There is an essay by Robin Collins on "Eastern Religions" in Reason for the Hope Within (also online here) in which he examines the tenability of various forms of Hinduism and Buddhism. In many respects however, his critique falls short. The problem with Collins's critique is not so much to do with substance as it is to do with method. The problems with method lead however to a number of problems which are more substantive.
Rather than dissect the essay piece-by-piece, I'll just make some general remarks and then focus on some problems with his critique of the Shankara school, since that's the tradition of all the ones he critiques with which I am most familiar. This should hopefully prevent my post becoming exceedingly long and boring.
Before I begin a critique of Collins's essay, I wish to note that his willingness to critically engage with some of the thinkers and traditions of Indian (and a bit of Chinese) philosophy is commendable. First, Collins indicates that this essay is a response to the fact that "Many people believe that the existence of other world religions somehow undermines the tenability
Christianity." I do not think that a critique of particular religions adequately addresses the assumptions that might underlie this belief, nor do I think that such an enterprise can be rightfully called 'apologetic.'
Where Collins primarily goes wrong is that his criticisms tend to make use of either simplistic or archaic interpretations of the source material. Part of this could be due to his reliance on secondary literature, but much of the secondary literature he relies on is quite good, even if much of it is somewhat dated. Collins says that he is examining only the weaknesses of the Eastern metaphysical systems, because examing their strengths and weaknesses relative to Western theism would require a book-length treatment. His essay however suggests that he is not only examining the weaknesses of these systems, but often formulating them in the weakest ways possible. I would not necessarily say that Collins does this intentionally, but I would suggest that he is not approaching the texts sympathetically. If you set out on a quest to find flaws with any philosopher or philosophical tradition, then flaws you will find. If you begin
your investigation on this premise, however, it becomes easy to underestimate those whom you are critiquing.
Concerning his evaluation of the Shankara school, the idea that their view supposes some kind of "cosmic illusionism" is simply mistaken. This is certainly an interpretation of Shankara that has been quite popular and influential, but the views of Shankara and his close inheritors are better explained here. Collins does address another view, offered by Keith Ward, who says that Shankara's position is a lot like any other well-considered idealist's view.
Collins's response to Ward however fails to take note of the fact that Vedantins (and many other Hindu philosophers) regard consciousness (I think the Sanskrit word Shankara uses is cit) as passive, whereas the active component of the mind (buddhi) is what engages in perception and discrimination. Furthermore, buddhi is a part of the material or manifest world, whereas consciousness is not. Since Collins's criticism relies on the assumption that the concept of mind is the same for Shankara and other Vedantins as it is in Western philosophy, his objections - insofar as they are formulated in his essay - fail. (Also, when he discusses 'subration,' the word should actually be 'sublation.' I'm not sure exactly how he came to use the wrong term, but I have a couple of guesses, and the fault probably does not lie entirely with him.)
I say all this as someone who is not at all attracted to Shankara's view, simply to demonstrate a potential problem with approaching Indian thinkers on a quest to dig for flaws and errors in reasoning without first developing a sympathetic understanding of the source material and tradition. This helps to avoid egregious errors, such as not recognizing the distinction between consciousness and mind in the Vedanta tradition. It also provides good reason to take one's criticisms seriously. I would not say that Collins's essay is a bad approach to the issues, but I am curious to see what he would offer in a case where his task was not overambitious and he was more sympathetic to the subject matter.
One of the other things he could have done in developing, as you say, a "sympathetic" view of the tradition, is to look for the same criticisms he himself wants to make within that tradition's history and present the replies given in their strongest form.
For example, he says, "The Mahayana Buddhist's stress on loving others, therefore, is inconsistent with their overall worldview, because ultimately their worldview implies that there is no one to love." The problem of Buddhist ethics and the existence of the 'self' is not a new one, and was debated internally in both Theravada and Mahayana traditions. While he gestures towards the debates, it seems that he could have give them a little bit more credence. Otherwise, it seems as if Eastern philosophers were spending thousands of years overlooking obvious criticisms.
