My last post was about a problem for open theists. I now think it is just a special case of a more general argument. Here's the quicker argument for the same conclusion:
1. Nothing (contingent) can be true without a truthmaker.
2. Truthmakers are a subclass of entailers: if T is a truthmaker for p, then it is impossible for T to obtain and p not to.
3. The future is metaphysically contingent: it is not metaphysically necessary that the universe continue.
4. So, for any T that obtains in the present or past, it is possible for T to obtain and every p about the future fail to be true.
4. So, nothing in the present or past could be a truthmaker for any future truth.
5. So, no claim about the future is true.
This is an argument the open theist I have in mind must reject, since such an open theist thinks there are some truths about the future. Pretty clearly, what must be rejected in the argument is the notion of a truthmaker. But here I'm lost, since the worry about future truths is supposed to be something about whether they are "grounded". I have no idea what this is supposed to be, since it can't be explained in terms of truthmakers. So the challenge is to say what the notion of grounding involves that doesn't require entailment, covers cases in which the future is determined, and excludes cases where the future is undetermined.
But don't say: to be grounded is just to be determined, either in the accidentally necessary way the past is or in the causal way that some of the future is. We want a substantive explanation of the view, not a trivial restatement of it.
I don't know, maybe I'm missing something, but I can't see why one should accept that 5 follows from the premisses (even with the charitable reconstruction)? I mean, here's a claim about the future: it's necessary that the future is metaphysically contingent. It's true and about the future, given your premises. But it contradicts your conclusion.
Okay, clever and not terribly interesting I know. But take an instance of "it will be that p". Suppose there is a truthmaker for it, and that truthmaker is wholly located in the present or past. Suppose also that the future is contingent. Where is the problem with these two claims both being true? Why can't a present truth about the future be contingent?
Hmm… this is an interesting argument.
I think the open theist who is a friend of truthmakers has other options. There is some subtlety in the claim hat “every p about the future fail to be true” if the universe does not continue. The friend of truthmakers and an open future could agree that many claims about the future fail to be true if the universe ceases to exist (primitive predications of the form Fa where the terms “a” is an expression referring to a contingent existent. But why think that all of them will fail? Why think that claims of the form: “God exists one hour from now” or “God exists at all times” must fail to be true? Or that we must think of them as not about the future?
More interestingly, what about conditional claims, of the form: “if these conditions obtain then those conditions obtain” or “if God continues to sustain the universe and the usual laws continue to hold, then…” I suppose I don't have a clear enough understanding of what it is to be a claim ‘about the future’ that these things are necessarily ruled out of court as being claims about the future.
The interesting work one can do with the ontology of truthmakers, of course, is that you can begin to draw some distinctions: we could say that sentences true at future time t which have truthmakers before t may be only ‘weakly about the future.’ Sentences true at time t whose truthmaker only comes into existence at time t are ‘strongly about the future.’ Or something like that. The claim is then that no claims strongly about the future are true now. But claims weakly about the future can be true now.
I haven't kept up with all the Open Theism argy bargy, but it seems that something like this might be an option.
Greg, yes, you're right that the argument is too sketchy. About the God claims, both premises 2 and 4 need to be restricted to values for p that are contingent. For purposes of the argument, I'm happy to let the open theist in question decide which claims are about the future and which are not (at least, until I see that the account is ridiculous!). It is such a theist who wants there to be two different kinds of such claims: those that are true and those that are not.
Christian--my first reply to Greg applies to your first paragraph as well. The truths in question are supposed to be contingent ones. As to your questions in the last paragraph, look at premises 2 and 4. They state the answers to your questions.
"look at premises 2 and 4. They state the answers to your questions."
Maybe. I'm just not seeing it yet. Suppose it is now the case that the sun will rise tomorrow. If so, then the sun will rise tomorrow. In fact, if it is now true, then it cannot be that the sun does not rise tomorrow. Okay.
That's consistent with 1, 2 and 3. It's a contingent fact that it is now true that the sun will rise tomorrow. But 4 says "So, for any T that obtains in the present or past, it is possible for T to obtain and every p about the future fail to be true." Why would we accept this if we accept 1, 2 and 3? It is now true that the sun will rise tomorrow obtains in the present, it's contingent that it obtains and so contingent that the future obtains, but the future cannot fail to exist if the fact obtains.
Anyway, denying 4 is one way out of the argument. I'm trying to see why this is a bad way out.
Well, there are two 4's! But both are conclusions from the premises, so it is one of those that needs to be denied.
I don't know what to say when someone can't see an argument. So I'll repeat. Suppose you think X makes p true. Suppose X is in the past, and p is about the future. You grant that it is possible for X to obtain and p not to obtain. Then you have to deny that truthmakers are a subclass of entailers.
Sorry.
"You grant that it is possible for X to obtain and p not to obtain."
No. I don't grant that.
I deny that. I think truthmaking, whatever it is, is necessary. What I do not see (and again, maybe i'm thick headed) is how the claim quoted above is inconsistent with the view that facts about the future are contingent. It is one thing for present facts to entail future facts so that it's impossible for some present fact about the future to obtain and the future not to obtain, it's another thing to move from this claim, which I am not trying to question, to the stronger claim that the future is not contingent in some way.
