing all of contingent reality).

Now if the Rowe principle is true, then even if we lived in that world, we could argue against the existence of God on the grounds that God could have created a world with a trillion and one extremely happy persons instead. But that argument would seem, I think, quite implausible.

Whatever we think of the argument from the evils of this world, an argument from the finitude of the world for the nonexistence of God is surely a bad argument. Yet if we have reason to accept Rowe's principle, it would be a good argument.

John:

If my argument works, then there will be a disanalogy between the God case and the human case, induced by the fact that God creates the whole world.

Everybody:

Let me suggest a different problem with my argument, one that I don't think anybody's pointed out yet. The argument assumes that God is making a single choice which world to create. This is true on both Molinist and theologically determinist (e.g., Thomist) accounts of creation. However, on accounts on which God's actions can be responses to concrete events in the world (rather than, say, responses to God's timeless knowledge of counterfactuals of free will) the argument fails.

I sense that John's puzzlement over the argument stems from this. The talk of intervening to prevent an evil isn't quite right on Molinist and theologically determinist accounts of creation, insofar as on those views God makes one holistic choice.

. . .we lived in that world, we could argue against the existence of God on the grounds that God could have created a world with a trillion and one extremely happy persons instead. But that argument would seem, I think, quite implausible. Whatever we think of the argument from the evils of this world, an argument from the finitude of the world for the nonexistence of God is surely a bad argument.

Alex, very interesting. Still, this is all assertion and no argument. On the other hand, Rowe does offer an argument for B. It goes this way: Let w and w' be the two worlds you describe, where w' is the better world. Suppose S actualizes w. But then Rowe argues there is a possible being S' exactly like S except that S' actualizes w'. But then S' is an overall better being than S. Other things being equal, an agent that brings about a better world is a better being.
This is similar to what we say about finite beings. Other things being equal, if person P acts more beneficently than P', then P is a morally better person than P'. It needs refinement, to be sure, but I don't find it radically wrongheaded.
But suppose it is too strong. Rowe can get by with a much weaker assumption. It serves his argument just as well to assume that, other things being equal, a person that acts much, much more beneficently is morally better. In case Rowe would have no quarrel with actualizing w rather than (the slightly better) w'. But he would still have a quarrel with actualizing w rather than the much better w''.

Mike, I can't think of one either.

Alex, one thing ignored above, and something that seems very important to me, is the idea that if God creates a world, he creates a world with infinite value.

Now, I'm no mathematician, so I don't want to throw the word "infinite" around, but assuming at least that adding one unit of value to a world with infinite value does "not" make the world better, then I don't see how a number of points above make sense, for example:

You wrote: "Let W* be a world just like W but where k knows p. Since knowledge is good, W* is better than W."

Assuming W has infinite value, then W* is not better than W.

Now...that aside, I'm still having alot of problem with the argument above. You suppose that God could be perfect but not create, but that seems wrong to me. But suppose it's right. Here's an analogy, tell me where it's bad okay.

I have a kid, but I'm not required to. He starts drowning in a pond. I watch. He dies.

Okay. Someone says to me you should have saved him and I respond. My obligations toward my creation were satisfied when I had that kid, he can have no beef with me. I made a "mini-world" in which his life was better than having not been lived at all!

My point is that even if God was permitted to create a world with less value, it doesn't seem to me that he's thereby allowed to allow bad things to happen. Similarly, even if I'm allowed to refrain from having 14 children, that doesn't imply that I can let my seven children drown or whatever.

What am I missing?

Christian:

One difference is that we have special duties to our children. I am not sure God parallel duties to us. It's all grace.

Here's another counterexample. I have two kidneys, A and B. You will die unless you get one of my kidneys, but I am not under a special obligation that requires me to donate a kidney.

If you get kidney A, you will survive, but you will go deaf due to some weird minor deformity in A. Moreover, if I give you kidney A, then I will go bald (let us suppose I have good reason not to go bald, because then I'd be cold in winter).

If you get kidney B, you will survive, and neither of us will suffer any adverse effects.

The following seem true:
1. If I am choosing between {not donating, donating A}, it is morally preferable (and supererogatory) that I donate A.
2. If I am choosing between {not donating, donating A, donating B}, then it seems morally wrong to donate A.

But by the principle of irrelevant alternatives, in case 2, donating A is better than something morally permissible (not donating), and hence should be permissible.

