Request for Popular Level Religious Epistemology

Jeremy, can you say more about the kind of issues this person want's to read about. At first I thought they wanted something to read on faith and reason judgeing from the title. However, your suggestion suggests something more apologetic.

Actually on either count I'd suggest Bill Craig's _Reasonable Faith_ and Swinburne's popular book _Is There a God_. Both books discuss religious epistemology as well as provide arguments for thesim (and in Craig's case the resurrection).

Also, Keven Meeker has a seven page intro to the Religious Epistemology section of _Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide_. Perhaps he's got it on his website.

Reason for the Hope Within is one of the best books for introducing the general reader to philosophy of religion. Here are a few suggestions, on a sliding scale, that might be of some help. On a very basic level would be the "Believing, Doubting, and Knowing" essays in Gregory Bassham's The Chronicles of Narnia and Philosophy. I haven't read the whole thing, but Tom Senor's article on Trusting Lucy: Believing the Incredible is going to address some of the epistemological issues a theist faces. Short, basic, and inexpensive, would be Nicholas Wolterstorff's Reason within the bounds of religion. A step up would be Wolterstorff and Plantinga's Faith & Rationality with accessible essays by both Plantinga and Alston. Finally I think William Alston's Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience is very approachable.

I haven't read it yet, but I'm told Esther Meek's Longing to Know is pretty good.

Another one: Tom Morris's _Philosophy for Dummies_ has sections on the soul and theism.

Try Keith Yandell's "The Epistemology of Religious Experience".

i think Plantinga's "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" (Nous 15.1 1981) could be worth this person's time but really I'd like to know more about what exactly this person is looking for in a text

Here is the message:

I really enjoyed your series on theories of knowledge. Having little formal education in philosophy, I found your posts to be really informative. I wonder if you have a recommendation for me. The primary question I keep asking is "How can our belief be warranted?" Of course, I know that Dr. Plantinga wrote his series on warrant, but is there anything that is at a level a bit more suited for the layperson that doesn't ignore the real issues?

Anything you can suggest is appreciated. Thanks.

The subject of the email was "question regarding agnosticism", which suggests to me that this is about religious epistemology and not about general epistemology. I don't know whether the intent is merely apologetical or more broadly philosophical, but the person asking might not even know the difference for all I know.

I should add one that a friend suggested: Kelly James Clark's Return to Reason.

Addendum to my recommendation of Swinburne's nice little "Is There a God?"

Chapter 2 is "How We Explain Things." It is a nice little summary of the form of Inference to the Best Explanation which he endorses (one that is consistent with Bayesianism, which is not discussed in the chapter).

Then the rest of the book is, of cousre, a sort of case history in applying the method in philosophy of religion.

One of my favorite things about the book is that if an individual gets into it and wants to dig deeper, then they can jump into _The Existence of God_ which covers both the general epistemology and its "religious" application in much more detail. The book is essentially a non-techincal precis of TEG.

I thought I'd chime in here since I'm the one who wrote the original email to Jeremy. I've got two interests here. First, the case against agnosticism, and second, justified true belief as it relates to religious knowledge. And I'm looking for items that are accessible.

Sorry if I'm using all kinds of buzzwords in ways that are inappropriate in academic philosophy.

And thanks for your thoughts thus far!

One more thing--while I'm interested in the case against agnosticism generally, I'm most interested in the case for justified true belief in the orthodox Christian message based on historical evidences, not in the existence of God.

MWC,
If you're looking for a case against agnosticism, then you're not going to be as interested in Plantinga's stuff, since his stuff focuses not on forming a case against agnosticism, but on arguing that belief in God can be warranted/justified/rational. The distinctions, I think, are between having a justified belief that God exists, being able to show someone else that you're justified in your belief that God exists, and then proving to someone else that they're not justified for not believing that God exists. (This last case is what you're interested in.) These are all different questions and Plantinga's mostly concerned with the first two, especially the second. I think he thinks that the last question is somewhat unrealistic, depending on the agnostic that you are arguing against.

Anyway, to add to the growing list of recommendations, I think that William Lane Craig's great at presenting a case for the existence of God at a popular level (which would also be a case against agnosticism). Check out his debates page:
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/menus/debates.html

The more popular level debates will be his debate with Massimo Pigliucci and Peter Atkins. The more difficult debates will be his debate with Jesseph, Tooley, and especially Quentin Smith.

MWC,
Oh, when I wrote that last comment, I missed the comment you wrote right underneath it. I'd recommend William Lane Craig again:
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/menus/historical.html

A good intro article is his "Contemporary Scholarship and the Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ."