Jon,
I would say that if God has unconditionally resolved that the universe endure forever, then (3) is false for, as a consequence of God's resolution, it would be metaphysically necessary that the universe endure forever. Similarly, if God has unconditionally resolved eventually to terminate the universe, then (3) is false because it is metaphysically necessary that the universe not endure forever.
The only case in which (3) would be true is one in which God has conditionally resolved to terminate the universe should events unfold in certain directions and not to terminate it should events unfold otherwise. But in that case (4) does not follow from (1)-(3).
In the first place, even if it is unsettled whether the universe will endure forever, there could still be truths about the future (presumably, "the sun will rise tomorrow" is one such) that are now metaphysically necessary in the light the present state of the world, the laws of nature, and God's unconditional resolution to let the future unfold in that respect. In the second place, with respect to matters on which God's resolutions are merely conditional (e.g., "heal S tomorrow if S prays and not otherwise"), there are "may and may not" truths about the future.
The flaw in your argument comes, I think, from construing metaphysical contingency in a strictly absolute or time-invariant sense that is incompatible with the open theist's basic commitments. Open theists generally hold to an actualist position on metaphysical modality acc. to which actuality is the metaphysical delimiter of possibility. In addition, open theists are committed to real becoming and an unreal future. The combination of these commitments entails that what is actual changes over time. Consequently, what is metaphysically contingent changes over time as matters that are open become settled.
Alan, to say that unconditional resolve yields metaphysical necessity looks an awful lot like confusing then necessity of the consequence with the necessity of the consequent. The following looks possible: God waited quite awhile after creation to unconditionally resolve that . . . whatever. On your account, that is impossible.
Christian, I don't know what further to say. 2 and 3 are definitional. 1 is an assumption. 4 follows from 1, 2, and 3, since if 3 is true there is a world where everything up to now occurs but nothing in the future. By the definition of entailment, that means the claims about the past and present don't entail the claims about the future. So, by the definition of a truthmaker, claims about the past and present aren't truthmakers of claims about the future.
Maybe what is confusing you is that you don't know which claims are about the past and which are about the future. You use the following kind of example: it is now true that it will be sunny tomorrow. The question is whether this claim is about the present or about the future. To decide that, you need to figure out the hard fact/soft fact distinction. Whatever one says about that, though, it had better turn out that the future is contingent. Open theism doesn't look very cool when combined with logical fatalism.
Greg, one other thought about your last two paragraphs. For this to work for the open theist, you need to be able to explicate the "weakly about the future" part. That's what I'm questioning. What are the truthmakers for this part of the future? In the penultimate paragraph, you cite a conditional about sustenance and the usual laws holding. That would be a good explanation if (i) the antecedent doesn't itself have future-tensed contingencies in it and (ii) the conditional is true. It's clause (i) that fails here, so far as I can see. For the conditional to be true, it has to be the case that God will not perform a miracle, or that the usual laws will in fact have their usual explanatory significance. Since those claims are about the future, we've just replaced the question about the truthmaker for the consequent of the conditional with a question about the truthmaker for the conditional itself, and especially of its antecedent, since we will need to appeal to it to derive the consequent.
Well (4a) just does not follow from (1), (2) and (3). You need a further premise:
Implicit: If (1), (2), and (3) are true, then (4a) is true.
Without "Implicit" the claim that "4 follows from 1, 2, and 3" cannot be right.
Consider some example: suppose I now have some origin property as an essential property so that some historical property like "having been birthed by Ma in 1979" is essential. Take the property of "my existing now". They are distinct properties and both are contingently exemplified but the later instantiated property entails the former. We don't on that account think that it's necessary that I was birthed by Ma in 79' because I could have failed to exist. The necessary connection gives us no reason to doubt a contingent past.
I don't see the argument to the conclusion that the future is any different. "Implicit" has not been defended and it needs to be even though I am happy to accept (1), (2) and (3). Neither of the 4's follows from them.
And besides, there are views that explicitly reject the move. Take Prior's or Markosian's view according to which claims about the future are sometimes true, but fall within the scope of a primitive future tense operator that one cannot quantify into. If that view is sound you can have both truths about the future, truthmakers grounded wholly in the present and also a contingent future.
I also doubt that a hard/soft fact distinction would help us to figure out what claims are about the future. I think a claim is about the future iff it is about something later than the present. I think the 'later than' relation is to be analyzed causally and 'the present' is primitive and 'aboutness', whatever it is, is the real issue in that debate.
Christian, sorry but you are simply confused here. Show me the countermodel and we'll have something to talk about.
Oh well, sometimes things just go that way. No worries.
My claim is that that the sun will rise tomorrow is true.
Given (1) the truthmaker is some property the present has like "being such that the sun will rise tomorrow.
Given (2) if the property is instantiated, then it's necessary that the sun will rise tomorrow, which is to say, the present instantiation of the property entails the truth of the proposition that the sun will rise tomorrow.
Given (3), which is just an assumption, it is contingent that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is consistent with what is above, since it is consistent with what is above that the present instantiation of the property of being such that the sun will rise tomorrow is contingent as well.
