The Possibility of Transworld Depravity

I've always understood Plantinga's talk of 'possibility' here as epistemic possibility. The same as when he talks of something being 'broadly logically possible'. I think this is all he needs to over come Mackie's argument because he's only offereing a defense, ie a story that's true as far as anyone knows.

"if it is possible that all persons suffer from TWD, given the nature of TWD, does this claim collapse into the claim that it is necessary that all persons suffer from TWD?"

No doubt, Plantinga holds that there are worlds w in which no moral agent goes wrong. So it is not necessary, by his lights, that all persons suffer from TWD. The trouble you suggest is based on this claim, I htink,

"But given that TWD is a cross-world property, it describes what persons are like in every possible world in which they exist. So if a person suffers from TWD in one possible world, it would seem that they suffer from this in all possible worlds"

TWD is not a cross-world property in the sense you're suggesting. TWD does not describe the way persons are in *every* world in which they exist. If I am transworld depraved that is a *contingent fact* about me. TWD is a cross-world property in the sense that it descibes a proeprty I have *in every world that God can actualize*. But the set of worlds that God can actualize is not identical to the set of worlds in which I exist. More exactly, let w be a world in which everyone is TWD. The set of worlds S actualizable FROM w is smaller than the set of all possible worlds. In every member of S I am depraved (I don't think I need to be TWD in all of these worlds) and I go wrong. In worlds not included in S, I am not depraved and never go wrong.

Kevin,

I don't really have anything helpful to say in response to your query. Sorry. I like Mike's response, though. But I did have a pedagogical question. When you say you use God, Freedom and Evil in your intro class is that intro to philosophy or intro to philosophy of religion? If the former, how do your students handle it? Is it too recondite for them?

Hey Mike,

I think TWD, according to Plantinga, is an essential property for those who suffer from that unfortunate plight.

Thanks for the replies. A few follow-ups.

Matthew,
If Plantinga means this only in terms of epistemic possibility, then what his defense amounts to is, for all we know, God's existence is consistent with the existence of evil. I've always taking Plantinga to be arguing, not that the existence of God and evil are consistent for all we know, but consistent full stop.

Mike,
Thanks. The distinction between possible worlds and feasible worlds (to use Flint's term), as well as the distinction between a person and a personal essence, were some of the complications I was trying to avoid. I completely agree with what you say about the TWD amounts to the claim that in every feasible world I do a moral evil: "The set of worlds S actualizable FROM w is smaller than the set of all possible worlds. In every member of S I am depraved (I don't think I need to be TWD in all of these worlds) and I go wrong." But I'm still not completely sure I understand how to take Plantinga's statement that "it is possible that everybody suffers from it. And if this is possibility were actual..." and understand it according to possible worlds semantics. How about this? If, as a matter of contingent fact, I suffer from TWD in the actual world, then given the set of true counterfactuals about me, there is no feasible world in which I exist, have significant free will, and commit no moral evil. (Though the other Kevin appears to disagree with this.) If this, or something close to it, is correct, then I think I see what exactly he's getting at here, and the possibility at issue would be stronger than epistemtic possibility.

Justin,
I use Platinga's book in my Intro to Phil class, which here at USD is a 100 level course with no prereqs. I've been using it in this class (or the equivalent classes at other places) for as long as I've been teaching the course. I think that it is a hard text for students, but I don't think too hard. I definitely wouldn't start with GFE, but I work my way up to it. I can't remember having been told by a student, either face to face or in my course evals, that this text is just too hard for an intro course (though I have had a number of other colleagues, here and elsewhere, ask just the same question you do). I can share more of how I try to prepare students for reading Plantinga if you like. But I agree with Stephen T. Davis' comment on the back of the new edition: "Unlike most of Plantinga's works, it [GFE] is aimed at the general reader.... Students can understand this book; they must only be willing to think as hard as they read."

I don't have a copy of GF&E handy but I think Plantinga says TWD could be an essential property of those who also share the property of being created by God.

