In addition to Luke Gelinas's interesting paper advocating one advantage of the Openness view over Molinism (mentioned in previous post) there was another paper advocating an approach to evil which emphasizes the limits of God's power. Neal DeRoo (Boston College) presented a paper called "The Weakness of God" which appeared to advocate a response to the logical problem of evil which gave up God's omnipotence.
What I want to note is that both Luke's and Neal's papers needed (admittedly) to appeal to the same kinds of considerations regarding evil as traditional theists do. And either those responses work for the traditional theist or they do not. If they do, then the nontraditional approaches which weaken the concept of God seem superfluous. Here's a little more detail.
A response to the problem of evil to which it is essential that evil persists because God does not have the power to stop it is a conceptual dead end. Events which constitute great evils are composed of little events. I'm OK with the idea that there is "emergent evil" in the sense that things like the Holocaust are worse than the sum of their parts (though Stalin argued that it was the reverse, since we can't fathom the extent of the evil after a certain number. This is, in part, why he had the confidence to surpass Hitler nearly four-fold).
At any rate, even if such emergence is the case, the events themselves are still not more than the sum of their sub-events. Back when I was studying with Geisler and looking at Process Theology I remember someone talking about just how weak God would have to be not to be able to prevent evil (assuming he has most of the other omnis). When I was a kid, my favorite super hero was Aquaman. When trouble was afoot (or afin) Aquaman would send out these rays from his head and all the sea creatures would come to his aid. Once, I remember a whale knocking over a boat, swallowing the bad guy, and spitting him up on the beach for the authorities. Now think of someone tied up or locked in a closet awaiting their doom. Can't God call mice in to chew through the ropes? Or if mice have free will and all extant mice are transworld uncooperative can't he just break the ropes Himself? Can't he make a flash like a decent magician and distract a bad guy so the intended victim could escape? (This is a standard kind of objection. Dean raised it in the talk and I pressed it afterward saying that God seemed to have about as much power as the average folk singer: he calls us to give peace a chance, man.)
In the end, the fact that if God has any significant power at all it becomes clear that he allows some evils He could, in fact, prevent. But once a theodicy or defense countenances that, the lack of power is not really doing any work and, like traditional theists, the theodicy/defense depends on some kind of perspective on why God allows the things He does. That is the Mystery of Evil and changing our concept of God is not likely to shed any light.
Trent,
I appreciate your comments, though I think it's a mistake to think that open theists advocate a "weaker" conception of God. Process theologians do by denying omnipotence, but open theists can (and most do) affirm that God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, necessary, etc. in just as strong a sense as so-called traditional theists do.
The significance of open theism is that it offers a tangible advantage over both theological determinists and Molinists vis-a-vis the problem of evil without compromising the core of monotheism.
Like Molinists, and unlike theological determinists, open theists affirm libertarian freedom and so can avail themselves of the Free Will and Soul-Making theodicies.
Like most theological determinists, and unlike Molinists, open theists believe that creaturely freedom is incompatible with meticulous providence. What this means is that open theists do not have the Molinist's burden of explaining why God ordained all of the particular evils in the world while knowing full well in advance that each of those evils would come to pass. Instead, the open theist has the lesser burden of explaining why God allowed those evils while knowing that they could come to pass.
The difference between "would" and "could" here is not trivial. It gives the open theist more room to manuever. For example, the open theist can say that God allowed an evil X to occur because that allowance was necessary to create the opportunity for a certain greater good to occur. The Molinist, however, can't give that sort of response. For her, God never simply allows evil for a greater good but rather positively wills those evils in the course of deciding to actualize this possible world rather than another one.
Trent,
I think it's a mistake to conclude that, just because the open view needs the same sort of machinery as other views to deal with evil, the open view isn't (or can't be) any better off. There might be other relevant aspects to the problem of evil not covered by the traditional theodical moves, and the open view might do better in one or more of these respects than other models.
While the advantage here might not be great, it would still be relevant.
This said, I'm not sure about the way Alan (Hi Alan, Luke) frames the advantage for opennism. In some cases this move seems fine--God allows evil that he knows could (not would) come to pass, and he does so for the opportunity of some greater good. I agree that the could/would distinction is relevant.
But the difficulty here is that some, and indeed many, evils are so bad that it seems morally offensive to think that a God who lacks exhaustive foreknowledge of what will result from these evils nevertheless allows them on the grounds that they merely make possible, or even probable, some greater goods.
Do we really want to say that God could be justified permitting horrendous evils on the grounds that they might be, or even probably will, result in greater good? Maybe this is okay for some relatively minor evils; but I for one don't want to say this about all (or even really that many). Here I think it's going to be better for the opennist to hold that the overriding goods God stands to lose by intervening are general, contemporaneous goods--things like the maintenance of the moral order (or something like this). I think the best bet for the opennist here is either to tell a Hasker-like story or plead skeptical theism about the general, contemporaneous goods God stands to lose.
Hi Luke,
I agree with you that the open theist isn't out of the woods as far as the problem of evil goes. It's still a difficult problem. My point was simply that the open theist is in a better position vis-a-vis the problem of evil than the other main theistic (non-process) alternatives.
I agree with your suggestion that "the best bet for the opennist here is either to tell a Hasker-like story or plead skeptical theism about the general, contemporaneous goods God stands to lose." I suspect that all theists when faced with the problem of evil will sooner-or-later have to punt to mystery. The theological determinist ordinarily does so right out of the starting gate. The Molinist can delay that move for awhile by first playing the free will theodicy card. The open theist can delay that move for a little while longer by appealing to "general, contemporaneous goods" and such. But in the end, it seems there's always going to be a residue of apparently gratuitous evils, at which point the committed theist will say something like "I don't know, but I trust God."
Hi Guys,
Electricity in the home is a good thing, on balance, even though there’s a possibility that some person will be electrocuted. That’s possibility is bad enough to warrant investigation to determine how probable it is. Suppose something like this is true. The probability of electrocution is so small and the benefits of electricity in the home so large that the balance clearly favors wiring one’s house. Notice the epistemic notion in the last sentence “clearly”. Consider the following principle: if a situation allows for a horrendous possibility and the overall balance of goods does not clearly favor bringing about the situation then it’s wrong to bring about that situation. (The principle will need some amending to allow for forced action.) If this principle is right then the "could/would" distinction isn't going to help the open theist. What the open theist needs to do is to argue that the antecedent of the principle holds. Suppose that the overall utility of horrendous evils is much less than the utility of goods. This implies that for the open theist move to come off then he need argue that the probability of horrendous evils is much, much less than the probability of the goods. If this is right then I think one can put Trent’s point like this. As long as God as much knowledge as the average politician he’ll see that the difference in probability isn’t that great. This implies that one will have to argue that the difference in utility is great indeed. But if this is what the open theist strategy turns out to be it’s not clear that the traditional theist can’t just avail himself of the same considerations; if, that is, the difference between the utilities is very great then the overall difference between probabilities and actualities won’t seem to affect the success of the argument.
Alan - maybe I'm missing something, but I don't think Trent was saying that Open Theism proposes a weak view of God, I thought he was saying that as well as a paper on Open Theism, he attended another paper advocating a Weak God. Anyway, Trent will tell us what he meant, I'm sure.
'The Weakness of God' is also the title of a recent book by John Caputo. Did Neal DeRoo discuss Caputo's book at all? Caputo's God is certainly about as weak as a folk-singer, his whole point, (although he doesn't use this language) seems to be to replace a God who is maximally powerful with a God who is maximally weak, a being in comparison with which Walter the Softy (British comic book character) is at least as powerful as Aquaman.