Still, I am not completely sure about the wrongness. Certainly, you could not charge me with any violation of your rights. You're better off for my donating A, after all.

Principles requiring benevolence will yield 2. For instance, consider the following principle:

(M) If an action or a modification of an action would prevent a significant evil to another, and would also make oneself be better off, and has no other relevant effects, then this action or modification of action is morally required.

If (M) is correct, then 2 follows, since modifying one's donation from a donation of A to a donation of B is morally required.

Alex:

I think we talked about this in another thread, but I think that God has duties to the things he creates. This is either because (i) there are special duties of the sort that people appeal to when they say they are obligated to care for their own children in way they are not obligated to care for their neighbor's children, or (ii) God has general obligation of beneficence to his children not only to make them better off than if had not created them, but to make them as well off as he can unless there is a significant to doing so, or (iii) God has an obligation to maximize value (if Consequentialism is true).

I don't think I have to take a stand on what generates God's duty to save a child in a shallow pond, but I'm quite happy to say that there is an obligation, and if God fails it, he is not deserving of worship, nor perfect, nor omnibenevolent and that is all the argument from evil shows anyway. If this means I deny the role of "grace" then I do deny it, and suggest that everybody deny it, and for very good reason.

Now, my own view is that one ought to choose, in option 2, to donate kidney B. Moreover, one ought to choose, in option 1, to donate kidney A. I also think the recipient of the kidney doesn't have a right to the kidney, in either case, so that means I deny that rights generate facts about what ought to be done. Similarly, I deny that we have a right to live in a world with less evil, but I don't think that implies God ought not to make a world with less evil.

In short, I think something "in the neighborhood" of (M) can be derived from the correct moral theory. I think one ought to donate in both case 1 and 2. I think not donating doesn't violate anybody's rights. But I think rights are derivable when the full moral picture is in view.

Christian:

Does your moral theory leave any room for the category of the supererogatory? (Live organ donation to a stranger is, I think, likely to be seen as the paradigm of the supererogatory.)

What do you think happens to the duty to make a creature as well off as possible in situations in which there is an infinite sequence of better and better states for that creature?

Alex,

I take it that your post, April 19, 2007 12:03 PM, does not allude to my post, April 19, 2007 10:53 AM. FWIW, Rowe's argument is designed to apply to greater and lesser supererogatory beneficence as well.

"I sense that John's puzzlement over the argument stems from this. The talk of intervening to prevent an evil isn't quite right on Molinist and theologically determinist accounts of creation, insofar as on those views God makes one holistic choice."

Alex

I think that you have interpreted me correctly. I would add that I can agree that God created a world that is defensible from a moral point of view, namely that His reasons for creating this world were sufficient to justifying its creation (After all, God can do pretty much what He wants as long as He has the power and knowledge to bring it about.) My issue is that even if the creation of this world is morally justifiable, this does this eliminate God from having any responsibility to aid His creation, if His aid is the only way to eliminate a particular evil.

I am inclined to agree with Christian's obervation that "God has duties to the things he creates. This is either because (i) there are special duties of the sort that people appeal to when they say they are obligated to care for their own children in way they are not obligated to care for their neighbor's children, or (ii) God has general obligation of beneficence to his children not only to make them better off than if had not created them, but to make them as well off as he can unless there is a significant to doing so, or (iii) God has an obligation to maximize value (if Consequentialism is true)."

We do use the 'parent'child' relationship to discuss the nature of our relationship with God so it seems appropriate to hold God accountable to the same standards that we would hold any parent too. As a parent I created my children (without their consent, etc) and I simply cannot defensibly do, or allow, things to happen to them simply because I do not want to intervene, or act as a parent should. This is why I think God is morally remiss when He does not eliminate particular evils to His creation, or parts thereof, when He is the only one who can.

I admit that has has little do with 'better-then-ok,' but that is why I think your theodicy will not work. It is not ok for children to starve; it is a duty, not a 'better- then,' to eliminate this if possible. I think that 'expansion' would work if one could present an argument that justifies God in not acting when He is the only one who can. In other words p may be true in S but not true in S+T (T being what God knows that we do not). Stating that He might have this knowledge in the knowledge he has that we do not will not suffice to excuse God from not acting. The logical response to a 'might be' is a 'might not be' and we are then left empty-handed. Your example of expansion does not leave us empty-handed, but it is different then what I am claiming. I think that if I know p in S, it must also be known by God in S+T, or the referents of p has changed from S to S+T such that p is not longer present in S+T.

