On March 28th William Lane Craig and Bart Ehrman engaged in a debate on the historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus. I don't usually post about apologetically matters, but there is a bit of philosophically interesting material in the debate. I'm not sure that it was a fair face-off considering the two work in quite different disciplines, but parts of it proved entertaining. I want to highlight a bit of the debate that I found humorous. During the debate Craig talks a bit about using probability calculus in arguing for the likelihood of the resurrection. OK he really went on at length about probability.
Here is what followed during the Q&A.
Dr. Ehrman: I am sorry. I have trouble believing that we’re having a serious conversation about the statistical probability of the resurrection or the statistical probability of the existence of God. I think in any university setting in the country, if we were in front of a group of academics we would be howled off the stage—The implication of the second line by Ehrman is pretty offensive, but there is plenty of egregious stuff in the transcript. I'm more interested in whether the use of probability calculus in arguing for the un/likelihood of God's existence or the un/likelihood of the resurrection passes the laugh test?Dr. Craig: That’s not true.
Dr. Ehrman: Well, it may not be true at the school you teach at, but at the research institution I teach at —
Dr. Craig: Well, what about Oxford University, where Professor Swinburne teaches?
Dr. Ehrman: Well, Swinburne has shown that there’s 0.97 percent probability. And how many people has he convinced of this exactly? These are the kinds of arguments that are convincing for people who want to be convinced. They’re not serious arguments to be taken by people so they can actually say, “Oh yes, now I am going to believe because there’s 0.97 percent probability factor!” In fact that’s nonsense; you can’t demonstrate the existence of the supernatural by statistical models.
I suspect it does pass the laugh test, and would at most research institutions. I could of course be wrong. I did have one Humean professor laugh at the idea, but then again he laughs at everything that touches on religion. The first time I read a paper that used probability calculus was in my very first graduate seminar. The paper was Paul Draper's "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists," and I certainly didn't find it any laughing matter. I think my actual response was more along the lines of "crap now I'm going to have to do some math!" (I'm not exactly a math guy, so I got a little worried.) But maybe I just take things much too seriously. I might trade laughing off Swinburne to be able to laugh off Draper too.
I also think Ehrman mistakes how such arguments are supposed to function. I don't have Swinburne's book handy (everything's in boxes) but I don't recall that he thinks he's offering a demonstrative proof. Probability arguments just don't work that way. I don't think anyone believes anything because there is a .97 percent probability. It's the factors that lead to the probability assignment that lend themselves to belief formation. I'd go on but it's after two AM already. You might find some interesting discussion of the debate over at the Boars Head Tavern by Joel Hunter and Alex Arnold. Joel offers the groaner of the week with... "You have to participate in the dismantling of metaphysics because it occludes our understanding of the resurrection. This “destruction” is, then, a constructive act."
[HT: Summa Philosophiae]
Technorati Tags: statistical probability, probability calculus, resurrection of jesus, bart ehrman, debate, william lane craig, howled, existence of god, humorous, likelihood, academics, entertaining, highlight
Technorati Tags: statistical probability, probability calculus, resurrection of jesus, bart ehrman, debate, william lane craig, howled, existence of god, humorous, likelihood, academics, entertaining, highlight
Both Draper and Rowe use some probability theory in developing the atheistic evidential argument from evil. And there are all of the natural worries about the application of formal models to complex cases. The same applies in decision theoretic models for Pascal's Wager, probabilistic models for fine-tuning arguments, and, for that matter, models in various modal logic(s) for the Ontological Argument. One feature of the probablistic case causes additional confusion, I think. For subjectivist (Bayesian) interpretations of probability, the application of probability theory is more plausible, but less convincing. It amounts to talking about what one most strongly believes and keeping the beliefs/reasoning consistent. But the decisions about priors, for instance, is up to you: it is your individal credence function. So, no fuss.
But for objectivist (or frequency or propensity) interpretations (and this is probability what Ehrman is worried about) it is much more difficult to apply probablity theory. Imagine trying to make some rational guess at the objective prior probability of the resurrection. Or, imagine trying to determine the frequency of resurrections prior to the (presumably most recent) resurrection. That might be viewed as a little silly.
It is also interesting to note (the observation is Howard Sobel's) that many philosophers are not up front with their interpretations of probability in these arguments. Two quick examples: Wykstra makes no mention of it and it is unclear in Rowe's work, too.
Good points Mike. I don't want anyone to think that I'm rallying the team for probability theory. There are serious practical and philosophical issues to be considered in the application of probability theory, and I have some worries of my own here. However, the seriousness of your comment shows that such arguments can't simply be laughed off as too silly to be taken seriously.
After reading the linked transcript of the debate I think Craig deserved the smack he got via the second line in your quotation (i.e., "it may be true at the school you teach at..."). Perhaps there's a place for the kind of self-confidence and showmanship Craig demonstrates - nevertheless, it sure made me cringe. As for coming up with cutesy names for an opposing position one thinks is in error: it's not 1903 and Craig isn't G.E. Moore. It's stunts like that that make me take Craig, Talbot and crew a whole lot less seriously than they probably deserve (see pg. 17 of the transcript for the ugliness).