In a Preface written in January 2004, Caputo accuses religious leaders who attempted to give a justification of the Tsunami of blasphemy (including an appeal to God's mysterious ways). So he is certainly interested in the problem of evil.
However, I think his main motivation is an interest in moral obligation. For Caputo, weakness is the ultimate source of moral obligation: if someone needs my help, and nobody else can help them, then I am obligated to help. So God, as the ultimate source of moral obligation, is the ultimate in weakness.
Caputo strongly rejects the idea that this weakness could be a pose on God's part, in particular, that Jesus is weak when he is crucified, but will return on the third day more powerful than ever. God isn't, in other words, like Aquaman stranded in the middle of a desert, bereft of all his superpowers until someone gives him water.
Of course, this is intended by Caputo as a radical departure from classical theism - not so much a strategic move to solve the problem of evil as an attempt to rewrite the whole tradition. I mention it because it seems that maybe, if you want to embrace a weak God, it is more convincing if you go all the way: Swinburne points out that the advantage of omnipotence is that you don't have to explain why God has this much power, but no more. The same is true if God is ultra-weak. When we start trying to fit God in between a normal human being and Aquaman, it's doubtful that we are talking about God at all.
Hi Ted,
You seem to be assuming that the openist takes the relevance of the could/would distinction in relation to God's justification for allowing evil, or for creating a world with libertarian free creatures, or something like this. But it might be that the could/would distinction is relevant in another way. My view is that the fact that the open God doesn't consent to horrendous evils (really, any evils) beforehand is morally relevant; it gives openism a leg up on more traditional views. How? It allows the open God to be shocked, surprised, deeply saddened, and generally opposed to the evils of this world in a way Molinism and Calvinism (and Thomism too, I think) preclude.
Hasker frames this as an "antinomy of divine pathos" for the Molinist God. I'd rather frame it in terms of divine protest. The fact that the open God doesn't consent to moral evils beforehand allows him to stand opposed to these evils in a way that is more morally satisfying--and indeed objectively morally better--than other models of God. It seems to me that something like this lies behind the frequent openist claim that the open view is better off in relation to the problem of evil than other providential models. Basically, I think that the open view can concede that, with respect to God's justification for allowing evils, openism is on a par with other models, while continuing to hold that openism allows a better divine response to moral evil than other views.
Hi Luke,
I wonder if you could say more about the relevant advantages you see in the response of an open God over the response of a more traditional God.
You say that the advantage of the open view is that God can be "be shocked, surprised, deeply saddened, and generally opposed to the evils of this world" and this is an advantage over other views. I think you are right that an open God can be surprised and shocked in ways not open to other views (the fact that shock and surprise require change alone rules out some views). But I'm not sure about the last two. Couldn't God, on the other views, be saddened or opposed to the evils in the world. I think of instances where I was saddened by and opposed to something I've allowed, allowing it for the sake of another good I had in view. Why can't a traditional view countenance that for God?
As for being surprised and shocked, two things. First, could you spell out more the advantages of being surprised and shocked? As of yet, I don't see why they are good-making qualities.
But, secondly, supposing they are good-making qualities, I don't see them as benefiting open theism in the long haul. here's what I mean. My mom watches this show Law and Order: Special Victims Unit. I've seen a few episodes with her, and was surprised and shocked the first time I saw and heard what happens to the victims in the show. But, shortly thereafter, I lost the sense of surprise. I even lost the shock, to an extent. I wasn't shocked that an atrocity occurred to the girl who was tied up -- I expected it, given what I saw up to that point. I was shocked at the sort of atrocity that happens to her but not at the fact that an atrocity occurred. If I were to watch that show now, I'd be surprised if something horrendous DIDN'T happen to the girl.
You can see how that ties to God. Maybe the open view has a leg up for the first few times God sees someone tied up in a closet (to use Trent's example), but after those few times, I doubt there's much surprise left in God. And now, after seeing so many (thousands?) of similar actions, how could he be surprised at the outcome? What would he expect to happen?
It seems to me that the divine response is just as bad for this view as it is for any other. God sees the person in the closet, as he has in so many other situations. He knows that no one is looking for her (say, in this scenario) and that the killer will most likely be back in 5 minutes. He sees that no one is on a trajectory to help her, and that, most-likely, something really awful will happen to her. He sees that the killer has in mind, and it is despicable. God is then opposed and saddened (I'm not sure if he would be shocked or surprised, at least not now, after seeing this sort of thing so many times). And God still does nothing. I guess I'm not sure how to weigh this scenario against a traditional God who does nothing to stop it. But, if I had to assign moral grades based on the goods I know about, they'd both fail.
Hi Luke,
Could you say a bit more about why you think God would be shocked and surprised at the evils in the world? To carry on with the electricity/electrocution analogy I would be incredibly shocked and surprised if someone were electrocuted in a house I wired. Electrocution is incredibly improbable and there are redundant safe measures to prevent it. In the case of God’s creation of a universe I don’t see that there’s a similar sense of shock and surprise because the evils aren’t all that improbable. That’s a facet of what I meant above when I said that as long as God has much knowledge as the average politician he’ll see that the difference in probability isn’t that great. Maybe you think that horrendous evils are very improbable, though. I’m open to that but I don’t see it right now.
About the consent move I think that’s interesting. There are several folks at U. Missouri working on consent so maybe they could set us straight. Here’s a challenge, though: why can’t the traditional theist hold that God doesn’t consent to evils. If I send my child to dentist then I know he’ll be in pain. I don’t consent to the pain but I do consent to something that implies he’ll be in pain.
Hi Guys,
The paper I gave at Rutgers is basically my attempt to argue the assertions I made in my previous post. I’m happy to send it to you if you want the full story, but here’s the basic gist. An argument for why the God of open theism is, in one respect at least, morally superior to the Gods of Molinism and Calvinism (and maybe Thomism too, though I’m less sure about this):
(1) Responding to moral evil (ex post facto) is morally relevant.
(2) Protesting instances of moral evil is morally superior than failure to protest.
(3) The open God can protest moral evil while the Molinist/Calvinist God cannot.
(4) Thus, the open God is capable of a morally superior response to evil than the Gods of these other models.
I take it (1) is fairly uncontroversial; just think of someone who shrugs callously at the news that her friend has been robbed or beaten; surely we think there’s something morally wrong or deficient w/ this individual. I use ‘protest’ in (2) to refer to a sort of illocutionary act of opposition; to protest x is thus to issue a statement of opposition against x. For the protest to be genuine, it must be capable of passing muster in a judicial or quasi-judicial setting; a genuine protest is one a fair jury could judge to be made in good faith by the one who is making it. From a moral standpoint, it seems there’s something better about voicing one’s opposition to evil than failing to do so; if you have the chance to sign a petition condemning the ongoing moral atrocities in Darfur, it’s a good thing (ceteris paribus) for you to do so. Thus, ceteris paribus, an agent who protests Darfur acts better than an agent who doesn’t.
(3) is where the could/would distinction becomes relevant. The reason the Molinist God (e.g.) can’t protest moral evils is because he knowingly and willingly (weakly) actualizes states of affairs in which they proliferate. Any decent jury (it seems to me) will reject the Molinist God’s statement of protest on the grounds that it’s the Molinist God himself who knowingly gives the go-ahead on the very evils he’s supposed to be protesting. Note that this isn’t a claim about the Molinist God’s justification for permitting evils; I’m not arguing that the Molinist God wouldn’t be justified actualizing these states of affairs. Nor am I saying that the Molinist God is culpable for failing to protest; on ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, he can’t be. The claim is simply that certain features of Molinism place constraints on the Molinist God’s ability to respond to the actual evils of our world, and that b/c of this the open God is capable of this morally superior act, protest, that the Molinist model precludes.
