How Scholarship Affects Scholars

I've known a few faculty and probably at least a half dozen grad students in my department who were former theists. I haven't met anyone who was a theist at the beginning of graduate work in philosophy who became an atheist during grad school. Every single one of them became an atheist during college or before that.

There have been at least four people I know of who came through the Syracuse department who were atheists or agnostics at the outset of their philosophical study but became theists during their time in the program. So at least at Syracuse the trend works the other way. Two of these four had been theists in their youth but had abandoned it in high school or college, one had been raised secularly, and I don't know anything about the background of the fourth.

Funny but I was thinking of one of those Syracuse cases as I wrote this. I might know of another case at Syracuse from before your time there. Must be something in the water.

I suspect there are more aspects of how scholarship affects scholars than are touched on in this article. Speaking just for myself, there are problems that I have worked on that have pushed me towards positions that I wouldn't have thought possible three years ago. I also know of one philosopher who originally started out writing in favor of the problem of evil but after looking at all of the arguments switched course halfway through the dissertation. Interestingly also at Syracuse.

For those who move away from theism in their education, what's typically the cause? My impression is that it's rarely in response to explicit arguments against theism. It's more in response to things like: the influence of climates of thought and an overall academic culture that's highly secular, the fact that in your education you have to get used to explaining things and thinking in ways that are naturally acceptable, you're constantly reading people who presuppose that theism is false, etc.

On the other hand, my impression is that when people move in the opposite direction in the course of their education, the influence of actual arguments is more significant.

I wonder if others have this impression as well. More importantly, I wonder if others think these generalizations are true.

By 'naturally' (above, first paragraph) I meant 'naturalistically'.

Don't forget that Peter van Inwagen's conversion was also at Syracuse during his early years on the faculty. Kretzmann was another instance of a faculty member who converted, although in his case it was much further into his career. I believe there were a few more examples of that in Philosophers Who Believe and God and the Philosophers, but I don't remember any offhand.

The student who was before my time that I was thinking of was just before my time. I arrived in the fall of 1997, and he had just finished a couple years earlier. Most of the older students still around knew him well. I don't know what his dissertation was on, so that doesn't help me determine if it's the same person.

Dylan, the people in the two books I just mentioned who became theists at a later age largely do not think that they did so as a result of positive arguments. I do suspect they may have realized after having the examine arguments against theism that those arguments don't hold much water, but that doesn't count as being convinced by arguments that theism is true. But if what was keeping them from accepting theism were bad arguments, and those arguments were removed, then in a sense arguments might play a role.

A quote I just read on "Evangelical Catholic" blog:

"Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming skeptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavoring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn skeptism." --George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

It is true that students are exposed to more atheistic belief systems versus the theistic species. When I graduated with a BS I was firmly adhered to Voltaire's proposition "When the truth is evident, parties and factions cannot arise."
Seeing a wide variety of religious denominations in the yellow pages (88 in PHX)I remained an atheist.

Until last summer when I read a number of essays and books on intelligent design (i.e. information theory) and was fortunate to intuit some unique conclusions. Being a Platonist helps in the area of logical causal chains.

[Edited for Relevance—MM]

I'm sure people move away from theism for any number of reasons. I can't speak to all the reasons why, but in the case of philosophers I suspect it often does have a lot to do with considering arguments against theism. I'm sure there are environmental factors that play a role. William Alston mentions this affect in one of the volumes pointed out by Jeremy. However, I suspect environmental factors are secondary in the case of scholars. Even in the cases that go the other way I suspect that the arguments have to come first. As I recall Peter van Inwagen said he got the arguments well before he got belief. This makes a bit of sense if you've thought about gap problems in presenting arguments for theism. The first step is getting someone to see the soundness of arguments for God's existence. The gap is in getting to the belief in any specific type of God. The general advice in overcoming the gap—from the likes of Eleonore Stump and C Stephen Evans—is to spend time in a "saintly" environment.