Andrew, I don't think Plantinga is doing any of those things. What he's doing is showing that attempts to show that he's not justified in believing in God fail. He's not showing that he is justified, just that he might be for all anyone else knows.

Jeremy,

Maybe you're referring to something else, but Plantinga does conclude about the ontological argument (his version, in any case) that "it is rational to accept his conclusion" (i.e., his conclusion that there exists a maximally great being). By which he means (again, more or less his words) that one does nothing epistemically wrong in believing that conclusion given those premises. So his conclusions are certainly stronger than that his belief that there is a maximally great being is justified for all anyone knows. It is in fact justified. But since he rejects universalism about reason, he does not claim that anyone who does not come to this conclusion is therefore irrational.
Rowe takes him to task for this in his well-known 'Modal Versions of the Ontological Argument' (anthologized everyhere)

I thought we were talking about his reformed epistemology.

MWC,

Re: arguments against agnosticism, are you familiar with Pascal's wager?

I've no doubt that Plantinga is reformed through and through. No question about that. But there's not much question either that his reformed epistemology is perfectly consistent with his views on his ontological argument. But of course, if these are not consistent, that would be very interesting to learn.

Mike, Plantinga is actually not Reformed in the usual sense of the word. He's a libertarian, not a compatibilist, and Reformed theology involves a compatibilist view about divine sovereignty and human responsibility with regard to human salvation. He does defend a view that he calls reformed epistemology, but that's not the same as being Reformed. He did grow up in the Calvinist tradition, but he has decisively rejected it for libertarianism as far as I can tell. Not that this has anything to do with what we're talking about here.

The issue we were talking about was his work on warrant, which I took to be referring to his application of reliabilism to religious belief, i.e. that if God is the source of the reliable process for our arriving at our beliefs then we can have genuine knowledge because God is the most reliable means there could be for accessing the truth of God's existence. If that's what MWC was originally referring to, then the argument does not in fact say anything about whether any belief is reliable (and therefore whether the belief is justified). It simply argues that, for all the agnostic or atheist knows, religious believers might have knowledge.

Now Plantinga may elswhere argue for a more positive claim through the ontological argument or any other means, but that's not the work by him that I thought we were talking about from MWC's question about his work on warrant.

Also, I wasn't saying anything about whether any of his views are or are not consistent. I just thought bringing up his work on the ontological argument was a complete change of subject.

Jeremy,
I said this:
"his stuff focuses not on forming a case against agnosticism, but on arguing that belief in God can be warranted/justified/rational."

But I also said this:
"...being able to show someone else that you're justified in your belief that God exists... Plantinga's mostly concerned with the first two, especially the second..."

I agree with the first quote, not the second. What I ought to have said in the second quote was "being able to show someone else that you CAN be justified in your belief that God exists..." And he certainly does that.

So correction taken. It was a slip on my part and I meant the former.

Jeremy, I think I see. I don't know what Reformed Theology consists in. I was referring to Plantinga's epistemological views. MWC says this above,

"I've got two interests here. First, the case against agnosticism, and second, justified true belief as it relates to religious knowledge"

I think I don't understand this response,

"If [Plantinga's work on warrant/reliablism] is what MWC was originally referring to, then the argument does not in fact say anything about whether any belief is reliable (and therefore whether the belief is justified). It simply argues that, for all the agnostic or atheist knows, religious believers might have knowledge."

But from Plantinga's reformed (epistemic) position, knowledge that God exists is basic. This is an argument against agnosticism. In response to the agnostic AP says "I know that God exists in a basic non-inferential way". Now that does appear circular, since the reliability of basic beliefs depends on our being created in the image of God (epistemically). AP does not see this as much of a problem, since the opposing epistemic position is also question begging and AP has other arguments (e.g., the ontological argument) for God's existence. In defense of agnosticism, you'd have to show that such a belief is not basic. This is where all of the Great Pumpkin arguments come in. What am I missing here?

About warrant and the ontological argument, I was simply urging that we are (says AP) warranted in believing the conclusion of that argument on the basis of those (controversial) premises. This is all I had in mind, and of course that this too is a response to the agnostic.

I thought of his argument as simply that for all the skeptic knows belief in God might be basic. I don't see any arguments in his work that belief in God is basic. He asserts that it's basic, but that's based on an assumption he can't prove, and he seems to me to be well aware of that. He doesn't think he's argued that it's basic in a way that he thinks the agnostic or skeptic should be convinced. You seem to be saying the same thing, but you're taking his conclusion to be that belief in God is properly basic, whereas I'm taking his conclusion to be that the agnostic can't rule out the possibility that belief in God is possibly basic (because the agnostic can't rule out the premise that Plantinga hasn't supported).