So the stuff about shock and surprise isn’t the main issue, and I’m sorry for not being clear about that. I agree that the open God can justifiably conclude that the world will contain some horrendous evils or others, but it doesn’t seem to me that the open God can have justifiable beliefs about just how bad these evils will be until shortly before they happen. So my intuition is that the open God can be surprised at just how wicked human beings turn out to be, though I don’t have an argument worked out for it right now. As for the Molinist God not consenting to evils, this seems a stretch. The principle I’m relying on here is roughly: If S has certain knowledge that p counterfactually implies q, and S consents to p, S consents to q. If consenting to q nullifies one’s ability to protest q, it follows that the Molinist God can’t protest q when q comes to pass in the manner foreseen—even if he’s justified in allowing q in the interest some greater good. This seems pretty clear to me, though if you don’t find it so I’d have to try to convince you via thought experiments and such.
(3) The open God can protest moral evil while the Molinist/Calvinist God cannot.
Why should any Molinist or Calvinist grant this assumption? It's certainly true than in one sense God has to stand behind it if God is willing to have it be part of the overall course of the world when it could be otherwise. But how does that amount to endorsing it as good? There are all sorts of ways God could denounce it as evil and yet still consider it, in context with the rest of the given history, better than the same history without that evil. Wasn't that the whole point of Trent's recent post?
Hi Jeremy,
My claim is not (indeed, emphatically not) that the Molinist/Calvinist God has to endorse evil as good. I’m sorry if I wasn’t clear about that. The claim is just that the Molinist/Calvinist God won’t be able to get away with a muster-passing statement of opposition to the actual evils the world contains when they come to pass in the manner foreseen.
The reason is simply that the Calvinist/Molinist God consent to the evils they’re supposed to be protesting. Heck, the Calvinist God *ordains* these evils. How could he simultaneously oppose them? Things are slightly better for the Molinist God, since he’s stuck w/ the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom he gets—their truth-values are beyond his control. Even so, once the Molnist God, on the basis of his knowledge of the CCFs, actualizes a world he knows contains moral evils, it’s tough to see how he could genuinely stand opposed to them when they come to pass in the actual world; he has, after all, agreed to them from the start. Again, this isn’t a claim about God’s justification for permitting evils; it’s a claim about what sort of divine response is available to different models of God, all of whom I’m taking to be justified in their permission of evils.
Luke,
Thanks for the response. I see now that the main issue is that the open God can protest, while you claim that the traditional God can't. I wonder:
I don't see how being able to protest is a good-making quality. I can see actually protesting being a good making quality, but that's not what you argue. You argue that the Open God's being able to protest (see (3) and (4)) makes that God morally superior to a God not able to. What if he can and doesn't; my intuition is that if he can protest and doesn't, he is worse than a God who can't protest by nature (though this is a very weak intuition). Following on your example, if I never have a chance to protest the atrocities in Darfur, I'm less culpable for not protesting than the guy who is able to protest and just walks by. The capability to protest in itself doesn't seem to add much to the Open God; actually protesting does (if it is really something a traditional God cannot do, and I'm not sure it is).
And, the way you describe protest, I wonder if a jury really would agree that an Open God does protest. I'm reminded of the Christian in the book of James who sends the hungry an naked man away with a blessing. James says faith without works is dead. He asks, "What good is it?" I wonder the same about protest without works.
If I were on the jury and God said, "I am adamantly against that dastardly deed" I'd wonder how serious he is, given he had the power to do something about it and didn't. He isn't backing up his protest with action, and protest without action (where action is possible and doesn't require extraordinary effort) is no protest at all. if it is still true that God knew the probability that the person in the closet would die painfully was very high, knew that no one was even looking for her, knew what the murderer intended, could stop it easily, AND STILL said he was in protest of the dastardly deed occurring, I don't think I'd believe him (ok, well, its GOD, so I guess I'd believe him; anyone else, though, I'd disbelieve and at least bring about a hung jury). So, I see no real advantage here for the open God, at least not on grounds of genuine protest.
Heck, the Calvinist God *ordains* these evils. How could he simultaneously oppose them?
Because he doesn't ordain them and oppose them in the same sense. He ordains them in their context as contributing toward the sovereign plan of history. He opposes them as wrongful actions on the part of the people who did them, because they did something immoral, even if from the perspective of God it contributes for good to the world. This isn't a very new point. It appears very clearly in the 50th chapter of Genesis from the mouth of Joseph, and I think it's even clearer in Isaiah's condemnation of the king of Assyria in Isaiah 10 for doing something evil that is blameworthy that still serves as part of God's plan.
I have to agree with those who are saying open theism faces the same problem. I think you have to count the possibility of there being evil as itself a bad, just an bad that in the big picture is worth it if it's required for freedom. For surely if a world without evil is ceteris paribus better than a world with evil, it follows that a world without chance of evil is ceteris paribus better than a world with a chance of evil, particularly one with a likelihood of evil. The same point applies to each particular case of possible evil. That means there's a tradeoff between something bad and something good even with open theism.
Luke, granted that if God knows the If p then counterfactually q, and allows p then he allows q, and granted that he cannot protest at that which he allows, still he can perhaps protest the counterfactual itself.
I know that if I give Jim an inch, he'll take a mile. I give him an inch anyway, and he takes a mile. Maybe I can't say 'I protest at Jim's taking a mile' but surely I can say 'I protest at Jim's being the kind of guy who takes a mile when given an inch.'
Is the first protest of greater moral value than the second?
Hi Tim,
Thanks. It’s true that my argument is framed in terms of the open God’s capability to protest, and that it doesn’t follow (immediately) from this that the open God in fact protests moral evils. A couple things: first, if you concede that the open God can protest; that protest is a good-making feature; and that the Molinist God can’t protest, it follows that, in at least one respect, the Molinist God is surpassable by the open God. This strikes me as relevant, and probably not something most Molinists are going to be happy with.
Second, the reason I hesitate to conclude that the open God in fact protests the evils of our world is that doing so assumes that the open model is true; and I haven’t even begun to argue this, nor am I entirely convinced of it myself (depending on the day and my mood). This said, I do think it follows from the open God’s moral perfection that if the open view is true, God protests actual evils. And that this might even give us some reason to prefer openism to other models (assuming there aren’t any knock-down arguments on either side).
Your worry about the genuineness of the open God’s protest, given that he permits the evils he’s supposed to be protesting when he could prevent them, is understandable. Presumably the reason God permits these evils is because he stands to lose some overriding particular or general good(s) by preventing them. My thought is that, so long as this is true, God can protest the evils he permits. Consider the case of a Jewish mother forced to choose, on pain of loosing both, which of her two children to send to the gas chamber. Suppose the mother makes the excruciating choice; whichever child she chooses, it was within her power (let us suppose), at the time at which she chose, to have chosen differently—to have saved her son instead of her daughter, or vice-versa. Suppose the mother chooses to save her daughter. Does the fact that it was within her power to prevent her son, rather than her daughter, from being sent to the gas chamber preclude her ability to protest her son’s treatment? The answer seems obvious; of course not. The mother can still declare her impassioned and unambiguous opposition to her son being murdered, even though it was within her power to prevent it.
It might be suggested that what the mother is really protesting here is the fact that either one or the other of her children is being sent to die, a state of affairs which she is, ex hypothesi, powerless to prevent. But this doesn't seem quite right. Surely as her son is being dragged away what the mother protests is this very thing—the fact that her son is being taken from her. If so, this shows that “protest” is a defensible description of the open God’s response to moral evil, even if God can prevent the things God protests.