Kevin,

I don't have a copy of the texts to hand, but I do remember spending a lot of time on this issue when I was a graduate student. I was considering writing an article criticising Plantinga, but as I did further reading, I saw that my criticisms had been anticipated, and were in fact misunderstandings of Plantinga's position. What I particularly remember was the discover that something I thought I had understood perfectly well as an undergraduate was more difficult that I realized. Indeed, I spoke to a friend who was teaching Philosophy of Religion at a-level ('advanced level' high school course, similar to American AP). He admitted that what he taught his students was not really what Plantinga was actually saying, but something simple enough for them to understand that sounded to them as though it were what Plantinga was saying. The conclusion we both drew was that irrespective of the philosophical merits of Plantinga's position, the way he sets it out misleads many readers: it is easy for the novice to think that they have understood his position, when in fact they have not. So it could well be that your students are doing what I did as an undergraduate - reading, thinking they've understood it, and that is wasn't so hard, but missing the whole point.

Of course, you have the option of taking the high ground not taken by my friend the a-level teacher: helping the students come to see that things are more difficult than they appear.

The problem, I think, is that if I call someone 'Transworld Depraved' that sounds as though I'm saying they are depraved in every possible world, particularly since he brings essences into it. If being TWD is part of my essence, then isn't it something I have in every possible world? However, (and here is where one needs to check chapter and verse, which I can't do since I don't have the texts with me), as I recall, what Plantinga says is that if I am transworld depraved at a world, w, then it is an interesting fact about my essence that it has the property of being transworld depraved at w. Using this formula, any contingent fact about me can be used to deduce a fact about my essence: I am wearing glasses in this world, w0. It does not follow that I wear glasses in every possible world, but it does follow that even if in some other world, w1, I don't wear glasses, the person in that other world who does not wear glasses still has the property of wearing glasses in w0. The thinking then is that we are in w0, and it is possible that every personal essence has the property of TWD at w0. I think this is what Plantinga was saying, and I think that the way he said it was such as to give the false impression that if I'm TWD, then I'm essentially TWD.

What kind of possibility is at stake here?

I think the point is that there is a possible world in which everyone suffers from TWD: such a world seems to be entirely free from logical defect and so to be logically possible. Then it would be epistemically possible that our world is in fact this world: so its logically possible that everyone is TWD, and epistemically possible that this logical possibility is actual.

Does that make sense?

Kevin T.,

What you say here is exactly right,

"If, as a matter of contingent fact, I suffer from TWD in the actual world, then given the set of true counterfactuals about me, there is no feasible world in which I exist, have significant free will, and commit no moral evil."

Being transworld depraved is a contingent property that restricts the set of feasible worlds (or restricts the set of worlds that God can weakly actualize). So take any world (including the actual world) w in which every creaturely essence of transworld depraved, from he point of view of w there is a limited set of worlds that God can actualize. But of course, as you know, from the point of view of other worlds, God can actualize different sets of worlds. It's probably true (though I haven't thought about it much) that there is no world w such that from the point of view of w God can actualize any world he'd like.

Excellent--thanks for the help Ben and Mike. Of course, given that whether or not any agent or set of agents suffers from TWD is a matter of contingent fact, raises an interesting version of the grounding objection. But that's an issue for another day (and not one I bring up in my Intro class!). Thanks again all.

Interested readers might find an old paper of mine helpful here: "Plantinga,
Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of Evil," CJP, 1991. A final draft
of it is available on-line as a word document at:
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/PPPPE.doc

I argue that we should be very suspicious of Plantinga's claim of possibility
here, and that because his argument rests on such a problematic claim, it is
very unsuccessful.

Keith,

Thanks for the paper. I look forward to reading it.

7 years after my paper, but independently (see their final footnote), Daniel Howard-Snyder and John Hawthorne made a similar criticism of Plantinga in their "Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense," International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 1998, available on-line (in pdf format) here:
http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~howardd/transworldsanctity.pdf

Perhaps one of you could assist me to figure out just what Howard-Snyder and Hawthorne point to in their article. In addressing the possibility of an individual essence being transworld depraved in any given possible world w, we still have an additional claim that I have never understood and don't see anything to support -- the proposition that it is possible that all individual essences may suffer from TWD. Swinburne, for example, doesn't accept Plantinga's reasoning because the number of possible essences is infinite. There is no limit. So what could possibly lead us to believe that it is not possible that for every individual essence IE who, if in situation S would go wrong with respect to a free action A in W, there is another essence IE*, that is identical to IE except that IE* would go right with respect to A if in S in W? After all, we are speaking of mere logical possibility and not actualities. What is it that renders IE* beyond God's capacity to weakly actualize? Swinburne and Mackie both seem to believe that the sheer unlimited nature of the logical possibilities guarantees that there must be such an abundance of possibilities open to God in the creation situation (I don't have the cites in front of me but I could get them if needed).