Actually, van Inwagen says that he understood the arguments and was never convinced by them. What brought him over had nothing to do with arguments. He doesn't think he didn't have reasons, but he insists that they're reasons he can't articulate.

I don't want to get to off track into the specifics of individuals, but I was just going by what van Inwagen says of himself in "Quam Dilecta". Namely that he read CS Lewis. Saw that Christianity was both serious and intellectual, which he specifies was in terms of propositions, distinctions, and arguments. However he still didn't believe it, though he could see that there was an "it" to believe. While he didn't believe right away it is hard to imagine that he would have ever come to have religious beliefs if he hadn't jumped the intellectual hurdle first. That would seem to have something to do with arguments.

My father was a minister. I do not share his beliefs and we had many wonderful discussions over the years. On the last day of his life we discussed the immortality of the soul. My mother could never accept that I had turned away from God and always asked me what philosopher was responsible for the change. Our discussions were not a fruitful over the years.

I did not turn away from God because of an argument, but because when I was in the service I could not reconcile why a loving God would want me to kill my fellow man. In short, trying to make sense of my life, not trying to understand others and their arguments, lead me to the position I now hold. I choose to believe, or at least I prefer to believe, that the universe exists as it does as a result of random chance, not the direct result of a Supreme Being's choices and plans. Makes it easier to understand evil without having to try and make excuses for God.

I'm curious, where does van Inwagen talk about his conversion experience? If anyone that could point me to an article or book I would be forever indebted to them.

Van Inwagen's essay "Quam Dilecta" can be found online and in the book God and the Philosophers.

The important thing about arguments for the existence of God, and apologetics, is that they soften the strength to which atheists hold their views. Most atheists would be rudely surprised by the power of modern Christian philosophy. They have internalized the "Hume and Kant debunked arguments for the existence of God a long time ago" meme (to borrow the atheist term).

john a,

It seems to me that, as you describe it, your conversion to atheism is based on an implicit argument from evil. It sounds very much like a "evil makes more sense on atheism" type argument. If I've understood you right (and correct me if I'm wrong) and something like this is motivating your atheism, then I'd wonder what can really be said for that arugment. Is it a good one? Is the theist really "making excuses for God?" Etc.

Van Inwagen's "Quam Dilecta" is wonderful; thanks for bringing that up. Google it, if you haven't read it.

In that BAR article, Strange sounds like a bit of a Wittgensteinian, don't you think? And I find it pretty bizarre that they paint him as the "orthodox Christian believer" and he doesn't seem to believe in the historicity of the resurrection!

Justin I'd agree whole heartily. I was actually talking to an Atheist not too long ago, about philosophy and he said "You do know that most Philosophers are atheists and the question of God isn't really that important any more." I'd say that most of the Atheists that I've interacted with don't (and in fact will not) consider theistic justifications coherent. I sometimes feel that these Atheists (Dawkins for example) are just as inflexible and ill informed in their beliefs as the fundamentalists that they choose to pick on.

Justin

I suppose it does sound like the problem of evil, but I want to emphasize that I choose not to believe in God. This choice was not the result of a formal argument, but an emotional response to what was happening in my life. I am not suggesting that there is no God. There may very well be one. I simply choose not to believe in Him. It is a (bizarre) leap of faith because the arguments from evil that attempts to demonstrate the logical inconsistency or consistency of theistic beliefs with the existence of evil is not successful. They are extremely interesting and good exercises in reasoning, but when all is said and done, evil exists and we have to deal with it with or without there being a God. Now a belief in God may help some to overcome evil (Adams) or help to develop their souls (Hick), but a belief in God is not reducible to there being a God. I would never maintain that a belief in God is without reason or justification. I have seen the positive affects of belief too often to discredit them. But, for me, my comfort comes in believing that evil is as it minimally (using Occam’s [sp?] Razor) appears to be, either the result of human actions (or lack thereof) or natural events resulting in suffering without trying to construct what appears to me to be an artificial and problematic metaphysical explanation or justification.