Hi Jeremy,
Your response on the part of the Calvinist seems to assume a compatibilist notion of freedom and/or moral responsibility that I myself find untenable. So we’re only going to be able to make so much headway here without hashing that through, which I just can’t do right now.
Hi Ben,
I agree that the Molinist God can protest the truth-values of the CCFs. I deny that this act of protest is nearly as relevant as protesting the actual events described by the CCFs. This simply because, while the first act of protest is made in relation to an abstract state of affairs, the second act of protest is made in relation to real people, undergoing real suffering, in the real world.
I'd rather frame it in terms of divine protest. The fact that the open God doesn't consent to moral evils beforehand allows him to stand opposed to these evils in a way that is more morally satisfying--and indeed objectively morally better--than other models of God
Ted, I'm not sure why this should be morally more satisfying. There is something God knows that is quite troubling: He knows that for all he knows something horrendous will happen (even will very probably happen, for all he knows) if he actualizes a world with free agents. And he does it anyway!
Now compare that to the way we evaluate human agents. If I have no idea how dense the gas fumes are in the garage--and really have no idea how probable it is that they are dense enough to cause an explosion--and in such ignorance I light a match anyway(!), I take it you would find my action terribly wrong. But the open God is acting largely under ignorance. Why should we not say that it is outrageously irresponsible that he would actualize a world with free agents, given his ignorance of what will happen?
Luke, I'm not trying to argue for this view, so it's a little strange to complain that I'm assuming compatibilism. I'm simply trying to explain what the view says, since you said something about the view that, according to the view, is simply false.
Let me give you an analogy that I think explains why I find your portrayal of Calvinism to be unfair. Consider version of open theism according to which God doesn't know future contingent truths because there are none, future contingents having no truth value. Some opponents of open theism describe such a position as denying omniscience because it amounts to denying God's knowledge of the things the opponent considers God to know. But on open theistic terms (at least on this version of it), there are no such truths to know, and thus God still knows everything. Therefore, it is unfair to say that the open God is not omniscient, even if it's true that the open God doesn't know all the things the traditional theist thinks are truths. On the view in question, God is omniscient.
Now replace the open view's claim that there are no truths about future contingents with the Calvinist's claim that compatibilism is true. Replace the claim that open theism denies omniscience with your claim that the Calvinist God can't protest evil and that God can't be against something while in another sense being for it. Can you see why I think your portrayal is unfair?
I want to tag something else on to Mike's comment. If God is ignorant about what would happen, then it's not just that God could have foreseen the actual world as a possibility and yet created free creatures anyway. It's that God would have to have seen how bad things really could have been and still actualized free creatures anyway. Presumably how bad things could have been is much, much worse than how bad things are, perhaps without limit.
Hi Mike,
Fair enough. But I think you’ve misconstrued the point of my argument. I’m not arguing that the open God is justified, or more justified than the Molinist God, in relation to evil. I’m assuming (provisionally, rightly or not) that both models are capable of providing sufficient justification. I’m also not arguing that the open God is, all things told, morally better than the Molinist/Calvinist God. My argument is just meant to show that, with respect to responding to moral evil, the open God has the advantage. That’s it.
It follows from this that, *ceteris paribus* (and I see that this is a whopping ceteris paribus, one I’m not necessarily convinced of myself), the open God is morally preferable to the Molinist/Caalvinist God. You seem to be saying that other things aren’t, in fact, equal; and that the Molinist God is morally preferable on other grounds. That very well may be; but this is another whole discussion waiting to happen, one that my present argument has nothing to say about.
Hi Jeremy,
I see your point. Thanks. The principle I’m relying on here is that S can protest state of affairs q only if S doesn’t knowingly and willingly actualize q or some other state of affairs p that includes q. If true, this principle precludes the Calvinist God from protesting. Maybe you think it’s false. If so, I’d love to hear a counterexample. (And it continues to strike me as a self-evident and bordering on analytic truth that S can’t protest a state of affairs he ordains. But that’s just me.)
Luke, that's fine, as long as you're willing to allow me to say that open theists deny omniscience, because the assumption I find self-evident and full-blown analytic is that if something will happen then it's true that it will happen, and thus if God is omniscient then God knows it will happen. I recognize that open theists deny that and thus don't think of God as less than omniscient, but they can only do so by denying something I take to be self-evident in the same way as 2+2=4.
It would be helpful if you rejected the principle on independent grounds, on something other than the assertion that the Calvinist God can in fact protest. I just don't see it. Openists have independent arguments for why future contingents lack truth-value, and so why the open God knows everything there is to know and is thus omniscient. They don't reason: the open God knows everything there is to know; the open God doesn't know future contingents; thus, furture contingents must lack truth-value. But this (or something like it) seems to be what you're doing on behalf of the Calvinist. I could be misunderstanding you, and if so, I apologize. But what independent grounds can you give for thinking that the principle I'm appealing to is false?
Luke,
Thanks for the in depth reply. I grant your first and second point, and now see why you wouldn't want to assert that God does protest. I'm also sympathetic to your Sophie's choice scenario, though I wonder if there isn't an analogous story that can be told for a more traditional God.
In a reply to me, you say:
"The principle I’m relying on here is roughly: If S has certain knowledge that p counterfactually implies q, and S consents to p, S consents to q. If consenting to q nullifies one’s ability to protest q, it follows that the Molinist God can’t protest q when q comes to pass in the manner foreseen..."
Do you see either of these situations as counterexamples?
1. I see that if I were to give the gunman my wallet, I would be out all my money. I consent to giving the gunman my wallet, so thus (you say) I consent to being out all my money. And, furthermore, since I consented to being out all my money I can't protest it. Suppose you were to see me the next day and I were to say "last night stunk, I was robbed and am out all my money, which surprised me, shocked me, disgusted me, offended me, and saddened me -- I protest such situations." Would you be right in saying, "why are you protesting the situation, you consented to it."
2. The open God sees the murder about to happen, knows that no one is on a trajectory to help the victim (no one is looking for her, no one is in the building or within earshot of it...), and knows what the murderer has in mind. Sometime before the actual murder, he knows that were he to refrain from helping the victim, the victim would die a really awful death. He consents to refraining from helping the victim, thus (you say) he consents to her dying a really awful death. And, furthermore, since he consents to her dying a really awful death, he can't protest that death.
I wonder whether the "consenting to refrain" is problematic in example 2. If so, I bet another counterfactual could be given that refrains from refrain talk. Also, I wonder if it is examples like these that led you to forming your principle in terms of actualization in later posts.
Thanks,
Luke,
You say, "Things are slightly better for the Molinist God, since he’s stuck w/ the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom he gets—their truth-values are beyond his control. Even so, once the Molinist God, on the basis of his knowledge of the CCFs, actualizes a world he knows contains moral evils, it’s tough to see how he could genuinely stand opposed to them when they come to pass in the actual world; he has, after all, agreed to them from the start.
But presumably God (on the Molinist view) has agreed to the evils only in the sense that he’s willing to let them occur for the sake of the greater goods to be obtained. How’s this different from God (on the openist view) who is willing to let those very same evils occur for the sake of the same goods. On both views God is willing to let certain evils occur in order to obtain certain greater goods, and on both views he has created a world in which those evils do occur. Furthermore, in neither view does he cause the evils to occur (I’m speaking here only of moral evils), nor does he want them to occur. The only real difference is whether God knows beforehand that they will occur. God, on the Molinist view, just gets the bad news earlier than he does on the openist view. I just don’t see why he can’t protest them if Molinism is true; he has agreed to them, so I claim, in the very same way he does if Open Theism is true—namely, by being willing to allow them to occur.