Taking the same approach with regard to Christianity, would be like overlooking the internal debates about the nature of the Trinity. This might lead to, for example, a rejection of anything except modalism as being obviously contradictory.
ck,
I expected that something like that was the case with the Buddhist topics, but I'm less familiar with those than I am with Hindu philosophy. To his credit, Collins does at least give a fuller airing to criticisms and responses in regard to the Advaita tradition.
The real problem seems to be that they asked Robin to write an essay that was beyond his area of specialization. A look at his c.v. indicates an area of competence in Asian philosophy, but this seems to be based on the sole publication in question here. None of his other publications are even close to area.
Marc,
Even if that's currect, it seems more like an ad hominem. Collins does cite relevant secondary literature and he does make arguments, so even though I think a lack of background in Indian philosophy plays a role in some of the mistakes he makes, it would be better to address the substantive issues.
I'm not trying to criticize Robin, but explain why one might expect that he'd make the very mistake that you point out. Not being aware of the most contemporary literature, or not being aware of the strongest argument for a view, is exactly the kind of mistake you'd expect someone who isn't a subject matter expert to make.
Looking through Collin's secondary literature, I'm surprised not to find any journals, like The Journal of Indian Philosophy. That's a good place to hone in on some of these debates.
On Buddhism and the self, he could have read Stephen Collin's 1997 "A BUDDHIST DEBATE ABOUT THE SELF" in that journal, which is focused on Theravada views of the self and talks about the difficulty in non-specialists like Parfit and Strawson using them in their arguments.
It's both a good overview of a debate about the self's existence, *and* a discussion of pitfalls in interpretating them. This particular essay is easily locatable using a Philosopher's Index search under "Buddhism" and "self" (how I found it). I'm no expert in Buddhism, although that's what I'm aiming to study--so I am surprised that someone like R. Collins who is more experienced than I wouldn't have taken the same approach in researching for his piece.
All that is to say, I don't think the mistake is one that is expected, Marc, since he has access to the same resources as I listed. (And yes, my illustration is about Theravada, not Mahayana views of the self, like my original comment, but I think the larger point holds...)
I think it's probably a fair thing to say that some of this is from being a non-specialist. I've seen this sort of thing lots of times.
James Rachels' awful chapter in his introductory ethics book on religion and morality demonstrates that he has absolutely no familiarity with the contemporary discussions of the Euthyphro and divine command theory and even no understanding of the classical natural law theories, never mind contemporary ones. This is all despite having several references in his bibliography that, if he had read them, would have shown him that he was severely misrepresenting both the views he was discussing and the way the issues could fall out. Unfortunately, his son Stewart's revisions for the latest edition didn't address any of the real problems with that chapter.
This is sort of a less severe instance of the problem Dawkins has whenever he tries to say something related to philosophy.
Then let me ask a constructive question to everyone--what do you think a non-specialist's responsibilities are when approaching a topic that is not their forte? How clearly should they make their limitations known to their audience? How many bibliographic trails are they expected to go down?
Where's the beef? I see an assertion of alleged "simplistic or archaic interpretations", but nothing to back it up. (I'm too lazy to read the Ency entry.) The reviewer seems to have been offended by Collins' critical, non-sympathetic aims. Well, in a chapter like that, there aren't a lot of available pages for hemming and hawing about the interpretation. You mostly say what you think it's saying, and then have at it.
RE: "outdated" interpretations - beware! If you're read as much history of philosophy scholarship as I have, you know that sometimes the majority of commentators in a certain era can really twist and distort the old texts, to fit their prejudices and interests. There is such a thing as the commenters making real progress on a true grasp of a text, but shockingly often, the efforts are impeded by people who like to see the historical philosophers in their own image. I've seen what I thought was this in some Eastern phil secondary literature - although I don't know if the problem is greater, the same, or lesser than with "Western" stuff.
In any case, I'm afraid David hasn't said enough to make his charges "stick". What exactly is the egregious error re: the mind? And why, briefly, it is obvious that Sankara doesn't endorse cosmic illusionism? To be more constructive, why not do a series of more focused postings, to expand some on the judgments so quickly rendered here? That'd be better than continuing in the discussion thread...