I think there's not much question that Plantinga believes that a belief in God is properly basic and sufficiently warranted under certain conditions, and that these conditions obtain (or can) for most people. These are the conditions, pretty much, that Calvin expresses. The short story is that religious experience provides a noninferential ground for belief in God.
But the relation to the agnostic is complicated. As Plantinga puts it, the de jure question about warrant depends on the de facto question about the kinds of beings we are--that is, whether we are created by God or not. To put it a different way, there is no theo-neutral epistemology. But I don't think it follows from this that there is nothing to say to the agnostic. The theist can say at least the following to the agnostic: you have (or can have) a noninferential warrant for belief in God, whether or not you now believe in him or believe that you have such warrant. The basis for the theist's belief that God exists need not be restricted to his properly basic belief that God exists. So, on the basis of the testimony of a theist who is warranted in his belief in God, the agnostic can learn that he has (or can have) a properly basic belief that God exists. This does not involve a circle that I can see. But it is complicated.

Yes, the agnostic has the capability to have the properly basic belief that God exists, if Plantinga's account is correct. But Plantinga doesn't think he's shown that his account is correct, right? He just thinks that it's true and that he therefore is justified in his belief and can give sound arguments that won't be convincing to someone who doesn't share the true premise. That's how I see the argument, and that's how I think he sees it.

"But Plantinga doesn't think he's shown that his account is correct, right? He just thinks that it's true. . ."

Jeremy, I can't understand the foregoing. Why would Plantinga believe it's true and yet not have shown (or tried to) that it's correct? Do you mean that AP holds this as an unjustified or unwarranted belief? That can't be right, I'm sure you'd agree. He does think that he's justified in believing that he has a warranted basic belief that God exists. I've no doubt that he believes that. But you might want to email him to be perfectly sure. It seems like a nice empirical approach that will settle the matter.

No, I think he considers it a justified, warranted belief. I just didn't think he considers it the sort of belief that he can prove to someone else that it's warranted or justified.

Mike,

For what's worth, AP seems to me to make both a stronger and a weaker claim. If Christian Theism is true, it is very likely warranted. In "two dozen or so arguments for the existence of God" he argues that Christian Theism is true. Butm he also makes a minimal claim, that if his account of warrant is correct, then Christian Theist can have warranted Christian belief and there are no good objections to his account of warrant. And again, if the belief is warranted it's likely true.

Mike,
It's also helpful to recall Plantinga's old thesis from God and other Minds. Plantinga thinks that belief that God exists (and belief in the other great truths of the gospel) can be known noninferentially in the same way that he knows that other minds exist. When asked for a proof that other minds exist, he'd probably acquiesce and admit that he may not be able to prove such a thing to "the other minds" skeptic. But he certainly thinks that that belief is rational, and he also thinks that his belief that God exists is also rational (and justified/warranted). And given the impression we get from Warrant and Proper Function, in the same way that we know that the external world exists, that induction holds, that 2+2=4, etc., Plantinga thinks that we can know that God exists.

Andrew,

That's helpful. Let me separate a few issues that might be confused here.

1. Provide good reason to the agnostic that belief in God is sufficiently warranted and basic.

2. Provide good reason to the agnostic that belief in God is sufficiently warranted.

My claim is that Plantinga can do both of these. I take it that there would be not much question about (2). Plantinga has provided lots of arguments (see for instance 'A Dozen or So Arguments for God's Existence'). But what about (1)? My claim is that if Plantinga can show (2) then you can show (1). According to Plantinga (see Warranted Christian Belief, III, 6, II) if the belief in God is true, then it is warrant-basic. But then I claim, if you are warranted in believing that God exists then you're warranted in believing that that belief is warrant-basic. So all Plantinga needs to persuade the agnostic that the belief in God is warrant basic is one of those dozen or so arguments to be found persuasive.
Maybe what you're claiming is that for someone who is stridently agnostic, no argument of any kind could persuade him out of it. Maybe so. But I'm not sure that is uniquely Plantinga's problem.

I think I just (more or less) reiterated Christian's point above. Sorry about that, just noticed that you said almost the same thing above.