Perhaps the openist will respond by saying, “yes, but on the open view God only concedes to the possibility of certain evils whereas on the Molinist view he concedes to the evils themselves.” But I fail to see how this distinction helps. On the openist view God is willing to allow an evil E for the sake of some greater good G—he just doesn’t know if E will occur. On the Molinist view God is willing to allow E for the sake of G, and he knows that E will occur. How does his knowledge of what will happen if, make him unable to protest the evil?
The principle I’m relying on here is roughly: If S has certain knowledge that p counterfactually implies q, and S consents to p, S consents to q.
I don't think this can be right. I can be certain, given your sincere threat to my life, that if I were not to harm Smith, you would kill me. I can certainly choose not to harm Smith without consenting to you killing me.
Luke, I just noticed that you add,
If consenting to q nullifies one’s ability to protest q, it follows that the Molinist God can’t protest q when q comes to pass in the manner foreseen—even if he’s justified in allowing q in the interest some greater good. This seems pretty clear to me, though if you don’t find it so I’d have to try to convince you via thought experiments and such.
As in the example above, it seems pretty clear that I can protest your killing me, though I knew you would kill me had I not harmed Smith and I refused to harm Smith.
But there are plenty of other examples.
Suppose I know that were I to take road A home, I would be mugged. I can take road B, but B is the long way home. I'm tired and not up for that long walk. Suppose I take road A and you mug me. Did I consent to being mugged? Obviously I didn't. I can obviously protest the mugging. I did something unwise and imprudent. Not the cleverest choice I might have made, agreed. But I certainly did not consent to being mugged. In another famous example from Bernard Williams, I might be in a position to kill one person or allow you to kill 10. You assure me that, were I not to kill one, you would kill 10. Suppose I refuse to kill one. Do I therefore consent to you killing 10? Of course I don't. I'd be prepared to tell you so and protest that you kill no one at all. Protest seems to me perfectly reasonable in each of these cases.
Hi Tim,
These are really helpful; thanks. First I should say that it was perhaps unwise of me to frame my principle in terms of consent, since I haven’t thought as much about the logic of consent as protest. The underlying principle (UP) on which my argument hangs is that S can protest x only if S doesn’t knowingly and willingly actualize x or some state of affairs y that includes x. If true, I think this principle does the trick without talk of consent.
A couple things about (1). First, for this to be a counterexample the state of affairs under protest must be you’re actually giving the gunman your wallet. It can’t be the wider state of affairs consisting in you being held up and robbed in the first place, for I agree that you can protest this—just like the Molinist God can protest the fact that he’s stuck with the particular CCFs that happen to be true. So just for starters, we might wonder whether the intuition you’re priming—that this can be a case where you do genuinely protest—isn’t satisfied by the fact that we can protest the wider state of affairs consisting in you being held up in the first place.
But there’s also a more important question about whether this actually runs afoul of (UP), since it’s not clear from the example whether you *willingly* give the thief your wallet, or whether you’re under enough duress for this to count as a case of compulsion. If the choice you’re faced with is give up your wallet or get shot, it’s not clear that you willingly give up your wallet. And if you don’t willingly give up your wallet, you can protest it. This points to a disanalogy between this case and the case of the Molinist God. The Molinist God isn’t faced with a situation in which he either actualizes the world or something really bad befalls him. The situation is rather one in which he either actualizes the world and in so doing (presumably) realizes some overriding goods (including whatever the overall end of creation is), or doesn’t actualize, no harm done. So there’s an asymmetry here that seems relevant.
As for (2), I agree that it might be problematic for the consent principle I unwisely stated earlier. But I’m not sure whether or how it violates UP. So yes, considerations like these might push me to give up talk of consent, but I’m not sure this foils my original thought. Thanks for pushing this line.
Hi Justin,
This is a great challenge; thanks. Your argument seems to turn on the truth of the following counterfactual (tell me if I’m wrong): If the open God were to have certain knowledge of all the evils our world contains before they happen (that is, if the open God were in the same position as the Molinist God with respect to knowledge at the time of the creative act), the open God would nonetheless have chosen to actualize our world. And the support for this counterfactual comes from the fact that the open God has in fact permitted the evils the actual world contains.
The first thing the openist can say is that the counterfactual here is indeed true, but only in a trivial sense, since its antecedent is, on openism, impossible. But apart from this, I’m not convinced that the fact that the open God permits the evils of our world gives us sufficient grounds for affirming that, per impossibile, were the open God to know beforehand how much evil the actual world contains, God would nonetheless go ahead with his plan. Is the fact that God permits actual evils supposed to entail the truth of this counterfactual? This seems too strong. It at least seems possible that God could have come to regret his decision to create some time ago, and yet, given that things are up and running, God has overriding reason to see the world to completion. Personally, I have no idea whether this counterfactual is true. I’m not sure how I could even hold a justified belief about such a thing. The fact that the open God in fact permits evil isn’t enough, in my eyes, to warrant much by way of concluding what God would have done had his knowledge (per impossibile) been different.
There also seems to be a difference in the way the Molinist and open God agree to the evils in question. The Molinist God agrees to them and willingly brings them into existence as the best possible means of achieving the ends of creation. Not so for the open God. For every evil the open God allows, God can say that this is emphatically not the best route available, not something he agreed to countenance as a necessary means to whatever goods he stands to lose by intervening. But once the Molinist God actualizes the world, he’s agreed that this is best way to go; this is what, in my eyes, prevents him from protesting the evils when they actually happen.
Hi Mike,
Thanks. As I say in the above posts, these sorts of examples might make me rethink my use of consent language. But I’m not convinced they threaten my argument much. Whether or not by refusing to harm Smith you consent to being killed, I’d treat this example the same as case (1) from Tim above. I’m not convinced it’s a case where you *willingly* bring about a state of affairs. There’s compulsion here, in a way that’s not present in the case of the Molinist God. If so, the principle stated above, UP, isn’t violated, and you can protest you’re being killed (well, this might be difficult, but you know what I mean). The same goes for the Williams example.
As for the mugging example, my intuitions aren’t with you. So you have certain knowledge that were you to take road A, you’d be mugged—but you choose to take road A anyways b/c it’s quicker and you’re tired. You get mugged, and show up before the jury to issue an impassioned statement of opposition to the actions of the mugger. It seems to me that any decent jury will say: ‘Well, seeing as how you had certain knowledge that you would be mugged on road A, and chose to travel A anyways (just to save a few minutes and a small bit of energy, no less), we really can’t give your statement much weight. By having certain knowledge of what would befall you if you traveled A, and choosing to travel A anyways, you basically agreed to your mugging beforehand, and indeed in some sense gave the go-ahead on it. This precludes us from judging your statement of protest to be genuine or really all that significant.'
I realize that intuitions might diverge at this point, and that I’d have to play around with more thought experiments to get those who disagree to come around to my way of seeing things. But I’m convinced that enough people will share my intuitions about these cases for the argument to have decently broad appeal.
By having certain knowledge of what would befall you if you traveled A, and choosing to travel A anyways, you basically agreed to your mugging beforehand, and indeed in some sense gave the go-ahead on it. This precludes us from judging your statement of protest to be genuine or really all that significant.
When I am mugged in the example I gave (and I'm sure this is what is getting confused in this discussion) the mugger could have done other than what he in fact did. We are talking about counterfactuals of freedom.