I enjoyed reading the interesting discussion of my article, and the questions about whether someone who is not an expert in an area should contribute in the way I did. I think it is fair to ask whether I interpreted correctly the figures I critisized, and it is true I would not call myself and expert in Asian philosophies. But, I do believe that I brought a needed critical perspective on them in the book chapter. Further, I was not simply critical of the Asian thinkers -- for example, I noted the strengths of Ramanuja's philosophical perspective. I also did a lot of reading to make sure that I was not simply misinterpreting the thinkers (or traditions of intepretations of those thinkers) that I critisized, since in some cases it seemed unbelievable to me that they would make claims that seemed blatantly contradictory. There are some revisions I would now make to the article, particularly noting that the Gelukba school of Tibetan Buddhism (often classified under Mahayana) do believe that there are ultimate distinctions in reality (see Jeffry Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness). Since writing the article, however, I believe most of what I have to say is basically correct, particularly with regard to Sankara. (Which is the only one I will address in this post.) The way I interpret Sankara is how he has been traditionally interpreted. It is that traditional interpretation that I refer to as the Sankara school. Since I have not studied Sankara’s original writing in detail, I cannot say whether his interpreters were correct or not. (An analogy is with John Calvin: Alvin Plantinga claims that Calvin never taught predestination in the sense of the denial of libertarian free will, although the followers of Calvin interpreted him that way. So, when I say Calvinism, I mean what Calvin’s followers thought he said, which includes the denial that we have libertarian free will.)
Below is some of the evidence for the long tradition of interpreting Sankara in the way I did. I have numbered each point. (I cut and pasted some of it from an Asian philosopher course reader I have constructed.)
1. Sankara’s opponents interpreted him this way: The following is a direct quotation from Ramanuja, from A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, edited by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles Moore, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 543- 554. He clearly interprets Sankara as teaching cosmic illusionism, and offers the same critique have:
"We now proceed to the consideration if ignorance. According to the view of our opponent, this entire world, with all its endless distinctions of ruler, creatures ruled, and so on, is, owing to a certain defect, fictiously super-imposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous Reality; and what constitutes that defect is beginningless ignorance, which invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot be defined either as being or non being . . . .
Now, this theory of ignorance is altogether untenable. In the first place we ask, “What is the substrate of this ignorance which gives rise to the great error of plurality of existence?” You cannot reply “the individual self,” for the individual self itself exists in so far only as it is fictitiously imagined through ignorance. Nor can you say “Brahman,” for Brahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and hence contradictory in nature to ignorance, which is avowedly sublated by knowledge . . . .
From all this it follows that Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, cannot be the substrate of ignorance: the theory, in fact, involves a flat contradiction . . . ."
2. The followers of Sankara interpreted him as teaching this position, as illustrated by the next selection is from A Sourcebook of Advaita-Vedanta, edited by Elliot Deutsch, The University Press of Hawaii, 1971, pp. 223 -228.
[This selection provides a short excerpt from the debate between two subsequent subschools of Advaita Vedanta concerning the question of the locus of ignorance. According to one school - the the BhÄ?mati - the individual self must be the locus of ignorance, since “ignorance” cannot be intelligently assigned to Brahman, since Brahman is pure knowledge. Thus, this school said that the human individual (the jÄ«va) must be the source of ignorance. The other school, the Vivarana school, criticized the BhÄ?mati position because they claimed that it was unintelligible for the individual to be both the product of ignorance and thus ultimately an illusion, while at the same time being the source of ignorance. Thus, this school argued, Brahman must be the source of ignorance. As Eliot Deutsch explains, according to this school individuals “thus may be said to exist as different reflections of Brahman on the mirror of ignorance.” The argument offered by the Vivarana school that Brahman must be the locus of ignorance is presented in the selection below.
This selection is included both to show that followers of Sankara were well aware of the problem their view of reality encountered in accounting for the existence of maya or ignorance and to illustrate the sort of logical reasoning that Indian philosophers engaged in.
