This weekend I chaired a session at the Eastern Regional Meeting of the Society of Chistian Philosophers in which Dale Tuggy put Reid and Hume on the psychologists couch. It was an interesting exercise in moral psychology. It also reminded me to post on the Trinity, since Dale is a detractor of social Trinitarianism (ST) of which I am an adherent. Dale has a 2003 Philosophia Christi piece criticizing my main man Ed Wierenga's ST paper which appeared in Faith and Philosophy in 2004 (the publication order is explained by the fact that Dale commented on Ed's paper at a conference before either were published).
I was not able to join the discussion here which Bill started but I think the discussion only briefly touched on the real issue.
To my mind, Tom made just the right move in that discussion: God is not a person, though he is personal. I think Bill's response is too quick: "If the personality is divided among the Persons, then the one God is subpersonal." I question whether "divided among" is the right way to think about it and I question whether even on that interp God comes out as subpersonal. It has always driven me crazy when Plantinga says that God is a person. He very frequently defines theism as the belief that "there is such a person as God." I've always cringed at this and I think in every text I have where he says that I've scrawled in he margins "No! God is personal!"
Social Trinitarians are *not* saying that the personality of the Godhead is divided among the divine persons in the same way that the personality of my Logic class is divided among my students and I. The relationship between the divine persons and each other and with the Godhead is much more intimate than that. Can I spell it out precisely? No I cannot (I might be more worried if I could!). But I don't think that's an objection in this context. ST-theorists, like all Trinitarians, will always have more work to do.
I do wish to note that papers arguing against ST tend to neglect of some of the details of Swinburne's 2nd section--"The Traditional Doctrine"--of his Chapter on the Trinity in The Christian God , especially 180-1, 186, 189. What he says there clearly distinguishes the society of persons in the Godhead from ordinary societies. Is the mystery going to disappear? Of course not (and we should be worried if it did!). Still, Swinburne states, in clear terms using standard terminology from analytic philosophy, a property which distinguishes them and which naturally expresses, though in a mind-boggling way, the interconnectedness of the persons of the Trinity. Anti-social Trinitarians will want more, no doubt, but I think it is enough.
Now to the polytheism bit.
Anti-STers sometimes suggest that STists fall into polytheism. Ed says there are three divine persons and Richard says that as well and goes one step further and, in discussing the creedal and other traditional material, affirms that there are three "dei". Since "dei" translates as "gods" the charge of polytheism seems to stick. I mean, it doesn't cease to be polytheism just because you say it in a different language, right?
Well, maybe. The reason for using untranslated words is often to convey the idea that a word is being used as a technical term. Such is common in philosophical theology as when we refuse to translate ousia, hypostasis or studying Kant we talk about the ding-an-sich or whatever. I think that any adherent to the creedal formulas is committed to there being three "dei" (and also to one "deus"). The question is what the terms convey. They clearly can't just be expressing the same concept in different number. Swinburne is to be commended for recognizing this clearly and discussing it forthrightly. (CG, 180-1, 186) This is a point not to be missed.
As I say, I think *all* (orthodox) Trinitarians are committed to three "dei". Let me now argue for that. The main thesis is this. (
T1) Any orthodox reading of what there are three of in the trinity will result in three gods.
The key to seeing the truth of (T1) is that it doesn't take much to be a god. Merely being divine in a perfectly historically ordinary sense is not that big of a deal. After all, Zeus was divine. Even Caesar was divine for crying out loud. So I don't necessarily think Mike's recent Theological Studies paper is *wrong*, I just think it's mostly *irrelevant* (though it's a very interesting paper). In what follows, I'll not resist his strike, but rather grab his fist and pull him over with me. We both land on the cushiony mat of orthodoxy.
DEFINITIONS and FURTHER THESES
So let's use deus+ to express the divine property had by the Godhead alone and not by any of the three persons. And let deus- express the divine property that each person has. Each of the persons of the Holy Trinity is a deus-. So there will be three dei- but not three dei+. Now we can define polytheism+ as the theory that there are multiple dei+ and polytheism- ("polytheism light" if you will) as the idea that there are multiple dei-. I submit that:
(T2) Trinitarians are polytheists-.
