Gary Rosenkrantz, UNC Greensboro, reviews J. L. Schellenberg's Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Rosenkrantz highlights a line of Schellenberg's thought that is relevant to some recent conversations here. "What are the most general aims of philosophy of religion?"
The aims of philosophy of religion should be to bring to bear methods and results from the rest of philosophy in (1) a comprehensive study of prolegomenous issues, including the questions of what religion, the various (actual and possible) religious propositions or claims, and the various responses to religious claims, as well as the proper evaluation of the latter and of those who embrace them, most fundamentally amount to; and in (2) an inquiry geared to determining whether any religious claims are justified, and also which responses to religious claims are justified, and to what extent persons who instantiate such responses -- in particular, religious responses -- are justified in doing so (these I have called the lower-level aims, whose realization is facilitated by work on prolegomena); and all of this not just for its own sake but in order to facilitate (3) an investigation of what bearing religious claims may have on theoretical problems in other areas of philosophy and (4) a rational evaluation of religious practice (these last are two higher-level aims). -- p. 191
So much for metaphysics.
I haven't read Schellenberg's book, but the general claim, "The aims of philosophy of religion should be to bring to bear methods and results from the rest of philosophy", sounds to me right on the money. But I don't see how metaphysics gets excluded. Consider the implications for 4-D for eschatology. If 4-D is right it looks like only a stage of me (and perhaps not even the worst stage) could suffer eternally. Most of me gets no punishment at all. That's good news, sort of.
Mike, I'm not sure if you're questioning my comment or agreeing with me, so let me motivate it just in case. He gives his general statement and then qualifies it in four ways. One of those ways is definitional. The second is epistemology. The third is a meta-issue of how philosophy of religion relates to other branches of philosophy. The fourth is epistemology again.
If all you're saying is that his general claim isn't complete unless he (at least) adds a fifth category for metaphysics, then I agree. If you were saying that his original statement allows that implicitly, then I think I see his statement as intended to be an exhaustive list of what philosophy of religion covers, with no mention of metaphysics. Nothing about the nature of God or whether God exists. Nothing about the nature of the afterlife or whether there is one.
I don't see any interesting issue here. I'm not sure exactly what (1)-(4) entail, but they certainly don't fit neatly into categories. Is (1) definitional? It states "a comprehensive study of prolegomenous issues, including . . ." and then some examples follow. So the question is whether "a comprehensive study of prolegomenous issues" is supposed to exclude metaphysics. Do prolegomena generally exclude metaphysical questions? Hardly. But does *he* intend to ignore metaphysical questions? Is that the proper way to read this? I doubt it, but I confess that the text is indeterminate on the matter. But what example does he use?
". . .including the questions of what religion, the various (actual and possible) religious propositions or claims, and the various responses to religious claims, as well as the proper evaluation of the latter and of those who embrace them, most fundamentally amount to."
Is this definitional? Again I have no idea. If I inquire into what religion fundamentally amounts to am I doing metaphysics? Am I looking for a definition of religion? If I am inquiring into religious propositions or claims am I seeking a definition of something? Of religion maybe? Of religious propositions perhaps? Or am I doing something else interesting in the philosophy of language? I don't think the answers to these questions is obviously yes or no. But it certainly does not obviously exclude metaphysics.
But consider (3).
"(3) an investigation of what bearing religious claims may have on theoretical problems in other areas of philosophy."
Does this entail that I should determine the metaphysical implications of religious claims? Should I be looking for whether eschatological assertions in religion express true or false propositions describing a nonnatural state? I don't see how such an interpretation of the vague language here would be mistaken. But again there is no neat category into which I should place the suggested inquiry. So I guess I'd put it this way. There are lots of admissible ways of reading (1)-(4). And that's exactly how I read it.