Does the fact there is logically no possible limit to the number and types of essences entail that for every individual essence that goes wrong there is another exactly like it in every respect except that whereever it would go wrong in the same situation, there is another that goes right in each such circumstance? I just cannot see why this possiblity isn't open to God in the creation situation given the logically unlimited number of essences.

I know that Plantinga's point is merely to show that there is no logical entailment. Yet given that there is another individual essence ("IE*") who goes right for every that goes wrong, what is it that prevents God from creating these IE*s instead? It seems that Plantinga treats IE*s as if they were actual and the actuality of their choices dependent on them rather than on God's logical options as to which IEs to create. Is it like the line in Dumb and Dumber when it is pointed out that while the odds against the possibility of all IEs suffering from TWD is infinitely small, that we conclude: "Wo what you're saying is that there is a chance"? Or is it logically impossible for there not to be an infinite number of IE*s who always go right for any action A in w given that there is no limit to such individual essences?

"I argue that we should be very suspicious of Plantinga's claim of possibility
here, and that because his argument rests on such a problematic claim, it is
very unsuccessful."

Keith, I don't see Plantinga's claim as more controversial than Hawthorne's/H-S's on transworld sanctity. As I recall, a transworld sanctified essence is one that *necessarily* never goes wrong. It is an essence E such that for any world W in which it exists, if E were instantiated, then E would do no wrong. But first, claims about what is necessarily true *seem* prima facie less reliable than claims about what is possible. Plantinga makes the latter, Hawthorne the former. Second, Hawthorne and H-S's claim is (contrary to what they argue) consistent with Plantinga's unless the transworld sanctified essence exists in every possible world. Let the transworld sanctified agent exist in just one world (as is possible, for all we are told). It is then necessarily true that this agent would never go wrong, were he instantiated. But that is consistent with there being worlds in which the transworld sanctified essence does not exist and in which all other essences are transworld depraved. So Hawthorne has to make the much strnger claim that such a transworld sanctified agent exists in every world. I see no reason to believe that.

Mike: I understand Hawthorne differently than you. I don't understand them to assert that any essence E exists in all possible worlds (that would make its exisence logically necessary). Rather, in each world where E exists, it is such that it will do no wrong. Thus, TW sanctity is more like a nature of E rather than a modal claim that obtains in every possible world. Hawthorne defines TW sanctity:

(TWS) An essence E is blessed with transworld sanctity if and only if for every world such that E contains the property is significantly free and always does what is right in W, for no action A and no maximal world segment S such that: (1) S includes E's being instantiated and E's being free with respect to A and A's being morally significant for E's instantiation; (2) S is included in W and includes neither E's instantiation performing A nor E's instantiation refraining from performing A; and (3) If S were actual then E's instantiation would go wrong with respect to A.

Now what Hawthorne asks us to consider is that it is possible that TWS is necessary; not that it is necessary that TWS is necessary. What they trade on, it seems to me, is the difference in meaning between finite and transfinite sentences. So while it is true that for any given number of essences each such esence may suffer from TWD, it is does not follow and it is not reasonable to beleive that all essences for a transfinite number of essences suffer from TWD. It follows from the mere fact that TWS is possible that not all possible worlds can be such that for every essence TWD is true. Plantinga doesn't give us an argument, and I know of none, to support that all essences of a transfinite number of essences may be such that they suffer from TWD. In the absence of an argument, the notion that TWS is possible for a transfinite number of essences seems fairly intuitive and congruent with transfinite logic.