(T3) Trinitarians are not polytheists+.
(T4) Being a polytheist+ is very very bad theologically.
(T5) Being a polytheist- is just fine from the standpoint of orthodoxy.
I'm just about in a position to argue for (T1). I need a few more theses to make things explicit:
(T6) For any x, if x is a deus-, then x is a god.
(T7) For any S, if S is a polytheist-, then S is a polytheist.
I think these two are just a consequence of the nature of disambiguation of terms (a subset exemplification entails its superset exemplification). Finally,
(T8) For any x, if x is at least as divine as Zeus, then x is a god.
ARGUMENT for (T1)
(P1) Any orthodox reading of the Trinity will make the three at least as divine as Zeus.
(P2) Zeus is a god.
(L1) Any orthodox reading of the Trinity will make the three gods. From P1 and P2 via (T8)
(P3) If so, then (T1)
Thus, (T1).
It should be clear to anyone who's read Mike Rea's recent paper that I'm trying to use a little theological jujitsu: Yes, STers are polytheists...and so are *all* orthodox Trinitarians, so it's not a problem that STers are.
In keeping the definitions above, we can say that being a monotheist+ is believing in just one deus+ and thus not being a polytheist+. Likewise, being a monotheist- is believing in just one one deus- and thus not being a polytheist-. It is very important to be a monotheist+ but I can't see that it's important to be a monotheist-. Indeed, I think it's impossible to be both a monotheist- and an orthodox Trinitarian. The monotheist+ can affirm all the right monotheistic theses:
(M1) There is only one independent ultimate reality.
(M2) There is only one ground of being.
(M3) There is only one source of all that is.
I think this last part underscores something that has ironically gone wrong with anti-ST arguments: neglect of the idea that the emergence of the Christian understanding of God, the Triune Ground of Being expands the notion of divinity to new levels. The Christian God is not just a special god and not just a special person. The Triune God is either of these only by analogy. An Anselmian divinity is tri-personal. If we keep this idea squarely in mind, then I think we will not be so surprised that doctrine of the Holy Trinity is so surprising and unconventional.
But if you postulate that there is a property (attribute?) that the deus + possesses that the dei – don’t, doesn’t this imply a Voltronian concept of God? Namely, that the three dei– are like the smaller lion robots who come together to form the one Voltron of the deus +.
I am just wondering if this conception is as orthodox as it appears. For example, what might be a property/attribute which dues + possesses, that the others don’t? I would surmise at least one might be the property of love, a community of love in which love is given and received which maintains the self-sufficiency of dues +. He can be “love� without being dependent upon any created thing to love.
If this is true, then it appears that all dei – may have either love or self-sufficiency as attributes but not both at the same time. It also appears that because of this, deus + is a greater God than the dei – in isolation, just as Voltron is more of a butt-kicking machine than all the lion robots by themselves. It follows then that language such as “Jesus is God� would thereby be wrong. Instead a more accurate version would be “Jesus is a god (deus -), but he is also a part of God (deus +).�
Now, this would not be problematic if the measuring rod for determining who qualifies as deity were Zeus or other non-biblical gods. However, I do not think the church fathers were comparing Christ to Zeus when determining He was divine. Rather, the question was, I believe, is Christ God according to the Biblical declarations of who God is. (I think the declared polytheism of your position may not be as problematic as your assertion that there are two kinds of dei. Are there 2 BIBLICAL kinds of dei? Remember that Arius believed – I think – only that Jesus was a lesser god than the Father.)
But Biblically speaking, take a passage from exodus. When asked, God declares He is the “I Am.� Was it just the father speaking here? Was He saying, “I Am a deus -?� I think not. It appears that He was declaring that He was deus +, the full voltron. There is no one or no God greater than Him. Now Jesus, a deus -, declares basically the same thing in John 9 and says “Before Abraham was. I Am!� What was He saying? I Am a deus -? If so, why did they want to stone Him? I think it’s because they thought He was saying I AM deus +, the full voltron, just like the exodus account.