Selection: Brahman As the Locus of Ignorance:1
Now ignorance cannot exist in the void. It must always be ignorance of someone about something, must always have a conscious ‘locus’ or ‘support’ in which it exists and an object which it conceals from view . Further we have already established that two categories exist and two only, the Self and the not-Self. From this it follows that the (support or locus) of ignorance cannot be the not-Self. For the very nature of the not-Self is ignorance, and ignorance existing in mere ignorance is unthinkable (since the existence of ignorance implies a knower or at least knowledge). Even if it could so exist, what difference would the rise of ignorance in pure ignorance effect that we could say it was an event having any significance whatever? Again, on the view that the locus of ignorance were the not-Self there could be no attainment of knowledge, and knowledge would not exist. But ignorance depends on knowledge for its own existence, since it exists only by virtue of negating it. Further, the not-Self is born of ignorance. It is absurd to suppose that which is logically and causally prior can only exist supported by and dependent on its own effect. Nor, again, has the not-Self any form independent of and different from ignorance whereby it could serve as its locus and support. These arguments refute the possibility of the not-Self serving as the support of ignorance, and if duly reflected on, they show it cannot be the object concealed by ignorance either. Therefore the not-Self is neither the one in ignorance nor the object concealed by ignorance.
Hence we conclude, as the only remaining alternative, that it is the Self alone which is both the support or locus of ignorance and the object concealed by ignorance. All of us have the experience “I do not know”, and in Å›ruti SrÄ« Nãrada says “I am only a knower of the mantras, my lord; I do not know the Self” (Ch. Up. VII. 1. 3.). Nor do the arguments which tell against the not-Self as the locus of ignorance apply to the Self. The Self, indeed, is not identical with ignorance, since its nature is pure consciousness. Again, on the hypothesis that the Self is the locus of ignorance, a difference is introduced into the locus in the form of a break in knowledge, whereby the existence of ignorance as supported in the locus can be established and regarded as a significant event. And again, on this view the attainment of knowledge is possible, since the Self, through its reflection in the mind, produced knowledge. Nor has the Self the disqualifying characteristic of being born of ignorance, since it is the eternal rock-firm changeless Self by nature. And finally the conscious Self has a form and existence independent of those of ignorance whereby it can serve as the latter’s support. From all this we conclude that it is the Self alone which is ignorant (i.e. which is the locus or support of ignorance).
“What then is the object concealed by this ignorance sustained by the Self?” “The Self is that object” we reply. “Well then, is it not a fact that ignorance is incompatible with the Self, since the latter is of the very nature of knowledge, is non-relational, is instrumental in the production of the very opposite of ignorance (viz. knowledge), and is contradictory to knowledge in other ways too?”
To this objection we reply that ignorance is compatible with the Self. For in reality the Self remains undifferentiated. It becomes differentiated into knower, knowledge and the known through mere ignorance alone, just as it is through mere ignorance that the rope becomes a snake—the Self and the rope remaining in reality quite unaffected. Hence when ignorance is shaken off there is complete absence of all the evils of duality . . . .
3. Finally, in defense of my own self, my interpretation of Sankara is the majority interpretation of those over in India. The origin of the alternative mentioned by Keith Ward is a more modern interpretation that appears to have been first elaborated by two Roman Catholic philosophers. Here is what Bede Griffiths, a Roman Catholic monk, who lived in India for 25 years and established an ashram there had to say:
“We come to Sankara. He is considered the great master. The majority of educated Hindus today are Advaitins, and accept Sankara’s Basic philosophy. But this can be interpreted in different ways. When I first came to India, I encountered Advaita on every side, especially among professors in the University and among the more educated people. But among them, Advaita, non-duality, is really monism. For them, this world, human beings, and a personal God, are all appearances—what they call ‘superimpositions’ on the one reality of Brahman. The one reality is without any differences and distinctions at all. You and I, the table and chairs, the earth and sky, all disappear when we come to full realization—and not only you and I, but also any Personal God disappears. Only the one Brahman, in pure identity, remains. That is monism; Brahman alone is and all the rest is maya - illusion. This is very commonly held. Monists will tell you that as long as you are living in this world, in your present state of consciousness, then of course you must recognize you are different from that person, the table, and so forth. But all this is really an illusion, a kind of dream. When you wake up, you will know that there are no differences.
