Some versions of open theism deny that the undetermined parts of the future can be known because there are no truths about that part of the future. Such positions say as well that for the parts of the future that are causally determined by events that have already happened, there are such truths and hence that knowledge of that part of the future is possible.
I don't quite understand why that would be true so long as causal determinism is compatible with the possibility of miracles. If we understand miracles as incompatible with laws of nature, I understand the view. But nobody should understand miracles in that way, and if we don't, I don't see how causal determinism will do the work this version of open theism needs. For even given the fixity of the past (and present) and the laws of nature, it won't follow that, e.g., the sun will rise tomorrow. So what I don't quite see is how an open theist who wishes to deny truth values for the undetermined part of the future can allow such truth values for the determined part, without either denying the possibility of miracles or interpreting them as incompatible with laws of nature.