However, (4a) is false. If the present instantiates the property of being such that the sun will rise tomorrow, then it is false that every proposition about the future could fail to be true given that some truthmaker in the present is instantiated, in this case, the property of being such that the sun will rise tomorrow.
So that is a counterexample. I'm not sure what a countermodel is though.
Christian, I see what is worrying you now. Actually, I like the truthmaker you cite very much, but no open theist of the sort under discussion can allow it. That's because we can find the same kind of truthmaker for indeterministic events. So they'll have to say that your truthmaker isn't really something about the present or past: it's really about the future.
That's why it can't be used against the argument in this context. Not because it isn't a counterexample (I like thinking it is one too) but because the open theist can't use it to avoid the problem.
"It's really about the future.
That's why it can't be used against the argument in this context."
I agree that it's about the future. Okay, so I guess there's more I need to know about the context. I really have no idea what the debate between open and non-open (closed?) theists amounts too. Good references?
yes, hasker's book is about the best I've seen from the open theist perspective. there have been a number of posts here about the position as well. Tom Flint has done some anti-OT work, as have I. Peter van Inwagen counts as well as one, though he hasn't been explicit about any precise formulation of the view. Others can perhaps add references, since I'm trying to do this off the top of my head.
I'm only barely familiar with both open theism and the concept of truthmakers, but I'm interested in why a response couldn't go something like this:
If a claim about the future is true, then there is some T that makes it true. What 2 says, among other things, is that p will necessarily obtain given a corresponding T. So if there is a corresponding T, p will obtain. In fact, take "The universe will continue to exist" as p, and take T to be the present Universe, or something about the present Universe. Isn't that a perfectly coherent and legitimate way of showing that the future universe can in fact be necessary, given particular T's?
If I'm correct, then there is obviously something wrong with 3. I also suspect, however, that the type of necessity conferred by a truthmaker is of a different nature that the type of necessity involved in saying the future is contingent.
Now that I've sufficiently confused the issues, I'll depart.
Joshua, your value for T about the present universe doesn't entail your value for p. If it did, the future wouldn't be contingent. So your value for T can't be a truthmaker for your value for p. I'm not sure what you were thinking is the relationship between these two values for T and p, but whatever it is, it isn't entailment.
I think I'm unsure what present truth-maker (presumably, some current or past state of affairs) presents a worry for the future proposition that it makes true.
Here's a present truth-maker that makes a contingent proposition in the future true: that Almeida types a note at 1:35pm. Tomorrow, the proposition, 'Almeida typed a note at 1:35 pm yesterday' is made true thereby. The future contains that true proposition. That's no worry for open theism.
In several notes above, it looks like present and past propositions are functioning a truth-makes for future states of affairs. That has the necessity reversed as in (1),
(1) [](p -> T)
When the posted argument has the necessity going as in (2),
(2) [](T --> p).
So I guess I'm looking for a present truth-maker that is worrisome for OT.
Mike, I'm a little lost here, but let me try. You note that some truths entail things in the opposite direction of the arrow of time. And, presumably, there are no entailments in the other direction. So if truthmakers are entailers, the truthmaker won't be able to follow the arrow of time. But the open theist in question requires that the truthmaker follow the arrow of time. So the reason that the comments require truthmakers following the arrow of time is that this is precisely what the open theist in question claims.
But I feel like I'm not understanding your last note. . .
I'm just looking for a present (or past) truth-maker that is a problem for OT. Give me an exampe of such a truth-maker. I'm assuming that what you are calling a truth-maker is some state of affairs that makes some future proposition true. But it is not clear from the discussion that this is what you mean by 'truth-maker' in this context. If not, then give me an example of a troublesome present truth-mker.
We might try something like what some presentists use. We might say there is an abstract state of affairs that presently exists and has, presently, the property of being such that it will be tokened in the future. The ontic units (states of affairs and properties) all presently exist, and the obtaining of the state of affairs having that property implies something about the future (exactly what depends on the nature of the state of affairs). But Open Theists won't allow such a truthmaker, because there is nothing in this story that requires the state of affairs and property in question to be only about some feature of the future that is determined.
What do Open Theists do with Peter's denials? Either Jesus was giving his best guess or He *knew* what was going to happen and then we must admit either that God chose for Peter to sin and that choice was the sufficient condition of the event.
We might say there is an abstract state of affairs that presently exists and has, presently, the property of being such that it will be tokened in the future.
And these present a problem for OT? I can't offhand see why they don't deny that there are any undetermined and contingent states of affairs with such properties. What would be the cost?
Jon,
I'm having trouble understanding (3) and those that you have in mind that think it's correct.
Do you mean something like this: If x is a future event, then x is metaphysically contingent?
But who would accept this that wouldn't also accept the same thing with respect to ANY event whatsoever, since (I'm guessing) the idea is that every event is metaphysically contingent because God could've refrained from creating or at any rate is never necessitated if he acts. (Is this the idea?
But then by parity of reasoning there could be no truthmakers for ANY event. (The only truth propositions would be necessary truths).
Personally, I can't make any sense of truthmakers so I should probably just quit.