So (1) and (2) are true:
1. I take A []-> You mug me.
2. I take A
But it is also true in a sense relevant to our moral assessment of you that,
3. It is possible that you not mug me.
So nothing I did prempted your moral responsibility for what you did. By taking road A, I did not make it impossible for you to act morally. Rather you chose to mug me, knowing it was wrong and knowing you could act otherwise. I can and would protest the mugging as it is happening, no question, and appropriately so. Frankly, what gives force to the line you want to take is the assumption that, in taking A, I somehow undermine the mugger's responsibilty for what he does. I somehow make it the case that the mugger must mug me. But these claims are false in this case. The mugger is perfectly free not to mug me, despite the fact that I take road A. So he takes full moral responsibility for what he does. When the freedom marchers went to Birmingham in the civil rights movement, they knew they would have to take some terrible beatings. It's a bit outrageous, I think, to suggest that they therefore "gave the go ahead" or they consented to the beatings they received at the hands of those thugs.
The same thing goes for the Molinist God. We should try not to confuse what free agents would do with what agents could do. To put it generally, there is no wrong action A performed by any agent S under a Molinist God G such that (i) were G to actualize W, S would do A and (ii) S could not fail to perform A. Since Molinist agents can (in a morally relevant sense)always do what is right, they do wrong freely. The agents are the ones responsible for what they do, not the Molinist God. Since the agents do wrong freely, the Molinist God can certainly protest.
Luke,
Thanks for the reply. A brief response to what you said. Yes, I think my argument does depend on something like the counterfactual you referred to. The reason I think it is true, is because…here we are, and here is our world with all its evils. If those evils outweighed the goods God was seeking to obtain, it seems he would prevent them. The fact that they occur seems to say to me that he is willing to let them occur. If they're worth it now, I see no reason to think God would think differently sans creation.
Also, I'm skeptical about your second point. The Molinist doesn't have to say that this is the best possible way for God to achieve his goals. God, on the Molinist view, might think that the actual world is one of the worst possible worlds in which his goals are accomplished, and he may genuinely regret this fact (and be angry at us for making it such a world). However, it may be the best feasible world, and this, say the Molinists, is a key distinction.
Thanks for the stimulating discussion point. This has been one of the most engaging posts here in a while. Kudos.
Hi Mike,
Of course I agree that, on Molinism, the mugger could have acted otherwise, and is totally, 100% responsible for the mugging. I’m not assuming otherwise, and this isn’t what gives the force to my line of thought. The force comes from the fact that the agent has full knowledge of the repercussions of his taking A instead of B and nonetheless takes A. Consider what this person’s thought train looks like: ‘I have infallible knowledge that if I take road A, I’ll certainly be mugged. But I think I’ll take road A anyways. Of course, when I do get mugged (as I know I certainly will), I’ll make a big stink out of it, be deeply angered and resolutely protest the fact that I got mugged, despite the fact that I knew full well I’d get mugged if I took A, didn’t have to take A, yet took A anyways.’
Seems to me there’s something deeply schizophrenic and unacceptable about this line of thought, even granted that the mugger acts wrongly, is morally responsible, could have acted otherwise, etc. What the agent can and should protest here is not her mugging, but the fact that, were she to take A, she’d be mugged; the Birmingham protesters protest the fact that were they to sit-in, they’d be arrested. (Of course, in the actual world the Birmingham protestors don’t have knowledge of the situation analogous to the Molinist God, so in real life they might be able to protest their mistreatment after all. But I take it you were implicitly stipulating Molinist-like knowledge here as a condition). The Molinist God protests the fact that the CCFs are what they are, not that the actual evils described by them come to pass—even though the agents who perpetrate these evils are fully responsible and could have done otherwise.
Now I’m not claiming (like Hasker) that the Molinist God can’t be saddened by evils when they come to pass, or that he has to like them. He can be sadly resigned that these are the best CCFs he has to go on; he can also (I think) be mourned (to some extent, at least) by actual suffering when it comes to pass. But this is different from issuing a muster-passing statement of opposition. And I still don’t see how any decent jury could possibly judge such a statement to be genuine, given that the Molinist God has knowingly and willingly chosen to actualize the overall state of affairs including these evils as the most desirable (given the CCFs he has to work with) means of achieving the overall ends of creation.
Hi Luke,
Let me put it this way.
1. It is appropriate for me to protest someone's failure to do what they morally ought to do, if they know what they ought to do and they can do what they ought.
Let what the mugger ought to do be 'B'.
2. AFTER I perform A, it is true that (i) the mugger knows he ought to do B, and (ii) the mugger can do B.
3. Therefore AFTER I perform A, it is appropriate for me to protest that the mugger failed to do B. (From 1,2)
The argument is valid, but I think you deny the concluson. So either (1) or (2) is mistaken. (2) is no doubt true. So I guess you're claiming that it is inappropriate to protest someone's failure to do what they morally ought to do, even if they know what they ought to do and they can do what they ought. Is this about right?
Luke, compatibilism does not rely on Calvinism as its only support. Most compatibilists aren't even theists. They think compatibilism is true on completely independent grounds.
My point had nothing to do with what arguments anyone uses to support any view. It was about which set of propositions is true according to each view. On open theism, there are no future contingent truths. So God is omniscient if open theism is true. With Calvinism, compatibilism is true. So people are free even if God determines everything in whatever sense the Calvinist God determines everything. But nowhere in there is there an assumption that Calvinists need believe compatibilism merely because they are Calvinists, just as there's no assumption that open theists need believe in the openness of the future because they are open theists. In both cases, the argumentation may go the other way.
My point was about what is true on each view, not about what arguments get you there. Presenting what is true on each view needs to take into account what the view holds as true, not what the person presenting it happens to hold as true. You can point out that the view in question says something you find implausible, but it's important to get it right what they say that's implausible. What you said is not what Calvinists say that you find implausible. You said the implausible thing that you think follows that Calvinists don't think follows. My point is that it's unfair to treat that as if the Calvinist would admit that such a consequence follows.
Hi Mike,
Yup, my argument’s committed to the claim that, under certain circumstances, (1) is false. These circumstances are those in which the putative protestor S willingly brings into existence a state of affairs p that S knows (w/ certainty) includes the state of affairs q S is supposed to be protesting. (I also hold that S can’t protest q if S knowingly and willingly brings about q directly).
In actuality, I don’t think we human beings are all that often in a position to satisfy this condition, since we’re hardly ever in a position to know w/ certainty that, were we to actualize p, some futre free action q would result. Presumably most openists (at least) will deny that, when p is actualized, the truth of q is even there to be known. But I’m also inclined to think that we can weaken the condition, replacing knowledge w/ highly justified belief (of the sort we humans usually don’t enjoy vis-a-vis future contingents), so as not to rule out the possibility of the open God being hoisted by his own (or my own, as it were) petard. Either way the Molinist God is ruled out.
Hi Jeremy,
I think we’re getting our lines of communication seriously tangled. This is no doubt mostly my fault, as my last comment to you was pretty opaque. What I was trying to say is this: if the Calvinist wants to convince me that the Calvinist God can protest, he should run an argument against the general principle I’m leaning on, or propose a thought-experiment or a counter-example, or in general try to attack it on independent grounds. As it stands I just don’t see how the Calvinist stands as a counter-example to the principle I’m proposing, even granted compatibilism. This is simply b/c he’s clearly in violation of the principle on which the argument hangs.
Of course, this doesn’t mean that the Calvinist God isn’t a counter-example, just that I can’t see how. A maximally helpful Calvinist, then, would not merely assert that the Calvinist God can in fact protest, but say a bit more about why the principle doesn’t apply to him, or why the principle’s misguided, or something along these lines.
BTW, many kind thanks to everyone who's been making these comments and challenging me on the argument. I truly appreciate the chance to receive feedback in this sort of forum. It's very valuable.
1. It is appropriate for me to protest someone's failure to do what they morally ought to do, if they know what they ought to do and they can do what they ought.
