February 2007 Archives

I'm working my way through a set of page-proofs, and need some help. Do any of you have (or have easy access to) a copy volume two of Oxford Studies in Metaphysics edited by Dean Zimmerman? I need to find the page number of a quotation in Bergmann and Brower's "A Theistic Argument Against Platonism." Unfortunately, I only have access to a draft of their paper, and not the actual book. Requesting a copy via inter-library loan would take more than the suggested 3 day turnaround time for the proofs.

If you are willing and able to help, please send me an email.

Update: Paul Franks (Oklahoma) sent me the following via email:

I thought I'd let you know that you can search within this book at Amazon.com. Their search feature usually works pretty well, the Bergmann and Brower piece starts on pg. 357, so just ignore search results that show a page number prior to that. Maybe you'll be able to find what you're looking for that way. I've had to use this method a time or two myself, and it's a lot faster than ILL.

I followed his suggestion and found exactly what I needed. So thanks to Paul for the help in this particular case, and for the strategy in general.

From time to time I get emails asking for my input on the quality of various departments when it comes to philosophy of religion. My general practice is to give the person any helpful information I might have and then point them to the Gourmet Report. Today, however, I got an email inquiring about terminal M.A. programs for someone interested in philosophy of religion. I couldn't point this person to the Gourmet Report because most of those programs don't grant a terminal M.A. degree. I also think there are some good M.A. programs that don't show up in the rankings. This isn't a fault of the Gourmet Report since typically there isn't much use in getting anything other than a Ph.D. these days. (I'm not convinced this is true, but I don't want to argue for it here.) My suspicion is that there are actually a decent number of people interested in the terminal M.A. in philosophy of religion.

I think two top programs to consider if one was interested in the terminal M.A. would be Purdue and Talbot School of Theology. Another program to consider would be the University of Oklahoma, Norman. Of course, I don't think the University of Arkansas is unattractive either. (We did have an unusually high number of M.Divs among the graduate students.) One of the biggest things to be aware of is that many schools don't provide funding to M.A. students.

So, the question is which programs would be the best, and what advice would you give to such applicants?

This ought to generate some discussion. It represents the latest on EAAN. A lot of it overlaps with the lectures he's been giving a lot over the last year and a half (I heard the same lecture three times last year!! (can't blame him for that though).

LINK

Our own Tim Pawl and his wife Faith have given birth (16th actually (wait, I'm saying that it actually happened on the 16th, not that it's their 16th kid, even Tim's not *that* Catholic)) to a son. Mother and child are now home safely so I wanted to make the announcement.

Congrats Tim!!

Keith DeRose reflects on Calvinism and philosophers. Why amidst a resurgence of Calvinism in mainstream evangelicalism (both among theologians and at the popular level) has there been virtually no change in the libertarian orthodoxy in Christian philosophy? Keith seems to agree with Dean Zimmerman that this has to do with having to put up a more serious defense of Christianity with secular philosophers, since most Christian philosophers are in secular philosophy departments, and most Christian theologians are in Christian seminaries and colleges. I think that's probably right as a sociological explanation.

I do find it somewhat interesting given that I (as a Calvinist) find the Calvinist response to the problem of evil to be more thoroughgoing in its consequences (even if more difficult to motivate in its foundations), as a number of Christian philosophers throughout history have held. After all, if Calvinism is true, then every bit of evil is fully explained with no remainder. But it's at the foundations of a response to the problem of evil that most Christian philosophers are turning to libertarianism. It's also in the face of considerable social pressure against libertarianism, given that compatibilism is now the default in the philosophical world (a situation interestingly parallel to the dominance of materialism, with many Christian philosophers holding on to dualism).

I've got some more detailed thoughts on this at my personal blog, but I thought it was worth directing Prosblogion readers to this discussion without subjecting all of you to the details of how a Calvinist will view this whole issue. Those who want to see that can read my lengthier reflections there.

Maybe everybody already knew about this, but I just found out about this book from Blackwell:

The Philosophy of Religion
An Historical Introduction
By: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

• Written with verve and clarity by a leading philosopher and contributor to the field
• Places key issues and debates in the philosophy of religion in their historical contexts, highlighting the conditions that led to the development of the field
• Addresses the core topics, among them the the existence of God, the problem of evil, death and the afterlife, and the problem of religious diversity
• Rich with argument, yet never obtrusive
• Forms part of the Fundamentals of Philosophy series, in which renowned scholars explore the fundamental issues and core problems in the major sub-disciplines of philosophy

Preface
1.The Philosophical Approach to Religion
2.The Classical Arguments for the Existence of God
3.Pragmatic and Fideist Approaches to Religious Beliefs
4.Who or What Is God?
5.Fate, Freedom, and Foreknowledge
6.Religion and Morality
7.The Problem of Evil
8.Death and the Afterlife
9.The Problem of Religious Diversity
10.Faith, Reason, and the Ethics of Belief
Bibliography
Index

Blackwell Link

The Philosophical Quarterly invites submissions for its 2007 international prize essay competition, the topic of which is 'Aspects of Theism'

Essays are invited that consider arguments for or against the central claims of (mono)theism; that explore its meaning, including its conceptual or propositional content, and its broader significance; or which connect it with issues in other areas of philosophy, such as metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of value, and political and social philosophy.

While it may be appropriate to consider ideas drawn from historical figures, essays should address problematic issues rather than be studies in the history of philosophy.

Similarly, while ideas of contemporary thinkers may be examined, essays should aim to do more than provide critical discussions of current work.

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The closing date for submissions is 1st November 2007

For entry details, please visit: www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pq

My last post was about a problem for open theists. I now think it is just a special case of a more general argument. Here's the quicker argument for the same conclusion:
1. Nothing (contingent) can be true without a truthmaker.
2. Truthmakers are a subclass of entailers: if T is a truthmaker for p, then it is impossible for T to obtain and p not to.
3. The future is metaphysically contingent: it is not metaphysically necessary that the universe continue.
4. So, for any T that obtains in the present or past, it is possible for T to obtain and every p about the future fail to be true.
4. So, nothing in the present or past could be a truthmaker for any future truth.
5. So, no claim about the future is true.

This is an argument the open theist I have in mind must reject, since such an open theist thinks there are some truths about the future. Pretty clearly, what must be rejected in the argument is the notion of a truthmaker. But here I'm lost, since the worry about future truths is supposed to be something about whether they are "grounded". I have no idea what this is supposed to be, since it can't be explained in terms of truthmakers. So the challenge is to say what the notion of grounding involves that doesn't require entailment, covers cases in which the future is determined, and excludes cases where the future is undetermined.

But don't say: to be grounded is just to be determined, either in the accidentally necessary way the past is or in the causal way that some of the future is. We want a substantive explanation of the view, not a trivial restatement of it.