I won't go through all of these claims, since I make exactly none of them. I said this only: Hawthorne's argument is successful only if it is true that there is some agent that necessarily exists and is TWS. It is not enough to make the argument valid that the de dicto claim about TWS agents is true.
The rest of these assertions (e.g. that Hawthorne claims that TWS agents necessarily exist, etc.) I never suggest or imply. I said only that the argument is invalid unless ('invalid unless', now) Hawthorne is willing to make the strong claim that there is some agent that necessarily exists and is TWS. That is a far cry from asserting that he makes such a claim or is willing to endorse such a claim.

For those interested in this line of argument, the most recent volume of International Journal for Philosophy of Religion contains an article by R. Zachary Manis entitled "On Transworld Depravity and the Heart of the Free Will Defense." In the article, Manis argues that Plantinga's argument involving TWD isn't, in fact, problematic in the way that he previously argued that it was.

Is it possible that all the angels in Heaven are depraved?

If so, then what evils have they got up to?

I don't understand Plantinga's argument

Plantinga says ( in effect) that the following 2 statements are true.

1) There is a possible world where agent A is faced with a particular choice of tea or coffee and it is a fact that he will freely choose coffee.

2) There is a possible world where agent A is faced with a particular choice of tea or coffee and it is a fact that he will freely choose tea.

(The existence of these worlds follows from libertarian free will)

And Plantinga says (if I understand him rightly) that one of the following two statements is true.

3) In all worlds where agent A is faced with that particular choice of tea or coffee, he will choose tea.

4) In all worlds where agent A is faced with that particular choice of tea or coffee, he will choose coffee.

But 1 2 and 4 make an inconsistent set of statements, as do also 1 2 and 3 make an inconsistent set of statements.

--------------------------
Can I put this another way, illustrate my problem?

1) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Thu. 21/09/2006, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose tea.

2) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Thu. 21/09/2006, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose coffee.

Clearly, I can conceive of both sets of circumstances, and they are both possible, and they are clearly different to each other.

We can apply Planting'as views to each set of circumstances, and see if it is true that a person will freely choose one particular way in each set of logically possible circumstances that could occur in a real world.

Plantinga's argument works perfectly here.

In the first, I will freely choose one particular way, just like Plantinga said I would. I will choose tea.

In the second set of circumstances, Plantinga is right again. I will choose one particular way. I will choose coffee.

Of course, my choices are different in the two sets of circumstances, but I’m sure Plantinga will agree that free agents will choose differently in different circumstances, and it cannot be denied that the 2 circumstances are different.

And Plantinga is right once again that not even God can determine my choice in those 2 sets of circumstances. In set 1), I drink tea, and in set 2), I drink coffee, and there is nothing God can do to change the outcome of either set of circumstances.

So why cannot God weakly actualise either set of circumstances?

And why should God (and His omniscience) be removed from a description of the circumstances in which people freely make choices?

Once God is included in a description of the circumstances in which people freely choose , surely Plantinga's argument falls apart?

"So why cannot God weakly actualise either set of circumstances?"

You could be asking the grounding question. But let's set that aside. Let A be the largest state of affairs that God can actualize in either the Tea world T or the Coffee world C, Plantinga's claim is that the following subjunctive conditional is true.
1. A []-> C
And (1) is perfectly consistent with (2).
2. <>(A & ~C)
So, yes, it is possible that God actualizes A and you do not drink the coffee. But given the truth of (1), God cannot actualize that world. That is,
3.[](((A []-> C) & A)-> C).

The proposition in (2) above had a diamond with wide scope, but it did not display. So, (2) says,

2. Possibly(A & ~C)

A , of course, includes God's knowledge that I will drink tea. (Doesn't Plantinga believe that God's knowledge that I will drink tea does not *determine* that I will drink tea?

So why will I drink coffee , when A includes the fact that I will freely choose to drink tea?

'Plantinga's claim is that the following subjunctive conditional is true.
1. A []-> C'

If that is to be taken as a truth, doesn't it cut down on what are logically possible worlds?

I mean, in the same way that Euclid's 5th axiom means it is no longer logically possible for triangles to have angles which sum to more than 180 degrees.

Isn't Plantinga a little like someone who takes Euclid's first 4 axioms, then proves that it is logically possible for triangles to sum to more than 180 degrees, and then adds in Euclid's 5th axiom to show that God cannot actualise a world with such a triangle?

CARR
1) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Thu. 21/09/2006, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose tea.

2) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Thu. 21/09/2006, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose coffee.

MIKE
Let A be the largest state of affairs that God can actualize in either the Tea world T or the Coffee world C, Plantinga's claim is that the following subjunctive conditional is true.
1. A []-> C

CARR (now)
I find this surprising. Is it really the case that in all the worlds containing all the things that God actualised in that hotel, then I will freely choose coffee?

Clearly God did not actualise the waiter's free choice to serve me.

So A' (which , on Mike's definition, contains only what God actualised), contains the waiter serving me AND the waiter not serving me.

Both are in A'.

So it simply cannot be the case that for all worlds containing what God actualised in that hotel, I chose to drink coffee.

So Plantinga's subjunctive conditional is false, unless A' is expanded to include things that God cannot actualise.

"CARR (now) I find this surprising. Is it really the case that in all the worlds containing all the things that God actualised in that hotel, then I will freely choose coffee?"

You should be surprised, since it isn't true that in ALL of the worlds there God actualized A you choose coffee. As I mentioned last time, the conditional
A []-> C is consistent with God actualizing A and you not choosing coffee. I don't deny (neither does Plantinga) that it's possible that God actualizes A and you do not choose coffee. The semantics that Plantinga adopts for evaluating subjunctive conditionals is Lewis/Stalnaker semantics. So reading the conditional semantically, now, it states that the CLOSEST worlds to (the relevant world) w at which A is true, are world in which you choose coffee. It does not say that EVERY world in which A is true, you choose coffee. Further , that conditional is perfectly consistent with the waiter being free in offering coffee (or not). It need only be the case that the closest world in which A is true are also worlds in which the waiter makes the offer. In other worlds where A is true, the waiter does not make the offer.

As A can well include God , and could well include God's infallible knowledge that I will drink tea, why will I choose coffee?

And why cannot God's free knowledge include the fact that these circumstances will occur in the actual world '1) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Thu. 21/09/2006, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose tea.'

Especially as a moment's thought will show that my counterfactuals of freedom mean that I would freely choose tea, if those circumstances were actual.

Does Plantinga mean merely that the worlds closest to the worlds where I drink coffee, are all the worlds containing a God who knows that I will drink coffee?

Steven, you write,

"As A can well include God , and could well include God's infallible knowledge that I will drink tea, why will I choose coffee?"

But it is true neither that A includes God or anything about God's knowledge. Rather A includes only states of affairs that God can weakly actualize. God does not actualize his own knowledge, so that is not in A. God does not actualize himself so that is not a part of A either.
Still, you might run a foreknowledge argument against libertarian freedom in the typical way where God's infallible foreknowledge F entails that actions B are performed, but that is quite independent of Plantinga's specific position on twd. My view on the matter is Lewisian. F entails B, but that is consistent with my doing ~B. In worlds where I do ~B the counterfactual backtracks in such a way that God knows I would do ~B and always did know that I would ~B. It does not involve changing the past and it does not involve any violation of God's infallible knowledge. But it does involve the actual past being different from what it is.

God does actualise his own knowledge, as his free knowledge is his knowledge of what circumstances are actual in this world.

And why cannot God weakly actualise the following ' '1) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Thu. 21/09/2006, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose tea.', when my counterfactual of freedom is obviously that I will drink tea?

What is there about my counterfactuals of freedom preventing God knowing that those circumstances will come to pass?

Similarly, what prevents God knowing that the following circumstances will come to pass (in the world where I choose coffee)

'2) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Thu. 21/09/2006, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose coffee.'

Surely God can choose either one of those worlds as his free knowledge of what circumstances will come to pass, as no counterfactuals of freedom prevent them happening?

It seems no more problematic for God to do that than for God to decide to create a world where a radioactive atom decays at 9.31 pm or one where it decays at 9.32 pm.

Or can God not actualise his knowledge of which of those two worlds it is.

If God does not actualise himself, then who did actualise the state of affairs before creation when only God existed?

I'm still interested to know why we should not rate worlds in 'closeness' to a world where I choose coffee, by seeing what God's knowledge of my choice is in those worlds.

The worlds where God knows I will choose coffee must be very close to each other, musn't they?

How else can worlds be ranked in 'closeness' without examining God's knowledge?