Yup, my argument’s committed to the claim that, under certain circumstances, (1) is false.
The bullet biting at this point is, I'm sure, by any measure big. Still, good to know where everyone stands.
Well, by my measure it's not big! It's far more counter-intuitive by my lights to deny the principle I'm appealing to than affirm it. We need to be clear that everyone other than the one who knowingly and willingly puts himself in the mugger's path can protest the mugging. Ask some of your non-philosopher friends whether the person who knowingly and willingly puts himself on road A can protest the fact that the mugging he's certain will happen in fact comes to pass. My bet is that a good 80% or more of them will say that he can't. The intuition here is widely shared, and generally stronger (from where I stand, at least) than our intuitions in support of (1). But I'd be interested to hear what others think about this.
That didn't come out quite right: the intuition in favor of the principle I'm appealing to is stronger than the intuition that (1) is unqualifiedly true, under no circumstances false.
On the Calvinism issue, I'm not sure what to say that I didn't say in my first comment. I thought I'd already done exactly what you're asking.
On the mugging issue, I think we need to distinguish between two things someone might mean about protesting the mugging. One kind of protest is complaining about getting what you knew would happen. Another kind of protest is pointing out that what the other person is doing is wrong and condemning the action.
Clearly there are cases when someone gets what they deserve at the hands of someone who does something wrong in accomplishing that. Some might think that's what happened with Saddam Hussein's death, since he may have deserved to die and be made fun of in the process, while at the same time it may have been immoral for the people to do what they did for whatever reason. Lots of cases of poetic justice seem to me to be deserved and yet immoral on the part of the people doing them.
In the mugger case, I think something similar is going on. It's perfectly consistent to protest at the wrongdoer's wrongful action on the grounds that it is wrong, even if you knew ahead of time that going that way would necessarily lead to that action occurring and you chose it anyway, which means you can't complain about getting the consequence you basically chose knowingly.
Luke,
This has been a really enjoyable conversation. Thanks for it.
I've been trying to think up counterexamples to UP. I think that your Sophie's Choice example comes close to being one, if we think that the mother's choosing the daughter includes (or even weakly actualizes, which is another way you put the principle)the state of affairs that her son die. But, I'm not convinced, so I thought of another.
"UP: S can protest x only if S doesn’t knowingly and willingly actualize x or some state of affairs y that includes x."
I have in mind a situation like the following:
a 18th century dad cuts off his son's arm to stop the spread of gangrene (suppose he doesn't have any other viable option for stopping the spread). Furthermore, he has no means of assuaging the son's pain (no drugs, and so on). He desires the removal of the arm, but he has no desire for his son to feel pain (and let's say the dad has a desire that the son NOT feel pain). Like any good dad, the cutting off of the arm is dreadfully painful to him.
Now, consider: (CE) the dad (S) knowingly and willingly actualizes a state of affairs -- the son's arm getting hacked off in in the manner described above (y), which includes the state of affairs that the son suffer horrendously (x).
Given CE and UP, it should follow that it isn't the case that the father can protest the son's suffering horrendously.
But, can't the father protest it? He doesn't desire it happens. It rends his soul. He hates that his son feels pain. He would gladly suffer all that pain in the place of his son.
You say:
"I use ‘protest’ in (2) to refer to a sort of illocutionary act of opposition; to protest x is thus to issue a statement of opposition against x. For the protest to be genuine, it must be capable of passing muster in a judicial or quasi-judicial setting; a genuine protest is one a fair jury could judge to be made in good faith by the one who is making it."
I think the dad could say, in good faith, "I oppose my son's horrendous suffering."
Do you?
Well, by my measure it's not big!
But that's just bullet biting about bullet biting!
You simply won't find one person denying (1). If someone does wrong knowingly and could have done right just as easily, that's pretty clearly all you need for proper protest. "Oh yes, I harmed you. And oh yes, I knew it was wrong. And yes, I could have just as easily not harmed you. But don't go thinking it is therefore appropriate for you to protest what I did!" Silly to think you'll find someone agreeing with that line of "reasoning".
Hi Tim,
I’m hoping I can handle this case in the same way as your earlier case concerning the mugging. It seems to me that the father doesn’t *willingly* actualize the situation in the relevant sense. He’s more-or-less forced to do it to avoid an even more undesirable result. So the dad might be able to protest the fact that his son feels suffering due to the amputation of his arm, and the dad can certainly protest the fact that this situation had to happen in the first place.
Your example might make me tweak (or at least be more specific about) how I’m using ‘willingly’ in the condition, and, again, I thank you for pushing me here. But there’s still an asymmetry between this case and the Molinist God, in that the Molinist God (let us suppose) freely creates, w/ nothing to lose, merely b/c he wants to. So consider this example, which I think is more analogous, and tell me what you think:
Suppose you’re presented with a device that allows you to see into the future. The device allows you to see precisely what certain days in the future hold if things unfold a certain way; it allows you to see what will come to pass if certain choices are made, certain contingencies granted, etc. In addition, the device permits you to view the future effects of each scenario for that day; it allows you to view and tabulate all the good and bad that will result from each possible scenario you see.
Suppose this device not only allows you to see possible scenarios of what could happen on particular days, but also to choose which scenario will in fact unfold. Peering into the device, you are presented with a variety of scenarios for next Thursday. All of them involve your nine year old daughter. You are now told that you must choose the scenario that will in fact unfold. However, you are also given the option of skipping next Thursday altogether—push a button and next Wednesday will blend seamlessly into next Friday; next Thursday will never be. Of the scenarios you are presented with, you are naturally drawn to the one that contains—and results in—the greatest amount of good and the least amount of evil.
Suppose it looks like this: your daughter is playing happily on the basketball courts with some friends when without provocation an older boy approaches her and begins to pummel her in the face. As soon as she is able, your daughter runs home with two swollen eyes, blood running from her nose and mouth, sobbing. You go to the park and confront the boy who beat your daughter. He apologizes. You talk with him some, and realize that he is in a bad life spot; he has no parents, no home, no job. Moved by compassion, you reach out to him; invite him over for dinner, get to know him, help him find a job. Reconciliation takes place between him and your daughter; they soon become friends. Eventually you refer the older boy to a couple you know who is looking for a boarder. He cleans up his act. In short, the amount of good that results from the situation outweighs the initial injustice suffered by your daughter.
Now, do you choose to actualize this scenario, or do you decide to skip next Thursday altogether? Suppose you actualize the situation. It may be true that you would be justified in choosing to bring about the state of affairs just described, owing to the fact that more good than bad results. However, it’s difficult to see how the one who did actualize it would be capable of genuine moral protest in response to the violent actions of your daughter’s attacker when things unfold in the manner foreseen. I do not deny that the parent could still feel grief at the sight of her bloodied daughter. Feeling grief over an action, however, is not the same as standing in opposition to that act. One can be grieved by the pain caused to a love one as the result of a medical procedure while wholeheartedly endorsing that procedure. What strains credulity is the supposition that the parent in the thought experiment would be able to stand, impassionedly and resolutely, opposed to the unjust actions of the bully when these same actions are agreed upon beforehand—and indeed put into motion—by the very parent who is supposed to be protesting them.
Hi Mike,
Ad hom aside, I actually know quite a few people (quite sharp philosophers, no less) who agree with the principle I’m using. The issue isn’t whether (1) is true in most or all cases; sure it is. The issue isn’t whether people in general can protest your intentionally harming me when you were free not to; of course they can.