Mike, well, they can't deny the existence of the abstract states of affairs, but they have to deny the property claim in question, since otherwise there will be a truthmaker for every truth about the future. Remember, the issue is an asymmetry claim: they want truthmakers for certain parts of the future but not for others.
Tully, there are truthmakers for present truths: the events they are about. Given the existence of these events, it is impossible for the claim to be false. So these events satisfy the entailment aspect of what it is to be a truthmaker.
(3) is intended to mean something like this. There is a possible world with exactly our history up to now, a world with no future of contingent things in it at all. Whatever contingent things there are simply go to non-being in that world. So if p is about the future and is contingently true here, it is false in that world.
Hi Jon,
I’m also having trouble seeing what’s at stake here. I realize the argument’s geared toward a particular version of OT. But why shouldn’t the OTist just admit that the future-tensed claims under discussion don’t have truthmakers (in the sense being used here), but that their truth is conditional on God’s intention to bring them about? What providential difference does it make?
Well, the harsher the open theist is about the future, the worse the position looks. So if only the undetermined part lacks truth value, that looks better than if every claim about the future is claimed to lack truth value.
I don't know what it would mean for something to have conditional truth, so I don't understand the idea that they might have their truth conditional on God's intentions. It's not as if they are true if God intends them to be true. God's intentions can't be truthmakers here unless you add a doctrine of immutability, a doctrine that open theists all deny.
I just mean that, so long as God intends and decides to take Rosie home next Tuesday, it will turn out true that God takes Rosie home next Tuesday. This doesn’t entail that God will take Rosie home next Tuesday; God’s intention now isn’t a truthmaker for this proposition. But if the only way God won’t take Rosie home is if God changes his mind and decides to let Rosie stick around, then it’s not as though this constitutes any sort of limit on God’s providential control. God presumably has full knowledge and control of his intentions, and can plan accordingly.
OK gents, this thread is getting long. But here 2 more cents.
This statement by Jon shows that he's not getting the point well made by Alan Rhoda, which is a crucial point for us openists - there is real change regarding what is actual, and thus, in what is metaphysically possible. To insist on sticking with a logical conception of possibility, according to which what is possible or necessary never changes, is missing the point. Thus, premise 3 is true if we're talking about this proposition not being self-contradictory: the history of the world will end soon. But again, assuming God resolutely intends to do things for, say, 3 more years, then it is necessary (in principle unchangable given all that's happened up till now) that the universe'll be around 1 year from now.I'm also mystified as to why Jon continues to insist that God's intention to take Rosie home can entail that it is now the case that she will be taken home (on that date) only if ALL God's intentions are immutable. Why think that some of his intentions are immutable only if they all are?
It seems to me, no reason has been given. Further, reason can be given for denying that. Whenever we resolve to do something, there are always factors we don't fully foresee - thus it seems that always or nearly always, no matter how firmly we resolve to do something, we could later let go of that intention. God, however, is omniscient - he knows all that is - this includes the entire past & present, whatever "future" there now is (what is now such that it will be) - AND (here's the important part) he's fully aware of every single way that history might go from here, if I could put it that way. With that entire, infinite realm fully in view, it seems to me that he could right now form an intention with a kind of unbreakable resolution, as he's already considered ALL the ways things could turn out. No unconsidered info could turn up, even given that it is (somewhat) open how history goes from here. To put it another way, when God says to himself "I'm going to do X no matter what" - he knows what he's talking about!
And this is all consistent with what many theists want to say - that for some of God's intentions, he's open to revising or dropping them depending on how we freely respond.
Re: bibliography - van Inwagen is an open theist, but not the kind we're talking about here. He claims to not understand the sort of view Alan and I are talking about, and specifically the notion of some claim being true "at a time". He assumes there's in all cases a timeless fact about what will be. But he believes in libertarian freedom, and for Consequence Argument type reasons, he holds that therefore, God must not foreknow those bits of the actual future. As far as I know, this paper of his (presented at Wheaton around 2003?) hasn't been published.
Mike, well, they can't deny the existence of the abstract states of affairs, but they have to deny the property claim in question..
Why not? What about OT commits them to the existence of such abstract objects? It would be odd if anything did.
Dale, you say,
I think you know that this is nothing more than equivocation you your part. There is a longstanding tradition in philosophy that distinguishes logical necessity and metaphysical necessity, with the latter being roughly what Plantinga intended by the notion of broadly logical necessity. We can thus arrange types of necessities in terms of strength, with nomological necessity next in line. And it is a well-known theorem for each of these that they are not subject to change. You can't get to the point where necessity comes and goes until you get to accidental necessity. Moreover, the truthmaker literature is clear on the point that truthmakers are a subclass of entailers.
Of course, open theists can present whatever account of all this they wish. But they shouldn't obfuscate things by using standard terms in nonstandard ways without noting the stipulative character of the usage.
I don't insist that all God's intentions are mutable. If open theists wish to hold that some are and some aren't, they need to explain the distinction. There are some possibilities. Maybe, if God is perfectly good, and he promises that some event will occur, then that event has to occur. Maybe that will work, though there are still some problems, since promises can be broken without violating any ultima facie obligation. My point has been that open theists can't just say that some intentions are irrevokable. If God is free to change his mind, then it is hard to see what the truthmaker would be for irrevokability. Maybe there is one, but maybe only an appeal to immutability in God would get the story to come out right. If talk of revoking only means that God will not in fact revoke his intentions, then the view is inconsistent, since God is a free agent as well, for open theists.