Regarding the laugh test, having come from a different discipline myself (software engineering, though I'm now a student again), I would hope that Craig's audience and certainly other academics would be at least initially puzzled by his statistical approach. The utilization of probability theory to assess the likelihood of historical events seems, without having done the kind of work that Craig or you have done, odd. That doesn't mean it's wrong-headed or silly. But when you move away from domains where the concept of probability is inferentially obvious (e.g., it's easy to see how past trends in hurricane formation and the assessment of current conditions can lead to estimating the likelihood of hurricanes this coming season), and start talking about the likelihood that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and your audience thinks you're continuing to use the concept of probability in the same way used for predicting hurricane formations - I think a little more explanation would be helpful. Maybe that's what Mike was getting at too when he said that "many philosophers are not up front with their interpretations of probability" as well (i.e., whether they're Bayesian or not, and other such matters).
The debate is very interesting, but it shows again why philosophers should be suspicious of the rhetorical domain in which sophists shine.
As for the debate itself, Ehrman starts out well, but grows more and more pissy and unimpressive as the debate continues. Craig, on the other hand, fails in describing what it takes for an alternative explanation of the evidence to merit acceptance. He shows exactly why the Ehrman's horrible argument about miracles is fallacious, but doesn't give an adequate response to the alternative explanations that Ehrman offers off the top of his head. Just citing one or two defects in the explanation won't by itself undermine the explanations any more than citing the incredible improbability of a miracle undermines the resurrection claim.
One other thought on the actual quote. Ehrman is simply wrong about UNC, unless he means the remark as a sociological one about how many departments find philosophical discourse too taxing. Perhaps he should have limited his claim to the claim that *in the department he's in* at UNC, or in departments where there is little patience for serious philosophical discussion, such talk would be howled off the stage. That says more about the his department and other such departments, I'm afraid, than about the issue. I can name 8-10 philosophers at UNC who would neither howl nor think the subject disreputable, and of those whom I wouldn't name, I doubt there would be such a reaction. They wouldn't agree with Craig's assessments, and would start from a stance of serious skepticism about the possibility of establishing the conclusions Craig thinks can be established, but neither of these points is the issue.
After reading Josh's post, I breathlessly downloaded the pdf and turned to p. 17 to see Craig's egregious showmanship in all its sordid detail... and (drumroll please) it is this ugly phrase: "Bart's Blunder".
Lighten up, brother! :-) It's called, communication with a popular audience. More philosophers should practice it.
About Jon's remark: Jon, did you mean to imply that it's misguided for philosophers to engage in public debates. I wonder... can we trust at least an important subset of the audience to separate the reasoning from the sophistry... What do you think?
I once remember hearing JP Moreland say something to the effect that he knew that most of the crowd wouldn't remember the details - or even the main lines of - his presentation. But he knew that they'd at least go away with the impression that Christianity was believed by smart people, and was to be taken seriously as an intellectual option.
Dale
Hi Dale, no I didn't mean to imply that. It's just that what makes for good philosophy and what comes across well in public debates are often pretty distant from each other. Some people are good at both (Craig is, for example), but that's pretty rare.
"can we trust at least an important subset of the audience to separate the reasoning from the sophistry...?"
I must be in an anti-luminous bad mood. My sense is that the salient subset (unless it's awfully small) also prefers the entertainment. Separating the reasoning from the sophistry is hard work.
Happy to have provided a good groan for you, fellas. As they say, a link is a link. Alex also called me out on the "groaner" you identified and I attempted to clarify what I meant in the final post below. FWIW. The exchange between Alex and me continued with:
1. Me
2. Alex
3. Me
Heh, Dale, you're probably right, I should lighten up a little.
Don't get me wrong: Craig was entertaining, and it's not like the jabs didn't go both ways. And of course Ehrman is ripe for the picking too. I still think Craig comes off as too self-confident, and that his self-confidence masks some difficulties behind his claims (not that I think he's substantively wrong).
Also, I'm not just harping on him just because of the cute titles he uses to point out the problems in Erhman's position. It's also the tired but yucky watch-me-make-your-position-self-refuting move and the polarized caricature of his opponent (e.g., by using phrases such as "abject failure" or the implication that Erhman is stuck in the 18th century and that this is bad).
These are great rhetorical strategies, but I suspect they come at the cost of sacrificing nuance and pandering to those who already agree with him. I think these are what one great sage once dubbed Geisler-style apologetics judo. =P
Josh, I once remember a former student of Craig's asking, "but how can he be so sure?" We went on to discuss how his "self-confidence" is sometimes unbecoming. True as that may be (though I'm not sure how true it actually is), Craig has devoted literally decades to studying certain issues in historical theology and philosophy of religion and from those years of study he is VERY convinced personally regarding his (major) conclusions. Thus, I venture to say that his comments are probably more than rhetorical strategies (though they might be that, too); rather, I think it's just a manifestation of Craig being deeply convinced of his conclusions and of the strength of the arguments used to draw those conclusions. Plus, you must admit--rhetorical strategies aside--it is very difficult, if not impossible, to communicate the academic nuances in a debate of this structure.
I thought Ehrman's confusion of probability with "statistical probability" revealed a pretty profound misconception about the sort of probability at issue. In context, Craig's pretty obviously talking about epistemic probability; his point is legitimate, given that Ehrman has claimed that the probability of the resurrection is so low that Craig's four pieces of evidence are simply irrelevant (p. 12)
Also, let's not forget that it was Ehrman who first introduced probability into the discussion with his extremely crude attempt to get a probability for walking on lukewarm water out of a sort of straight rule (p. 12).
There's quite an entertaining thread over on Victor Reppert's blog regarding Ehrman's reactions after the debate. There are five threads on this; the fourth one is the best. Incidentally, the "Tim" there is not me.