As far as theists making excuses for God I would suggest that when we look at the various theodicies what are they attempting to do, but find reasons, or plausible explanations as to why God is not responsible for evil or has compelling reasons (that we will never know) that enables Him not to act when common morality does require us to act. To me this sounds a lot like finding ‘excusing conditions’ to me.

john a

You said: "But, for me, my comfort comes in believing that evil is as it minimally (using Occam’s [sp?] Razor) appears to be, either the result of human actions (or lack thereof) or natural events resulting in suffering."

JC: But, of course, many theist (myself included) think just that, that evil is the result of human actins and/or natural events. Isn't that the idea of "free will" defenses and theodocies?

You said: "I would suggest that when we look at the various theodicies what are they attempting to do, but find reasons, or plausible explanations as to why God is not responsible for evil or has compelling reasons (that we will never know) that enables Him not to act when common morality does require us to act. To me this sounds a lot like finding ‘excusing conditions’ to me."

JC: I think it's better to look at theistic responses to evil more along the following lines. An "excuse" is an attempt to show that a person is not blameworthy for doing something wrong. When giving an excuse, you admit you did something wrong but try to show that you're not blameworthy. However, what theists are trying to do is not to come up with excuses but rather justification. When you try to justify yourself you are trying to show that, in fact, you've done nothing wrong. So, according to the theist, their's simply nothing morally objectionable about God allowing evil. It's like if someone accuses you of doing something wrong when you know full well you've done nothing wrong. Indeed, even your line "common morality does require us to act" seems to indicate that by allowing evil, you are tempted to think God is doing something wrong. But the point of the defenses and theodicies is to show that either God hasn't done anything wrong or that, at minimum, he hasn't been proven guitly yet.

JC: But, of course, many theist (myself included) think just that, that evil is the result of human actins and/or natural events. Isn't that the idea of "free will" defenses and theodocies?
JA: I agree. But, my point is that it gives me no reason to conclude anything about there being, or not being, a God.
JC: I think it's better to look at theistic responses to evil more along the following lines. An "excuse" is an attempt to show that a person is not blameworthy for doing something wrong. When giving an excuse, you admit you did something wrong but try to show that you're not blameworthy. However, what theists are trying to do is not to come up with excuses but rather justification. When you try to justify yourself you are trying to show that, in fact, you've done nothing wrong. So, according to the theist, their's simply nothing morally objectionable about God allowing evil. It's like if someone accuses you of doing something wrong when you know full well you've done nothing wrong. Indeed, even your line "common morality does require us to act" seems to indicate that by allowing evil, you are tempted to think God is doing something wrong. But the point of the defenses and theodicies is to show that either God hasn't done anything wrong or that, at minimum, he hasn't been proven guitly yet.
JA: One of the meanings of excuse is to justify. Another is to remove from blame. If I did not do x then I am not to blame for x. Or, if I have a sound reason for allowing x, then I am not to blame for x. I grant that theodicies have merit for those who accept that there is a theistically defined God, but I do not think most have been moved to a belief in God simply because of a theodicy. However, some, myself included, have moved away from believing in a theistically defined God because of evil. One reason is that the existence of evil is consistent with there being a God who has all the characteristics of the theist except one, instead of being completely good, He is completely evil. Based on the evidence of the world there is no reason to believe in a good God, or an evil God, or no God. One simply chooses.
I should also point out that I am maintaining that I do not believe in a theistically defined God. I am not maintaining that there is no theistically defined God. There may very well be one. I know that GW Bush exists, but I choose not to believe in him. My happiness is not worth all the suffering even if I am a better (more compassionate, more sympathetic) person for having tried to deal with some of the suffering. I also do not need the belief in God to know that I ought not cause unnecessary and avoidable harm and to try to eliminate suffering.