I think this may be a problem for your argument. But I must confess, this may just reflect my ignorance of ST and life in general. The Trinity makes my head hurt!
1. "what might be a property/attribute which dues + possesses, that the others don’t?"
A. Being Triune, B. Having a haecceity.
2. "language such as “Jesus is God� would thereby be wrong"
I already thought that. When I was an Evangelical, it drove me nuts when people would say that. Jesus is divine. This means more than what the Jehovah's Witness say, but they do have the grammar of John 1 right. I think it's OK to say that when you're not thinking of the Trinity, but I think anyone kind of remotely orthodox Trinitarian would think it wrong to say "Jesus is the Godhead". However, being one of the dei of the Trinity so surpasses any other conception of deity in history, that I think the capital "G" is warranted. More importantly, each dei of the Holy Trinity has the numerically same divine nature. It should surprise no one that we run up against some limits of conventional language when when expressing the deepest mystery of Christianity.
3. "I do not think the church fathers were comparing Christ to Zeus when determining He was divine."
Not so sure about that. Read Irenaeus. The Fathers were definitely distinguishing themselves from people who's conception of the Divine Being was Zeuslike. I don't think there's anything riding on this though. Clearly they were affirming that Jesus had the same Nature as Yahweh, and all we (orthodox) Social Trinitarians affirm that. Here's some of what Swinburne says that I referred to above.
there is a sense in which a divine individual is his essence, namely, that he lacks a thisness--there is nothing more to a divine indvidual than the instantiation of the divine essence and any further individuating relational properties (e.g. 'being begotten'). Hence what the Council may be saying is this: The godhead is not just three individuals, each with a thisness, who have common essential properties. Rather, it is exactly the instantiations of the same essence of divinity which makes the Father God, as makes the Son God, as make the Spirit God. They would be the same individual but for the relational properties which are distinct from the divine essence and which distinguish them. (189)
I don't know if we'd ever have thought of such a thing without revelation, but the language just involves property exemplifications, haecceities, essences, relations, fairly standard stuff in metaphysics. It's hard to grasp the parts being put together in this way, but that's true for extended simples and other concepts in fundamental physical ontology.
4. "I think the declared polytheism of your position may not be as problematic as your assertion that there are two kinds of dei"
That there are two kinds of dei seems to me a straightforward deductive consequence of the words of the Creeds modulo the assumption that the Creeds do not *manifestly* contradict themselves. (See Swinburne, Christian God, p. 180, 2nd new paragraph, and p. 186, also 2nd new paragraph).
5. "Are there 2 BIBLICAL kinds of dei?"
I'm not sure what you're asking. I can think of two possible questions.
A. Is there being two kinds of dei ENTAILED by Sacred Scripture? Um, no. Very little of philosophical or dogmatic theology is. If I limited myself to that data I wouldn't even *be* a Trinitarian (maybe a modalist if that even counts).
B. Is there being two kinds of dei CONSISTENT by Sacred Scripture? I certainly do or I wouldn't hold it. Sadly, I also think all kinds of heresy is consistent with the plain words of Scripture as well (but that's a whole other story).
6. "Now Jesus, a deus -, declares basically the same thing in John 9 and says “Before Abraham was. I Am!� What was He saying?"
That he exemplified the divine essence of Yahweh.
Hey Trent,
Thanks for the interesting post. I have a lot of reactions - probably too lazy to type them all! :-) But here are some:
"God is not a person, though he is personal." Better to drop that "he" then, no? Seriously, this is a real mind-boggler. If there's anything revealed about God in the OT, it is that he's (identical to) a personal being. The Swinburnean ST position has this wierd impliction: -Ex (x = g). The Trinity isn't an entity, but rather a logical construction out of entities, or a sort of virtual entity. One might say that on this view, God isn't a god! That's hard to take, and Latin Trinitarianism, as well as a raft of other positions, don't say that.
The main reason why this is a mind boggler is the language of the NT, and the thought-habits acquired by serious readers thereof. The Father of Jesus is a divine person (i.e. he's identical to a personal individual), and the Father just is (is numerically identical to) God. In the current context, suprisingly, that needs arguing for - but here I'll lazily refer to my "Deception" paper, where I do that, arguing from NT language.