Who counts as an open theist and who doesn't is an interesting question. I typically count anyone who denies exhaustive foreknowledge on the basis of a desire to preserve libertarian freedom. But that may be slightly stipulative.
Mike, here's a flippant answer. Abstracta exist necessarily, so everything commits one to them!
But, I understand your concern that some may wish to hold that types don't come into existence until tokened. Even then, though, there will be problems denying the abstracta in question. Think of this possibility: tomorrow for the second time in my life I will drink tequila. On what I take to be a reasonable account of the constituents of states of affairs, the state of affairs in question has already been tokened. So it already exists. The only question is whether it has the property posited by the prediction.
Dale, I can't resist pointing out the tension in these sentences:
The second sentence shows that God's saying to himself, "I will make sure that p will be true no matter what," that doesn't imply that p will be true. It only implies it given that God won't change his mind. And saying that he won't change his mind doesn't imply that he won't either. The Classical Theist can answer otherwise, on the basis of the immutability of God, but not the Open Theist.
Luke, the open theist owes us an explanation regarding how God can know what he will or won't do tomorrow as much as they owe us an explanation of why God can't know what I will do tomorrow. If God is free to do otherwise, at least, there's as much of a difficulty regarding God knowing what he will do as there is about knowing what I will do. Of course, if we interpret libertarian freedom in a way that denies the principle of alternative possibilities, maybe there's a way out of the problem. But even then it would be surprising to find out that God can know what he will freely do but not what I will. I'm much easier to predict and understand than God is, I would think!
Jon,
No one's trying to trick anyone, least of all me. Why lecture me on terms, when I defined how I was using the term?
As to giving the needed distinction, I already took a shot at it, and you have not offered any objection. All we need to do is to imagine the kind of ALL things considered "I'm doing it no matter what" intention you could form if you were all-knowing (yes, even understood in the open theist way). It seems to me that this has to do with the content of the intention, but perhaps there's a difference in the way one would attend as well, content aside.
As to the cited tension, there is no tension at all as I understand the cited sentences. What makes it true that Rosie will die is God's current state of mind, specifically, his having the irrevocable, no-matter-what kind of intention to pull the plug on her then. Yes, God's having that mental state logically implies that she dies when he intends (could be a date, or a range, or a disjunction of dates depending on scenario) - it would be a contradiction for him to intend in that way, and for her to live (beyond the specified time).
I note that if there's such a thing as this sort of intending, there's no problem at all about how God might know some of his future actions, namely, the ones entailed by his having that sort of intention. This is compatible with libertarianism, although not with an unqualified PAP.
Finally, re: who counts as an open theist, I think your definition is the standard one, both inside and outside the camp.
Sorry - typo:
not "a difference in the way one would attend as well, content aside."
but "a difference in the manner of intending as well, content aside."
Dale, let me add two cents to your two cents. That would make fours cents, right?
Jon, if what is metaphysically possible is different than what is logically possible, then there is a world in which something that is metaphysically impossible is true "or" there is a world in which something that is logically impossible is true. So what facts are true in these logically possible, but metaphysically impossible worlds? I can't think of any.
Dale, Tooley defends a growing block view according to which what is actual as of a time changes. Suppose that's the right view. How does this help to support the view that what is metaphysically possible changes? Don't you think the past could have been different? If the past could have been different, then how could it be that generally when what is actual changes what is metaphysically possible changes.
Jon said that an open theist is "anyone who denies exhaustive foreknowledge on the basis of a desire to preserve libertarian freedom."
I understand a libertarian to be someone who believes that we are free and that our freedom is incompatible with determinism. Am I right? But then would I also be correct in think that an open theist believes there is a connection between exhaustive foreknowledge and determinism, that, for example, exhaustive foreknowledge entails determinism? I ask so to know the backdrop for the discussion.
Anyway, the main worry I have with certain facts about God, his intentions for example, being truthmakers for facts about the future is that these seem to me to be the wrong truth-makers. If it is now true that the sun will rise tomorrow that is because, intuitively, the the day after the present day is such that the sun will rise on that day.
Anyway, that is not a fact about God's intentions even though god's intentions may be sufficient for the existence of the truth-maker.
Hi guys,
I apologize for my previous snippiness - I've spent too much time snow shoveling in 5 degree weather lately. Jon's replies have helped me to see that we (I) do owe a more developed account of the distinction I suggested between two kinds of divine intentions. Still, I'm hopeful, and see no reason to be pessimistic.
Christian, both presentists and growing block theorists can hold that modal facts or truths change. A kind of fact which would be metaphysically (now-unchangeably) or accidentally but not logically necessary or (I think) nomologically necessary, would be: Rosie's coming death (which God has destined, so to speak). (I for one, won't shed a tear. :-) And no - the thought isn't that exhaustive divine foreknowledge would entail causal determinism. Rather, it would entail that all events are now-unavoidable (whether or not determinism is true). Some call this theological fatalism. Another thing: this sort of open theist view is compatible with everything about Plantingian possible worlds talk, except one thing - there will be no actual world, because an actual world is a possible world, and a possible world is defined as temporally and spatially maximal. But according to this sort of open theist, the future isn't yet wholly set - there's presently no maximal state of affairs, no possible world, which is actual. "alpha", we hardly knew ye!