Furthermore, the example of donating a kidney falls into the supererogatory category in that the cost (potentail risk) to the person donating is such as no duty to donate can be established (a radical utilitarian probably would disagree). However, the simple act of saving the child from the river poses no such cost. It is these types of particular examples of evil that is the focus, I think, of the 'real' problem of evil. It is not that God created a world He ought not to have created, it is in the fact that, even so, He has duties, based on what we (including God) know re morality, that requires us to act to eliminate evil when we are in a position to do so.

Alex, et al; again, what a wonderful thread. I am learning so much for this exchange. Thanks!

So long as one doesn't define supererogation partly in terms of wrongness, which is ho it should be, my account handles supererogation fine:

S's act A is supererogatory iff S performs A from certain motives, for example, with intention to benefit another person with the belief that doing A will cost S something at least moderately significant.

I don't know how to answer the other question. But if I could make a person better off, I think that I should make them as well off "as possible". So, however good a particular life can be, if I can bring that about without depriving others of a good life or myself in certain ways, then I think I ought to do it. But I don't know how to understand "as possible" when we're considering the possibility that a life could always be better.

Christian
I like you definition of supererogatory. I would add that an action is supererogatory if it is praiseworthy if performed but not blameworthy if not performed.

The only possible exception re the kidney donation would be the general obligation that a parent has to improve, or at least maintain above a certain level, the well-being of his/her child. It might be possible to argue that an action is supererogatory for some, i.e., strangers, but obligatory for others, i.e., parents. If this is the case then God undertood under the parent-child type relationship has obligations that pertain to Him that are derived from the nature of that relationship that would not pertain if that relationship did not exist.

I think there may be a deep disagreement here on what grounds the duties in the parent-child relationship. There are many possibilities here. Three come to my fingers immediately:

1. The parents have caused the child to exist.

2. The relationship between parents and children is very close, and our duties of beneficence are proportional to the closeness of relationship. On this view, the duties of parents to children are like the duties of children to parents (except that children additionally owe gratitude). They result largely from closeness.

3. The parent-child relationship mirrors that which obtains between God and human beings; God contingently chooses to go far over and beyond what justice requires, and so parents should likewise go far over and beyond what justice requires.

I think (1) is incorrect as an account of the source of the duties of parents to children. For consider other potential causes of the existence of children:

(i) The doctor at the fertility clinic who actually joined the egg with the sperm in a petrie dish, after having surgically extracted the ovum from the woman. (I think such procedures are morally wrong, but that is beside the point.)

(ii) The friend who convinced the couple that they should have a child.

(iii) The nurse who injected an ovulation-inducing drug in the woman.

Each of these would have causally contributed to a child's existence in some case--one could even have a case where all three were involved. And in fact the intentional causal contribution of the doctor in case (i) is if anything greater than the intentional causal contribution of one of the biological parents in the case of unassisted reproduction (and we could imagine a case where for medical reasons the sperm needs to be surgically extracted from the man, in which case the intentional causal contribution of the doctor will be even greater).

Yet the doctor, friend and nurse do not bear even remotely close to the kind of responsibility for the child that the biological parents do. Hence, I do not think (1) is the real explanation of parental responsibility. Of course, (1) combined with some other features of the situation may be the explanation. But then one has to argue that these other features obtain in the case of God. E.g., maybe (1) combined with (2) is the explanation. But there is no analogue to (2) in the case of God.

Interestingly, the same argument shows that (1) is not the real explanation of children's duties towards parents.

Hi Alex,
I think we do have a disagreement, furthermore, I do not think your counter-examples work quite the way you want them to.
1) Consider the Doctor: he has a responsiblity to bring about the healthiest possible child he can and can be held accountable for any improper methods/technigues/experiments that he might carry out in the performance of his duties. But he is doing his duty in a contractual relationship with the parents so it is the parents that will ultimately be held responsible for deciding to 'have' children and to raise them properly.
2) The friend has an obligation to be truthful to her friends in discussing their desire to have a child. It might be that in her judgement they are not ready to fulfil the responsbilites of raising a child and she should counsel accordingly. She can be held accountable if she fail to be ruthfyl and to intentiaonally mistpresent her views.
3) The nurse, like the doctor, must follow established /medical/safety protocals in the performance of his duties and can also be held accontable for negligent performce of her duties.

