So I was discussing Wes Moriston's recent reply Ed Wierenga in Faith and Philosophy with him (Ed, not Wes) and I mentioned that I was extremely puzzled by the argument...or rather utter lack of argument.
In his 2002 piece Ed suggests that as long as God is acting from his own nature in always choosing the best if best there be he is free. Now forget the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists and PAPs and all that for a moment, that's all extraneous to what I want to say about Moriston's reply.
Moriston merely says: imagine a person, Bonnie Chance, who is such that (i) she just popped into existence uncaused, (ii) she chooses by nature the best if best there be. [I don't know if we are to suppose her to have either of these traits essentially.]
He says that since Bonnie surely isn't free, and there are no relevant dissimilarities in the God case, then God--as conceived by Wierenga--isn't free. He just *declares* that Bonnie is free, there's no argument, not even an attempted argument that I think is no good (not that I can tell anyway).
I'm perplexed. If there is no relevant dissimilarity to the God case, and I'm OK with the God case, why is there any expectation that I'll be convinced here just because she's finite. And if I was already uneasy about the God case, how is adding that Bonnie--who's case is said to be just like God's--isn't free supposed to add to my discomfort? Am I missing something here?
I hasten to add that there is obviously a form of argument that goes something like this: "You said that a is F and b is relevantly like a, so you should think b is F. However, it seems that in such cases the b adverted to is usually something I already have a view on, not some case that is specifically conjured up just to be like the a case. So I don't see how that form of argument is supposed to apply here.
As far as I can see, as long as Bonnie is acting from her nature--which for me is going to include her higher-order beliefs and desires--then she is free (as far as the story goes), just like God. One man's tollens is another man's ponens...
I haven't read the paper, but here are some questions. Why is it supposed to matter that Bonnie just popped into existence uncaused? Well, if there's no argument given, maybe that's just one of the mysteries of the paper. But it just doesn't seem to me that that would make a difference as to whether Bonnie was free.
Second question, is the fact that it's Bonnie's nature to choose THE BEST IF BEST THERE BE supposed to make a difference? I mean, what if it was just part of her nature to choose TO EAT AN APPLE IF APPLES THERE BE? Maybe there's an assumption being made that if it's S's nature to choose X if there is an X to choose, then S's choice of an X in a given circumstance isn't free? Or maybe the fact that it's THE BEST that Bonnie will choose if she can is supposed to make a difference? Again, maybe another mystery of the paper.
Finally, I take it that you meant (in the fourth paragraph) "no relevant DISsimilarities in the God case"?
Dylan, I haven't read the paper either, but I'm guessing the point of having her just pop into existence is that she didn't have a hand in shaping her own character the way we do. That's supposed to make it analogous to a being whose moral character is necessary rather than developed as ours is.
Jeremy, do you think it makes a dif that she can't shape her character?
I don't think that does any work in the argument (it certainly doesn't address my worry, since that's the same in the God case).
Dylan, thanks for catching the typo, I've corrected it.
My own view is that if it makes a difference it's not enough difference to mean she's not responsible for her actions. But then I'm a compatibilist, so I have less difficulty with this sort of thing anyway. I was simply explaining to Dylan why someone would craft the example this way. That explanation seemed plausible to me.
He says that since Bonnie surely isn't free, and there are no relevant dissimilarities in the God case, then God--as conceived by Wierenga--isn't free. He just *declares* that Bonnie is free, there's no argument, not even an attempted argument that I think is no good (not that I can tell anyway).
Morriston (hereafter M) does offer an argument. He takes Wieregna's (hereafter W) position to be this: the incompatiblist has an insight that is correct about free will and that is that an agent is free if his action has causes that are all and only "internal" to the agent. So if the agent does A and the causes of A are entirely sourced in the nature of the agent and the nature of the agent is itself not caused by anything external to it, then the agent acted freely. Suppose that W believes this is true.
M's counterexample has us imagine a finite agent BC that comes into existence by chance with a nature that is uncaused and such that BC cannot perform any act that is less than the best available. M says that we would view BC's actions as unfree. My sense is that he's right about that. He would have done well to imagine instead that BC's nature made it impossible for BC to do anything other than the worst possible action. He would have done well to imagine BC suffering severe punishment for her actions. He would have done better to have BC replying that there is really nothing that she could do to the contrary, given a nature concerning which she had no choice. Those are the circumstances of BC. But he has us imagine none of that.
Trent notes about the case M offers that it is ineffectual because,
". . .in such cases the b adverted to is usually something I already have a view on, not some case that is specifically conjured up just to be like the a case. So I don't see how that form of argument is supposed to apply here.
But this just misunderstands how M's counterexample functions (indeed, as most counterexamples do). M invites you to consider a case that promises to elicit pretheoretical intuitions about when one is free. One's substantive commitments on free will can only come under review if you're prepared to consider the example independently of them. No question some know that but refuse to do it, I see that now and then. But that's the joyless spectacle of philosophy degenerating to politics.
Perhaps the author of this little paper could put in his two cents?
I think Jeremy Pierce has said pretty much what needs to be said in response to Trent Dougherty's critique of the paper.