Dale, please have patience with me. I don't yet see how modal facts (let me stipulate I mean only facts about metaphysical possibility and necessity) can change. If possibly p, then necessarily possibly p, so the possibilities could not have been otherwise, and similarly, the necessities could not have been otherwise. But if neither the possibilities nor the necessities could have been otherwise, then the modal facts could not have been otherwise, so the modal facts could not have been otherwise.
And I don't see how there could be a fact that is metaphysically necessary but not logically necessary. What possible world do you have in mind?
Q: Is an open theist motivated then to accept open theism because she thinks theological fatalism is inconsistent with libertarian free will?
Q: Why think maximality requires that there are facts about the future, on the view in question, if the future is not possible relative to what is actual?
Let me add that I don't see how there could be a fact that is logically necessary but not metaphysically necessary.
One last comment guys, and thanks for the help in revising the paper I'm writing! The comment is for Christian. Suppose it is a necessary truth, as some claim, that water is H2O. It isn't a logical truth, but anything's being water entails that it is H2O. In discussions of truthmakers, the notion of metaphysical necessity and entailment are interdefinable, since we can't have entailments arising and disappearing through time.
Jon--I realize the last comment was your last--but, I agree that some truths are logical truths and other truths are, say, metaphysical truths. I mean only to point out that these truths, both metaphysical and logical truths, are necessary in the same sense. There is no world in which water is H2O that is not also a world in which modus ponens is valid. There is no world in which modus ponens is valid that is not also a world in which water is H2O. So a "logical truth" and a "metaphysical truth", if we want to describe things that way, are true in just the same worlds. And any two truths that are true in the same worlds have the same modal status and so these two truths have the same modal status. So, I don't understand the idea that one kind of truth is broader than the other. I don't see that there is any important distinction between the two.
Christian, so I take it back: one more quick note! Think of it this way. A world is logically possible if no contradiction can be derived from the maximal conjunction of propositions that is that world by the rules of the correct logic. So there is a logically possible world where water isn't H2O, because including that claim in a world does not imply any contradiction using only the rules of, say, first order theory with identity. A claim such as water is H2O may be metaphysically necessary, perhaps, but it is not a logical theorem. So a world in which it is true that water isn't H2O is logically possible but metaphysically impossible if it is a metaphysically necessary truth that water is H2O. In general, if there are a posteriori necessities, their denials are found in some logically possible worlds, but in no metaphysically possible worlds.
Jon,
AFAICT, your view allows God to know things like “unless I decide to end the space-time universe or suspend natural laws, p” where p is a future contingent. So the question comes down to whether God can know that he won’t decide to do something extraordinary between now and when p becomes actual.
It seems to me that he can, even without immutability. Denying immutability just means that one allows that God can change at least once. OTers deny immutability because they want to allow that God responds to free human actions. It does not imply super-mutability, on which one allows that God could change anytime, for any or no reason. I don’t see why OTers would agree to that.
The explanation of how God knows what he will do tomorrow, when he can’t know what I will do tomorrow, is that God has to speculate about my actions but he can plan his own. His knowledge of his own acts depends on his intentions, which are under his control, whereas his knowledge of my acts depends on my intentions, which are not.
I suppose I just don't think that there is a world in which something is both red all over at t and blue all over at t. When I say that 'it is impossible that something be both red and blue all over at t' I mean to make the strongest impossibility claim. If some responds "no, it is possible, it's logically possible" then I don't think they are using 'possible' in the way I am. Or take the claim (since this is Prosblogion) that 'God could not have failed to exist' and assume that God's existence is necessary. Theist thin God's existence is necessary in the strongest sense, but if there really were this distinction between metaphysical and logical possibility, then these theists would be wrong. They should reject the distinction.
I of course agree that we can distinguish contradictions from inconsistencies like something is fatter than itself, but what I think is that this distinction is not one between different kinds of modality, it is one between how different claims can be impossible in the same sense. Something can be absolutely impossible by being contradictory or by being inconsistent or in other ways.
That's my story and I'm sticking to it:)
Think of this possibility: tomorrow for the second time in my life I will drink tequila. On what I take to be a reasonable account of the constituents of states of affairs, the state of affairs in question has already been tokened. So it already exists.
Jon, I'm not denying that some case can be made for the existence of abstract states of affairs. Of course it can. But it is equally obvious that there might be good reasons to deny that there are any abstract entities. If abstract objects are problematic for OTers, they might have good reason to deny that such things exist. They would certainly not be the first to do so.