These three examples can be handled under the idea of someone being resposnbile for what they cause, or, agent-causation responsibility. In each these examples people have responsibilities re their professinal/social roles. Now, if I and my wife could not have children, but desired them and could raise them properly, then we could utilize 1 and 3 within the scope of their professional roles/responsibilites to help us bring about what we ourselves wanted to direcly cause, but could not.

Problems of adoption and divorce, etc can be handled within the context of a parent's duties to the children they directly cause to exist, or agree to act "as if" they had caused them to exist; namely assuming the role of parent in the life of an already exiting child.

Now, having said this, even if I grant you your point this does not allow God a reason not to act. You are correct that it is the nature of the relationship that establishes the duties, but that relationship is brought about through human decision-making and actions.

John:

I don't think we need to add into the account of supererogation that the agent of the supererogatory act is praiseworthy, but I do think supererogatory acts "are" acts the performance of which makes the agent praiseworthy. So we agree. Also, I think it's important to note that agents, and not actions, are praiseworthy.

As far as the case goes, I'm not convinced that a child has a right to her parent's organs (is that what you're suggesting?).

"It might be possible to argue that an action is supererogatory for some, i.e., strangers, but obligatory for others, i.e., parents."

I'm not sure I understand this. Recall that an act can be both obligatory and supererogatory.

Christian
I am not so sure that an act can be both abligatory and supererogratory in that the former is a 'must do' if one is to be considered a good moral agent and the latter is a 'can do if one chooses.' In the latter the agent will still be considered a good moral agent for going beyond what is required, but not for doing what is required.

Now the agent may believe that the action she is performing is obligatory in the sense that she believes that she must do it to be a morally good agent as she conceives of an agent being morally good. But believing x to be true does not entail that it is true.

As for the 'rights' of the child, I am inclined to think that this 'right' is not an entitlement (claim) that the child has on the parents, but more a duty the parent has to the child to provide for its well-being born out of the unigue relationship between the parent and child. I think we would think that a parent who did not donate his kidney (all else being equal) to save his child's life would not be acting as a 'good' parent should. We would, I think, consider it to be an act of selfisness. Right now I am going to leave this at an 'intuitional' level meanng that I think that we have a shared set of considered judgements (to use Rawls idea) that we have developed over time regarding how we 'ought' to act towards one another in the various socially defined roles we assume.

John: Some people do have that reaction. But I don't think it's right, I think we should "not" define supererogation in terms of obligation. For example, we should not say an act is supererogatory iff it's not required or prohibited, but one for which the agent would deserve praise. One could stipulate the concept, but I suggest it picks out nothing interesting that my account of superergation misses.

And I agree that we would think about about a parent who wouldn't donate their kidney to save their child, they ought to, I'm just saying a child doesn't have a right to the kidney.

Christian
I am confident that we do agree on the essentials. I am making the distinction between those actions that are supererogatory and those actions that we are obligated to do that Urmson makes in "Saints and Heroes," and I think you are also. Mother Teresa may have thought (believed) she was obligated to help the poor, but if it is an obligation, in the sense that I am using that term, then we are all obligated to help the poor as she did and are blameworthy if we do not. However, if her action is supererogatory, then I can praise her for her actions, and maybe even grant that she is a 'better person then I am' but not believe that I have violated any of my moral obligations.

Also, I should point out that I think that an action can be supererogratory of person A in situation X, but not for person B in that same situation. I was interpreting your statement to mean that an action can be both supererogatory and obligatory for the same person in the same situation. But I think I was wrong to do so.

If I understand your position correctly then I think you would agree with me that God cannot be a completely good moral being if he does not come to the aid of those (his creation) to whom only He can give aid.

Thanks for your comments. They are helping me to clarify my position (at least to myself, if not others).

It doesn't follow from my view that I have an obligation to do something that I should think everyone has the same obligation. My obligation might be a special obligation because of a commitment I've made (and that might include a commitment I've made to God), or it might have to do with receiving some kind of revelation from God as to a particular mission given to me personally from God.

Or perhaps everyone has the obligation prima facie provided no other obligations interfere with it, but perhaps the obligations that come with having a family do interfere with the obligation in question (and it is a legitimate choice between having a family and pursuing this prima facie obligation that gets canceled if you have a family).