The issue is rather whether the following line of thought is plausible, or even coherent: ‘I’d really like to go to the movies tonight. I don’t need to go—nothing bad will happen to me if I don’t; but nonetheless it’d be enjoyable to go. But hold on a minute: thanks to this nifty crystal ball I’ve got, I’m infallibly certain that if I do go to the theatre, someone will steal my jacket when I’m not looking. Even so, I think I’ll go. And when someone does steal my jacket, as I’m certain beyond all doubt they will, I’ll get outraged and lodge a vehement statement of opposition against their action.’
The thief is guilty; the thief should be punished. You, Larry, Steve, Joe and whoever else so desires can protest the fact that my jacket is stolen. I can protest the fact that my going to the movies counterfactually implies my jacket being stolen; that sucks. I can even be saddened, having decided to go to the movies, that my jacket is stolen. What I can’t do is protest the fact that my jacket is stolen, since (by knowing that it would be stolen and going anyways) I’ve agreed to it beforehand. If I didn’t want my jacket stolen I shouldn’t have gone to the movies. The price of my choosing to go to the movies when I knew full well what would happen is an inability to protest my jacket being stolen. Nothing you’ve said so far inclines me to give up this line of thought.
Next time you're at a protest, turn to the person next to you and say: 'BTW, I'm the one ultimately resposnible for bringing it about that these execs are (freely) building this Wal-Mart in the middle of town. Yup, were it not for my giving the go-ahead, none of this would be happening right now. But I hate this, don't you? Down w/ Wal-Mart!' What sort of reaction would that elicit?
Luke,
I see how the situation you spell out is more like the situation of the Molinist God than the Gangrene situation is. I have difficulty seeing how I could protest in the situation you give. However, I think you're going to have to tweak your UP so that situations like the Gangrene situation aren't counterexamples.
Here's some other things to take into account when tweaking UP (UP= "S can protest x only if S doesn’t knowingly and willingly actualize x or some state of affairs y that includes x.") The first two aren't relevant to the Molinist God scenario, but the others may be:
1. The "oops" factor: S knowingly and willingly actualizes y, which, for reasons unknown to S, includes x. Ex: I shoot my gun at a firing range (y), it misfires (through no fault of my own) and kills you(x). I can genuinely say that I oppose your death(x), even if I actualized a state of affairs (y) that includes your death.
2. The "regret" factor: S actualizes x and later comes to regret it. Ex. Norma McCorvey (Jane Roe of Roe v Wade) worked hard to actualize the state of affairs of abortion being legal. She is now pro-life and does much in the pro-life movement. She can genuinely say "I oppose the state of affairs of abortion being legal.
3. You say that the dad in the Gangrene scenario doesn't cut off the arm "willingly" in the right sense. What is the right sense?
4. If to protest x is just to say genuinely, "I oppose x", why is the jury required? Why can't we just say that a protest is genuine when the person really means it? But, if all that is required is someone really meaning it, I don't see why someone can't really mean that he opposes something even if he intends that it occur and brings it about. Can't he be of a divided mind on the issue, opposing and supporting the same thing? Or, can't he perceive the same state of affairs in different ways? Ex. Can't a senator vote for additional funding for the Iraq war, seen as a means for reducing American casualties, but oppose additional funding for the Iraq war, seen as either morally or fiscally inappropriate? If not, I guess I need to know a bit more about what counts as "opposition" here.
Sorry to scattershot so many different things in one post. I suspect that part of the intuitive appeal that UP has is due to the looseness of its formulation. I wonder if I'll still find it intuitive when I know the relevant definitions of "willing" and "opposing", and when the tweaks are made to it to avoid counterexamples.
Thanks again for the great conversation. I'm really enjoying this.
Tim
What I can’t do is protest the fact that my jacket is stolen, since (by knowing that it would be stolen and going anyways) I’ve agreed to it beforehand. If I didn’t want my jacket stolen I shouldn’t have gone to the movies.
It is obvious that we disagree on this point. I'm baffled by it, but there it is. What you continue to pass over too lightly, in my view, is this: Just as my jacket is being stolen all of the following are true: (i) the thief knows that he is doing something wrong (ii) he can just as easily not steal my jacket (iii) he steals it anyway.
The assertion that I cannot properly protest, assuming I see him doing this, just seems bizarre to me. I can't protest to him that he should stop?? I cannot protest to the police that he should be stopped?? I cannot protest after that he did not stop himself, as he easily could have? These are things I would certainly do, since I know that he can be stopped and that he can stop himself. But there it is, as far as I can see, this seems to be your view.
I understand not being able to protest IF what I did caused him to act this way. But it does not. I can understand not being able to protest IF what I did DETERMINED him to act this way. But it does not. He freely and knowingly performs the wrong action. I would protest, and I expect many would. But, as I say, this is not your view. So we rather starkly disagree on this point.
Hi Tim,
Thanks. I’m enjoying this myself, and these are helpful points.
(1) I intend my statement of UP to rule out the ‘oops’ factor. But you’re right in that the way I’ve been stating UP is ambiguous between:
(UP) S can protest x only if S doesn’t knowingly and willingly actualize x and S doesn’t knowingly and willingly actualize some state of affairs y that includes x.
and
(UP*) S can protest x only if S doesn’t knowingly and willingly actualize x and S doesn’t willingly actualize some state of affairs y that S knows includes x.
The ‘oops’ case is a counterexample to (UP), but not (UP*), since S doesn’t know when S pulls the trigger that her pulling the trigger includes the person being shot. Does this seem right? So (UP*) is what I have in mind; sorry for not being clearer here.
(2) This is a great counterexample, one that Andrew Bailey pointed out to me as well at the Rutgers conference. Another counterexample would be a change in moral knowledge, where my knowledge concerning the moral status of x changes between the time I actualize y and the time x comes to pass. So I’d definitely have to tweak UP to rule these out, but (as you say) neither is relevant for God.
(3) I’ve been thinking a bit about this myself. I guess I’m inclined to take the thought-experiments as our guide, and let our (or at least my) intuitions about them shape the formulation. So we want to accommodate cases where it seems the agent involved clearly can protest—the mugging, gangrene, and Williams examples; and rule out cases where it seems the agent can’t protest—the father in the thought experiment. To me this suggests something like: S willingly actualizes x iff (i) S intends x; (ii) S can do otherwise than actualize x (at some nearby world, S doesn’t actualize x); (iii) it’s not the case that S is under duress of the sort that, were he not to actualize x, some equal or greater evil would befall him. The danger here is being ad hoc. But so long as the intuitions concerning these thought experiments are widely enough shared, I think I can avoid the charge.
(4) This is a really interesting challenge. I have to think about it more, but at first blush I’m inclined to say that the one who knowingly and willingly actualizes the situation she’s protesting can’t really mean her protest in the right way. There’s going to be a whole bunch of cognitive dissonance involved, and, if the agent is being honest w/ herself, it’s not clear to me that she’ll be able to stand behind her act of protest, in full knowledge of the role she’s played in bringing the thing she’s protesting about. Sure, she can say she means it. And if there’s regret or change in moral knowledge a la (2), then she can really mean it, and her protest is good. But if she continues to stand behind her decision to do what she’s done, I’m not sure an honest and fully transparent agent can mean it in the right way. But again, I have to think more about this. Thanks for the challenge.
Mike:
Here’s an independent counterexample to (1):
Suppose I implant a chip in your brain that allows me to control your thoughts, actions, intentions, and the like—your entire mental life. I do this for the sole purpose of getting you to assassinate some high-ranking government figure. For six whole years I tweak your brain in such a way as to implant rock-solid intentions and extremely strong desires to kill this individual. For six years it’s all you ever think about; I work the device in such a way that all you ever do is constantly dream and fantasize about killing this man. You’re lusting for his blood.
Then, the day before you’re supposed do the deed, I