Overspecialization

Hi Jeremy I agree, I don't think too many people over specialise in philosophy of religion. The main reason I think is that most major topics in philosophy of religion have significant cross overs with other areas of philosophy, such that if you want to keep up with the state of play in a particular area of philosophy of religion, then you need to also follow whats going on in that area in metaphysics or ethics. Once youre doing that you will usually develop an interest in that other area as well...

Jeremy,

I think part of what of may account for less overspecialization in philosophy of religion is the often apologetical nature and motivation of those in the field. There's not only an interest in doing philosophy in a particular area but doing philosophy in a area that encompasses so much of life - namely, something so broad as religion. Those in other fields, say philosophy of language, operate from their worldview, but do not necessarily seek to defend the entirety of it with their discipline but only a certain aspect. But philosophy of religion requires not only the employment of one's worldview (as every discipline requires) but the defense of it as well. This usually requires a broader understanding of philosophical disciplines. Philosophers of religion past and present have used a broader apologetic than most other disciplines. Since religion is so broad itself this discourages overspecialization. Biblical studies has in recent years become less interested in its connection to broader religious concerns and thus its overspecialization. It epitomizes the adage that we're learning more and more about less and less until we'll know all there is to know about absolutely nothing.
-John Fraiser

I think those who are more apologetically motivated tend to work only in the areas that affect their philosophy of religion, e.g. Bill Craig (who makes no bones about his apologetic motivations) does philosophy of time because it relates to his work on God and time, because he thinks that helps deal with the problem of evil. But I think many in philosophy of religion are primarily in other areas, usually metaphysics or ethics.

I don't think this is to serve philosophy of religion, either. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman are primarily metaphysicians who have also written about philosophy of language. Alston is an epistemologist and philosopher of language who then did philosophy of religion. I think Jon Kvanvig would classify himself as an epistemologist first.

What I was suggesting above is that this might be in part because getting a good job requires doing other core subjects as a primary AOS. It isn't that people need to do other things and thus hide their philosophy of religion interests. It's that people who are generally interested in other subjects are going to be the ones who tend to get the positions in the best departments.

The advice for those interested in having an AOS in philosophy of religion was to have one in something else, as well, because there's not much chance of getting hired anywhere if your AOS is just in philosophy of religion.

I know of a similar problem here in the UK, where someone who is a good enough philosopher and has even published books can't find a permanent position in philosophy departments because his background is in theology.

Thus, it would make sense that those who are doing philosophy of religion aren't overly specialized, because they wouldn't be employed if they were.

I meant to start with 'The advice for those of us at the University of Oklahoma . . .'

Jeremy,

This topic might have come up in another context on PB. I don't think it is possible to specialize in philosophy of religion. Anyone who is any good in philosophy of religion is either a good generalist (as Brian Weatherson uses that term) or very good at some other major field (e.g. metaphysics, epistemology, logic, value theory, etc.). Some people who are really good in philosophy of religion focus mostly in epistemological questions in philosophy of religion. Others are really good but they focus on metaphysical aspects of philosophy of religion. These people work at the intersection of their specialization in contemporary metaphysics (epistemology) and philosophy of religion. There's no question, I think, that everything in philosophy of religion demands some other specialization, and ideally (but it is so hard to do well) the generalist's deep and broad appreciation of contemporary philosophy. If you don't know contemporary philosophy pretty well, it is really hopeless to try to produce anything worthwhile in philosophy of religion.

Well, there are some specialists in philosophy of religion. Rowe and Swinburne come to mind. They really do hardly anything else. I think Dan Howard-Snyder also counts as one. You have to be very good to get away with it, but I think those three have done so. You have to be well-trained in other areas, but that doesn't mean you need to be a generalist in the way that John Hawthorne is. He publishes in all sorts of sub-fields of philosophy. Rowe, Swinburne, and Howard-Snyder do not.

I certainly don't call someone a specialist in philosophy of religion because they publish exclusively in the area. Who would? Further, I don't take Hawthorne to be a typical generalist: Hawthorne is close to a super-specialist and (I think) unique in this respect. I have in mind people who approximate B. Weatherson or D. Pereboom.
Rowe's work in philosophy of religion is terrific partly because it is informed by his knowledge of the history of philosophy (which of course he has published in) and partly because of his metaphysical knowledge and acumen. And Dan Howard-Snyder has published lots of good work in epistemology.
Here's what I am getting at. Every interesting problem in philosophy of religion is a metaphysical problem or an epistemological problem or a problem in value theory or... You cannot specialize in philosophy of religion without knowing some of these areas very well. Philosophy of religion is like applied ethics in this respect. There are people who specialize in applied ethics and don't know much else. And the result is a lot of bad philosophy. And there are people who "specialize" in philosophy of religion and don't know much else. And the result is a lot of bad philosophy.

The term was being used that way in the post I linked to. He was talking about biblical scholars who specialize in the gospels, say, in the sense of not publishing on wider topics, e.g. Paul.

Hawthorne has published in philosophy of religon, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, medieval, early modern, and even some logic (with respect to relative identity). Some of his work has also related closely enough to ethics and aesthetics. He describes himself as a generalist also. Brian Weatherson is a funny example as a contrast, since I see them as generalists in the same sense. They both publish in a lot of different areas of philosophy (not the same areas exactly, but that's not the point).