Also, there's my deception argument, given in the same paper. Briefly, if Swinburne is right, then f, s, and h deceived the Jews by masquerading as the one true god, whereas, in fact there are three gods, which function as one. Moreover, this deception *appears* to be wrong, which is a reason to reject ST. But my main reason, is that it is straight up inconsistent with the NT, which identifies g and f.
Some other comments on difficulties for your view:
As Leftow (and maybe, Howard-Snyder) have pointed out, uniting three beings in will and action, doesn't make them one god. So the intimacy of inter-Trinity relationships seems irrelevant to the question of polytheism.
Your view is that the three share one haecceity. Does it not follow that they are numerically identical? A haecceity is an individual essence - an essence such that it is impossible for more than one thing to have it. Thus, in your view, f=s=h=g - they all collapse, no? If you're talking about a "haecceity" that could be shared by more than one individual... then I guess I don't know what you mean, given that you don't mean to switch to talk of a universal essence, one sharable by more than one entity.
Again, if each of f, s, h lacks a haecceity, is it also true that all entities have haecceities? If so, then the Persons won't be individuals, and it would seem that all that's left for them to be is modes of an individual. Doh! Modalism is the one thing Swinburnean ST is supposed to clearly avoid... What do you say about this issue?
About being "as divine as Zeus" - I take it, you mean, as actually divine as z is merely said to be. Forgive my ignorance of mythology - but, what does that mean?
Regarding your M1-3: The "only one" is in every case the Trinity, the Group, right? There are some problems here. On Swinburne's views, f is the source of s and h, and so, f and not g would be the only being who meets those three conditions in M1-3. But the same would hold of any view that takes seriously the early medieval talk of f generating s, and h proceeding from f (or f & s). If this is so, f is "the font of divinity", and f, not g, is the *ultimate* source of everything else.
Another conversation for another time would be: what is the exact content of biblical monotheism? But that's all for now... looking forward to your further thoughts.
Dale
Hey Dale, I figured you might comment on this!
1." Better to drop that 'he' then, no?"
I sure can't see why. Like I said, being tripersonal is being *more* than merely a person, not less.
2. "The Swinburnean ST position has this wierd impliction: -Ex (x = g)"
I just don't think that's a consequence at all. God is an existent entity so He's in the domain of quantification.
3. "the language of the NT...the Father just is (is numerically identical to) God."
I imagine this will come down to very different ways of reading Sacred Scripture--mine very Catholic and yours very Protestant--(you refer to the "radical reformation" in one of your published pieces, the Philosophia Christi one I think).
I hold, unsurprisingly, the same basic view as Swinburne in his chapter "Presupposition" in his Revelation. Also, why think the Apostles understood the Trinity. The Gospel reading at Mass this last Sunday--it was Pentecost Sunday--was John 16 here are verses 12 and 13 (NKJV).
12 “I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. 13 However, when He, the Spirit of truth, has come, He will guide you into all truth..."
I think one of those truths was a fuller doctrine of the Trinity. So I don't think the writers of the NT understood the doctrine of the Trinity as well as we do today, they didn't have the benefit of a few centuries of reflection and dogma guided by the Holy Spirit.
I should ad that I'm not actually convinced that the linguistic facts are as you say, my point here is the more general point that even if they were I don't think that would have much by way of implications for this debate. Some are fond of saying that the Bible is not a Science Text. They are right but some of them need to also understand that it is not a Theology Text either.
4. "the NT and the thought-habits acquired by serious readers thereof"
Not sure what you're trying to say here. Surely you're not suggesting that social Trinitarians are not serious readers of the NT. My reading (and the reading of Swinburne, et al. (it *is* an august list after all) differs from yours, but it's serious as a heart attack. The methodology behind your "Deception" paper is, I think, particularly protestant. I also think it runs counter to some of the material of which I am convinced in Swinburne's "Presuppositions" in _Revelation_ which I mentioned above.