Justin, I am enjoying our dialogue.

Dylan, (this is your old friend from sb), at first I was inclined to think your generalizations for the most part are true. However, if I start thinking about actual cases it seems the reverse can be true as well so I'm not sure one can make such generalizations. Of course this is all based on my own limited experience.

(Hey, I've been trying to reach you but your old email seems to be bouncing my emails back. My email is: joseph dot s dot kim at asu dot edu)

Count me in as another one who bit the dust. I wrote the book titled "Why I Rejected Christianity," and I started a blog called "Debunking Christianity," which explains my process in more detail.

Actually, it was Christian scholarship which led me away from the faith. I suspect there are surely many Christian scholars in our seminaries who struggle with their faith, like I did.

JA: "I do not think most have been moved to a belief in God simply because of a theodicy."

JC: Theodicies are not meant to move people to belief in God; they're designed rather to help remove potential obstacles to belief in God raised by problems of evil.

JA: ...the existence of evil is consistent with there being a God who has all the characteristics of the theist except one, instead of being completely good, He is completely evil. Based on the evidence of the world there is no reason to believe in a good God, or an evil God, or no God."

JC: I think this is right, and I think theists need to do some work here in natural theology that has not yet been done. Also, some theists think there is a good moral argument for God's existence, that somehow morality and God are linked. If they are right, that could be a reason for believing in a "good" God. Moreover, I think special revelation comes in at this point too. For Christians, for instance, the goodness of God is revealed through the life and teachings of Jesus. So, insofar as we have good reason to think Jesus' claims and teachings are true, we might have good reason for believing in a good God.

JA: I am not maintaining that there is no theistically defined God. There may very well be one. I know that GW Bush exists, but I choose not to believe in him.

JC: This makes it sound like you don't deny God's existence per se but rather that you choose not to enter into relationship with him via some religious tradition or commitment.

JA: I also do not need the belief in God to know that I ought not cause unnecessary and avoidable harm and to try to eliminate suffering.

JC: Not many theists think you do.

I personally found interesting the remarks from one of the Jewish interviewees about how Judaism has learned to live with our not having an answer to the problem of evil.

I am reminded of something James Conant once said to me that I found inspiring. The thing to imagine, according to Conant, a stereotypical, loud Jewish family dispute with God. Maybe the person yells: "You, how could you allow such and such to happen to me?" In the stereotypical Jewish family, one can yell such things at family members without the least doubt that the family members exist and without in any way impugning one's love for them.

I am a bit milder mannered than that. But for me what made the problem of evil not be a live issue was a visit to the concentration camp Majdanek about eleven years ago. There I was, amidst evil, praying near the mound of ashes, in the cells, near the well where people were being drowned, by the gas chamber, etc. I was asking God about all of this. And that was that for the problem of evil. It is not that God revealed to me some all-encompassing answer. In fact, God remained persistently silent. But as of that day, the problem of evil simply ceased to be an evidentiary issue for me. And not because of my having an answer.

(I suppose I can say, funny as it sounds, that the fact that I could ask God why the evil happened entails that God exists. I suppose on Plantingan grounds it can be a properly basic belief that one is asking God why there is evil.)

Alexander;
I would maintain that a person asking God why evil exists only entails that that person believes that God exists.

My son Micah visited Auschwitz and told me that he had never been in a place that convinced him that God did not exist while at the same time convincing him that there had to be a God. I could understand his point. The significance of evil, or the meaning of evil, certainly seems to be paradoxical.

I guess I am somewhat 'old-fashioned' in that I think that meaningful propostions need to be falsifiable; we need to know under what conditions a propostion can be shown to be false. Evil, for me, falsifies the proposition that a completely good God who is all powerful, all-knowing, present everywhere and Who can enter into a meaningful and caring relationship with His creation exists. Others do not see evil this way; they see it as evidence that He exists. If evil does not have evidentiary power, pro or con, what does?