Either of those views seems plausible enough that it could be perfectly consistent to hold that Mother Teresa had an obligation to help the poor in ways that I don't.

1. I certainly believe that God is like a father to us. However, I think this is a contingent fact. Scripture insists on God's grace here--on the fact that he is our adoptive father. So on the grounds of revelation, I accept this claim. (But of course once revelation comes into play, a completely different set of considerations comes into play on both sides.)

2. Let's go back to the case of the fertility clinic doctor. The suggestion was made by John that even if parental duties stem from the causal relationship, for contractual reasons the doctor does not have parental responsibilities once he has done his job. Instead the responsibility is on the biological parents. This shows that even if causation results in responsibility, that is a responsibility that can be passed on. But the same could be true in the case of God: perhaps apart from the case of the first generation of human beings, one can argue that the responsibility in fact has been passed on to our biological parents and maybe to the rest of human society.

3. It might still be argued that God has a parental duty to intervene when we are in danger and our parents and the rest of society are not able to help us. But that would be disanalogous to the fertility clinic doctor who does not have parental duties vis-a-vis the child even if the biological parents fail (innocently or culpably). For instance, if the biological parents die in an accident, the doctor does not have a parental obligation to take the child in. Or if the child needs a kidney, and only the doctor is a good match, the doctor does not have the kind of duty that the biological parents would.

Jeremy
I think you are correct. But, in the roles that we assume we do have similar obligations if the role and/or committments (promises)are the same.

I may be confusing people in that I have not differentiated clearly enought (or at all) between obligations we share in the 'thin' sense, e.g., to eliminate harm if possible, to specific obligations that are derived from the 'thick' sense, e.g. thos obligations derived the roles/committments we make.

MT may very well have thought (correctly) that she had an obligation derived from her role, but this obligation (or particular instantiation of an general obligation) does not extend to those not in the role.

I still think the distinction made by Urmson is correct. We do not have to become 'saints' (or heroes) to do what we are obligated to do, e.g. keep our promises, not cause unnecessary and avoidable harm, etc.

Back to yard work. I promised my wife I would rake and spread mulch.

Alex
A comment on your 2nd point.

It seems that you are suggesting that if A sets up w and then passes responsbility for w to others, then A is no longer responsible for what happens in w. But this certainly cannot be the case. Hitler set up teh program for the final solution and left the responsibility for carrying it out to others. We certainly held Hitler responsible for what happened event though others carried out the program. If it is morally correct to hold Hitler responsible, why cannot we hold God responsible for what happens in His creation?

I should point out that, since we're doing theodicy in the spirit of Augustine here, I don't think Augustine would be disturbed in the slightest at the suggestion that all of us, not just most of us, are thoroughly immoral for not doing things most of us consider supererogatory.

But Augustine also has two ways of talking about something as good or bad. He accepts that something can be relatively good or bad in this life, and that really does count as good or bad (i.e. it's not a misuse of the term for goodness or badness). But he thinks ultimately all goodness in this life is really pretty low on the scale of goodness.

I think he'd say the same about the amount of good that can be accomplished by someone. We may never come remotely close to what we're obligated to do, but it's not a misuse of the term 'good' to say that we're good people in comparison with someone who accomplishes little. It's just immense pride to act as if that kind of goodness is what God ultimately cares about. I'd be very surprised to find a passage in Augustine that deals with the concept of supererogation if it's speaking from the perspective of God's ultimate standards.

Jeremy
I really have no clue as to God's ultimate standards regarding morality or Augustine's scale of goodness for that matter. I do not even know what the phrase "God's ultimate standards" means, or refers to. Of course, I do not believe in God so that may be the root of my problem. But it does seem to me that if we are to have a chance at understanding what we ought to do, what we are obligated to do (God or no God), then what we ought to do and the standards that support what we ought to do must be knowable to us. Furthermore, if God does exist, it must be the same as what is known by Him. If God does exist, He may very well have knowledge we do not have. But regarding knowledge of morality, this is knowledge we must share. If we do not, then how can we ever know that we are on the right track? We may always fall short (I certainly do), but we must know what we are falling short of and this problem cannot be handled by simply maintaining that it is 'beyond our keen' (popular phrase today, I guess) to know and understand God's 'ultimate' standards of morality.

Let me ask all of those reading this thread a question of ethics and obligation. I am sure that all of us are familiar with Singer's solution to world poverty. How would Augustine react to Singer's argument? Where would it rank on Augustine's scale of goodness? How close is his scale of goodness to God's ultimate standards?