Also, Progressively telling the truth is not deception. What you say at one point might be such that *were it said at a different point in the dialectic* it would mislead but that does not make it deception if you go on to tell a fuller story as we Catholics think God has done. (Again, this is a fortiori since I don't accept the linguistic arguments to begin with).
5. "if Swinburne is right, then f, s, and h deceived the Jews by masquerading as the one true god"
Not at all. Swinburne is clear on two things that are a standard part of Greek views of the Holy Trinity: A. The Son and Spirit necessarily co-will what the Father wills; B. the Father is the primary origin of willings (this is one reason why the filioque is so objectionable). Before the revelation of God the Son in the Incarnation (hypostatic union) there was functionally, so to speak, one divine being: the Father. After the Son became incarnate, we got a much fuller picture of God, a picture which has continued to grow as a result of Spirit-guided theology.
Hey Trent!
Now we're getting somewhere.
D: 1." Better to drop that 'he' then, no?"
T: I sure can't see why. Like I said, being tripersonal is being *more* than merely a person, not less.
You may think that being tripersonal in a certain way is *greater than* being identical to any sort of person, but it does not (as you understand it) *include* that property (plus some more). Hence, we're fundamentally, in Swinburne's view, addressing a *group* of persons - an especially and wonderfully united one - as "he".
D: 2. "The Swinburnean ST position has this wierd impliction: -Ex (x = g)"
T: I just don't think that's a consequence at all. God is an existent entity so He's in the domain of quantification.
D: This is a fundamental ambiguity in the ST type position, and STers must make a clear choice here. Either the Trinity is a substance / entity / individual, or it is not. As I read him, Swinburne is clearly in the "not" camp. He sort of smoothes this over by emphasizing how united this group of things is, and how it makes sense to think of it is a group, and so on. But he doesn't (correct me if I'm wrong) say what Craig and Moreland say: that the Trinity is a composite thing, with three parts (the three divine persons). If you want to maintain a classical Catholic view, I think you can't say this - divine simplicity. (Actually, the modern ST view seems quite out of step with the whole Latin tradition back to Augustine...)
D: 3. "the language of the NT...the Father just is (is numerically identical to) God."
T: I imagine this will come down to very different ways of reading Sacred Scripture--mine very Catholic and yours very Protestant...
I hold, unsurprisingly, the same basic view as Swinburne in his chapter "Presupposition" in his Revelation.
D: Is that the view that the Scriptures mean *whatever* the current community says? I find that position mind-boggling, and have never been able to think of a response beyond the old blank stare that we practice when reading or hearing, say, David Lewis. Some reviews of that book, though, esp one by Byrne, expressed my worries. I'll plead guilty to being very non-Catholic, but not to being Protestant.
T: Also, why think the Apostles understood the Trinity?
D: As a Christian who holds the OT to be inspired, I have to believe in progressive divine revelation. But the notion of progressive revelation only goes so far - it can't be used to smooth out just *any* inconsistency between earlier and later statements. (That would make it a classic weasel, and not a principled move.) What I'm unable to accept is that Jesus, John and Paul falsely believed and taught that f=g. That they assumed and taught this is undeniable (if you insist, I'll dig up the references). Traditional Latin Trinitarianism tries to smooth this over by sailing *very* close to modalism. ST doesn't, esp Swinburne's; rather than obfuscating, it straight up denies f=g.
T: I should ad that I'm not actually convinced that the linguistic facts are as you say, my point here is the more general point that even if they were I don't think that would have much by way of implications for this debate.
D: Those words are our best guide to what the apostles and Jesus thought. As a non-Catholic, they hold more authority for me that the Church Fathers and the councils. But even for a Catholic - surely, you'd like your view to be consistent with what they thought, right? And this is one way of sorting the good from the bad within the later tradition, no?
D: 4. "the NT and the thought-habits acquired by serious readers thereof"
T: Not sure what you're trying to say here. Surely you're not suggesting that social Trinitarians are not serious readers of the NT.