Jon and Christian,
So a "logical truth" and a "metaphysical truth", if we want to describe things that way, are true in just the same worlds. And any two truths that are true in the same worlds have the same modal status and so these two truths have the same modal status
It is better, I think, to distinguish conceptual possiblities and metaphysical possibilities. In order to do so carefully, you have to go two-dimensional (contra Kripke). That water is not H2O is conceptually possible and metaphysically impossible. Roughly, 'water is H2O' is associated with two propositions, 1-intensions and 2-intensions. The 1-intension is just the meaning of the sentence we get when we consider possible worlds as actual (or from their own point of view). In that case, H2O is not in general water, since in some worlds 'water' was used to dub other stuff, and so from their point of view water is not H2O. A 2-intension is the meaning of the sentence we get from considering other worlds counterfactually. Consider counterfactually, there is no world in which water is not H2O. Maybe Christian's intuitions are Kripkean, in which case he does not recognize 1-intensions, and does not think that conceiveability is much of a guide to possiblity.
Mike, you had to go and bring up intesions! That stuff drives me nuts. I don't know what it means to consider a world as actual. It just sounds epistemic to me, like, for all I know the actual world is such that...perhaps you could convince otherwise, I wouldn't be surprised.
But what do you think about the claim that there are worlds in which something is red all over and green all over at the same time?
And what does 'conceptually possible' mean? Is it just epistemic possibility?
You didn't bring up 'intesions' you brought up intensions. What are intesions anyway, someone needs to coin that.
Christian said:
Yes, Christian - that's exactly right. I agree that S5 is the correct logical system for that sort of necessity. I called what I was talking about "metaphysical" possibility because it is necessity in the world, not in our minds or concepts or whatever. (It certainly isn't an epistemic concept either.) But it's a narrower kind of necessity - what is necessary in the "normal" (Plantingian) sense is also necessary in the sense I was talking about, but truths can be now-unchangable (temporally necessary) without being necessary (in the Plantingian sense). For instance, it is now-unchangable that you existed 5 years ago. Anyway, you're not as confused as you think.
Hi Christian,
If p is conceptually necessity then p is knowable a priori (and vice versa). The idea is to link necessity to a prioricity in a way that Kripke severed. You can't link metapysical necessity and a prioricity, given a posteriori necessary truths. But you can link a prioricity with conceptual necessity. In this sense the concept of epistemic. So your question comes to this: Is it a priori that nothing is both red all over and blue all over? Conceptual necessities include facts like triangles are necessarily three-sided and cats are necessarily feline. Insofar as one is happy to talk about essences, these "about the world" every bit as much as any other kind of necessity.
Dale:
That seems right to me. There has to be some sense in which as time goes on the past gets fixed. What is possible, in some sense, changes. Now I can't imagine anybody is going to deny that, so I just got lost. How does this view help the libertarian who believes that if God knows truths about the future, then the future cannot be otherwise?
Mike,
I like that distinction. I'm inclined to think it is somewhat "misleading" to call these necessities "conceptual". I think they are just metaphysical, but that we have a different access to them, a priori access. But whatever, I would happily concede that "logical necessity" is conceptual necessity, but then Jon will likely deny that analaytic truths are logical truths, thus severing the identity between logical and conceptual necessities. So while your distinction is fine by me, it won't help him.
I'm inclined to think it is somewhat "misleading" to call these necessities "conceptual". I think they are just metaphysical, but that we have a different access to them, a priori access
I don't know what inclines you to think that. Nothing I said precludes a conceptual necessity from being metaphysically necessary. But certainly, not all metaphysical necessities are conceptual necessities. Nor are all conceptual necessities analytic. There are, among other things, contingent a priori truths that are conceptual necessities.
. . . but then Jon will likely deny that analytic truths are logical truths, thus severing the identity between logical and conceptual necessities. So while your distinction is fine by me, it won't help him.
There should be no problem here. Logical truths can be conceptual truths without also being analytic. Conceptual truths are in general a priori, but not in general analytic. So Jon need only agree that logical truths are a priori. I doubt he'd disagree.
Mike I'm naive about the conditions under which a proposition is conceptually necessary. It seems like you are using the term 'conceptually necessary' to pick out propositions which are knowable a priori. So are there other conditions for something to be a conceptually necessary proposition other than a priori knowability?
What I'm saying about Jon is that, given what he said above, he should disagree that a proposition is conceptually necessary iff it is logically necessary. That's because on you view an analytic truth can be conceptually necessary, but analytic truths are not logical truths. The same will go for claims like nothing is fatter than itself. Those claims aren't logically necessary, but they are conceptually necessary.
What I'm saying about Jon is that, given what he said above, he should disagree that a proposition is conceptually necessary iff it is logically necessary. That's because on you view an analytic truth can be conceptually necessary, but analytic truths are not logical truths.
Christian,
This conclusion doesn't follow. You point out that some conceptual truths are not logical truths and you conclude that therefore logical truths are not conceptual truths. Conceptual truths include all of the apriori truths--including all logical truths--and much else. So there is no worry here. Jon would rightly deny that P is a logical truth IFF. P is a priori. That is false right to left, but true left to right. So again, no worries.
Hey Mike,
No!!!!
"you conclude that therefore logical truths are not conceptual truths."
There's an iff (if and only if) in there. That wasn't a typo.
Sorry, I just assumed you meant 'IF'. If Jon accepts that P is a logical truth only if P is a conceptual truth, then you've got all the logical truths as conceptual. Nothing left over. What problem could there be in not accepting the converse? I should hope not much of a problem, since nobody (or nobody I know of) accepts the converse.