With libertarian free will, there are two possible worlds, which are virtually identical.

In one of them I choose action A, and in the other I do not choose action A.

The only difference between the two worlds at the time of my choice is God's knowledge of my action.

How else can these logically possible world be distinguished from each other, except by the marker of God's knowledge of which one is which?

"How else can these logically possible world be distinguished from each other, except by the marker of God's knowledge of which one is which?"

I'm not sure what this is supposed to show. We were talking about what is contained in A. What is contained in A is what God weakly actualizes, so his knowledge of what you freely do is not contained in A. What you say here has nothing to do with that, I don't think. What you say seems to have something to do with the grounding objection to counterfactuals of freedom. I'm certainly not going to wade through that literature here. The truth of the counterfactuals is determined by the free choice of agents alone--by facts about what they will freely do--rather than what God knows. That is Plantinga's answer, for whatever it's worth. But there are obviously too many laborious and painstaking issues to pursue here.

You mean there are two logically possible worlds, both containing A - I am offered tea or coffee - , and also containing something not in A - ie one world contains God's knowledge that I will choose tea, and the other contains God's knowledge that I will choose coffee?

And Plantinga maintains that in all worlds containing A, I will choose tea , regardless of what the world contains other than A?

This is obviously false.

And of course God's knowledge of what the actual world contains (ie God's knowledge of what any particular agent in the actual world might or might not know), is part of God's free knowledge , and so God can decide that the actual world contains an agent that knows a particular fact.

And that agent can be himself.

Is Plantinga only offering a defense - a story which is true for all we know?

How should I react to claims that people have two legs?

My memory tells me this is true, but , for all I know, my memories could have been implanted in me?

Do I now have a defense against those people who argue for the bipedal nature of Homo sapiens?

Do I have a successful defense?

I have a short story at http://stevencarrwork.blogspot.com/2005/09/god-omniscience-free-will-and.html

The last paragaphs illustrate Plantinga's difficulties.

God says 'Remember books 485,486 and 487.’

‘They are identical up to page 327, and then the person they are describing chooses to say one of ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘but’?’ - I said.

‘Those are the ones.’ God said ‘See what happens when you try to read them.’

I got the three books down and turned to page 327. Each of the three books contained the word ‘and’.

‘I thought you said that the 3 books were identical up to page 327, and then they record 3 different free will decisions - one says ‘and’, one says ‘or’ and one says ‘but’’ I said.

‘That’s right. They do.’, said God. ‘The Library of Babel contains all possible combinations and so records all the free will decisions. Here there were 3 free will decisions, so there are 3 different books, identical up to when they diverge. The possible free will decisions to choose between the words ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘but’ are all in the library.’

‘But the books all have the same word!’, I said. ‘How can they record different free will decisions if they all have the same decision?’

‘This is Plantinga’s Law of Counterfactuals’, said God. ‘People have free will , so in the same circumstances they have possible choices, and all the possible choices are recorded in one book or another. The books are identical up to a certain point and then diverge, depending upon which choice is in which book. But no matter which of those books I choose to read, the same decision will be recorded in that book. I cannot choose to read the book which has the word ‘or’ in it, because when I do, the word ‘and’ will be chosen instead.’

This all seemed too much for me.

At Sept. 3 above I say this,

"As I recall, a transworld sanctified essence is one that *necessarily* never goes wrong. It is an essence E such that for any world W in which it exists, if E were instantiated, then E would do no wrong. But first, claims about what is necessarily true *seem* prima facie less reliable than claims about what is possible."
Strictly, what is assumed in JH/DHS is that possibly, it is necessary that some essence or other is transword sanctified. So no matter what world happens to be actual, there is at least one essence that could be instantiated in any actualizable world and not go wrong. That *might be* weaker than the position I recalled. But if there is exactly one world W such that every possible world is actualizable from W (and there is no good argument against that), then there will be some essence E such that, for every possible world W* simpliciter, the instantiation of E in W* would not go wrong.
In short, if there is some world from which God can actualize any world, then TS entails TS*.

TS. Necessarily some essence or other is TWS.

TS*. There is some essence that is necessarily TWS.

And, as I noted above, TS* is difficult to believe.