D: No - sorry - I was fatally unclear. I wasn't even criticizing ST at all. I was just making this point: even unreflective readers of the NT fall into its pattern of assuming that f=g. Interestingly, this language lasted up through Nicea. Here, "God" means f, not the whole Trinity. It's a startling fact that nowhere in the NT is the group of three really addressed or named as God, that is, this threesome is never identified with Yahweh. But f is, consistently & repeatedly.
D: 5. "if Swinburne is right, then f, s, and h deceived the Jews by masquerading as the one true god"
T: Not at all. Swinburne is clear ... Before the revelation of God the Son in the Incarnation (hypostatic union) there was functionally, so to speak, one divine being: the Father. After the Son became incarnate, we got a much fuller picture of God, a picture which has continued to grow as a result of Spirit-guided theology.
D: Again, are f, s, and h three parts of one entity, or not? Swinburne says no, but you are sort of right down the middle. As to the fuller picture idea, here's another analogy. You're Dorothy, and you arrive in OZ with your friends. You've come to see the Wizard, and you get ushered into that big scary hall, in the movie. You see the green floating head: "I am OZ!!!" etc. You talk and interact with it, but (here we diverge from the movie) after returning how, you realize that there is no being identical with OZ, but rather, "OZ" is a fictional character produced by seven cooperating men, acting behind the scenes. Now, this is no "fuller revelation" of what or who the great OZ is. Rather, the seven have (rightfully or not) deceived you; there simply is no OZ. I hope you see the point that this sort of criticism applies to Swinburne's view, but not at all to views that hold that g is a being which is somehow composed of f, s, and h. That *could* be construed as a fuller revelation of the nature of g.
As a Christian, I of course have to agree that God's Spirit has in some way overseen and guided the development of theology. But we both have to also hold, that this fact doesn't preclude the development of egregious errors (falsehoods, nonsense), which sometimes last for many centuries, and sometimes become very widespread. The more of the councils and father you read, the more you become convinced that they are, like us, all too human. This is not a reason to ignore or disrespect them, but it leads to a sober realization that we're have to differ from them, and not view them as mere divine instruments.
- Dale
1. Re: the dilemma:
God is three hypostases in one ousia and all the persons are consubstantial. There's some debate and leeway on how to translate those, it's unfortunate that ousia can mean such divers things as "being," "essence," and "nature" . I'd say that God is a substance and that each divine person--lacking a haecceity--is not a substance in this sense. I don't see that anything's riding on it.
2. Re: "Is that the view that the Scriptures mean *whatever* the current community says?"
No. Definitely not. There are two main theses: 1. That false assumptions on the part of new testament writers does not present a problem as long as a richer context fixes referents. 2. That the text of the Gospels records one segment in the life of the Church, a segment which lacked detailed theological reflection. This was added latter as the Spirit--as Jesus promised--led the Church into a fuller understanding of the Gospel. Thus, there is no reason to expect that the Apostles had a detailed doctrine of the Trinity, even implicitly. Indeed, the evidence is that they did not.
3. "What I'm unable to accept is that Jesus, John and Paul falsely believed and taught that f=g. That they assumed and taught this is undeniable (if you insist, I'll dig up the references)."
I wouldn't be bothered if John and Paul falsely believed this but I don't think they did. I won't *insist* that you dig up the references, but I was not convinced by your essay. I didn't think the analogy stuck. I think the main false premise is that f = y. For readers who don't have access to your article, I'll past in the relevant paragraph:
-------
In the New Testament, ‘Father’ and expressions containing it are usually used
interchangeably with terms which refer to Yahweh. Thus, Jesus talks about the
‘Kingdom of God’ (Matthew 21.31), which he also calls ‘my Father’s kingdom’
(Matthew 26.29).10 He calls himself the ‘Son of God’, and addresses God as his
Father. (Tellingly, it is ‘God’, and not ‘God the Father’ who is the Father of Christ
in the New Testament.) John has Jesus say before his Ascension: ‘Do not hold on
to me, because I have not yet ascended to the Father. Go instead to my brothers
and tell them, ‘‘ I am ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your
God’’ ’ (John 20.17). As Jesus prepares to wash his disciples’ feet, John comments,
‘Jesus, knowing that the Father had given all things into his hands, and that he
had come from God and was going to God, got up from the table’ (John 13.3-4). In
the introduction to his Apocalypse, John says that Jesus ‘made us to be a kingdom,
priests serving his God and Father’ (Revelation 1.6). After greeting the
Colossian church, Paul comments, ‘ In our prayers for you we always thank God,
the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ’ (Colossians 1.3). James uses the phrase ‘God
our Father’ (James 1.27, NIV, NJB). Peter exclaims ‘Blessed be the God and Father
of our Lord Jesus Christ! ’ (1 Peter 1.3).