That is one interpretation of Sankara. It is only one school of Vedanta, and a particular interpretation of one school. Very eminent swamis will say, “This is Vedanta, this is Hindu Doctrine.” It is not so. It is a particular school, and a particular interpretation. It happens that two Catholic philosophers in India have made a special study of Sankara, De Smet and Sarah Grant. They both took doctorates at a Hindu university, and both were able to affirm that the doctrine of Sankara is much more subtle. It is not pure monism at all. Sankara is much nearer to the view expressed in the verse at the start of this talk: Purnam adah, purnam idam. Sankara says that this world is neither sat, ‘being’, nor asat, ‘not being.’ It is something between being and not being. It has purely relative existence. He compares it to the sun shining into pools of water. There is only one sun, one life, one truth, one reality, and it manifests itself in this, in that, in you, and in me. These are reflections of the one reality. This, I believe, comes very near to the Christian understanding.” (From Bede Griffiths, The Cosmic Revelation: The Hindu Way to God, Springfield Illinois, Templegate Publishers, 1983, pp. 71-72.)
Just as a follow up to my last post, I have a question to David Slakter. The article in the Internet Encyclopedia you give a link to seems to interpret Sankara’s doctrine in the traditional way, the same way that I do (and by the way, contrary to Bede Griffiths.) And I do not see how it avoids the contradiction I point out in my article. Here are two relevant quotes from the article:
“(Brahman is alone True, and this world of plurality is an error; the individual self is not different from Brahman). Plurality is experienced because of error in judgments (mithya) and ignorance (avidya).”
“This absolute Brahman is known as nirguņa Brahman, or Brahman “without qualities,” but is usually simply called “Brahman.”
So, this seems to repeat the two claims that result in the contraction, namely that Brahman is the sole reality and that Brahman is distinctionless. Given both of these claims, it follows that neither maya nor ignorance can exist, since if they did, they would either have to exist apart from Brahman or there would have to be distinctions in Brahman, namely between ignorance and knowledge. Are you denying that Sankara (or his followers) make these two claims or are you denying that it follows from these premises that ignorance or maya could not exist? [Or perhaps you say they neither exist nor not exist, as some defenders of Sankara have claimed. But then I fail to understand what it means to say that Brahman is the Sole Reality (See Deutsch below) or alone True, since there is then something that has a form of reality (neither existing nor not existing) apart from Brahman.)
[By the way, Eliot Deutsch, a leading Western defender of Sankara, claims that Sankara made these two claims in Chapter 20 (p. 308) of his Sourcebook of Advaita Vedanta. He explicates Sankara as claiming that “Brahman is Real and, in essence, is without quality or distinction” and that “Brahmin is the sole Reality, and consequently the world of duality, of multiplicity, of change, and process is less than “real.” It is a product of, and is constituted by, a creative illusion, maya.”
Hi, Robin. Thanks for the reply. In regard to the fact that your position is the one taken by most Indians, I think that is a reason why it is worth addressing, but that of course does not make it correct. There are certain pecularities of the Indian intellectual tradition which lead to the entrenchment of ideas, no matter what their origion or accuracy, and it is considered a faux pas to be original or to be critical of the tradition (to be fair, I'm sure there are similar problems in the Western tradition of which I am blind to due to my familiarity). It can be frustrating when you come against this tendency when trying to debate Indian philosophers on matters in their tradition, and Shankara himself took pains to point out that his view was nothing novel when, in fact, it was. (On an aside, I would also think it's not true now that most educated Hindus are Advaitins, if it was even true when Keith Ward said it.)
As for the more substantive issue, the view propounded by Ward (via Bede Griffiths) is also not some kind of novel development in the Shakara school, given that Shankara says this in his commentary on II.16 of the the Gita (trans. Alladi Sastry, pp.34-36):
I think the reply, based upon this excerpt, would be that of course avidya and maya are not real in the way that Brahman is real, but they are explanations for errors in judgment regarding the perceived world. I think the Brahmatis are mistaken in saying that the non-Self is only ignorance, because Shankara says that it's possible for the embodied self to be conscious of the real, which is existence. So, ignorance and maya can exist inasmuch as anything else in the world of prakriti can, but they are not real in the way that the atman or Brahman is real, becuase no one is unfailingly conscious of them.