I agree with your last paragraph. I don't think you need to publish in those other areas to know them well, and thus you can be very good at philosophy of religion without publishing much of anything else. But I don't think that will get someone a job in most cases, and hardly anyone does it. I do think there are people who aren't very good at philosophy of religion because they don't know very much about the other subjects that philosophy of religion requires. On that we're completely on the same page.

Jeremy - it isn't true that Swinburne publishes only in philosophy of religion. In recent years, he's published a book on Epistemic Justification, and edited and contributed to a collection on Bayes's Theorem. In the early days of his career, he published mainly in philosophy of science (e.g. his book on Space and Time). Of course, this is not unrelated to his work in apologetics - I recall reading that, if he intends to make use of some field of philosophy in his theological writing, he tries to first publish an article dealing with some topic in that field.

On the generalist question, I agree that both Weatherson and Hawthorne (and Pereboom, for that matter) are rightly so-called. So, I'm not denying that. But obviously Hawthorne produces much more at a very high level, and in many more areas. That's the contrast I had in mind. But I doubt we disagree there.

Jeremy,

I'm sure vocational concerns play a part, but I can't imagine that that's even a majority of the reason that philosophers of religion generalize. Your examples of Alston and Kvanvig help to make my point that since philosophy of religion encompasses such a broad range of disciplines, those whose previous work was in epistemology, metaphysics or ethics are able to move over to philosophy of religion and make a contribution because it is such a broad discipline. Likewise, many philosophers of religion are able to make contributions in other fields because the discipline already requires experience in other philosophical disciplines. Take Plantinga for example. He spent the first twenty years of his career in philosophy of religion and later was able to make a significant contribution to epistemology.

So which comes first, philosophers of religion can't get jobs unless they study up on other disciplines? Or, their own discipline already requires the study of many other disciplines, thus they get jobs? I strongly suspect that its the latter. -John Fraiser

John,

It is also worth noting--as you no doubt know--that Plantinga made major contributions to metaphysics as early as '74. It is interesting that in a later preface to _God and Other Minds_ he is a bit apologetic about the early epistemology. At least that's how I read it.

So which comes first, philosophers of religion can't get jobs unless they study up on other disciplines? Or, their own discipline already requires the study of many other disciplines, thus they get jobs? I strongly suspect that its the latter.

Why can't both be true?

I was going to point out Plantinga's major contribution to modality alongside his work in philosophy of religion, but Mike beat me to it.

Not to belabor the point, but I'll add a small caveat. Jeremy, I agree that both occupational concerns as well as the broad nature of POR are factors that work against overspecialization. However, when I ask which is first, I mean to ask which is first in a primary sense rather than a chronological sense. Sticking with Plantinga as an example, I think his primary motivation for writing on modality was his interest in the Ontological Argument and how it related to POR, rather than his concern that he study up and write on broader subjects to keep his job or get a better one (even if it did lead to that). If the latter was a factor, did it really take priority?

From the beginning I have insisted that some people can get away with that. For someone like me struggling to come up with a dissertation that will help land me a job, I'm not going to be able to do philosophy of religion from the beginning. Two things work against this. One is that we're now at a point where philosophy of religion is up and running, without the broad landscape of possible topics that had been ignored and mishandled for so long. Kretzmann's terrible paper on the rock problem (arguing that it shows how ridiculous theism is) would never pass muster nowadays, but everyone nodded in agreement when he published it. That means there isn't as easy a time coming up with groundbreaking work in philosophy of religion.

Second, not everyone is going to be as obviously good as some of the pioneers in 20th century philosophy of religion were for their time. There are plenty of people who would love for their primary work to be in philosophy of religion but who know the realities of the job market. Older faculty are regularly telling students not to write dissertations in philosophy of religion. Someone told me that (though I had already wanted to do metaphysics, but I was steered away from a topic in metaphysics too and have ended up with something intersecting metaphysics and philosophy of race). Someone told Matthew the same thing, and I believe several other people here mentioned similar faculty guidance when we had that discussion several months ago.

Plantinga's case is therefore nothing like that of the typical Ph.D. student today. This is a reality of the job market right now, and it has an impact on what people do.

Jeremy, I agree with your assessment that writing dissertations on philosophy of religion makes finding a job difficult. Although I'm not so sure this is as recent an issue in the landscape as you indicate. Plantinga wrote his dissertation in ethics, perhaps at the behest of an advisor making much the same recommendations as many advisors today. If anything philosphers of religion face much less hostile terrain today than forty - and even twenty - years ago.

But this question of generalizing and overspecializing does not relate just to those writing dissertations. I agree that occupational concerns will play a large part when deciding on a dissertation topic. However, I think these concerns become far less relevant for philosophers who already have jobs. They write where they can make a contribution to a field. If it is in philosophy of religion, then so be it.

Furthermore, I'm pretty sure that finding a job after a freshly written Ph.D. is an issue in almost any discipline. So this would hardly explain why so many of them overspecialize and why philosophers of religion do not.

There are more far philosophers of religion than the new Ph.Ds. So while occupational concerns may be a primary motivation for them, I still maintain that those concerns do not dominate the field and explain the reason for the generalization of so many veterans in the field for whom gaining or maintaining employment is far less important. I think I'll drop the issue now.