-------
As I said above, it was natural for an OT reader to think of God only in paternal terms and since the Persons of the Holy Trinity necessarily act in unison it's a harmless mode of apprehension. God the Son and God the Holy Spirit would only be revealed as distinct in the drama of salvation. Furthermore, not to be contentious but I just don't see where the problem for ST is supposed to be in these passages. On the contrary, they seem to support ST *in excelsis*, for they entail that the Father is God, but the Father is not the Son, but the Son is God. You note--with a hint of triumphalism--that Jesus doesn't say "God the Father". But he says "God" and "Father" so what more do you want? You draw from this the conclusion that g = f.
Now that sounds to me like a *denial* of the Doctrine of the Trinity if by '=' you mean numerical identity. Numerical identity is the one relation that we know *can't* hold otherwise we'd get s= f = hs. The puzzle is *precisely*, if you will forgive the phrase, to discern what the meaning of "is" is the the statements: 1. The Father is God, 2. The Son is God, 3. the Spirit is God, 4. The Father is not the Son, 5. The Father is not the Spirit, 6. The Son is not the Spirit. (Did I leave any out?)
So some suggest the "is" is the is of relative identity, some say it's the is of constitution, and we STers say it's the is of a kind of predication as in the passages from Swinburne I cited above. Again, the one thing it *can't* be is the is of numerical identity since that leaves one either embracing a contradiction or denying one of 1-6, all of which would be heterodox.
Again, for STers, especially the more Greek ones, Jesus calling the Father his God or just "God" is perfectly natural.
4. To the extent that the OZ picture is analogous I see it the other way. I think you could easily tell the story in a harmless way. The big differences of course are that the seven are not such that if one exists the others necessarily exist, they are not such that they necessarily have the same intentions, and they all have individual haecceities.
God is so completely different that such analogies are destined to be unilluminating. What we learn in learning that God is triune is that reality just got a little bigger.
The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is so integral to the Catholic Faith that I do not hold it possible that God would allow the Church to teach error in this regard any more than I think it's possible that God would allow pseudopigrapha in the canon of Scripture.
I believe in the Trinity on the teaching authority of the same Church--the "Pillar and Foundation of the Truth" (1 Timothy 3:15)--that gives me the the canon of Scripture.
Hey Trent,
I apologize - this discussion is getting rather long - let me know if you want to move on. I just find it endlessly interesting. Here's another round of replies in the conversation.
T: God is three hypostases in one ousia and all the persons are consubstantial... I'd say that God is a substance and that each divine person--lacking a haecceity--is not a substance in this sense. I don't see that anything's riding on it.
D: “ousia”, “consubstantial” (“homoousias”) Sigh. Those are *so* ambiguous... But what’s riding on it here is avoiding modalism. Our concept of a person is a concept of a certain kind of thing / substance. Hence, in your view, f and s will only be quasi-personal - maybe centers of consciousness, maybe personalities, maybe who-knows-what. But we’ll be very close to modalism, if not standing in it with both feet, for these persons, will be “adjectival” with respect to God - they’ll be ways he is.
T: … there is no reason to expect that the Apostles had a detailed doctrine of the Trinity, even implicitly. Indeed, the evidence is that they did not.
D: Red herring. The problem is, what they did teach, is inconsistent with ST.