I say that this is not "cosmic illusionism" because taking maya that way assumes that the Lord or Brahman is the source of that which is false, rather than a charitable interpretation such that the maya being talked about is referring to the Lord's power or creative activity, and avidya of that, along with mithya, leading to false perceptions or consciousness.
Sorry David for not responding sooner to your post, but a major conference which I spoke at intervened, along with some other “must do” work. I agree that the passage you cite does support your (and other’s) interpretation of Sankara.
Certainly, there must be many other passages from Sankara that other Indian thinkers are relying on in interpreting Sankara in the way they do. At the very least, I think you would have to provide an “error theory” that explained how these thinkers came to so radically misinterpret Sankara, including his followers and opponents: for example, the passages they cite in favor of their view and how they interpreted them incorrectly. I’m not saying that cannot be done, but it seems a pretty tall order. Second, the above interpretation of Sankara makes Sankara either like Ramanuja or even some variation of Western theism (though, perhaps de-emphasizing the personal aspects of Brahman). So, the overall point of my paper still stands, that the really challenges that world religions pose to Western theism is offering alternative models of God and God’s relation to the world.
Related to this last point, you say that my response to Ward’s interpretation of Sankara fails because “the active component of the mind (buddhi) is what engages in perception and discrimination” and “ buddhi is a part of the material or manifest world, whereas consciousness is not.” But, I do not see how what you say here helps. Buddhi would be distinct from Brahman given what you claim, and hence would fall prey to my second horn of the dilemma: As I say in the article, “If Ward adopts (ii), on the other hand, then our selves or minds become distinct from God's consciousness, and hence Sankara's claim that we are in reality identical with Brahman is lost.” At best, Sankara’s view would become something like Ramanuja’s, which I did claim was not in any obvious way incoherent. Could you enlighten me here?
In any case, in light of you comments, I will put a note at the beginning of my web-based paper making clear that when I say Sankara’s view, I really mean the view that the vast majority his followers have attributed to him.
I end with a two final questions to you, which I would appreciate you answering on this forum or in a private email. (1) Given your interpretation of Sankara, how does Sankara provide an alternative to Ramanuja’s view or does it? (2) It seems that the internet encyclopedia article that you recommended as offering also interprets Sankara in terms of a form of cosmic illusionism (thought I did not read it carefully). Is this right, or do you interpret him differently?
In accounting for why Shankara came to be misinterpreted, I think there are quite a few reasons. First, maya is an ambiguous term, and sometimes Advaitins do use it to mean 'illusion,' with meaning of great power or creation being archaic in the classical Sanskrit language, so the stage is set there for a great deal of misinterpretation.
Second, many thinkers reacting to Advaita Vedanta often had no access to the primary texts. Ramanuja himself probably never read Shankara.
Third, there were (more or less) "illusion" theories of cognition and in aesthetics with which Advaitins became identified, which may have bled over into assumptions about their metaphysics.
As for cases where commentators specifically misinterpreted Shankara but quoted directly from him, I'm not familiar with the secondary literature on Shankara, so I can't yet account for that.
On the issue of consciousness being distinct from Brahman, the consciousness of brahman is cit, whereas our consciousness of the world of plurality is buddhi, with cit being identified with the Self. Cit is passive, while buddhi is active. It's important to recognize that many (if not most) Indian theorists take the position that the mind and the Self are two different things, with the mind being part of the work of prakriti, like the body.
As for your questions: (1) I'm not familiar enough with Ramanuja to answer this question, but I think the important difference between them is where they stand on the possibility of difference at a fundamental level. Ramanuja thinks difference is an inherent part of existence, whereas Shankara thinks it is not. In fact, Shankara makes an argument against the possibility of difference as a category that mirrors your (and others') argument against the possibility of avidya, given that everything is supposed to be brahman. As for (2), you are right that the article I linked to does lend some credence to an interpretation that Advaita does take a position of cosmic illusionism, but it also shows some of the ambiguity of the term 'maya,' although it doesn't make it explicit.