But perhaps I can add a comment or two. It's quite true that one man's Modus Tollens is another's Modus Ponens. But of course that cuts both ways. It seems intuitively clear to me that "Bonnie Chance" is neither free nor morally responsible. If she can't help being good because she is good by nature - a nature that she is simply "stuck" with, what difference does it make whether her existence has an external cause?
I would have expected any libertarian incompatibilist to share this intuition. If Trent doesn't share it, then of course he won't be persuaded by my argument. But now I find myself wondering about some of those interesting questions that he "set aside" at the beginning of his post. Is he a compatibilist or an incompatibilist? I'd also like to know if he supports something like Plantinga's free will defense, as Wierenga certainly does.
Those who haven't read the paper can find it here:
Michael Pierce made some helpful suggestions about other ways in which I might have imagined "Bonnie Chance". He may be more satisfied by the way I ran roughly the same argument in another paper published in Phil Quarterly. The paper is titled, "What Is So Good about Moral Freedom?" You can find it here.
I just realized that I mistakenly attributed Mike's comment on my article to Jeremy Pierce. Sorry about that.
Not at all, thanks Wes.
Just noticed this reply. I'm very glad to get a reply from Wes! He won't be surprised that I think this looks like an impasse as I feel no pre-theoretical pull (at all) to take Bonnie Chance as unfree. As for his questions, I'm a compatibilist about some things and an incompatibilist about others. I'm a compatibilist w.r.t. divine foreknowledge and logical fatalism but an incompatibilist about external causation. I have no sympathy whatsoever for PAPs (though I used to, so it's not that I can't see how someone could find them attractive).
Sorry I didn't notice this sooner.
Trent says he feels "no pre-theoretical pull (at all) to take Bonnie Chance as unfree". I take this to mean that he thinks that, as described, he thinks Bonnie IS free.
It seems that we have a genuine clash of intuitions, all right. But I'm still curious about one thing. Does it seem equally obvious to Trent that IF God had CREATED Bonnie (with exactly the same essentially good nature), she would NOT have been free?
Is that Trent's pre-theoretical intuition? If so, then we probably are at an impasse.
That's right Wes, I think freedom is "intrinsic" in some sense hard to explain (which is part of why Franfurt-style c-e's to PAP's work for me) and since *being created* is a relational property that doesn't seem to affect my intuitions about Bonnie.
Ed and I were talking about Rowe's argument again just the other day--he's doing an Author Meets Critics session at the APA with Rowe--and here's part of what I said:
Consider the following argument.
1. External causation of beliefs and desires is incompatible with freedom.
2. Human beliefs and desires are frequently externally caused.
3. Thus, human actions are frequently unfree.
4. When human beliefs and desires are externally caused, humans cannot do otherwise than they do.
5. Thus, frequently, when human actions are unfree, humans can’t do otherwise.
This phenomenon of constant conjunction misleads us into thinking that it is the inability to do otherwise that is the key criterion of freedom: thus if God lacks the ability to do otherwise, He must be unfree.
This is a reasonable inference since there is a correlation, however, as is often the case with mere correlations, the two phenomena have a common cause: external causation.
2. Human beliefs and desires are frequently externally caused.
(2) suggests that I have some static set of beliefs determined by causes external to me. But that could not be more clearly false. Obviously, every belief I have is susceptible to revision. I can decide to revisit any one of them (I know, since I've revisted so many of them), I can reconsider my standards for belief acceptance or warrant (I know since I have done so), I can reconsider the standards for acceptable inference, etc. None of this activity is external to me, all of this activity deeply affects the beliefs I have. The idea of passive belief acquisition from external causes is just implausible. Obviously, much of what I believe has an internal cause. Similarly for what I am disposed to do.
Of course the case is vastly different with God. No amount of deliberation or reconsideration can modify his essential perfect goodness. The case is vastly different too with Bonnie. No amount of deliberation or reconsideration can alter her essentially good nature.
Trent,
I have long understood and taken into account the distinction you're making here. There may be a strong correlation between "not having external causes" and "being able to do otherwise" even if the "key criterion" of freedom is NOT the ability to do otherwise.
So what is the "key criterion"? You merely say that "freedom is 'intrinsic' in some sense hard to explain." Intrinsic to what? To the action? And what exactly is it, according to you, that distinguishes freedom from randomness? My own suggestion is that freedom involves agent causation. This is implicit in what follows.
My published objection to Ed Wierenga's view does NOT depend on any version of PAP. It depends rather on the assumption that a person who acts freely is the ultimate source of her action. The proverbial "buck" of responsibility stops with HER, and not with anything else, including any internal desires and beliefs she may have. So if her nature is such that she necessarily possesses certain desires, and if these desires cause her to perform (or refrain from performing) an action, then the "buck" stops, not with her, but with her nature. Unless, of course, something else (God, for instance) is responsible for the fact that she has that nature, in which case the "buck" stops with HIM.
In the case of Bonnie Chance, she, with her essentially good nature, exists purely by chance. There is no "external" cause. Nevertheless, it seems clear enough to me that Bonnie fails my test for acting (or refraining) freely. Bonnie's nature, rather than Bonnie, is responsible for the fact that she consistently refrains from evil. That is why it makes no difference whether the instantiation of Bonnie's nature has an external cause or happens by purely chance.
Wes