T: … that f=g - I wouldn't be bothered if John and Paul falsely believed this but I don't think they did. I won't *insist* that you dig up the references, but I was not convinced by your essay. I didn't think the analogy stuck. I think the main false premise is that f = y. …
As I said above, it was natural for an OT reader to think of God only in paternal terms and since the Persons of the Holy Trinity necessarily act in unison it's a harmless mode of apprehension. God the Son and God the Holy Spirit would only be revealed as distinct in the drama of salvation. Furthermore, not to be contentious but I just don't see where the problem for ST is supposed to be in these passages.
D: The problem is the ST denies f=g, and the NT affirms it.
T: On the contrary, they seem to support ST *in excelsis*, for they entail that the Father is God, but the Father is not the Son, but the Son is God.
D: Sorry, but you’re missing the point. Those passages don’t support ST at all, because terms “Father” and “God” are being used as co-referring names. There is no predication there. If I call you Trent, the Dough-man, and you call be, Dale, the Tugster, no predication has occurred, but only irritating, president-Bush-like nicknaming. :-) No doubt God is called “Father” because he has father-like features. But in addressing God as “Father”, one is not predicating fatherhood, or any feature of him. Again, the problem is that by ordinary reasoning that we apply to any text, we see that “Father” and “God” are being used as two names for one thing.
T: Now that sounds to me like a *denial* of the Doctrine of the Trinity if by '=' you mean numerical identity. Numerical identity is the one relation that we know *can't* hold otherwise we'd get s= f = hs.
D: That would be modalism.
T: The puzzle is *precisely*, if you will forgive the phrase, to discern what the meaning of "is" is the the statements: 1. The Father is God, 2. The Son is God, 3. the Spirit is God, 4. The Father is not the Son, 5. The Father is not the Spirit, 6. The Son is not the Spirit. (Did I leave any out?)
D: Sure, but I don’t assume that the same analysis will have to hold for each case. I think 1 is =, but 2 can’t be, given the NT, as f and s have different properties.
T: The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is so integral to the Catholic Faith that I do not hold it possible that God would allow the Church to teach error in this regard any more than I think it's possible that God would allow pseudopigrapha in the canon of Scripture.
D: I hear what you’re saying; I think that most Catholics, and most “high church” Protestants would say that. Probably most Evangelicals as well. Surely, one may think, there have to be limits as to how far off track a provident God would allow his followers to go. But I have to say, what with things like the perpetual virginity of Mary, transubstantiation, the view that there’s no salvation outside the Catholic church, and both the Papacy and disbelief in the Papacy - whether you’re as Catholic as they come, or about as un-Catholic as they come, you’ll have to admit that God tolerates a lot of widespread and long-lasting, egregious errors amoung people who are in fact his friends and servants. And that’s only sticking to doctrine, leaving aside practice - where there’s a whole lot more disagreement (e.g. the cult of Mary).
Another worry - it’s one thing to trust what an authority tells you *when you understand the content of what they mean to assert*. But when they hand down *words* the intended meaning of which is unclear (hence, the blooming garden of current-day trinitarian theories) … well, that’s a bigger risk. It’s sort of like handing them a blank check - “Yes, I’ll believe whatever it is that you’re asserting.” One might wonder whether this is epistemically irresponsible…
T: I believe in the Trinity on the teaching authority of the same Church--the "Pillar and Foundation of the Truth" (1 Timothy 3:15)--that gives me the canon of Scripture.
D: Well, OK. But if you’re elevating Councils etc. to the level of the NT or above it is hard to see how the Church could ever correct her course in light of the NT, as countless reform-minded Catholics have urged. But I would suggest that this is consistent: I believe what A says in part because I believe in what B says, and B says: believe what A says, AND when A and B conflict, I go with B. There’s a real danger, I think, of falling into the problem the Pharisees got into, for which Jesus harshly excoriates them. (Mark 7) Remember - the Jews really were God’s chosen people, and he really had guided and preserved their religion and nation. But when push came to shove, they went with the “tradition of the elders”. So to me, the safer path is - yes, I believe in the New Testament in part because of the testimony of the Christian church through the ages, Catholic and not (but also because it makes sense to me, coheres with my other beliefs, and best explains my and others’ experiences), but in some cases elements of that tradition contradict the NT, in which case, count me in with the apostles & other NT authors.