One further question: Does God live my His ultimate standards or do they apply only to us?

Augustine might find feeding the poor to be a worthy cause, but it's certainly much lower on his scale of goods than eternal salvation. But you have to keep in mind that he doesn't have an act-based ethical system. It's entirely motivation-based. What we ought to do is derived from what desires we ought to have as our strongest desires. The good life is having our desires ordered such that we desire the best things more than things that are good but not as good, and so on.

The highest obligation, then, is to love God as fully as God can humanly be loved and to love the pure things of God more than anything in this fallen world, and no one can do that in this world without God's help, which requires repentance and following of God in the way that Christianity teaches. I don't think he has a concept of supererogation with respect to this, which is the one thing he considers to be the most important obligation we have. We are all thoroughly immoral with respect to this kind of thing, even those whose motivations have been transformed by God in this direction, because it's not something we can do ourselves (in our own power; it's not that there's nothing we can do to bring things about so it will happen though, so it's not a violation of "ought implies can").

Jeremy
1. I maintain that 'can' means 1) having the ability to do the action, 2) having the knowledge to do the action, and 3) having the right to do the action. It does not imply that there are any relavent alternative actions available to me at the time I perform an action.
2. How do you know that loving God is the highest good? Does God need this love? If so, is He not being a bit egoistic if He is maintaining "love me or else?"
3. If we are allthoroughly immoral how can we ever achieve any approximation to this highest good? If we are thoroughly immoral we would never 'choose' to do the right thing. Also, if we are al thorooughly immoral then how can we differentiate between the actions and character of Paul and Hitler?
4. I know that many Christians believe they are fallen, but I know many who do not believe this, if by 'fallen' you are refering to original sin. Also could you (or anyone) explain to me how Adam and Eve could be held responsible for what they did if they lacked knowledge of good and evil and only gained this through eating the forbidden fruit? "Obeying' is a moral concept and to be held accountable for faililng to obey entails that one has moral knowledge sufficient to knwo they ought to obey. Also, please explain to me how their 'sins' are passed down to others? Seems unjust to hold me accountable for what others have done.
5) What are the 'pure things of God' that you refer to?
6) What criteria does Augustine, or others, use to understand the scale of goodness? Why put the love of God 1st? Why not put sacrificing everything we own to feed the hungry 1st?

You're coming about things from entirely the wrong direction. Nothing I'm about to say isn't already in my above comment, but I'll repeat it in the order Augustine would give.

1. He argues in his ethical theory (in dialogue largely with Plato, Epicurus, and the Stoics) that what gets us to act is our desires, and we simply do what we most want, and thus they key to ethics is having the right desires, i.e. desiring the best things and desiring better things more than things that aren't as good.
2. What could be more good than God? God is perfectly good, and nothing else is.
3. Therefore, the highest ethical goal is to love God more than you love anything else.

I see nothing in that argument that requires that God needs anything, never mind that God would need our love. The argument has entirely to do with recognizing what is good as good and acting accordingly. In fact, loving what is good and having our priorities organized in that sort of hierarchy would lead to what's best. Consequentialists should love this.

It is nonsense to claim that since no one is going to be perfect that no one is going to be closer to perfection in any respect than anyone else. Some people love some good things more than some less good things. That's better than having a completely inverted hierarchy. Therefore there is such a thing as relative goodness of recognizing the hierarchy of worth. Some approximate it better than others.

I am not going to take the bait to address every single criticism of Christianity you might have. The questions you raise have legitimately been raised, and a fully defense of Christian beliefs should eventually discuss them, but this is a blog comment thread on a particular issue, and it's one that I'm largely not following closely because I don't have the time to get into the kind of detail people are getting into here. I saw one thing as I was glancing through the very long discussion that I thought worth commenting on, and I commented on it.

Jeremy
I was not trying to bait you. I am trying to understand the position that you are coming from. Thank you for your comments, they have given me something to think about.

I too am going to withdraw from this discussion.

I understand that these are questions you would like to understand my view on. What seems like baiting about it is that you asked a whole bunch of questions, each of which would seem to me to require a whole conversation in itself. I could probably do a series of seven or eight posts responding to those questions. It wasn't your motivation I was commenting on but the practice of asking questions that can be stated very simply but that require many lengthy answers to deal with properly.