So are there other conditions for something to be a conceptually necessary proposition other than a priori knowability?
The general 2D conditions on conceptual necessity (possiblility) are roughly these.
P is conceptually necessary (possible) at w just in case from the point of view of every (some) world w' accessible from w, P is true at w'. If you assume a logic as strong as S5, you can drop 'accessible from w'. That's the idea.
Thanks Mike. I'll have to look into this here conceptual possibility. Have a good one.
If I were an open theist, I'd try push on the promise side. It seems to me that an unconditional promise by God would always be fulfilled. For it seems to me to be dishonest to make an unconditional promise if one foresees the possibility of any circumstances in which one would not be obligated to keep the promise. Now, God, even given open theism, foresees all possibilities and knows what obligations he would have in each. Hence, he cannot make an unconditional promise that it would be non-obligatory for him to keep under some circumstances. And it is a necessary truth that God does whatever is obligatory.
Therefore, necessarily, if God makes an unconditional promise, it will be kept.
What is the truthmaker for that given open theism? I have no idea, but I am assuming the open theist who believes in truthmakers will have some answer, since it is the same kind of question as: "What is the truthmaker for God's being omnipotent tomorrow?"
Stepping back from the case of promises, it seems to me that Chrsitian open theists do need to make something of the insistence of the Christian tradition (and some passages of Scripture) on God's immutability. The standard open theist story--which for the record I think is unsatisfactory--is that the kernel of truth in the doctrine of God's immutability is God's unchanging character or the like. This suggests that the open theist should accept some kind of constancy as being one of God's attributes. Constancy will not be the same as immutability, or else open theism will collapse. But it may well be that a part of the attribute of constancy will be the keeping of past resolutions.
Alex, in the world as it should be, we'll just walk down the hall for this kind of conversation! :-)
I just erased a long reply attempting to show that God can't make any important unconditional promises given this principle and open theism. I think this is simpler. For the open theist, God will then deliberate like this: if he foresees a certain possibility, he won't unconditionally promise. So the order of explanation goes from possibilities foreseen to promises made unconditionally. Now, every moment could be the last moment of time, so the possibilities foreseen always bar any unconditional promises that affect contingent beings.
So suppose that God unconditionally promises according to the condition you cite. Then certain futures metaphysically are no longer possible when they would have been without the promise. But then we have action at a temporal (and modal) distance again, right?
Yes, if God makes a promise, then certain futures cease to be metaphysically possible. And if open theism cannot allow this, then open theism is plainly incompatible with Judaism and Christianity, since God's being absolutely certain to keep his covenants is perhaps the most basic tenet of Judaism and Christianity.
But I do not see why open theism has to disallow this, unless we understand omnipotence to include the possibility of God acting unjustly.
Alex, so the issue was whether God could make unconditional promises. I agree he can. But I don't think he can't make unconditional promises that can't be legitimately broken. I think you worried about this, and so gave an argument: he wouldn't make any such promise if there's a possibility of having to break it. That's what I was responding to, since if that condition were true, God couldn't make such promises that affect contingent beings, since apart from the promise and the claim in dispute about them, the future is metaphysically contingent.
So what we need is a different argument for the claim that God can't make unconditional promises that can legitimately be broken. Promises, after all, are like that for moral agents that can't predict with certainty what the future will be like. And of course for the open theist, that's God's predicament too.
Jon,
Are you assuming that for every promise there are possible circumstances in which not fulfilling the promise would be right? I am not sure this is true. Suppose God promises that ten days he will create a wondrous parallel universe whose total value in some appropriate sense far exceeds all possible goods and evils in our universe, and suppose that our universe is the only there is right now. Then it is very hard to see what circumstances could possibly make breaking this promise right.
The closest I can come is a case of blackmail. Somebody in this world threatens God with a horrible evil unless God promises him not to produce that universe. However, in such a case, God would have other ways of acting, such as striking the blackmailer with lightning. And in any case since the good promised--that parallel universe--far exceeds any evils possible in our universe, the blackmail just won't have sufficient force.
Alex, no I didn't mean to assume that any promise can be broken. Just that one can't use the claim that no unconditional promise can be broken to generate some metaphysical necessity for there being a future. If we wanted to sort unconditional promises into those that can be broken and those that can't, the most obvious first step, it seems to me, is to attend to what can be infallibly known and what can't: where a promise has possible effects only regarding what one has infallible knowledge about, the promise looks to me to be unbreakable. But when the promise has possible consequences for stuff beyond such infallible knowledge, then the new information that comes to light later on can justify breaking the promise. Does this seem right, or on the right track, to you?
Jon:
Thanks! Your response to my initial comment was indeed exactly right.
I basically agree with what you say, but I would say that sometimes one may not have infallible knowledge about the exact effects, but one may have infallible knowledge about the range of effects, and that may be all that is needed for one to make an unbreakable promise.
By the way, here's a non-trivial truth about the future that the open theist is committed to recognizing. Tomorrow, God will believe that Napoleon was vanquished at Waterloo. (Unless, of course, the open theist wants to allow the possibility that God might be ignorant of the past.)