Logic tells that there is either a God or there is not a God. It cannot tell us which is the case. We have to commit ourselves to one or the other, or , I suppose, remain neutral. But it does seem to be a matter of choice what to believe when logic/reason fails us.

There's a factive and a non-factive sense of "ask". The factive seems to me to be the primary use. In the factive sense, that x asked y Q entails that y exists.

The argument "Jones asked God question Q, therefore God exists" is valid if we understand "asked" in the factive sense, but in typical circumstances it is question-begging, since typically someone who does not already accept that God exists will not accept that Jones asked God anything, in the factive sense. However, whether an argument is question-begging typically depends on the circumstances (there are even cases where "p and p, therefore p" is not question-begging). If the belief that Jones asked God something is properly basic for someone (say, Jones) in some case, then, if Plantinga is right, the argument will not be question-begging.

(This reminds me of a remark in Kierkegaard's journals that when Anselm prayed to God to get an argument for the existence of God, that prayer was a better argument than the argument he eventually got to. Make of that what you will. It is likely an exercise in irony.)

"Evil, for me, falsifies the proposition that a completely good God who is all powerful, all-knowing, present everywhere and Who can enter into a meaningful and caring relationship with His creation exists."

Suppose, however, that Christian story of the Incarnation is correct. Then the existence of evil makes possible a deep, "meaningful and caring relationship" with God, in that the incarnate God faces the evils with us, taking the bulk of the burden on himself. I think there is good reason to think that a relationship of facing evil together, of sharing burdens, is a particularly meaningful relationship for us humans.

Problem is that I have no reason to accept the Christian story of Incarnation as being true. Now, that does not mean it cannot be a meaningful idea that many people take comfort in, but that is another issue. I am not denying that a belief in God can provide comfort and meaning for people. As I indicated earlier, I have seen too many intances of this belief having a positive impact on people's lives. But that does nothing to indicate whether what the belief refers to is true.

John:

Suppose that the story of the Incarnation, if true, would provide a response to the version of the problem of evil that bothers you. Then that version of the problem of evil does not show the non-existence of God. Rather, at best it shows that either (a) God does not exist or (b) the Incarnation story is true. And, hence, unless you have strong evidence against (b), that version of the problem of evil does not prove strong evidence for (a).

Moreover, if there is independent reason to accept the existence of God, and if the relevant version of the problem of evil is soluble if the story of the Incarnation is true, then this provides us with reason to believe the story of the Incarnation.

Alexander
You pose an interesting argument. However, I have no reason to reason that b is true. Now, people can accept, on faith, that b is true and then the problem of evil that I am maintaining is countered. But I lack faith in b. I can appreciate that others can say, truthfully, that their burden has been lessened because of their belief in God. "God will not give be a burden I cannot handle." But this demonstrates only that a belief can have positive effects on those who hold them, not that what the belief refers to actually exists.

Now I should point out that my life is pretty good. I am content with who I am and the life I am leading. I am not claiming that I am suffering, or taking a 'woe is me' attitude. My position re evil is that I, if I were God, would not have created a world with the types and amounts of evil that exist. To me, the amount of suffering that exists does not begin to explain or justify my, or anyone elses, eternal happiness for simply accepting God into one's life. It seems to me that there is an underlying, and unrecognized, selfishness, or self-centeredness, in taking the position that x suffers so I can become a better soul. Like Camus' rebel, I say 'NO!" God may exist as described by the thesist, I simply want no part of his 'game.'

So, what is the independant reason for believing in God that you pose in your comment? I would be very interested in knowing your thoughts on this.

By the way, my last name is Alexander.

Independent evidence? Well, I find the standard traditional Christian apologetic arguments on the basis of testimony (say, for the resurrection) persuasive. I also accept, and defend (e.g., that's the main purpose of my Principle of Sufficient Reason book), the cosmological argument in more than one form.

Best wishes,
Alex