Mike,
So if I understand you correctly, first you prove to the agnostic that God exists with an argument (maybe one of Plantinga's two dozen). The argument can be so convincing that it gives the agnostic warrant. With warrant that God exists and the premise that if God exists, then belief in God is warranted and basic, it follows that we've got an argument that belief in God is warranted and basic.

I actually think this line of reasoning is correct. But I'm worried about an objection. A close look at the section you cited never specifically says that the belief is produced in a basic way. (Perhaps he does say that in another section.) Plantinga does say that it's likely that God designed us with faculties that can have belief-forming processes that lead us to belief that God exists. But this doesn't mean that the belief forming process has to be a non-inferential belief. Perhaps it could be based on religious experience or coherence with life experiences or something like that. God could have made the world like that; perhaps the world is like that. So I'm not sure if Plantinga allows this possibility or was thinking of this possibility. If he does think so, then I don't know why this possibility couldn't be the case so I would raise this as an objection to the claim that if God exists, then it is likely that belief that God exists is warranted in a basic way. I guess the answer might come down to introspection.

Andrew,

It is one of Plantinga's central claims (right?) that the belief that God exists *can* be properly basic. This is what causes him all of the Great Pumpkin problems (recall the argument that if Plantinga is right about the belief in God being properly basic, then so is the belief in the Great Pumpkin). I guess the objection assumes that there is no Great Pumpkin, which is of course bad news.
But under what conditions can the belief in God be properly basic? The conditions are Calvin's, essentially, and hold for theist and nontheist alike. Pretty much they are these:
1. We all (theist and nontheist) have a strong inclination to believe in God caused by a common experience: i.e., when we observe the wonders of the world, the belief in God naturally arises.
2. If we were not so sinful, we would believe that God exists with the same conviction that we believe that there is an external world.
3. Theists, says Calvin, should not believe that God exists on the basis of argumentation (i.e., inferentially). Otherwise their beliefs are liable to be undermined. That is, they won't be a "stable" beliefs.
Taking the advice from Calvin, and believing under the conditions specified, (i.e., viewing the wonderment of the world in a way not entirely obscured by sin) the belief in God is properly basic. That seems to be Plantinga's story about how belief in God is properly basic and noninferentially warranted.
It is also properly basic for the agnostic, once he is convinced that God exists. That's the idea.

Mike,
I just corresponded with Ted Poston briefly on this subject and he gave me an idea. So it seems clear that Plantinga wants to say that it is properly basic. Calvin's conditions seem to call for it.

However, here's another interesting point. It seems that Plantinga's view could be interpreted internalistically. Epistemic internalists normally think that perception is internalist. It is justified by our sense experience. However, many of them would also believe that it is a basic belief. (We do not have to reason from our sense experience to the conclusion that the external world exists.)

It seems that someone could be a Plantingian internalist about belief in God. (If anything's an oxymoron...) Perhaps there is a way of being appeared to in these conditions Calvin specifies which is what justifies belief in God. God could've certainly designed us that way. And the belief need not be justified by way of argument. Rather, the justifier, like in the perceptual case, may just be an internal experience. (Thanks to Ted for helping me see this simple point.)

Now I actually don't find this view plausible because I don't think internalists handle perception very well in the first case. For it's hard to say what it is about the experience that would justify the belief. Consider Sellar's Dilemma: Does the experience have content or not? If it does, then the experience itself needs justifying. If it doesn't, then it has no justifying power. So the criticisms that apply to internalist theories of perception apply to this suggested Plantingian internalist theory. Of course, internalists have their replies to the Sellar's dilemma. As I haven't yet seen plausible responses to the former, I don't expect to see plausible responses to the latter. But perhaps I just haven't read enough...

Sam,
I am familiar with it on a popular level, although I've not read it directly from Pascal. How does it apply to the question of truth and knowledge? And I always thought that Pascal's wager directly contradicted Paul's claim that if Jesus has not risen, then our faith is in vain and we are to be most pitied of all people. At any rate, how does it apply?

Thanks,
MWC

The basic application in arguing against agnosticism is that we all must wager in some way regarding God. On the one hand we can wager that He does not exist. This will bring us little gain if true and infinite punishment if false. On the other hand we can wager that He does exist. This will bring us little harm if false and an infinite gain if true. Finally we could remain agnostic. This will bring us neither gain nor loss if God does not exist but will deprive us of an infinite good if He does. Since we must take at least some stand regarding God's existence (whether we choose theism, atheism, or agnosticism), according to such considerations we ought to place our bets on theism.

It's not the most rigorous or knockdown argument, but I don't see why it couldn't be used in some cases.